The Rise of the Ottoman Empire

Studies in the history of Turkey, thirteenth–fifteenth centuries



UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

SPECIAL UNIVERSITY LECTURES IN

Oriental Studies

A COURSE OF THREE LECTURES

ON

"The Rise of the Ottoman Empire"

WILL BE GIVEN AT THE

NEW BUILDINGS OF THE UNIVERSITY

(ENTRANCE FROM MONTAGUE PLACE, W.C.1)

BY

DR. PAUL WITTEK

(of the Institute of Oriental and Slavonic Philology and History in the University Lviv, Poland)

at 5.30 p.m. on

MAY 4th, 5th and 6th, 1937

SYLLABUS

LECTURE I.—Criticism of the Tradition and Exposition of the Problem

LECTURE II.—Turkish Asia Minor up to the Timurids.

LECTURE III.—From the Position of March-warriors to the Empire

At the First Lecture the Chair will be taken by

PROFESSOR SIR E. DENISON ROSS, C.I.E., D.Lit., Ph.D.

Director of the School of Oriental Studies and Professor of Persian in the University.

The Lectures are addressed to students of the University and to others interested in the subject.

ADMISSION FREE, WITHOUT TICKET

S. J. WORSLEY,

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Paul Wittek
Edited by Colin Heywood

ROUTLEDGE

VISIT...

The Rise of the Ottoman Empire

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

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ROUTLEDGE

The Rise of the Ottoman Empire

Paul Wittek's *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* was first published by the Royal Asiatic Society in 1938 and has been out of print for more than a quarter of a century. The present reissue of the text also brings together translations of some of his other studies on Ottoman history; in all, eight closely interconnected writings on the period from the founding of the state to the Fall of Constantinople and the reign of Mehmed II. Most of these pieces reproduce the texts of lectures or conference papers delivered by Wittek between 1936 and 1938 when he was teaching at the Université Libre in Brussels. The books or journals in which they were originally published are for the most part inaccessible except in specialist libraries, in a period when Wittek's activities as an Ottoman historian, in particular his formulations regarding the origins and subsequent history of the Ottoman state (the 'ghâzî thesis'), are coming under increasing study within the Anglo-Saxon world of scholarship.

An introduction by Colin Heywood sets Wittek's work in its historical and historiographical context for the benefit of those students who were not privileged to experience it firsthand. This reissue and recontextualizing of Wittek's pioneering work on early Ottoman history makes a valuable contribution to the field and to the historiography of Asian and Middle Eastern history generally.

Paul Wittek (1894–1978) was one of the leading Ottoman historians of his generation. After serving in the old *k.u.k. Armee* in Galicia, Italy and Turkey, and an eventful career in Austria, Turkey and Belgium, in 1949 he became the first holder of the Chair of Turkish at the University of London.

Colin Heywood has taught Middle Eastern history at a number of American universities and at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, where he took courses with Wittek in the 1950s. He is currently a member of the Maritime Historical Studies Centre, University of Hull; his areas of active research include the early modern maritime history of the Mediterranean and the

intellectual legacy of Wittek's contributions to Ottoman history.

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Studies in the history of Turkey, thirteenth–fifteenth centuries
Paul Wittek, edited by Colin Heywood

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Studies in the history of Turkey, thirteenth–fifteenth centuries

Paul Wittek

With translations into English by Colin Heywood, Rudi Paul Lindner and Oliver Welsh

With a Preface by İlker Evrim Binbaş

Edited by
Colin Heywood
With an Introduction and Afterword

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İLKER EVRIM BINBAŞ

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COLIN HEYWOOD

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Preface

Paul Wittek: A Man in Dark Times

İlker Evrim Binbaş
Royal Holloway, University of London

The Ottoman historian ʻÂşikpaşazâde (*ca.* 1395–*ca.* 1481) tells the following story in his famous history of the Ottoman dynasty entitled *Tevârîh-i Âl-i ʻOsmân*: One night, the daughter of the *tekfur* of Aydos Castle saw the Prophet in a dream. She was stranded in a pit, but a handsome man comes and saves her; he undresses her, washes her body, and dresses her with new clothes made of silk. The girl woke up, but she couldn't explain the story to herself. It happened while she was trying to interpret the dream that the Turks of Samandira Castle laid siege to Aydos Castle. As the soldiers in the castle were defending themselves against the Turks, she also decided to join the battle. When she recognized the saviour of her dream as the leader of the Turkish soldiers, she understood the meaning of her dream. She wrote a letter in Greek to the Turks, and explained her dream. In her letter, she asked them to leave, but promised to hand over the castle if the Turks sent a few reliable men. She wrapped the letter around a stone and cast it among the Ottoman soldiers, and the stone somehow fell at the feet of Ghâzî Rahmân, who brought the stone to Akça Koca. As soon as the letter was translated into Turkish, Akça Koca started assembling a little band of volunteers. Ghâzî Rahmân immediately offered himself for the mission. But Koñur Alp, one of the leaders of the Turks, had a different idea. He suggested that they should burn down Samandira so that the enemy would think that they had lifted the siege and had withdrawn. They proceeded accordingly, and Ghâzî Rahmân, together with the other volunteers, arrived at the place that had been suggested by the girl. The girl was waiting, and when she saw Ghâzî Rahmân,

she tied a rope to the battlement of the castle and lowered it down. Ghâzî Rahmân grabbed the rope and climbed up in a second like a spider. He and his companions opened the gates of the castle to the *ghâzîs* who were waiting outside, and when Akça Koca arrived in the morning with other Turkish soldiers, they conquered the castle. He gave the *tekfur* and his daughter to Ghâzî Rahmân, who took them to Orkhan Ghâzî in Yenisehir. Orkhan Ghâzî gave the girl to Ghâzî Rahmân together with a good share of the booty that he had brought from Aydos Castle.[1]

Paul Wittek (1894–1978) discussed this charming little story in one of his most characteristic articles, published in 1965 in a volume dedicated to the renowned Islamic historian Hamilton A. R. Gibb.[2] In it, Wittek compared the version of the story found in 'Âşikpaşazâde's chronicle with a slightly later version in the *Kitâb-i Cihânnümâ*, an equally famous Ottoman chronicle written by Neshrî (d. *ca.* 1520), who composed his work slightly later than 'Âşikpaşazâde. Wittek demonstrates in a densely packed, brilliant forensic analysis that Neshrî's version follows 'Âşikpaşazâde in its broad outlines, but that the subtle changes he introduced alter the meaning of the story completely. The apparition of the Prophet, the key theme in 'Âşikpaşazâde's version, is excluded by Neshrî. Devoid of its religious significance, the girl's dream, in Wittek's view, 'receives a strong erotic flavor'.[3] Neshrî's dereligionization continues with the figure of youth. In 'Âşikpaşazâde, even the name of the main protagonist, Ghâzî Rahmân, literally means 'The Holy Warrior [and] Merciful [God]'. Rahmân is not a common Muslim name, but no Muslim, and especially 'Âşikpaşazâde, would miss the reference to God here, as the word *rahmân* is one of the ninety-nine names of God in Islamic theology. This is perhaps the reason why Wittek inserted the words 'holy man,' in the following sentence: 'As soon as she arrived there she saw – that *holy man* of her dream was the leader of this host.'[4] Wittek certainly knew that the words 'holy man' did not exist in the original Turkish text, but he was simply trying to convey the powerful sense that the name of a God-like Holy Warrior implies. Neshrî, however, simply, and one should admit, skilfully, trivialized the episode by naming Wittek's *holy man* as Ghâzî Abdurrahman (*lit.* 'the Holy Warrior', Slave of God), an inconspicuous Muslim name.[5] Wittek clearly dislikes Neshrî's desacralizing yet ultimately more pious tone. In 'Âşikpaşazâde's text, according to Wittek, 'it is precisely the girl's reference to her dream – and surely also to her recognizing its holy man in their leader – which compels the Ghâzîs to trust her and to

agree to her plans; they knew at once that it was their Prophet the girl had seen. . . .'[6] Neshrî, on the other hand, 'presents her as a lovesick maid merely daring, driven by curiosity, to trip to the parapet in order to view the attackers, whence she then drops – daintily, as would a townsgirl – her message to the youth of her infatuation.'[7]

In this brilliant interpretation, Wittek's genius is not to be found in his grasp of the story, but in his ability to connect his literary analysis to the development of the early Ottoman historiographical traditions. In the latter part of his article, he argues that the version found in 'Âşikpaşazâde represents a 'genuine document of the earliest Ottoman times by the lack of any anachronism'. He concedes that the narrative is much more of a legend than a historical account, but it reflects 'almost without reservation . . . the life and spirit of the earlier times'.[8] Neshrî's account, however, is a later perception of this earlier spirit. 'Overshadowed by the spectacular campaigns of the sultan's armies', the individual bravery and spiritual ethos of the earlier *ghâzî*s look like fairy tales to a 'rationalist' scholar like Neshrî. At this point, Wittek again plays with the figure of the *holy man* and makes him the very Prophet whom the girl saw in her dream:

> Above all [he comments] the Prophet had to be eliminated, probably because Neshrî felt it shocking that he should figure in the story at all, and probably also because he could not understand how *the Prophet should be seen at the head of the Ghâzîs*.

That's why Neshrî turns a 'pious legend' into a 'love story'.[9]

There are multiple problems both in the original accounts of the story and in Wittek's analysis of it. For example, the relationship between the Prophet and the *ghâzî* leader whom the girl sees among the Turkish soldiers is left rather vague, and Wittek also leaves it unexplained. Perhaps this is why he took the risk of interpolating into the original text the 'holy man' figure. Still, Wittek had a point. As Cemal Kafadar demonstrated convincingly, one can read Wittek's analysis as a discussion of 'alternative ways of looking at the past, and present'[10] among fifteenth-century Ottoman historians.

If one ignores Wittek's antiquarianism and obsession with the origins of peoples and dynasties, his analysis can still be read in multiple layers and meanings. And this we have known since at least 1989, when Colin Heywood published an early seminal article on Wittek and drew our attention to the secondary or tertiary levels of meaning in Wittek's earlier works.[11] That is what makes Wittek so sophisticated as a historian.

Here I would like to point to another aspect of Wittek's article, an aspect, or hidden quality if you will, which I hope to connect to the volume that you are holding in your hands. In the Aydos Castle article, Wittek translated, all the while taking considerable liberties, one should admit, the accounts of 'Âşikpaşazâde and Neshrî on the taking of the castle. In his translations, he wrote only two words in capital letters: FRIEND and HE. The latter is part of the last sentence in Neshrî's account: 'But HE knows best (*Vehüve a'lem*).' As Wittek explained, this sentence betrays Neshrî's scepticism. As opposed to 'Âşikpaşazâde's confidence in the truth-value of his account, Neshrî, as a member of the ulema, could never really believe in the story, and in the sentence 'God knows best' he delegates the responsibility to God.[12]

The first capitalized word, FRIEND, however, is not explicitly explained in Wittek's article. He uses the word in his translation of a poem in the account of 'Âşikpaşazâde:

> Who has seen that friend with the eye of the soul,
> The moment she saw him she surrendered her whole being to the friend.
> Nothing but that friend remained in the city of the heart,
> Thought dispersed, she gave her reason to the winds.
> Hey friends (*azizler* – E.B.), be not astonished by this:
> Him she did not see (with her eyes), the eye of the soul saw.
> 'Ashiqi, there are two meanings of love –
> The obvious one and that which means the FRIEND.[13]

This poem itself would explain why Wittek was captivated by the account of 'Âşikpaşazâde. With all its allusions to friendship and love, and with the sharp emphasis on the difference between seeing with the eyes and seeing with the heart, Wittek must have felt in this mystical poem the neo-romanticism of Stefan George, the inimitable German poet, pole of a conservative literary circle, and Wittek's intellectual master.[14] The FRIEND here is the ultimate materialization of love. This might sound like a figurative speech to unaffected ears, but it meant something concrete, even personal, for Wittek. The FRIEND himself would immediately recognize the hidden quality here, but ordinary readers would have to wait until the end of the article to discover the identity of the FRIEND:

> The Aydos story assumes here, in this volume of homage, a further significance which I should like to disclose to the reader, though it will not have escaped the admired scholar and friend to whom this study is dedicated: *for at a perilous juncture of my life, when reality was dream and dream reality*, it was he who came as a *friendly helper* and raised me out of the pit of dire distress – something never to be dismissed from my mind.[15]

Wittek's FRIEND was Sir Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb (1895–1971), the renowned British scholar of Islamic history and literature, who moved to Harvard University in 1955. Perhaps this is one of those rare instances in which Wittek reveals the hidden quality of his essay in a touching paragraph. How Gibb helped Wittek and raised him out of the pit is a story told elegantly on several occasions by Colin Heywood. On 24 October 1935, the Board of Studies in Oriental Languages and Literatures at the University of London, of which Gibb was a member, decided that Paul Wittek, then a research associate at the Université Libre in Brussels, would be recommended to the university for selection as Special University Lecturer for 1936–1937. Wittek's nomination was successful, and he eventually delivered his famous three lectures in 1937, which were published in 1938 by the Royal Asiatic Society under the title *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. These lectures paved the way for Wittek to come to London first as an enemy alien and refugee in 1940, and finally as the first Professor of Turkish at the University of London in 1948.[16] For a scholar who had taken refuge in Brussels in 1934 after he lost his job prospects at the German Oriental Institute in Istanbul after the Nazis came to power in Germany, what other metaphor would be more befitting than the story of the Aydos Castle to describe Wittek's feelings? Yet, there is one other element in this paragraph, which still needs to be explored, and the book in your hands is a long commentary on that sentence by Colin Heywood. In conjunction with critical editions of the 'documents', i.e. *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* and seven other articles of Wittek, it explains why he felt that the reality was a dream and dream was the reality at that perilous juncture of his life.

The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, which is the first item published in this volume, is the point where Wittek presented the most crystallized formulation of his famous *ghâzî*-theory. Wittek postulated in this little *risâle*, if I may use the term, that the ethos of holy war (*ghazâ*) that existed at the frontiers of Islamdom with the Byzantine State, and the heroic figure of the holy warrior (*ghâzî*) engendered the formation of the early Ottoman polity. In this relatively simple formulation, Wittek envisaged a 'causal economy' between the idea of holy war and the formation of the Ottoman State. Just as in the king's body, as postulated by the fellow Stefan George disciple, Kantorowicz, it explains the relationship between action and thought, or practice and belief.[17] As explained by Colin Heywood in his introduction, those who criticized it have tried to revise, challenge, supplement, and refute Wittek's theory with various other combinations, each of which

emphasized one or another element of the Ottoman state formation story with the support that they received from various adjunct disciplines to history.[18] But seventy years on, Wittek's scholarship is still with us. Cemal Kafadar explained its persistence by its flexibility. It is a form of ideology, or a metaphor, and it could be incorporated into various other explanatory frameworks even though Wittek did not foresee such combinations.[19] One can perhaps also add that it is a theory that puts the human being at its centre. We live in an age when we put ever more emphasis on such concepts as myth, memory, and emotions as important factors in historical events, and it is just natural that Wittek continues to be a crucial figure in Ottoman studies. As Heywood puts it in reference to Isaiah Berlin's conceptualization, in which the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing, Wittek was one of the few hedgehogs in the field of Ottoman studies, and probably the only one who was able to be a fox and a hedgehog at the same time.[20]

Yet this present work does not aim at discussing this point. If I may borrow a term from Rudi Paul Lindner's recent book on early Ottoman history, this present work is an exploration on the prehistory of a theory on the prehistory of the Ottoman Empire.[21] All but one of the articles of Wittek republished here either slightly predate or are contemporary to *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, and they highlight the maturation process of the *ghâzî*-theory. Colin Heywood discusses in his introduction various influences that Wittek received, most prominently from Stefan George, even though he never made it into the famous inner circle of George's elite club of intellectuals. Wittek shared the same passion for the frontier idea with his friend in Istanbul, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966), and with the titan of Belgian academic circles, Henri Pirenne (1862–1935).[22] I would add to this list the great Russian scholar V. V. Bartol'd (1869–1930). Wittek and Bartol'd met during the latter's visit to Istanbul where he delivered his famous lectures called *Orta Asya Türk Tarihi Hakkinda Oniki Ders* (*Twelve Lectures on the History of Central Asia*) in 1926, and they appear to have developed a close relationship, and remained so until the death of Bartol'd in 1930.[23]

It appears as though in the late 1960s, when Wittek wrote his analysis of the taking of Aydos Castle, he thought that he was living in a dream in the 1930s. I don't think that Wittek's reference is referring to anything political. Wittek was very much aware of what Nazism meant, and he was fiercely anti-Nazi to the end. In other words, he knew what the reality was and what the dream meant. So, why did he

think that he was living in a dream in the 1930s? The answer is found in Heywood's introduction to this volume. Heywood argued that there was 'an element of apocalyptic in Wittek's historical formulations – sometimes buried, but often close to the surface, and on occasion clearly visible.' But this apocalyptic vision was not the expression of the dark times of the 1930s.[24] Rather, following the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in Vienna, Wittek was certainly hoping for a regeneration and rejuvenation, and his mystical super hero, or *ghâzî* was the archetypical prototype of the imminent new man. It was exactly this hope that, some thirty years later, seems to be a reflection of the confusion of dream with reality.

We are still at the beginning of understanding Wittek's *oeuvre*. There are still many unanswered questions, especially relating to his London years. Why did a mind, or a hedgehog if you will, which was capable of producing *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, withdraw to the safety of philological studies in his London years? This does not mean that Wittek's later works are less valuable. Just the opposite is true, in many respects they are more solid than his earlier works. It should suffice to compare his monumental, though slightly outdated, analysis of Yazicioglu 'Alî with anything he wrote before 1938.[25] Both Colin Heywood in his earlier studies and Alain Boureau, who published a brilliant little book on Ernst Kantorowicz, have drawn our attention to the parallels in the lives of Wittek and Kantorowicz.[26] After almost eight decades, it is now almost impossible to imagine how the social sciences and humanities would have developed without those Germanophone scholars, who, for various reasons, had to leave their homes and seek refuge at the universities of North America, Britain, Turkey, and elsewhere. From Ernst Kantorowicz and Gershom Scholem in medieval studies to Erwin Panofsky in art history, from Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer in literature and linguistics to Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss in political thought, from Gustav E. von Grünebaum to Andreas Tietze in Islamic studies and Turcology, these scholars transformed their newly adopted higher education institutions.[27] However, if we adopt Boureau's idea of 'parallel lives', it would also be justifiable to ask why Wittek did not write a book like Kantorowicz's *King's Two Bodies*. I do not mean a book in the same style, of course, but a book of the same stature. Although Kantorowicz produced his *Friedrich der Zweite* under the deep influence of Stefan George and German neo-Romanticism, today he is mainly remembered for his classic analysis of the development of medieval political ideas in the *King's Two Bodies*. Was this apparent discrepancy

in terms of their post-war scholarly production, between Wittek and Kantorowicz because, as some of his students and colleagues have argued, the School of Oriental and African Studies in London failed to provide Wittek with a suitable office, or was he simply not able to find the intellectual vibrancy of Vienna in London?[28] Or was the reason perhaps more intellectual? He may just have realized how much groundwork needed to be done in Ottoman studies to engender a work of the statue of the *King's Two Bodies*, or, after witnessing and mourning the collapse of two imperial ideals in Vienna and Istanbul, he had to endure the dis appearance of a third one, i.e. the British Empire, in London. We don't know, and we will probably never know. What we do know is that Wittek, in the second half of the 1930s, believed in what Walter Benjamin realized in 1940:

> The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of Antichrist. Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that *even the dead* will not be safe from the enemy if he wins.[29]

Wittek in 1965 believed that in the second half of the 1930s, he was in a pit dreaming about the Messiah, or the super-*ghâzî*.[30] Thanks to the efforts of Colin Heywood, and also those of his fellow translators, Rudi Paul Lindner and Oliver Welsh, we now have a fundamental set of texts in translation collected in a single volume to enable us to study in depth Wittek's political theology and devoted scholarship, and its application in dark times to the apparently insoluble problems of early Ottoman history.

Notes

1 'Âşikpaşazâde, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, 113–114. For the life of 'Âşikpaşazâde, see Halil Inalcik, 'How to Read Asik Pasazâde', in *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, eds Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994), 139–156.

2 Paul Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle: A Ghazi Legend and its Transformation', in *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb*, ed. George Makdisi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 662–672. For an analysis of the story as an oral folk narrative, see William Hickman, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle: Further Considerations on a Chapter from Aşikpaşazade', *JAOS* 99 (1979), 399–407.

3 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 669.

4 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 666. See also Aşikpaşazade, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*. Ed. Nihal Atsiz (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayinevi, 1947), 113 = '*O gördügi çukurdan çikaran kisi bu leskerün*'. Italics in the English text above are mine.

5 Neshrî, *Kitâb-i Cihan-Nüma*, eds Faik Resit Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1949), vol. 1, 141–143.

6 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 670.

7 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 670.

8 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 672.

9 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 672. Italics are mine.

10 Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 103.

11 Colin Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant": Paul Wittek, the *George-Kreis*, and the Writing of Ottoman History', *JRAS* (1989), 34.

12 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 668; Neshrî, *Kitâb-i Cihan-Nüma*, 142. See also Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 103.

13 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', p. 665; 'Âşikpaşazâde, *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*, 113. Wittek does not distinguish the words *dost* and *aziz* and translates all of them as friend. It seems to me that there is a subtle distinction between the two. The word *aziz* addresses the audience as opposed to the word *dost*, which 'Âşikpaşazâde equates with love.

14 Heywood, 'Boundless Dreams of the Levant', 40–45.

15 Wittek, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle', 672. Italics are mine.

16 Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', *JRAS* 1(1988), 8–12; Heywood, 'A Sub -terrranean History: Paul Wittek (1894–1978) and the Early Ottoman State', *Die Welt des Islams* 38 (1998), 398–399.

17 Alain Boureau, *Kantorowicz*, 95.

18 Heywood, 'Introduction', 3–4; Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 35–59; Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, 5–13.

19 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 58.

20 Colin Heywood, 'Introduction', 21.

21 Rudi Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006.

22 Colin Heywood, 'Introduction', 23–24. Wittek's relationships with his Turkish colleagues in Istanbul are poorly studied. For the Köprülü connection, see Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 35–44.

23 Our knowledge on Wittek's relationship with Bartol'd is based entirely on the remarks found in short notices in Bartol'd's works and the documents found in his archive. Wittek was certainly aware of Bartol'd's visit to Istanbul, as he announced the lectures in the *Türkische Post*, and he accompanied him personally during his city-tour on 6 January 1926. They stayed in touch even after Bartol'd's departure back to Russia. Bartol'd received an unpublished

draft of Wittek's undercited article 'Türkentum und Islam', which was later published in the famous *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1928, and took some notes on it. See, V. V. Bartol'd, 'Otchet o komandirovke v Turtsiiu', in *Sochineniia*, vol. VIII (Moscow: Izd-vo 'Nauka', 1973), 462–464; N. N. Tumanovich, *Opisanie arkhiva akademika V. V. Bartol'da.* (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia Vostochnoi Literatury, 1976), 296, 360. Another evidence of their close relationship is that Wittek's first wife translated a short article of Bartol'd from Russian to German. See, V. V. Bartol'd, 'Der Heutige stand und die nächsten Aufgaben der geschichtlichen Erforschung der Türkvölker', *ZDMG* 83 (1929), 121.

24 Colin Heywood, 'Introduction', 14–16.

25 Paul Wittek, 'Yazïjïoghlu 'Ali on the Christian Turks of the Dobruja', *BSOAS* 14 (1952), 639–668.

26 Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant,"' 37–39; Alain Boureau, *Kantorowicz. Stories of a Historian.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), xv. I believe we should take a note of Boureau's failure to appreciate Heywood's contribution here.

27 The contributions of Germanophone scholars to the post-war development of the American academia is a well studied subject, but as Heywood demonstrated, the contributions of those scholars studying non-Western history have been consistently ignored in the literature. See Heywood, 'A Subterranean History', 15.

28 For the first remark, see Stanford J. Shaw, 'In Memoriam: Paul Wittek, 1894–1978', *IJMES* 10 (1979), 140; and for the second remark see John Wansbrough, 'Obituary: Paul Wittek', *BSOAS* 42 (1979), 137.

29 Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in W. Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt and tr. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999), 247.

30 Colin Heywood, 'Spectrality, "Presence" and the Ottoman Past: Paul Wittek's *Rûmtürkische Studien* and Other Ghosts in the Machine' (forthcoming).

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The present work has had a long gestation, and in the course of producing it I have incurred many debts, only the most significant of which is there the space to mention here.

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light hand as an editor and commentator has made his own work a model of its kind, and I hope he will not feel other than gratified that I have broadly followed his editorial approach in my treatment of the comparable editorial problems, which must encompass any attempt to 'translate' Wittek's own writings for a twenty-first century audience.

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Notes

1 It may be noted that the original versions of what are now Chapters III and IV(II) were translated by Rudi Paul Lindner. The text of Chapter V was originally translated by Oliver Welsh. The original versions of Chapters II, IV(I) and VI(I), and the footnotes in Chapter V, were translated by Colin Heywood, who also oversaw and takes responsibility for the final version of all the above translations.

Permissions

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– M. Martin Wittek (Brussels), for permission to republish in original or translation those of his father's works presented here;
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It has unfortunately not proved possible to trace the current holders of copy -right for the Dutch Oriental Society (*Oostersch Genootschap in Nederland*) in respect of 'Die Glaubenskampfer im osmanischen Staat'and 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische beziehungen', in the

Proceedings (*Verslag*) of their 8th Congress (Leiden, 1936, pp. 2–7 and 29–32), or for L. W. Seidel & Sohn (Vienna) in respect of the essay by Wittek on 'Muhammed II.' in R. P. Rohden (ed.), *Menschen, die Geschichte machten* (2nd edn, Vienna, 1933, vol. I, pp. 557–561).

A Preliminary Note on the Text of *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*

A reissue of the text of Wittek's *Rise* presents its editor with a number of problems, some of which cannot easily be resolved. Fundamental to the present reissue of some of Wittek's major publications from the 1930s (a problem that does not arise in the case of his 1955 article 'Fath Mubîn' (see Chapter VI(II)), was the obligation placed on their editor to 'scrupulously respect' Wittek's texts. This, of course, has been our intention throughout the process of producing the present volume.

The Rise, however, is a special case, being the only piece of Wittek's work republished here that was first published in English, a language in which Wittek possessed, it is clear, a considerable facility, even in the years before the war, but which in the 1930s was not his native tongue, nor a language which, as later became the case, he was accustomed to use on a daily basis.

It is perhaps for this reason that, after the passage of nearly seventy years, some of the English usages in *The Rise* possess a certain archaic or non-contemporary flavour, which sits somewhat awkwardly with accepted early twenty-first century usage. This tension is particularly noticeable in the case of proper names. For example, Wittek consistently employs the adjectives 'Moslem' and 'Mohammedan', both acceptable English usage perhaps in the thirties, whereas now we would write 'Muslim'. He also at times employs the term 'Osmanli' for 'Ottoman' – still perfectly acceptable in Turkish, but now obsolete in English usage. In these usages we may perhaps discern the influence at the time of H. A. R. Gibb.

Even more of a problem is posed by Wittek's consistent use of 'Constantinople' to denote both the Byzantine and the post-1453 Ottoman city. Officially, of course, it was not until 1926 that the Turkish republic decreed that 'Istanbul' was the only official form of the City's name; before that, in different contexts – on coinage; in Ottoman documents; in literary usage – both names had been utilized.

A further problem is posed by Wittek's somewhat idiosyncratic

utilization of the *Latin harfleri*, the modern Turkish alphabet, the use of which had been made compulsory by Mustafa Kemal barely a decade previously. This can be seen, for example, in his macaronic transcription {6} – *Jihangirâne bir devlet tshiqardiq bir 'ashîretden* – of the well-known and historically inaccurate phrase from the Turkish writer Namik Kemâl: '*Cihangirâne bir devlet çikardik bir 'asîretden*' ('we raised a world-subduing power from a tribe'), but also in such forms as 'Tshaudar' and 'Tshavuldur' for *Çavdar* and *Çavuldur*. I have noted the modern equivalents of these forms in the text, but left unresolved mutually inconsistent usages such as 'Seljuk'/'Kayi', a compromise which will probably satisfy nobody. (It may have been, and probably was, the case that Wittek, or whoever was advising him in the process of turning his lecture notes into publishable English, utilized these forms to give the Turkish pronunciation its nearest equivalent in (mentally) spoken English.)

Wittek was also prone to 'telescope' certain phrases, employing, for example, 'Khanate of southern Russia' {1} (a meaningless contraction), for 'Khanate of the Crimea in southern Russia' (still historically unsound as a descriptor, but certainly identifiable).

Thus it has been a difficult task to determine what, if anything, should be done with the 1938 text of *The Rise*. To change one word or phrase which sits uneasily in literary English of the present day, might mean to change all, and thereby both to deform Wittek's text and to give it a contemporary form which almost certainly would be found less acceptable than the original.

In the end, therefore, it was decided that the text of *The Rise* which is republished here should be the text of 1938 (and of its unaltered reprints down to 1971), warts and all – except in a small number of instances:

1. In every case (except in the titles of published works), 'Moslem' and 'Mohammedan' has been changed to 'Muslim'; and 'Osmanli' to 'Ottoman'.
2. 'Angora' (again, an obsolete form) has been changed to 'Ankara'.
3. Significant 'telescopings' (as above) have been expanded between braces { }.
4. In all cases in which Wittek, as was his frequent habit, telescoped or abbreviated his footnote references, these have been expanded *without comment* to conform to current scholarly practice. This has also been done in the case of Wittek's other

work republished here (the hitherto unpublished reference notes to his 1933 essay on Mehmed II (see Chapter VI(I)) forms a special case, which is discussed in the Introduction to that chapter). Where it has seemed imperative to update Wittek's bibliographical references, these editorial interpolations have also been placed within braces.

5. Wittek's use of /i with a 'hollow dot'/ (as used in the Swedish å) to represent the Turkish sound of 'back' /ı/ has been abandoned perforce on typographical grounds, and the modern Turkish character /ı/ substituted, wherever this is appropriate.

It remains to note that the original pagination, not only of 'The Rise', but of all the material republished here, has been recorded, and is indicated in the text within braces, e.g. {203}.

In all cases other than those mentioned above, Wittek's original text has been preserved, in conformity with the obligation to respect his father's work which was laid on me some years ago by M. Martin Wittek.

Journal Titles and Other Abbreviations Employed in Footnotes

BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
EI; EI²	*Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1st edn, 4 vols, Leiden, 1913–38; 2nd edn, 10 vols, Leiden, 1960–80)
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
TOEM	*Târîkh-i ʻOsmânî Encümeni Mecmûʻasi*
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

Introduction

A Critical Essay

Colin Heywood

Paul Wittek (1894–1978) was one of those scholars of a type that now, in the early years of the twenty-first century, has become by the passage of time entirely extinct: members of a generation of scholars and intellectuals, artists, painters and musicians who, for the most part, received their earliest training in the universities of central Europe in the last decade before 1914, and who later, often after many difficult years, were driven by moral conviction or by political or religious persecution to seek refuge in Britain or America. In their time they added immeasurably to the intellectual vitality and variety of the Anglo-Saxon world. There, on both sides of the Atlantic, many of them eventually came to enjoy several decades of fruitful and fructifying activity in the country that had adopted them and to which they themselves, more or less willingly, adapted. In this context, for the present writer, the names of Erich Auerbach, Sir Ernst Gombrich, G. E. von Grunebaum and Ernst Kantorowicz, and Andreas Tietze, as well as of Wittek himself, come immediately to mind for intellectual debts that can never be adequately repaid.

* * *

I

The key event in the emergence of the origins and early history (1300–1453) of the Ottoman state as a discrete field of historical enquiry, in the course of the second half of the twentieth century,

must be the publication in 1938 of Paul Wittek's *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*.[1] *The Rise*, although little more than fifty pages in length (being the reworked text of three lectures delivered by Wittek in the University of London in 1937), encapsulated in a compressed form the substance of several of his earlier studies and articles.[2] Some (though not all) of these had as their principal object to demonstrate, in the main on the basis of certain early Ottoman literary and epigraphic sources (principally an inscription from the Sehâdet Cami' at Bursa (1337), and a passage from the *Iskender-nâme* (*c.*1403) of the west Anatolian versifier Ahmedî), that the Ottoman state was from its inception and virtually until the end of its existence a ghâzî state.[3] In other words, it was an Islamic polity, the sole *raison d'être* of which, according to Wittek, was to undertake war for the Muslim faith against the Infidel.[4]

For more than forty years from the late 1930s, Wittek's monistic 'ghâzî thesis' of the origins and nature of the Ottoman state remained virtually unchallenged, except to some extent by a slightly earlier, more national- and tribally-based explanation, which was put forward in its developed form in 1935 by Wittek's near-contemporary, one-time patron, and eventual critic, the Turkish nationalist historian Mehmed Fuat Köprülü (Köprülü-zâde Mehmed Fu'âd).[5] It was not until the late 1970s, around the time of Wittek's death, that the beginnings of a revisionist reaction to the problems inherent in an uncritical acceptance of his historical formulations began, somewhat cautiously, to be put forward. Before that, thanks not only to the stylistic brilliance and the underpinning scholarly rigour with which Wittek put forward his views, but also to the formidable strength of his personality, the influence that he had come to exercise, first as a refugee scholar in Belgium from 1934 to the fall of France, and second in Britain, as the first holder of the Chair of Turkish in the University of London from 1949 until his retirement at the age of sixty-seven in 1961, on the founding generation of serious Ottoman historians in both Britain and the United States, as well as elsewhere. Wittek's influence in these years cannot be underestimated. His long-lived intellectual ascendancy, when there is added to it the close relationship between him and Halil Inalcik, the most Westernized and equally the most influential Turkish Ottoman historian of his own generation, who had come over the years very largely to share Wittek's views, meant that in the middle decades of the past century the Wittekian 'ghâzî thesis' held almost undisputed sway as the accepted interpretation of the origins and early development of the

Ottoman state.

Since the late 1970s a number of divergent critical views of Wittek's historical formulations regarding the origin and early nature of the Ottoman state have emerged, from historians such as Rudi Lindner and the late Ronald Jennings in the United States, and Colin Imber and the present writer in the United Kingdom.[6] Other scholars, in some cases students of Wittek such as Elizabeth Zachariadou (Athens), have continued either to follow his views or to place themselves in opposition to the critical stance of the revisionists.[7] Furthermore, as for example in recent monographs by Heath Lowry and Cemal Kafadar, and now most recently by Rudi Lindner, perhaps the three most prominent historians of the pre-1453 Ottoman state currently working in the United States, we have seen renewed attempts to rework early Ottoman history either within or at a tangent to the Wittekian paradigm.[8]

The process of the re-evaluation of Wittek's historiographical legacy is still in train. As probably the youngest surviving active historian from among those few fortunate auditors who participated in at least some of Wittek's last courses at SOAS in the years before his retirement from the School in 1961, and as a participant in the last twenty-five years of revision and debate, I have increasingly felt that the Wittekian *oeuvre* – or at least that part of it that comprises the broadly-based writings from the mid- to late 1930s which led up to and culminated in the publication of *The Rise* – should be allowed once more to speak for itself, and should be made available to a new generation of students and to a new, perhaps now more monoglot, English-speaking audience than that in which it first saw the light of day.

The present volume, therefore, brings together in one volume, either in the original English in the case of *The Rise*, or in English translation, in that of the other pieces selected, eight closely interconnected writings by Wittek on Ottoman history during the century and a half from the founding of the state to the Fall of Constantinople. All but two of these pieces reproduce the texts of lectures or conference papers that were delivered by Wittek, originally in English, French or German depending on his audience, to seminars or conferences held in Leiden, Paris or London between 1936 and 1938. All these pieces achieved publication rapidly, in the short space of little more than two years. All, in terms of their style and approach, stand apart from the majority, although not all, of the other works in Wittek's scholarly *oeuvre*. In places they also manifest certain elements

in common with his earlier, now largely forgotten essays in political and cultural journalism that appeared, principally in the pages of the *Österreichische Rundschau*, a *Grossdeutsch*, conservative-leaning Austrian political and cultural fortnightly, in the early 1920s.[9]

I shall return to these last observations later; for the present it suffices to ask what justification can be found for republishing these eight pieces at the present time, and in their present form, seven decades after they were written, and nearly three after the death of their author? The present work is designed to supplement, rather than to replace, the excellent collection of Wittek's 'best' articles, skilfully gathered together by Professor V. L. Ménage almost a quarter of a century ago and published in the well-known Variorum Series of Collected Studies.[10] That work was designed with other Ottoman specialists in mind; the present collection, which shares two items, albeit here in English translation, with Professor Ménage's selection, is designed more to make accessible to non-specialist historians of other fields on which Ottoman history has impacted, and to students of Middle Eastern history in general, a body of material that may nowadays be difficult of access other than through the larger and more specialized library holdings. That alone should be regarded as sufficient justification, but it is perhaps worth observing that the study of Ottoman history, as presently practised, appears often to have little in common with the Wittekian *oeuvre* either in its broadly-based concepts or in its more narrowly text-oriented aspects, and yet the influence of Wittek as an Ottoman historian still continues to be felt and, in the decades since his death, to be increasingly discussed and debated.[11] In this context it has been observed more than once in the course of the past twenty-five or thirty years, as the last century and the millennium approached and then passed, that we live in a post-historical age.[12] Were this observation to be correct, historians might be condemned to go on repeating old procedures, redeploying old methods, pursuing old aims, and developing old themes.[13] In this spirit, one may tinker with the machine; fine-tune it, add this or that device to improve its performance, but beyond it one cannot go. The wheel, once invented, cannot be reinvented, or even modified in its essence, without ceasing to be a wheel. Thus, Darwinism, Marxism, Freudianism, have all been seen as the last universally valid intellectual 'structures' in their respective fields, fields that in fact encompass the whole of humanity, not to say the whole of life, beyond which it has appeared to be impossible to advance. And for the more restricted field of Ottoman history, during the period under

review, similar observations could at times have been made. For Darwin, Marx, Freud, substitute Paul Wittek; for the theory of evolution, or the primacy of the class struggle, or the superego, substitute Wittek's 'ghâzî thesis', his all-embracing explanation of the origins, development and ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire, which finds its most sustained exposition in the studies collected in the present volume.

With the passage of time, it is now seventy years since the 'ghâzî thesis' received its final, English-language distillation. The indirect connection, mentioned previously, between Wittek's London years and the studies collected here lies in the fact that in the spring of 1937 there appeared in the vitrines of the University of London's newly-completed Senate House in Malet Street a printed announcement to the effect that on 4, 5, 6 May of that year a 'Course of Three Lectures' on *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* would be given at what were then called the New Buildings of the University. The speaker, it was announced, would be Dr. Paul Wittek, 'of the Institute of Oriental and Slavonic Philology and History in the Université Libre, Brussels'; the event was to take place under the aegis of the London University Board of Studies in Oriental and African Literatures.[14] The lectures were duly delivered, and in the following year, 1938, the Royal Asiatic Society published, as Volume XXIII of the Society's series of monographs, a slim work of no more than fifty-four pages, bound in austere grey card covers, which contained the text, considerably revised according to some oral traditions handed down to the present age, and the adequate if somewhat sparsely furnished footnotes, of Wittek's London lectures. The title of the short lecture-series was also used as the title of its printed version; and the titles of the individual lectures were retained as the headings of the work's three chapters.

Wittek's *Rise* was last reprinted almost forty years ago, in 1971, seven years before the death of its author. During his lifetime Wittek's work as a historian of the early Ottoman state appeared unassailable, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world.[15] Even after his death a number of devoted followers watched over the shrine and attempted to subvert, or at least to dissuade, the emergence of what may be termed a revisionist school of thought regarding his work. Noteworthy in this latter trend were a number of articles published in the early 1980s by American scholars, the appearance of which was followed by the holding of a *Wittek-Tagung* at SOAS in 1984 that (as it turned out) pitted critical papers by two British 'revisionists', Colin Imber and the present author, against two papers, essentially hagiographical in

nature, by the late Susan Skilliter and the late John Wansbrough, both of whom were, in their lifetime, arch-defenders of what may be termed Wittekian orthodoxy.[16] Both Skilliter and Wansbrough had been students and then close colleagues of Wittek; although neither of them, it may be observed, possessed any particular expertise in early Ottoman history. Subsequent to the 1984 *Tagung* more work, noted previously, has been undertaken in an attempt to re-examine and in some cases to revalue Wittek's large-scale formulations regarding the origins and essential character of the Ottoman state.[17] It is in this context of revisionism and ongoing debate that justification is to be found for the decision to reissue – in English – the eight studies that form the major proof-texts for any study of Wittek's ghâzî theory.

To recapitulate, the earliest, in chronological terms, of the eight studies re -issued here are two short papers, entitled 'Die Glaubenskämpfer im osmanischer Staat', published here in English translation as 'The Warriors for the Faith in the Ottoman State', and 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische Bezieh ungen' or 'Byzantine–Seljuk Relations'.[18] Wittek had written them, presumably late in 1935, for the Eighth Congress of the Dutch Oriental Society, which was held in Leiden in early January 1936.[19] Barely two months later he was in Paris, at the invitation of the Centre d'Etudes Turques at the University of Paris, to deliver a pair of lectures collectively entitled 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum' (published here as 'Two Chapters in the History of Rûm'), the two parts being entitled 'Les traits essentiels de la période seldjoucide en Asie Mineure' and 'Les ghazis dans l'histoire ottomane'.[20] These lectures were delivered at the Sorbonne on 9 and 11 March 1936. Already by the time of his Paris lectures, wheels were being set in motion that would bring Wittek to London in the following year to deliver the three lectures on *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, mentioned previously.[21] In 1937, the year of his visit to London, Wittek published little, only a short epigraphical notice that he contributed in that year to *Byzantion*. In 1938, however, besides *The Rise* Wittek published (in the *Bulletin* of the Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves at the Université Libre) an article entitled 'Le Sultan de Rûm'. This is the only work in the present collection (republished here as 'The Sultan of Rûm') that was not based on a public lecture or seminar paper.[22] Finally, less than a year after his visit to London, and two years after his first visit to Paris, Wittek returned to the Sorbonne on 29 and 31 March 1938 to deliver two further lectures under the auspices of the

Centre for Turkish Studies. These lectures, which were published in the same year in the *Revue des Études Islamiques* as 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (Une demi-siècle d'histoire ottomane)', are translated in the present work as 'From the Defeat of Ankara to the Conquest of Constantinople: A Half-century of Ottoman History'.[23]

The sequence in which these eight pieces are published here reflects a chronological ordering based on their subject-matter, and not on their date of delivery or publication. The logic of this arrangement, it is hoped, will be self evident, in that, as already noted, all the pieces published here derive from a single, tightly-drawn period of not much more than two, or at the most, three years in Wittek's career. Chapters II and III, entitled respectively 'The Sultan of Rûm' and 'Two Chapters in the History of Rûm', fit together in terms of their subject-matter, and reflect Wittek's deep, not to say passionate conviction that what he perceived as the historical characteristics of that 'Land of Rûm', the Anatolian heartland of the Ottoman state, were something to be cherished and memorialized. 'Byzantine–Seljuk Relations' and 'Warriors for the Faith', the short, unfootnoted papers that stands here as Chapter IV, both contain elements in their original German which illuminate Chapter I, the published text of the three 1937 lectures on *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. There, many of the themes developed at length in Chapters II and III, or prefigured in Chapter IV, are recapitulated before Wittek passes on to the more narrowly Ottoman elements in the work. Finally, Chapters V and VI, which are concerned exclusively with the Ottoman state in the first half of the fifteenth century (V), and with the reign of Mehmed II (VI), deal in considerable detail with a period in the history of the Ottoman state otherwise either merely touched on or passed over in Wittek's writings from this period.

'De la défaite', delivered in March 1938 and published later in the same year, closes the series of Wittek's pre-war, mainly public, lectures and writings on broad themes of early Ottoman history that have been selected for republication here. Less than a year after publication of 'De la défaite' and *The Rise*, Europe was to be again at war, and within a further few months, in the spring of 1940, Wittek would be forced into a second exile, this time as a refugee escaping from Brussels ahead of the German armies to the British lines at Dunkirk, to temporary internment and asylum and, eventually, to permanent residence in Britain, and to an illustrious late-flowering career from 1949 to 1961 as the first holder of the London Chair of

Turkish.

II

Having advanced so far, it is necessary to retreat fifty years or so in time, to the years before the outbreak of the First World War. Although it is true that the study of Ottoman history as a specialized sub-discipline practised either by oriental philologists with a historical bent or by historians equipped with the necessary languages, has been, at least as far as the English-speaking world is concerned (but almost exclusively in Britain and the United States, and latterly, Canada), a product of the second half of the last century, the origins of the field were considerably older. As an organized scholarly discipline, a starting-point may be found in the formation in 1909 of the Ottoman Historical Society and the establishment by some of its leading members of the first scholarly journal devoted exclusively to the subject.[24] Shortly thereafter, in the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution, came the first attempts to catalogue, or at least to classify, the hundreds of thousands of registers and millions of documents that comprise the main archival legacy of the Ottoman state. Simultaneously with these developments came also the first hesitant opening of the Istanbul archives to a small handful of carefully chosen scholars.[25]

At first, and for many years subsequently, Ottoman historical studies were the preserve of Turkish and Central European – mainly German-speaking or Hungarian – scholars. A powerful nineteenth-century tradition of Anglo-Saxon scholarship in Ottoman lexicography and literary history, embodied in the careers and scholarly achievements of – to name only the two most significant figures – Sir James Redhouse and E. J. W. Gibb, failed to survive the latent and intermittently recrudescent Turcophobia that preceded, accompanied, and followed the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Subsequently, the British political classes' passionate and disastrous love-affair with the Arabs ensured that in the reapportionment of academic resources that accompanied the First and followed the Second World wars, the study of the Arabic language and the history and societies of those who spoke it would maintain its effortless primacy in Middle Eastern academic studies.[26]

In the post-Ottoman era, when the study of Turkish could no longer be seen to possess even a strategic importance, the legacy of Redhouse and E. J. W. Gibb was abandoned, and Ottoman and Turkish studies in Britain came to take on some of the characteristics of the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt: an alien institution, preserved and carried on by foreigners, and in native-born hands likely to fail after the first generation.

In Central Europe, Turkish and Ottoman studies took a different course. In Germany the politics of diplomacy, and the close connection between diplomacy and scholarship that had developed in the Wilhelmine era, all contributed to an upsurge in German scholarly activity before and during the First World War. In Austria, fittingly, matters were more complex. The old tradition of Ottoman scholarship, nurtured in Vienna, beginning in the sixteenth century with a series of more than competent *Hof-dolmetschers* and culminating, at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries respectively, in the lexicographic and historical achievements of Meninski and von Hammer, had been forged out of necessity in the course of nearly three centuries of armed conflict between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans for control of the lands lying between Vienna and Belgrade.[27]

As a result, when, in 1918, the German and Austrian empires preceded in defeat the fate of their Ottoman ally and disappeared for ever, it was in the successor states of Weimar Germany, the post-Habsburg rump of the new *Grossösterreich*, and the kingless kingdom of Hungary, that scientific Ottoman historical studies found their post-war base. In Weimar Germany, Ottoman historical studies were in the main directed by former expatriates, Johann Heinrich Mordtmann, who during the Great War had been German consul-general in Istanbul, and was an early patron and supporter of Wittek; Friedrich Giese; Theodor Menzel, and Fr. Taeschner, were all active in early Ottoman studies in the Weimar Republic. In Munich there was a local scholar in post, in the person of Franz Babinger (1891–1968), a young and promising Bavarian, who had served – inaccurately, according to Wittek, in the ranks – in Turkey during the war, and for whom Wittek came over the years to develop an extreme and in some ways unjustified antipathy.[28]

Germany had survived the peace settlement more or less intact, territorially speaking, but the sundering in pieces of the Habsburg lands effectively divided the Turkologists and the Ottomanists – representing the two basic approaches to Ottoman Turkish studies –

between the two main successor states of Austria and Hungary. At Budapest there emerged in the post-war period the consider -able figure of Lajos Fekete, who consolidated and raised to new heights the old Habsburg tradition of archive-based documentary studies in Ottoman paleography and diplomatic and applied it principally to the history of Hungary under Ottoman rule.[29]

In Austria, which is more our concern, Ottoman studies were concentrated, as they always had been, in Vienna. The leading post-war figure there was Friedrich von Kraelitz-Greifenhorst, another former diplomat-scholar turned academic.[30] Under the aegis of Kraelitz, and joint-editor with him of the newly-founded *Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte*, was a younger scholar, a former student of classical studies and a one-time artillery officer in the *k.u.k Armee*, who had served in the latter part of the war on intelligence duties in Turkey. This was Paul Wittek. It was the pattern of Ottoman historical studies as they had developed at Vienna, their development during the interwar years by Wittek, first at Vienna, then in Istanbul and finally at Brussels, and the course of Wittek's own academic career post-1945, which was to be the principal agent in the intellectual transference of the Central European, and principally the Viennese, traditions of Ottoman historical scholarship into the English-speaking academic world. In this process the publication in London in 1938 of Wittek's *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* may with hindsight be seen to have been the decisive step.[31]

III

What was the immediate critical reaction to *The Rise*? It had been published at a time of a growing world crisis; by the time the reviewers had done their work Europe was at war. It is worth pointing out that despite Wittek's *reichsfeindlich* status in Nazi Germany – as mentioned previously, he had resigned his post at the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul immediately after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany – *The Rise* was accorded respectful and thoughtful reviews in Axis Europe. In Berlin, the eminent Arabist Richard Hartmann, who had earlier given Wittek's monograph on the west-Anatolian emirate of Menteshe high praise in the austere and prestigious columns of the *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* (a journal to

which, in his Istanbul days a decade earlier, Wittek had been a regular contributor), contributed to it an equally positive review of *The Rise*.[32] Hartmann's review had appeared promptly, in the latter part of 1939; in it he characterized *The Rise* as 'a concise exposition [of the subject] but [one] uncommonly compelling and rich in thought, . . . [presenting] a total picture that reads uncommonly compellingly and absorbingly' (*eine gedrangte, aber ungemein gedankenreiche und fesselnde Darstellung, . . . [ein] Gesamtbild . . . das ungemein anregend wirkt und sich spannend liest*). He concluded that what he termed 'these fine lectures' (*schönen Vorträge*) were a landmark in the investigation of their basic theme (*ein Markstein in der Erforschung des Themas*).[33] Equally positive was the verdict of Franz Taeschner, Wittek's old collaborator in pre-Nazi days at the German Archaeological Institte in Istanbul. In a review of *The Rise* published in *Der Islam* in 1942, Taeschner observed that 'In both these works P.W. has given Ottoman scholarship and also general historical studies a sketch of his insights, based on detailed studies, of the process of the genesis and emergence of Ottoman power' (*Durch die beiden . . . Arbeiten* [scil. also 'De la défaite', which Taeschner reviewed concurrently] *hat P.W. der osmanist ischen Fachwissenschaft wie auch der allgemeinen historischen Forschung einen Abriss seiner, auf eingehenden Einzelstudien fussenden Einsicht in den Prozess des Werdens der osmanischer Macht gegeben*).[34] Taeschner's review ends with an expression of hope that it might be permitted to Wittek to present in a single work a full working out of the development of the Ottoman state down to 1453: courteous and possibly courageous sentiments in the context of the time and place in which they were written.[35] Remarkably, and in contrast, *The Rise* seems not to have been reviewed in either *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, the publisher of the work, or the *Bulletin* of the School of Oriental Studies, the house organ (if one may so describe it) Wittek's future employer.

IV

Any introduction to Wittek's historical writings from the 1930s must make reference to the intellectual underpinnings that sustained it.[36] It would not be unfair to observe that there was always an element of apocalyptic in Wittek's historical formulations – sometimes buried, but

often close to the surface, and on occasion clearly visible. It surfaces in the introduction that Wittek wrote on taking over the editorship of the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* at the beginning of 1922.[37] For an apograph to the 'Introduction' Wittek chose the violently apocalyptic closing lines from Stefan George's 'Der Krieg' (1917):

> Der Kampf entschied sich schon auf Sternen: Sieger
> Bleibt, wer das Schutzbild birgt in seinen Marken
> Und Herr der Zukunft, wer sich wandeln kann.[38]

The 'Introduction' itself is heavy with historical myth and symbolism, deeply evocative of the vanished Habsburg monarchy – 'the mythical picture of his country which everyone carries in his heart' (*das mythische Bild, das jeder von seinem Staate im Herzen tragt*) – and imbued with a spirit of uncritical historical romanticism, whether applied to the Habsburgs, to the medieval Holy Roman Empire, or to the nations of contemporary Europe, even to secular, republican France, 'in which the medieval knightly archetype (*das mittelalterliche ritterliche Urbild*) is alive today in every Frenchman'.[39] It would be facile to dismiss these attitudes as mere journalism, or as evidence of what Fr. Giese, more than a decade later in his critical and *ad hominem* review of Wittek's sole monograph, correctly if unkindly defined as 'the undoubtedly quite considerable journalistic talents of the author'.[40] In fact, they should be taken seriously, as evidence of the saturation of the younger Wittek – he was twenty-seven when he took on the editorship of the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* – by the strongly romantic-apocalyptic and deterministic ethos that grew out of his personal involvement in and commitment to the ethos of Stefan George and the *George-Kreis*, coupled with his own experiences in and after the First World War and the virtual 'Apocalypse Now' world of post-war, post-Habsburg Vienna.[41]

These attitudes carried over into Wittek's interpretation of early Ottoman history, developed in the following years. Writing at a time when he was still only in the mid-thirties, he apostrophized the *uj* (mod. T.: *uc*), the west Anatolian marchlands between Islam and Byzantium, as the scene of heroic, quasi-Stefan Georgean activities:

> The spiritual posture and view of life on the borders . . . is heroic, chivalric, romantic: to put it bluntly, primitive (*Die geistige Haltung und Lebensanschauung an den Grenzen . . . ist heroisch, ritterlich, romantisch; im Vergleich zu jener ausgesprochen primitiv.*)[42]

'Heroisch', 'ritterlich', 'romantisch': these are the key words for

arriving at a clear understanding of the Wittekian mode of historical formulation. But the marchlands of western Anatolia were not only heroic, knightly and romantic; they were also possessed, according to Wittek, of a historic mission. In fact the concept of a 'historic mission' was also extended to the Dânishmendids, the opponents in the eleventh–twelfth centuries of the Seljuks of Rûm and, according to Wittek, the upholders of the ghâzî tradition and ethos in extending the old march traditions across the whole of Asia Minor: 'The Dânishmendids had fulfilled their historic mission, the extension of the old border traditions across the whole of Asia minor (*Ihre historische Mission, die Ausbreitung der alten Grenztraditionen über Ganz Kleinasien, hatten die Danischmende erfüllt*).[43]

Nor was this all: in dealing with even the earliest period (late eleventh century) of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia, Wittek adopted a quasi-Nietzschean heroic/joyful motif: this was the period of what he styled 'the lively, cheerful conquests'[44] – a sentiment that doubtless was fully shared by those inhabitants late eleventh-century Anatolia on whom fell the weight of the first Turkish conquests.

Viewed thus, the Ottoman state may be contrasted with Byzantium: in Ottoman history there is no state apart from the dynasty that creates it; the imperial idea does not predate the dynastic creation, but is created by it, as evidenced by Ottoman attempts from the fifteenth century onwards to supply a pre-existent imperial connection to legitimize their rule.[45] Historians have not found this state of affairs easy to accept. Wittek regarded the existence of the Ottoman state as an end in itself, requiring no further justification for its existence than its being the embodiment of the ghâzî idea.

As a result, perhaps, of the strength of his historical formulations and the influences that were early brought to bear in formulating them, Wittek was condemned to stagnate as a historian. It may be that the intellectual limitations of the Ottoman chronicles were in themselves unlikely to lead one beyond their own brand of ethical idealism coupled with naked *Staatsräson*. As a result, the fruitful syntheses between history, geography and locality that from the late 1920s animated the *Annales* school and that, from 1950 or thereabouts, were taken up, although with uncertain results, by Barkan and the 'second wave' school of Ottoman defterologists, seem to have remained to Wittek a closed book.[46] The large-scale work on Anatolia in the *beylik* and early Ottoman period, which was looked for by the German reviewers of *Mentesche* and *The Rise*, never saw the light of day.

V

A further fallacy, which the Wittekian view of Ottoman history propagated without its being noticed, was the fallacy of historical inevitability. The fallacy in this case can perhaps be expressed simplistically: because the Ottoman state lasted for 600 years it was inevitable that it should have endured so long. In fact, there were several other directions in which Anatolia could have developed from the mid-thirteenth century – the critical period – other than the route it took, which led eventually to total Ottoman hegemony.

One such route could have been the reduction of much of the peninsula to quasi-colonial economic status under greater Venetian and Genoese political and economic hegemony than that, which eventually was the case. Another, a prerequisite for the first, would have been the continuation in Anatolia of the quasi-Italian *Kleinstaaterei* that obtained from the mid-thirteenth to the latter part of the fourteenth century.[47] In this way there might have built up, as in Italy, a sort of internal balance of power that would have effectively prevented the emergence of a single great power in the region until much later – possibly even until the nineteenth century, when an emergent Turkish nationalism could in truth have modelled itself on the contemporary activities of the Carbonari.

Equally, in the context of the simultaneous collapse of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, it was perhaps not so much that, as Wittek expressed it, their destinies had been inextricably linked but, as Roy Bridge cogently observed twenty years ago, it was 'not an inexorable community of fate, but simply the coincidence in time of the blows sustained by the two empires . . . that accounts for the fact that in their deaths they were not divided'.[48]

It may thus be argued that meaning had been superseded by function, a real critical transference of meaning, in that the meaning of Ottoman history had been superseded through the imposition of the Wittekian ghâzî theory as an all-inclusive explicator of every aspect and phenomenon of the subject, into its function as the political and social reification of the ghâzî ethos.[49] But what, epistemologically speaking, was the function of the 'ghâzî thesis'? Put simply, or when viewed objectively, it provided an ideology to be used to explain, justify and, above all, rationalize the Ottoman past in terms of an *Ideenschema*, i.e. a fixed set of assumptions and notions that, when adopted, would immediately allow the historian to 'explain' not just

some, but *all* the aspects, *all* the disparate phenomena, of – in the Wittekian case – Ottoman history.[50] Thus, Ottoman history was being (re)written in terms of a *Weltanschauung*, a total world-view. The ghâzî theory, which was used by the Ottomans themselves as both stimulus and justification, as both a spur to their gaining the place in the world that they saw themselves as destined for, and a justification of the methods of statecraft and warfare which they had employed to attain it, was re-used by Wittek not only as the ideological basis for his own re-interpretation of Ottoman history, but as a tool to fashion ideological status for his reinterpretation as a *Weltanschauung* that supplied not merely one possible, but *the only* possible explanation of the entire course of Ottoman history from the foundation of the Ottoman state to its eventual dissolution rather more than seven centuries later.

Such retrospective rationalizations have hardly been uncommon as vehicles for the rewriting of history from a fixed ideological standpoint, whether of the right or the left, or even from the standpoint of ostensibly value-free, 'objective' scholarship. The classic example of the latter case, that of the so-called 'Protestant Ethic', formulated by and encapsulated in the work of Max Weber, is not without relevance as a possible formative influence on Wittek. The idea of the Protestant ethic and that of the ghâzî theory have much in common, typologically speaking, as *Ideenschemen* that manage at one and the same time to be both highly nebulous and richly documentable.[51] In fact, the influence of Max Weber should not be discounted. Although it has been pointed out that it was Weber, and not Stefan George, who opposed what have been termed the 'impulsive elements' that eventually were absorbed into National Social -ism,[52] Weber himself, in his later years, seems to have been at least to some degree attracted towards the charismatic persona of Stefan George and his mystical verses.[53] Equally significantly, it was in the pages of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, the prestigious pioneer journal of sociology that Weber had founded, that Wittek published two of his earliest – and longest – articles (on Turkish and Islamic, rather than on purely Ottoman history), in 1925 and 1928, respectively.[54]

VI

To return to the question posed at the beginning of this essay. After so much criticism has been levelled, not at Wittek's formidable forensic skills per se, but at the historical formulations that he encapsulated in most of the eight pieces republished here, what justification can be found for republishing these five pieces at the present time? It is not only that, as Professor Ménage wrote in his obituary notice for *The Times*, 'very little even of his earliest publications, has been or is likely to be superseded':[55] more is it that today, seventy years since these studies were written, and thirty years after their author's death, the turn of fortune's wheel has suddenly made the whole question of the ideological justification for religious warfare appear to be of a far greater relevance than even Wittek himself could have imagined.

Should we then once more prepare to accept Wittek's 'great idea' of the permanent ghâzî character of the Ottoman state? In attempting to answer this question we have also once more to ask, what sort of a historian was Wittek? The late Isaiah Berlin, in a well-known essay on Tolstoy's view of history, took for the book's motto a fragment from the ancient Greek poet Archilochus to the effect that 'the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing'.[56] In relation to the ghâzî theory we may enquire whether Wittek was a hedgehog or a fox, or whether perhaps he partook simultaneously or alternatingly of the characteristics of both creatures.

In fact, Wittek, like Tolstoy in Berlin's classificatory schema – which is perhaps an indication both of Wittek's stature and of the difficulty in coming to terms or accounting for what he wrote – appears to have been a fox who wanted to be a hedgehog (or possibly a hedgehog who had superlative skills as a fox). Like the fox, he 'knew many things', never (or almost never) putting a foot wrong, as in the final, unfinished series of articles on early Ottoman documents that he contributed to the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* during his last years of active scholarship.[57] But in public, as evidenced by the lectures and seminar papers republished in this work, he seems to have wished to appear a hedgehog, subordinating all his forensic skills and vast source-derived knowledge to creating (and I use the word advisedly) a monistic picture of the Ottoman state as a – as *the* – ghâzî state.

Most Ottomanists – by this I mean, most historians of the Ottoman state – who have been productively active during the past century have been foxes, quintessential foxes, eschewing the broad questions, the monist stance, while quietly cultivating their patch. Out-and-out hedgehogs have been few in number, and for the most part they have

been notably unsuccessful both as historians and Ottomanists, a situation that can be easily but not inaccurately blamed on 'the state of the art' and on the undisputed fact that learning to read and, having read, to understand Ottoman sources either literary or archival is a lifetime task that leaves little time or energy for the erection of a metaphysical scaffolding to support the work in hand.

In all this, Wittek was, in his time, as he remains today, the great exception to the above rule. In the years since his death those elements in his work that can be most easily identified with a hedgehog-like stance – most particularly, at least one of the works republished here – have not fared well at the hands of critics who, for the most part – those at least of them, that is, with the capacity and insight to do so – have staunchly stood by and indeed acknowledged their indebtedness to, the methods and the insights that he brought to his forensic and detailed scholarship.

The penultimate piece in the present volume, the 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople' (Chapter V, 135–160) furnishes a case in point. Given at what was the first public occasion devoted to attempting a revaluation of Wittek's work as a historian, the fateful *Wittek-Tagung* of 1984 already referred to, Colin Imber's critique of 'De la défaite' is still required reading for any student wishing to get to grips with the fundamental problems sur -rounding Wittek's broader historical formulations. In his paper, Imber criticized particularly harshly Wittek's handling of the confused period that followed on the defeat of Bâyezîd I at the hands of Tîmûr in 1402, and singled out for particular criticism Wittek's presentation of the personalities and policies ascribed to the sons of Bâyezîd, who for a decade struggled for political and territorial supremacy in the territorially much-reduced post-Ankara Ottoman state.[58] Subsequently, Imber has arrived at a position that rejects Wittek's 'ghâzî thesis' in its entirety, and in an essay that appeared recently as a contribution to a Festschrift presented to Professor Geoffrey Lewis, he has argued that the term 'ghâzî' is at best an imprecise one, and one that perhaps means no more than marauder or border raider.[59]

More may be said concerning the external and internal stimuli that affected Wittek's work in the mid- to late 1930s. Externally, one may adduce the political situation in Europe: Wittek was active in Belgium, Holland, England, France, the last functioning democracies (apart from Switzerland) in Europe. Germany was already under Nazi rule; later, with the Sudeten crisis and the appeasement of Hitler at Munich, together with Austrian *Anschluss* after some years of right-

wing dictatorship, the tone of the times was apocalyptic. Wittek, in Brussels, a political refugee from Nazism, could not but be very aware of this.

Internally also, Wittek's move from Istanbul was also influential, shifting him from archaeologically or epigraphically-based work to the wider intellectual ambiance of Brussels, the Université Libre and his patron there, the renowned Byzantinist Henri Grégoire, 'grande studioso e dispotico organizzatore di studi'.[60] It is worth remarking that there is nothing in Wittek's published work on Ottoman history prior to 1934 to prepare one for the sudden and radical turn that his work took once he was settled in Brussels. Why should this be the case?

It may be that sufficient notice has not been taken of what we may term the 'Brussels connection' in relation to Wittek's formulation of his 'ghâzî thesis', a process that was essentially a product of his Brussels years. The mid-1930s were fruitful ones in Belgian academic circles for the formulation of widely-influential historical theses. In 1936 there appeared a posthumous work entitled *Mahomet et Charlemagne*, by the late Henri Pirenne, the leading Belgian medievalist of his time. Pirenne had died in 1935, and the work was published under the aegis of one of his sons, equally but not an equal historian. It rapidly became influential, being widely disseminated in its original French version, and soon becoming even more widely known on both sides of the Atlantic through the medium of the English translation that quickly followed.[61] In *Mohamed and Charlemagne* Pirenne examined the effect of the rise of Islam on the Mediterranean world. The thrust of Pirenne's work – what rapidly became known as the 'Pirenne thesis' – was that the unity of the Mediterranean world, which had endured through Antiquity and into the first centuries of the Dark Ages, had been irredeemably shattered by the rise of Islam, which had divided the lands surrounding the middle sea into two contrasting and mutually hostile sectors, between which, from the seventh century onwards, a state of perpetual warfare had continued to exist.[62] Pirenne's thesis has been much discussed, and a considerable body of argument both for and against exists in the literature of historical scholarship, and even if Pirenne's thesis no longer continues to be accepted as a benchmark and as a basic truth by Mediterranean historians, it continues to be cited as a landmark and a starting point for further study.[63] Equally, as we have seen, this has been the case with Wittek's work from the 1930s. The point to be made here, however, is the interesting coincidence – to put it no

higher – that both Pirenne's and Wittek's theses were formulated in Belgium in the mid-1930s; that both were – and have continued to be – enormously influential; that both brought to their formulators a sort of immortality, and ultimately a considerably body of largely posthumous criticism; both – like the Turner thesis – had to do with frontiers; both, more narrowly, dealt with the frontier between Christendom and Islam, Pirenne with its moment of creation, Wittek with its later, post-Manzikert manifestations.

It is not difficult to determine, even at this distance of time, whether or not Wittek had read and was influenced by Pirenne's work when it appeared at the exact time he was engaged in writing the pieces collected here, although it is impossible to know whether or not Wittek had read Frederick Jackson Turner. My instinctive feeling, for what it was worth, that Wittek could not fail to have been aware of Pirenne, but was probably unaware of Turner, is borne out by his citing (at p. 1, n. 1. of his 'Sultan de Rûm'), p. 1, n. 1 of Pirenne's *Mahomet et Charlemagne*, for its definition of the *Romania* of late Antiquity.[64] Pirenne's patron and protector at Brussels, Henri Grégoire, certainly knew Pirenne well and contributed to one of his Festschrifts. In any case, the fruitful episode of Wittek's Brussels period was soon hastened to its end by the irresistable force of events. As it turned out, after 1938 Wittek was to publish nothing on pre-1453 Ottoman history for over ten years. The looming crisis precipitated by the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in that year was followed within twelve months by the outbreak of the second half of Europe's second Thirty Years' War. Less than a further twelve month forward, in 1940, Wittek was obliged to flee for his life before the advancing German army, and to find refuge in England. In England he was first interned and then rapidly released. Some work from his Brussels years was perhaps lost at this time, the promised *Rûm-Türkische Studien* for example;[65] other work, completed before 1940, appeared after the war.[66] Wittek's first and only historical publication in wartime England was in a different and for him an entirely new field: a critical study of the seventeen Turkish documents published in translation in the two editions (1589/90 and 1598–1600) of the Elizabethan geographer Richard Hakluyt's *Principal Navigations . . . of the English Nation*.[67] After the war, after – effectively – a ten-year hiatus, and after his appointment to the chair of Turkish at SOAS, the work of Wittek's last period is of a different character and (with the exception of his Mehmed II piece from 1953, which demonstrates a reversal to *George-Kreis* influenced work and attitudes and his lifelong

allegience to the poet)[68] marks a return to the minute – one might even say, micro-historical – forensic scholarship in which he so greatly excelled.[69]

VII

How may we deepen our insights into Wittek as a historian? The supersession of the religiously-based, multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire by the increasingly secular, nationalist and republican Turkey of Atatürk generated a flood of comment and reportage, both from observers among Turkey's former allies and from her one-time enemies. This coverage extended from the journalistic-ephemeral to the scholarly, or at least ostensibly scholarly, such as the work of Arnold Toynbee. The figure of Atatürk as national leader *and* ghâzî was one that might have been expected to appeal at a number of levels to Wittek, mourning the loss of the 'old' Austria and the lack of coherent national leader -ship in post-war Germany and Austria, while seeking to find in the Turkish nationalists and especially in Atatürk the romantic latter-day exemplars of his idealized medieval ghâzîs. This quest for parallels led him at times into apparent absurdities – linking the fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicler 'Âşıkpaşazâde and Mustafa Kemal's troops at the battle of Inönü, for example – but one must say that Wittek was not alone in the West in seeing Mustafa Kemal as a saviour-figure.[70]

Evidence for these attitudes is to be found in Wittek's work from the 1920s – journalistically in his writings for the *Oesterreichische Rundschau*; in scholarly guise with the first appearance of the ghâzî idea, which may have been gleaned by Wittek from the work of Friedrich Giese, or possibly from Mehmed Fuad Köprülü – the evidence remains unclear. By the 1930s the contrast between the old Ottoman Empire and the 'new' Turkey, and the contrasts and parallels between the establishment of Atatürk's Turkey and the foundation 700 years earlier of the Ottoman Empire had begun to attract the attention of serious historians. One pioneering essay from this time by a Swiss historian deserves attention. Rudolf Tschudi (1884–1960), a one-time student of the pioneer Turcologist Georg Jacob, and an assistant to C. H. Becker, was a professor at Basel, living and working under the long shadow cast by Jacob Burckhardt.[71] In 1930, for a German semi-popular series of short works entitled 'Philosophie und Geschichte',

the Tübingen publishing house of J. C. B. Mohr brought out a long essay by Tschudi entitled 'Vom alten osmanischen Reich'.[72] The interesting point about Tschudi's essay is that by 1930 Wittek's work was already being noticed: Tschudi draws largely on the most recent secondary literature by Hartmann, Becker, Wittek and Giese, including Giese's pioneering and largely overlooked essay,[73] and Wittek's modifications to its argument that he published in an appendix to and article on early Turkish mystics by Th. Menzel.[74]

It is perhaps worth noting that an element of mysticism creeps in to Wittek's work at various levels. Stefan George was par excellence the poet of mysticism – and of charisma. Wittek too possessed a powerful charisma, which (to be allowed a personal reminiscence) both haunted and fettered when encountered at an impressionable age. Like Burckhardt, it can be said that he shook wisdom from his sleeves: image and contact has ever since both haunted and fettered, stimulated and repelled, turning us from our 'daily bread of good and evil' (Burckhardt). Wittek's interpretation of Ottoman history is both mystical and amoral, in the Machiavellian sense – as can be seen in his almost flippant treatment of Mehemmed II's state crimes.[75]

Why should this be so: was it an ethical indifferentism or a complacent historicism? Whatever the cause, it was something deeply embedded in Wittek's work. Meinecke spotted this collection of attitudes as the defining element in the post-First World War crisis of German historicism, but his work was ignored by Wittek – as by many others. We may take some comfort in drawing on the authority of the late Sir Ernest Gombrich in pointing out where the romantic tradition of history, as embodied in Wittek's ghâzî apotheosis, led. It was in this German romantic tradition, seeing history as 'an extension of cosmic evolution', 'in which the great leaders must obey the laws of mankind's destiny but no other laws of God and men' that the roots lay of what Gombrich, in his Creighton Lecture for 1969, has called 'the profound intellectual aberration that found its expression in the Nazi myth'.[76] It was also the soil in which was firmly rooted the profoundly anti-Nazi Wittek's own historical formulations concerning Ottoman history and his idealized view of what he perceived to be the ghâzî state *par excellence* and the individual and collective ghâzî activities embodied and realized within its world-outlook framework.[77]

It could therefore be argued that the Ottomans' view of themselves, in the form in which we have it from the earliest literary sources employed by Wittek (Ahmedî, etc.) contained a dialectic of action: it

was teleological and messianic (as is bin Laden's) – cf. for example, the (spurious) prophetic traditions (*hadîth*) focussed on the future conquest of Constantinople – the Twin Towers of the age.[78] Certainly the progress of the Hegelian Zeitgeist ('Das Gang Gottes in die Welt') is akin to the Ottoman belief in the (God-guided) 'ever-victorious Frontier'. From hence, possibly, derives the unconscious reduplicative fascination of the ghâzî idea for Wittek, who appears to have been unaware of the implications glimpsed by Meinecke in his analysis of the writings on the Ottomans of seventeenth-century political theorists or latter-day Joachimites such as, respectively, Boccalini and Campanella.[79] It is noteworthy that Wittek appears to have been as uninfluenced by Meinecke as he was influenced by Stefan George and Max Weber, even though the former's observations on the – admittedly post-1453 – Ottoman state as a *Machtstaat* might have significantly modified Wittek's romantic formulations, had he been aware of them.[80]

We may instance also Wittek's love of and fascination with miracles, right through his career, from Ertoghrul's miraculous dream of the future greatness of the Ottoman state and the legend of Seyyid Battal Ghâzî to the legend of Eyyub al-Ansari and the legend of the Byzantine castellan's daughter's dream of the Prophet Muhammad.[81]

VIII

Seventy years ago Wittek's 'ghâzî thesis' in itself might well have been regarded as of merely academic interest in the context of the secular messianisms of the 1930s. Now, in a new age of global crisis, where pre-modern attitudes have re-emerged, there may be new relevance in a somewhat more presentist critique of Wittek's ideas. In apotheosising the fourteenth-century ghâzîs of Bithynia and Thrace was he romanticising the terrorists of the age? The economic angle, by land or by sea, needs to be considered: the slaving raids of the ghâzîs in Rumeli, as well as the 'piracy' of the sea-ghâzîs of the Aegean – as all piracy, may be regarded as legitimized economic activity as well as reified ideology.[82] Once more, we come back to the crux of stimulus and justification, best expressed and defined a quarter of a century ago by Rudi Lindner.[83] Air piracy is apparently not profitable, indeed, it is counterproductive: unlike captured ships/slaves/cargoes, wrecked

aircraft or ruined buildings cannot be sold on – but what of 'insider knowledge' – what of the allegations of informed stock trading immediately before and after 9/11? The early Ottomans, in their links with Genoese merchants and in the farming of monopolies, were canny businessmen as well as ghâzîs, just as the Ibn Ladin family appear to have produced successful capitalists as well as an apparent master-mind of global terror.[84]

These latter-day thoughts, unthinkable in Wittek's day, bring us back to the unresolved problem of Wittek's ghâzî theory and the influences that shaped its formation. One such influence, that of the poetry and ethos of Stefan George and his circle, I have already dealt with at length, together with some of the – to some extent superficial – influences deriving from nineteenth-century 'official' Austria's approach to history.[85] But there were undoubtedly other influences at work on Wittek's complex and fertile historical imagination.

It may be worthwhile here to step back a little. Erich Auerbach, to take a name already mentioned not entirely at random, was an almost exact contemporary of Wittek. He was born in Berlin in 1892, two years before Wittek came into the world in Vienna and, like Wittek, he was a scholar-exile member of the Central European intellectual diaspora precipitated by the rise to power of National Socialism. And – another connection – *Mimesis*, Auer bach's great and enduring work for which he is still today mainly remembered, was written when he was in exile in Turkey between 1942 and 1945.[86]

Auerbach has been acknowledged by Carlo Ginzburg, one of the founding fathers of the 'scienza nuova' of microhistory, as the main inspiration of his work.[87] It is the 'exceptional normal' that provides the *Ansatzpunkte*, the 'starting points' predicated by Auerbach and taken over by Ginzburg, and defined as the 'concrete details' from which 'the' global process – one would prefer 'global processes' – can be inductively reconstructed – what Auerbach termed 'the unprejudiced, precise, interior and exterior representation of the random moment in the lives of different people'.[88] Ginzburg describes Auerbach's strategy, 'the collecting and elaborating of *Ansatzpunkte*', as being based on a cognitive model that he had previously detected in the work of Marcel Proust and Virginia Woolf. This may well be the case: since I am no literary scholar, I am not competent to judge – but with Auerbach there were also deeper elective affinities, going back to the eighteenth century and not alluded to by Ginzburg, at work.

Edward Said, in his deeply felt *Introduction* to the fiftieth-anniversary edition of *Mimesis*, has emphasized in this context Vico's

discovery of the primitive mentality, with its profound influence on European romanticism and its cult of the imagination.[89] Said continues with Vico's observation that developments in culture take place within a cycle that goes from primitive to advanced and degenerate epochs, and then back to primitive, according to the modifications of the human mind, which makes and can then re-examine its own history from the point of view of the maker. Said goes on to stress Vico's theory of historical coherence: that each period shared in its language, art, metaphysics, science, logic and religion features that were common and appropriate: 'primitive times produce primitive knowledge', pointing out that this was the main methodological point for Vico as well as for Auerbach.[90]

Said further observes that '[i]n order to be able to understand a humanistic text' – we may substitute here, perhaps, 'an early Ottoman chronicle' – 'one must try to do so as if one is the author of that text, living the author's reality . . . , *all by that combination of erudition and sympathy that is the hallmark of philological hermeneutics* [author's italics]'.[91]

It is exactly this Vicoesque, Auerbachian combination of erudition and sympathy that can be seen in Wittek's work, mainly though not entirely in some of his shorter studies written both during his Brussels years, including 'Le Sultan de Rûm', republished in the current work (Chapter II), which is shot through with empathic sympathy for its subject, and more particularly in a series of articles written during the years of his tenure of the chair of Turkish in the University of London. In these studies he demonstrated his mastery of a technique that may be described as the application of rigorous philological scholarship (in languages – principally Ottoman Turkish – not formally considered to be a part of the Western intellectual canon) to apparent historical and philological minutiae.[92] One may instance here inter alia the use he made of the name of the Gagauz people of the lower Danube and the Dobrudja; equally of the Turkish name of the Greek coastal fortress of Monemvasia.[93]

Such an approach of course has its limitations. Said observes, correctly I think, that, in the case of Vico, 'the line between actual events and the modifications of one's own reflective mind is blurred': what Said calls 'one of the unresolved contradictions pertaining to humanism itself' and 'this perhaps tragic shortcoming of human knowledge and history' – i.e. the role of thought in reconstructing the past can neither be excluded nor squared with what is 'real'.[94] My intuitive feeling is

that it is exactly this unresolvable crux that lies at the heart of the difficulties experienced in coming fully to grips with Wittek's work and his legacy as a historian. There is no doubt, at least in my mind, that Wittek, for his work in Ottoman history, and despite all that one may perceive of its shortcomings, rightfully belongs in the pantheon of European scholarship and intellectual achievement in the twentieth century.

I mentioned in the note of indebtedness that serves as the proemium to this Introduction, the names of Auerbach, Gombrich, von Grunebaum and Kantorowicz, as well as Wittek. Auerbach and Gombrich, and to some extent Kantorowicz are still – dare one say it – household names (at least, one hopes, in reasonably civilized households); von Grunebaum's legacy remains much more among the specialists. Wittek's name, perhaps, was always little-known in the wider world outside of Ottoman studies: a reflection of the lack of standing in the wider historical world of what Professor Ménage and, following him, my old friend Klaus Kreiser, has aptly termed 'Clio's poor relation'.[95]

This, then, is the problem. Despite the efforts, not entirely unsuccessful, of Fernand Braudel and other nonottomanist historians to bring Ottoman history in from the cold, and despite work in several aspects of the field now achieving parity with that done in other, allegedly historiographically more 'advanced' areas, the 'curse of orientalism' (or *Orientalism*) still appears to have the field in its baleful grip, and there can be little doubt about the continuing unfashionability of Ottoman history among many in the wider world of historical scholarship.[96] It may be this was a state of affairs – which has a long history behind it, reaching back at least to Leopold von Ranke – which helped to mask Wittek's talents as a historian and a scholar – and perhaps also because his *oeuvre* lacked a 'big book' that caught the public's imagination: there was to be no *Mimesis*; no *Friedrich II*. His achievements may have failed to register in the wider world. It is hoped that this long-posthumous reissue of some of his most accessible works may go some way to correct this misapprehension.

Notes

1 Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938; repr. 1958, 1971). Republished as Chapter I (31–69) of the present work.

2 See in particular the following: 'Der Stammbaum der Osmanen', *Der Islam*, xiv (1925), 94–100; 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', in *Festschrift Georg Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 329–354; *Das Fürstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–15. Jahrhundert* (Istanbul, 1934 [Istanbuler Mitteilungen, ii]); 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64; 'Die Glaubenskämpfer in osmanischen Staat' (Leiden: Oostersche Genootschap in Nederland, *Verslag van het achtste Congres, 1936*), 2–6 (English translation published in the present work, together with 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische Bezie hungen' (ibid., 129–133), ch. IV); 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 285–319 (English translation published in the present work, ch. III). Cf. also 'Le Sultan de Rûm', *Annuaire de l'Institut Oriental*, vi (Brussels, 1938), 361–390 (English translation published in the present work, ch. II), and 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, xii (1938), 1–34 (delivered in Paris in March, 1938; English translation published in the present work, ch. V), both of which were published in the same year as *The Rise* (see *The Rise*, 54, nn. 58, 59).

3 The crucial passage setting forth Wittek's Ahmedî/Bursa-based view is in *The Rise*, 14–15.

4 *The Rise*, 14.

5 Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935); English edition: *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, tr. and ed. Gary Leiser (Albany, 1992). Cf. also two articles by Köprülü, 'Osmanli imparatorlugunun etnik mensei meseleri' [Problems of the Ethnic Origin of the Ottoman Empire], *Belleten*, vii (1943), 219–313, and 'Kay kabilesi hakkinda yeni notlar' [New Notes on the Kay Tribe], *idem*, viii (1944), 421–452, in the course of which he takes issue with Wittek who, as Rudi Lindner has observed, had erroneously ascribed to Köprülü the notion that because the Ottomans claimed to be descended from the senior Turkish clan of Kayi, the prestige accruing from this made them the natural leaders of the Ottoman Turks (cf. Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, IN, 1983), 8).

6 R. P. Lindner, 'Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History', *The Greek Orthodox Historical Review*, xxvii/2–3 (Summer–Fall 1982), 207–224; R. C. Jennings, 'Some Thoughts on the Gazi Thesis', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, lxxvi (1986), 151–161; Colin Imber, 'Paul Wittek's: De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople', *Osmanli Arastirmalari*, v (1986), 65–81; *idem*, 'The Ottoman Dynastic Myth', *Turcica*, xix (1987), 7–27; repr. in *idem, Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul, 1996), 305–322; *idem*, 'Canon and Apocrypha in Early Ottoman History', in Colin Heywood and Colin Imber (eds), *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage* (Istanbul, 1994), 117–137; *idem*, 'What Does Ghazi Actually Mean?', in Çigdem Balim-Harding and Colin Imber (eds), *The Balance of Truth. Essays in Honour of Professor Geoffrey Lewis* (Istanbul, 2000), 165–178; Colin Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant": Paul Wittek, the *George-Kreis*,

and the Writing of Ottoman History', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1989, 32–50, reprinted in *idem, Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Inter pretations* (Aldershot, 2002), § V; *idem*, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1988, 7–25, reprinted in *Writing Ottoman History*, § VI; *idem*, 'A Sub -terranean History: Paul Wittek (1894–1978) and the Ottoman State, *Die Welt des Islams*, xxxviii (1998), 386–405, repr. in *Writing Ottoman History*, § VII.

7 Halil Inalcik, 'The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State', *International Journal of Ottoman Studies*, ii (1981–1982), 71–79; *idem*, 'How to Read Asik Pasazâde's History', in Heywood and Imber, *Studies in Honour of V. L. Ménage*, 139–156; Elizabeth Zachariadou, 'Histoire et légendes des premiers Ottomans', *Turcica*, xxvii (1995), 45–89.

8 Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995); Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany, NY, 2003); Rudi Paul Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2007).

9 See Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"', 36, 39–40; *idem*, 'A Sub terranean History', 392–394.

10 Paul Wittek, *La formation de l'Empire ottoman*, ed. V. L. Ménage (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982).

11 See, further, Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 22–25.

12 Arnold Gehlen, 'Ende der Geschichte', in: *idem, Einblicke* (Frankfurt, 1975), 115–134.

13 Anton C. Zijderfeld, *On Clichés: the Supersedure of Meaning by Function in Modernity* (London, 1979), 3.

14 See, for further details of the origins of Wittek's 1937 London lectures, Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 7–8.

15 Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams"', 34–35.

16 Three of the four papers delivered at the 1984 *Tagung* were subsequently published. For Imber's 'Paul Wittek's "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople"', and Heywood's '"Boundless Dreams"', see p. 3, n. 6 in this volume. Cf. also John Wansbrough, 'Paul Wittek and Richard Hakluyt: A Tale of Two Empires', *Osmanli Arastirmalari*, vii–viii (1988), 55–70. Susan Skilliter died in the following year (1985) and I have not been able to trace any record of her paper having been published.

17 Cf. Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*; Heywood, 'A Subterranean History'; Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*; and Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory* (see p. 3, nn. 6 and 8, in this volume).

18 Ch. IV in this volume, 125–133.

19 'Die Glaubenskämpfer im osmanischer Staat', Oostersch Genootschap in Nederland, *Verslag van het achtste Congres gehouden te Leiden op 6–8 januari 1936* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1936), 2–7; 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische Beziehungen', ibid., 29–32.

20 Ch. III in this volume, 176.

21 Ch. I in this volume, 31–69.

22 Ch. II in this volume, 73–96.

23 Ch. V in this volume, 135–160.

24 The *Târîh-i Osmânî Encümeni* (the Ottoman History Society) was founded in 1909, in the year following the Young Turk revolution. The society and its journal, *Târîh-i Osmânî Encümeni Mecmuasi*, later, after the fall of the Ottoman dynasty, renamed *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuasi*, were under the direction of the last Ottoman Imperial Historiographer, 'Abdurrahman Seref (1835–1925), cf. Fr. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927), 404–406.

25 On the opening of the Ottoman archives and its early years as a public institution, see L. Fekete, 'Über Archivalia und Archivwesen in der Türkei', *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, iii (1953), 179–205.

26 One may mention here the most eminent British Turkologist of his generation, the late Sir Gerard Clauson (1891–1974) – an almost exact contemporary of Wittek, it may be noted – who, as both he himself and Professor Bosworth in his admirable recent memoir have made clear, began to publish extensively only in 1961 after his retirement from a lifetime career in government service (see Sir Gerard Clauson, *Studies in Turkic and Mongolic Linguistics*, 2nd edn, with an Introduction by Professor C. Edmund Bosworth (London, 2002) ix (Clauson) and xxii–xxiii (Bosworth). This second edition is (with the exception of Bosworth's 'Intro duction', an unaltered reprint of the first, published in 1962 by the Royal Asiatic Society (Prize Publication Fund, vol. XX), under the title of *Turkish and Mongolian Studies*. It may be observed that even the relatively enlightened policies of the post-1945 years in Britain, which saw the establishment of the London Chair of Turkish, have not been perpetuated: the post of Professor of Turkish in the University of London has remained unfilled since the Thatcherite-inspired university cut-backs of the mid-1980s.

27 For a short conspectus of this subject, with references to further reading, see Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 13–15.

28 On Babinger as an Ottoman historian and an antithesis to Wittek see my study, 'Mehmed II and the Historians: Babinger's *Mehmed der Eroberer* During Half a Century', *Turcica*, xl (2008), 295–344. For a homely and at times uncritical, but deeply revealing study of Babinger, cf. the 'essay' by Gerhard Grimm, 'Franz Babinger (1891–1967): Ein lebensgeschichtlicher Essay', *Die Welt des Islams*, xxxviii/3 (1998), 286–333.

29 Fekete's major works span almost thirty years, from his magisterial *Einführung in dies osmanische Diplomatik* (1926) to his equally masterly *Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung* (1955).

30 On Kraelitz see Colin Heywood, 'Between Historical Myth and "Mythohistory": The Limits of Ottoman History', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, xii (1988), 339, 340; for his influence on Wittek see *idem*, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 9, 10, 21, 22; *idem*, 'A Subterranean History', 389.

31 For the academic politics that eventually brought Wittek from Brussels to

London in 1937 see Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 7–8, 11–12.

32 Richard Hartmann, '[Review of] Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938)', *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, 1939, no. 10, cols 642–644 (cf. ibid., 1935, no. 5, cols 320–332 for Hartmann's review of Wittek's *Mentesche*).

33 Hartmann, '[Review of] *The Rise*', col. 322.

34 Franz Taeschner, '[Review of] Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938)', *Der Islam*, xxvi (1942), 166–168.

35 Taeschner, '[Review of] *The Rise*', 168.

36 See further on this point the extensive commentaries in my '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"' and 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition' articles.

37 On Wittek's editorship of the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* see my '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"', 38, 39; 'Wittek and the Austrian tradition', 9, 18; 'A Sub terranean History', 389, 392.

38 'The struggle is determined already in the stars: the Conqueror remains the one who saves the holy ikon within his marchlands, and Lord of the Future [Things], who can transform himself.' 'Einleitung', 1; cf. Stefan George, *Werke* (4 vols, Munich, 1983), ii, 195.

39 Ibid., 3.

40 Fr. Giese, [Review of Wittek, *Mentesche* (1934)], *Historische Zeitschrift*, cliii (1935–1936), 370–372, at p. 371.

41 Colin Imber, in his critique of Wittek's 'De la défaite', makes much of Wittek's attachment to German nationalism. I am reminded here of a conversation that I had with Professor Klaus Kreiser in 1987, shortly after the publication of Imber's article, in the course of which he made the observation that Wittek was not influenced by anything as specific as German nationalism, but more by a generalized 'romantic' attitude, and asked me whether I did not think that what Wittek wrote could as well have been written by an Italian (note of telephone conversation with Klaus Kreiser, 11 January 1987). My response at the time was that I did so think, that Wittek should in no way be considered as a crude nationalist, and that his historical obsession, not to put the matter too strongly, was not with the post-1871 Prusso-German *Reich*, but with the Holy Roman Empire, both in its Italian/Hohenstaufen phase (congruent with Stefan George), and in its last twentieth-century efflorescence under the Austrian Habsburgs, although, I added, one should not overlook Wittek's manifest *grossdeutsch* political sympathies in the period from 1920 to at least 1924.

42 Wittek, *Mentesche*, 7.

43 Wittek, *Mentesche*, 8.

44 Wittek, *Mentesche*, 8: 'Erst als die Periode des frisch-fröhlichen Eroberns und . . . noch vermehrten chaotischen Durcheinanders vorüber war, erlangte das rumseldschukischen Staatswesen von Konja das Übergewicht'.

45 Cf. the critical observations by Imber, in his 'Ottoman Dynastic Myth', and

'Canon and Apocrypha in Early Ottoman History' (see p. 3, n. 6).

46 On the connections between the *Annales* school and Ottoman history see Colin Heywood, 'Fernand Braudel and the Ottomans: the Emergence of an Involvement (1928–1950)',*Mediterranean Historical Review*, xxiii/2 (December 2008), 165–184.

47 On the west Anatolian Kleinstaaterei see Wittek, *Mentesche* (see p. 1, n. 2 in this volume);P. Lemerle, *L'Emirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident* (Paris, 1957); and Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice, 1983).

48 Francis Roy Bridge, 'Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century',*Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, xxxiv (1981), 270.

49 Cf. here Arnold Gehlen, *Urmensch und Spätkultur* (Bonn, 1956), cited by Zijderfeld, *On Clichés*, 116, n. 10.

50 Erwin Hölzle, *Idee und Ideologie. Ein Zeitkritik aus universalhistorischer Sicht* (Bern and Munich, 1969). Cf. also the valuable review article by Herbert Arnold, *History and Theory*, x/1 (1971), 134–147.

51 For a useful assessment of Weber's thought see Arthur Mitzmann, *The Iron Cage: an Historical Interpretation of Max Weber* (New York, 1969).

52 Bruce Mazlish, [Review essay on Mitzmann, *The Iron Cage*], *History and Theory* x/1 (1971), 90–107, at pp. 93–94.

53 On Weber in this context, and his influence on Wittek, see Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 10, 13, 21; *idem*, 'A Subterranean History', 391; on his interest in the *George-Kreis*, see 'A Subterranean History', 404.

54 Wittek, 'Konstantinopel, Islam und Kalifat', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, liii (1925), 370–426; *idem*, 'Türkentum und Islam, I' [all published], *ASS* lix (1928), 489–525.

55 *The Times*, 16 June 1978.

56 Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York, 1970), 1.

57 Wittek, 'Zu einigen frühosmanischen Urkunden (I-VII), *WZKM*, lii–lix/lx (1957–1963/4), reprinted (with continuous pagination and a separate index) in *idem, La formation de l'Empire ottoman*', § VII.

58 Imber, 'Wittek's "De la défaite"', 76 ff. Cf. further on Imber's stance my remarks in 'A Sub -terranean History', 400, n. 35.

59 Colin Imber, 'What Does Ghazi Actually Mean?', in Balim-Harding and Imber (eds), *The Balance of Truth*, 165–178.

60 This vivid description of Grégoire by Francesco Gabrieli is said to be from *Oriente Moderno*, lviii/5–6 (May–June 1978), but the ascription on the photocopy of my page is incorrect.

61 Henri Pirenne, *Mahomet et Charlemagne* (Paris and Brussels, 1937); English translation: *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, tr. Bernard Miall, (London, 1939).

62 Pirenne sets forth his thesis in *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, 147 ff.

63 See, for the latest updating and revision of the Pirenne thesis, Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, *Mahomet, Charlemagne et les origines de l'Europe*, tr. Cécile Morrisson (Paris, 1996).

64 Wittek, 'Le Sultan de Rûm', 1, n. 1 (74, n. 1 in this volume). Interestingly, Wittek misquotes the title of Pirenne's book: *Mahomet à Charlemagne*).

65 On Wittek's 'lost' *Rûm-Türkische Studien* see my forthcoming study, 'Spectrality, "Presence" and the Ottoman Past'.

66 E.g. Paul Wittek (with P. Lemerle), 'Recherches sur l'histoire et le statut des monastères athonites sous la domination turque, I', *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Oriental*, iii (Brussels, 1948), 411–472.

67 P. Wittek, 'The Turkish Documents in Hakluyt's "Voyages"', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, xix /57 (November 1942), 121–139. It is worth noticing, in the light of the characteristic 'density' of Wittek's incursion into a new field, that under the exigencies of wartime this number of the *Bulletin* did not appear until 1944. Wittek also prepared in these war years a monograph on Anglo-Turkish diplomatic relations in the period 1553–1588, which has remained unpublished. The manuscript was given by Wittek to the late Dr Susan Skilliter, who made extensive but unquantifiable use of it for her *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578–1582* (Oxford, 1977) – cf. the useful insights of Professor Ménage in his review of the latter work, in *IJMES* xii (1980), 373–383.

68 Paul Wittek, 'Fath Mubîn – "An Eloquent Conquest"', in S. Runciman *et al.*, *The Fall of Constantinople* (London, 1955), 33–44. Cf. on Wittek's 'neo-Georgian' treatment of Mehemmed II, Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"', 40 f., and 'Mehmed II and the Historians', § II (304–310).

69 Cf., for example, from Wittek's last period the following, all of which possess a distinct microhistorical element – large conclusions drawn from small events: Paul Wittek, 'Ayvansaray – un sanctuaire privé de son héros', *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, xi (1951), 505–526; *idem*, 'Yazijioghlu 'Alî on the Christian Turks of the Dobrudja', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, xiv/3 (1952), 639–668; *idem*, 'Devshirme and Sharî'a', *BSOAS*, xvii/2 (1955), 271–278; *idem*,'The Castle of Violets: From Greek Monemvasia to Turkish Menekshe', *BSOAS*, xx (1957), 601–613; *idem*, 'Der "Beiname" des osmanischen Sultans Mehemmed I', *Eretz-Israel*, vii (1964), 263–275; *144–*153; *idem*, 'The Taking of Aydos Castle: A Ghazi Legend and its Transformation', in G. Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), 669–672.

70 Cf. in particular the largely forgotten autobiography – *Soldatenblut: vom Baltikum zu Kemal Pascha* (Leipzig: Koehler, 1925) by a certain Hauptmann [Hans] Tröbst. Tröbst certainly saw in Mustafa Kemal a vigorous and successful national leader of a type that he believed Germany, in the mid-1920s, seemed to be in most need of.

71 Cf. the informative funeral notice/*Lebenslauf* in 'Prof. Dr. phil. Rudolf Tschudi 1884–1960'(6 pp.; n.p., n.d., but Basel, 1960). A copy of this booklet is to be found at SOAS (Pam. Biog. A. 158921).

72 Rudolf Tschudi, *Vom alten osmanischen Reich* (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1930; Philosophie und Geschichte, Hft. 25).

73 Fr. Giese, 'Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches', *Zeitschrift für Semitistik*, ii (1924), 246–271.

74 Th. Menzel, 'Die ältesten türkischen Mystiker', *ZDMG*, N.F., iv (= lxxix, 1925), 269–289. Wittek's 'Mitteilung' (not listed in his *Schriftenverzeichnis*) is at pp. 288–289.

75 See Paul Wittek, 'Muhammed II.', in *Menschen, die Geschichte machten*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1933), 197–207, and 'Fath Mubîn' (1955), *passim*; and, for a more detailed excursus on the problem, Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"', 41–43.

76 E. H. Gombrich, 'Myth and Reality in German Wartime Broadcasts', reprinted in *idem, Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art* (Oxford, 1979), 93–111, at p. 110.

77 Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 18–19 (influence of Kurt Hildebrandt); 23–25 (Wittek and the historicist tradition).

78 On Constantinople – and later Rome – as loci of the mythological Kizil Elma (*pomum rubrum*/the 'Red (or Golden) Apple' of Turkish folklore, the legendary city that was to be the ultimate goal of Turco-Muslim conquests see J. Deny, 'Les pseudo-prophéties concernant les Turcs au xvie siècle', *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, x/2 (1936), 201–220; Ettore Rossi, 'La legenda turco-bizantina del Pomo Rosso', in *Actes du Vème Congrès international des études byantines* (Rome, 1936), 542–553. From the Red Apple to the Big Apple is perhaps not too far a step to take in considering the aetiology of present-day terroristic eschatology.

79 Fr. Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsräson* (Munich, 1957), 101, ff. (*Werke*, I).

80 It is worth noting that Meinecke's *Staatsräson* was first published in 1924, when Wittek was still in Vienna, and reviewing works on political thought for the *Oesterreichische Rundschau*.

81 Cf. Wittek, *The Rise*, 20; 'Ayvansaray – un sanctuaire privé de son héros', *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, xi (1951), 505–526; 'The Taking of Aydos Castle: A Ghazi Legend and its Transformations', in G. Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), 662–672.

82 Cf. David Starkey's observation in regard of piracy, but equally applicable to ghazâ, that 'for all its political and social ramifications, [it] was essentially an economic activity' (David J. Starkey, 'Pirates and Markets', in L. R. Fischer (ed.), *The Market for Seamen in the Age of Sail* (St. John's, Nfld, 1994), 59–80 (= *Researches in Maritime History*, no. 7, December 1994) at p. 59).

83 Lindner, 'Stimulus and Justification' (see p. 3, n. 6 in this volume).

84 On the Ottomans' early commercial and diplomatic links with Genoa see Kate Fleet, 'The Treaty of 1387 between Murâd I and the Genoese', *BSOAS*, lvi/1 (1993), 13–33; *eadem*, 'Ottoman Grain Exports from Western Anatolia at the End of the Fourteenth Century',*Journal of the Economic and Social History of*

the Orient, xl/3 (1997), 283–293; *eadem, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge, 1999).

85 Heywood, '"Boundless Dreams of the Levant"'; *idem*, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition'.

86 Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, [1946] tr. Willard R. Trask, fiftieth-anniversary edition (Princeton, NJ and Oxford, 2003).

87 Carlo Ginzburg, 'Latitude, Slaves and the Bible: An Experiment in Micro history', *Critical Inquiry*, xxxi/3 (Spring, 2005), 665, 683.

88 Ginzburg, 'Latitude, Slaves and the Bible', 666, citing Auerbach, 'Philology and *Weltliteratur*', *Centennial Review*, no. 13 (Winter, 1969), 1–17.

89 Edward W. Said, 'Introduction to the Fiftieth-Anniversary Edition', in Auerbach, *Mimesis* [2003], xii.

90 Said, 'Introduction', xiii.

91 Said, 'Introduction', xiii.

92 These works are listed in this volume, 20, n. 69.

93 On Wittek's creative use of (among other sources) an early fourteenth-century foundation inscription on the Orhaniye mosque in Bursa to deduce the essential 'ghâzî' character of the Ottoman state, see his *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), esp. pp. 14–15. For a discussion of the problems inherent in any attempt to interpret the inscription see Heywood, 'The 1337 Bursa Inscription and its Interpreters', *Turcica*, xxxvi (2004), 215–230. See also Wittek's 'Yazicioghlu 'Alî on the Christian Turks of the Dobrudja', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, xiv/3 (1952), 639–668, and his 'The Castle of Violets. From Greek Monemvasia to Turkish Menekshe', *idem*, xx (1957), 601–613, and – his last work – 'The Taking of Aydos Castle: A Ghazi Legend and its Transformation', in G. Makdisi (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), 662–672.

94 Said, 'Introduction', xiii.

95 V. L. Ménage, '[Review of] History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. vol. I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808 by Stanford J. Shaw', *BSOAS*, xli/1 (1978), 160; Klaus Kreiser, 'Clio's Poor Relation: Betrachtungen zur osmanischen Historiographie von Hammer-Purgstall bis Stanford Shaw', in Gernot Heiss and Grete Klingenstein (eds), *Das osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch* (Vienna, 1983), 24–43.

96 Cf. two recent review articles in leading non-orientalist journals imbued with pyrrhonic undertones about the viability of the field: Andreas Schultz, 'Befreiung von Orientalismus. Neue Literatur zur osmanisch-türkich Geschichte', *Historische Zeitschrift*, cclvi/1 (August 2005), 103–129, and Virginia Aksan, 'Theoretical Ottomans', *History and Theory*, xlvii (2008), 109–122.

Part I
The Rise of the Ottoman Empire

I *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*

Introduction

Wittek delivered his three London lectures on The Rise of the Ottoman Empire *in May 1937. A short book with the same title was published by the Royal Asiatic Society in 1938. This makes it, together with 'De la défaite', the last of what turned out to be Wittek's pre-war publications from his years in Brussels. The genesis of the lectures that became a book can be located some three years earlier, in the autumn of 1935. On 25 October in that year the Board of Studies in Oriental Languages and Literatures of the University of London had the duty of recommending to the University the names of two European scholars for selection as Special University Lecturers for 1936–1937. One was the celebrated Spanish Arabist Miguel Asín y Palacios; the other was Dr Paul Witteck* [sic] *of the Université Libre, Brussels.*[a] *Little happened thereafter until late 1936, but by February 1937, when a public announcement was made by the University, the proposed single lecture on 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire' had been expanded into three, the titles of which reflecting Wittek's intention to provide for a London audience no doubt but little acquainted with his work what he described as 'an outline of the subject'.*[b] *At the beginning of May 1937 Wittek duly travelled from Brussels to London, and delivered the lectures on three successive days, 4, 5 and 6 May 1937. Wittek must have worked on the text during the following year (the Preface is dated 'Brussels, June, 1938').*

I have observed elsewhere that 'the significance of Wittek's London lectures as a condensation, final summation and first exposition in English of his "ghâzî-theory" explanation of the foundation and expansion of the Ottoman state . . . can hardly be over-estimated'.[c] *The immediate impact of the work appears to have been slight – it appears not to have been reviewed in any major British academic journal, not even that of the Royal Asiatic Society, who had published it – but in the post-war years, and among British and American students of Ottoman history, most of whom were to begin their careers either as Wittek's students or as students of his students,*

Wittek's view of Ottoman history came to command a general acceptance that was not seriously challenged or made the subject of scholarly debate until the decade following his death.[d]

In actual fact, there was little that was new in Wittek's London lectures, which were in large part an epitome of his own earlier and contemporary work. As he himself pointed out, the material in them was drawn mainly from his monograph of 1934, Das Fürstentum Mentesche,[e] *and from three articles, of which two, a valuable longish article in German on medieval Ankara,*[f] *and an even longer one, also in German, on the toponymy of Anatolia in the era of the Turkish conquest, which has subsequently attracted some criticism,*[g] *were not selected for republication here. The third, 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum' (1936) appears here in translation (Chapter III). Nonetheless, rarely can a book of such small compass – fifty-four pages in all – have had such an impact on a field. Crucially, it was within these pages that Wittek gave a final condensation and distillation to the thesis – the so-called 'ghâzî thesis' – that he had first formulated as early as 1925 in a note appended to an article by Theodor Menzel on the earliest Turkish mystics. There, Wittek observed that, in the context of Menzel's vivid depiction of the rise of a religiously based heroic society among the Turkish masses of Anatolia, Osman – the eponymous founder of the Ottoman state – 'appears in the first place as a ghâzî, [which] presents his foundation of the [Ottoman] state in an entirely new light'.*[h] *I have observed elsewhere that the significance of this last sentence cannot be overestimated, since here, in short compass, is the nodal point within early twentieth-century Ottoman historical studies for all of Wittek's later formulations concerning the origins and fundamental character of the Ottoman state.*[i] *Wittek's insight into Menzel's article in the context of Ottoman history was thus transformed in little more than a decade from an observation in an obscure Note appended to a learned article, to do service as the foundation-stone of a 'general thesis' which bids fair to rank with that of Wittek's Brussels colleague Henri Pirenne in its significance for later scholarship. Either in acceptance or in rejection, it has set the tone for scholarly debate on the origins and nature of the early Ottoman state ever since.*

* * *

Preface

I had the honour of delivering the lectures here published at the University of London on May 4th, 5th and 6th, 1937. Naturally, these lectures can only present an outline of the subject. The notes added here are limited to what is strictly necessary, and refer in general only to my preceding publications,[1] where fuller information and references are to be found; sources and authorities are quoted only in the passages containing details with which I have not dealt up to the present.

I desire to thank Sir Denison Ross for his encouragement and the interest that he has shown in my work, and the Royal Asiatic Society for accepting it for publication. I also acknowledge the great assistance Miss Elizabeth Kara-Mikhailova, Miss Joan Hussey and Mr. Peter Charanis gave me in translating these lectures into English. Last, but not least, I am greatly indebted to Professor H. A. R. Gibb, who carefully read and revised my manuscript.

Paul Wittek
Brussels, June, 1938

{1}

I Criticism of the Tradition and Exposition of the Problem

AMONG the great universal monarchies known in world history the Ottoman Empire holds a special place on account of the vast extent of its realm and the long duration of its existence. Arising about 1300 from very modest beginnings, only a century later it was clearly inspired by the idea of universal domination, which it was afterwards to realize by occupying vast territories in the three continents of the ancient world, Europe, Asia and Africa. In this enormous area the Ottoman Empire was for centuries the unrivalled power that determined all political events, and at the same time represented for these countries a cultural epoch, the traces of which still remain

visible long after the empire itself has disappeared.

In world history this empire of the Ottomans represents, above all, the dominant Muslim power of modern times, from the beginning of the modern period up to very recent years. Indeed, it united under its rule the largest and most essential part of the Muslim world. Syria, Palestine, Irak and Egypt, the most important stretches of the Arabian peninsula, all these were 'under the shadow' of the Ottoman Sultan. This immense realm was further increased by the addition of vassal states such as Tunis and Algiers in the western Mediter ranean and the Khanate of {the Crimea in} southern Russia. No other Muslim prince occupied in modern times a position that could possibly be compared to that of the Ottoman Sultan, who ruled over the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and also over the old residences of the Caliphs, Damascus, Bagdad and Cairo. What were Morocco and {2} Persia, the princes of Turk estan, and even the Great Moguls of India, in comparison with the vast power of the Ottomans, whose armies appeared at one time beneath the walls of Vienna, then on the Caspian Sea, and invaded Poland and Abyssinia; whose fleets cruised in the Indian Ocean and in the Atlantic, controlling the Straits of Gibraltar? And in Constantinople, their capital, the spiritual life of Islam found once more a centre in which were assembled the treasures from the libraries of ancient Bagdad and Cairo, and where Muslim intellectual activity was greatly encouraged by rich academic foundations. This centre evolved a magnificent though somewhat arid architecture, which moulded and determined the features of all the other cities of the empire and spread even as far as India.

But a closer view of Ottoman history shows us that this hegemony in the Muslim world was for the empire itself only of secondary importance. All the Old Muslim countries that we have enumerated as dominions of the empire represent only an outer zone added on to an older nucleus. Though of much smaller extent than the Muslim world-empire, into which it later developed, this older nucleus was in itself already an empire, likewise dominated by the idea of a universal realm. Having grown up in the provinces formerly governed by Byzantium, in Asia Minor and in the Balkans, it finally took possession of Constantinople, the natural centre of this area, and thus obtained a capital that for more than a thousand years past had been the seat of imperial traditions.

This older Ottoman Empire, which we might call the 'Sultanate of Rûm', a name applied to it by the Ottomans themselves on account of the 'Rhomæan' – i.e. Byzantine – area that it embraced, was never

completely absorbed in the later and larger Muslim one; it distinctly retained its position as the vital nucleus of the whole and imposed upon the latter the continuation of its peculiar political tradition. From the first appearance of the Ottomans, the principal factor in this political tradition was the struggle against their Christian neighbours, and this struggle never ceased to be of vital importance to the Ottoman Empire. Even while {3} engaged in their major conquests in the Muslim world, the Ottomans never lessened their efforts to push forward simultaneously the frontier line in Europe. Up to the seventeenth century the Ottomans were still on the offensive on this front; in 1669 they seized Crete from the Venetians, in 1672 Podolia from the Poles, in 1683 they besieged Vienna. It was not until the peace of Carlowitz in 1699 that the slow, gradual process of decomposition began, called 'the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire', although it really concerned only its European possessions. But it has been quite rightly remarked that the losses endured in Europe, small as they might seem on the map compared to the circumference of the total, yet left the deepest impression on the whole, and the wounds that the empire received in Europe were closely followed by its decline and ruin. This decline was nevertheless not a rapid one. It was not until the nineteenth century that it became accelerated, and it came to an end at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is very characteristic that the accomplishment of the final breakdown was closely preceded by the loss of nearly all the European possessions consequent on the defeat in the Balkan War. This defeat obliged the Ottomans to resign definitely and for ever any ambition of ruling over Christian countries, and this meant not less than the renunciation of their dominant idea, of the *raison d'être* of their state. Thus the defeat in the Balkan War was a blow to the heart of the Ottoman Empire, and the dissolution brought about a few years later by the Great War was only a necessary consequence. This renunciation could not have expressed itself more clearly than by the alliance that united the Ottomans during the Great War with their sworn enemy, the Habsburg monarchy. By this alliance both the empires of Austria and Turkey broke with their most essential traditions and thus showed that they had outlived themselves. It is not surprising that both empires failed the test of the Great War and disappeared for ever.

In these introductory remarks I have already tried to lay stress on the point of view that we shall take in the following {4} attempt to describe the rise of the Ottoman Empire. It will not deal with the great Muslim empire that issued from the conquests of Selim and Sulayman

in the sixteenth century, but will be devoted to the older one, to the Sultanate of Rûm, the fundamental tradition of which – emphasizing not so much the establishment of a hegemony in the Muslim world as the struggle against its Christian neighbours – remained also the pulse of the greater Muslim empire up to the end. We shall therefore mainly treat such questions as these: how the political tradition, the motive force of the Ottoman state was formed, and in what manner this state, founded on such ideals, developed into an empire whose extension over the greater part of the remaining Muslim world was then only a necessary consequence and a question of time.

I shall begin by saying at once that I place the decisive turning-point in the evolution towards an empire in the time of Sultan Mehmed II, who in 1453 conquered Constantinople, and that we shall therefore take our survey much further than the books that have recently discussed this problem. The oldest of these books, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, by Herbert Adam Gibbons, published in 1916 at Oxford, has the great merit that it pointed out the numerous problems posed by early Ottoman history in their connection. But it ends its narrative with the year 1403, when there could as yet be no question of realization of an empire; on the contrary, we shall see that in this year the Ottomans were, after the disastrous defeat inflicted on them by Tîmûr at Ankara, thrown into a most critical situation, which menaced even their political existence and stopped the development of their state for nearly half a century. Moreover, this book, written by a non-Orientalist, neglects most of the detailed investigations and results due to the studies of Orientalists.

More recently all the detailed results of research on this subject were presented in two clear surveys, one by the Swiss Rudolf Tschudi, and the other by the Americans William L. Langer and Robert P. Blake.[2] Of still greater interest naturally is such an attempt when undertaken by the eminent {5} Turkish scholar Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, who himself has done a considerable amount of research on this subject. His interesting and important book *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman* originated from lectures that he gave in 1935 before the *Cercle d'Études Turques* at the Sorbonne.[3] Unfortunately in this book the investigations are limited to the earliest epoch and do not go beyond the beginning of the fourteenth century. All the questions that are especially important for explaining the {Ottomans'} development towards an empire are therefore completely missing in this work. One year after Köprülü's lectures I gave an exposition before the same Parisian *Cercle d'Études* of my own opinion on this subject.[4] These few

references should be sufficient to show that the interest of a large number of scholars of different countries is being concentrated on this subject. I shall, as already mentioned, direct my attention to the question concerning the rise of the empire as such, this point of view having been – in spite of the titles of most papers – neglected up till now. They all content themselves with treating of the origin of the Ottomans and the first beginnings of their political existence, without showing how far those beginnings are yet distant from the later universal monarchy of a Mehmed II, and without dealing with the important development that the Ottomans had still to accomplish before their state evolved into an empire. But we too shall have to turn our attention towards the origins. It is not naive curiosity that has directed research to the study of these first beginnings, but rather the conviction that the history of the Ottoman state, with all its peculiarities, becomes comprehensible only after one has accounted for its origin. The well-known sentence, that every state owes its existence to the same causes that created it, holds good to the full extent for the Ottoman state, and I can say that today, by having gained a clearer comprehension of its origins, we are able to under - stand better the later and even the most recent periods of Ottoman history.

Until quite recently one was content to repeat what the official Turkish historiography said of the origin of the {6} Ottomans. In Europe, where since early times an immense literature has been devoted to the picturesque Ottoman state, which was such a tremendous enemy to Christendom, but also a much sought-after ally by European Powers in their own conflicts, this official Turkish tradition has been accepted as early as the sixteenth century. Josef von Hammer-Purgstall secured it a permanent place in all future narratives by including it unquestioned in his monumental work, his *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, the standard Ottoman History, entirely based on the original sources.

According to this tradition the Ottoman Turks had been a nomadic tribe, which was forced by the pressure of the Mongol invasion to emigrate, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, into Anatolia, led by the grandfather of Osman, the eponymous founder of their state. They finally settled down in the Byzantine–Seljuk borderland near Eskishehir. *Jihângirâne bir devlet tshiqardiq bir ‘aşîretden* (‘We raised a world-subduing Power from a tribe’) – in these words the political achievement of his Ottoman ancestors was praised as late as in the nineteenth century by the Ottoman poet Namık Kemâl as a miracle.

We certainly should have to speak of a miracle, had things happened according to the tradition. It is true that several large dominations founded by nomadic tribes are known in history, but none of these has ever attained anything like the same duration as that of the Ottomans. Moreover, their foundations took place in quite different circumstances; they were preceded by fierce struggles among the nomads themselves; in these struggles one of the tribes gains the upper hand over the others and welds them by force into a single unit. This united nomadic power then breaks out like a hurricane with all its tremendous and irresistible forces into the neighbouring civilized countries, which it absorbs into a more or less ephemeral empire. Today we know the conditions that existed in Asia Minor during the thirteenth century well enough to be able to say that there can be no question of such fierce fighting between nomadic Turkish tribes, and even though the speed with which the Ottomans realized their conquests may seem to us very {7} rapid, still it is infinitely slow compared to that of the nomadic invasions – for instance, that of the Mongols. I hope that the second and third lectures will lead to a clear conviction on these points.

Critical historical research, as it developed with the nineteenth century, has taught us, to quote a well-known example, to understand Livy's account of the foundation of Rome as a legend. We have equally every good reason to treat the Ottoman tradition with suspicion and to examine it more closely, applying the methods of philological criticism. This means first to pursue this tradition back to its oldest available sources, and then to consider whether it contains any contradictory elements and whether it does not partly consist of borrowings from other legendary or historical narratives, which may be supposed to have been known to the surroundings in which it originated.

The official Ottoman tradition – which since the court historiography of the sixteenth century dominates all the historical works written by the Ottomans – attributes to Osman a line of 52 ancestors (or even more), which ends up with Noah of the Bible. It is important that the family tree leads through Gök Alp and his father, Oghuz Khan, because it is thereby connected with the tribal legend of the Oghuzes. The Oghuzes are one of the most important, we can very well say – considering the part they played in history – the outstanding branch of the Turkish people. In the tenth century the Oghuzes began to migrate from Central Asia towards the south and west; they penetrated in large numbers into Iran, Armenia, Anatolia,

the Caucasus and southern Russia, from there crossing the Danube into the Balkans, while others reached Mesopotamia and Syria. The Turkish hosts with the help of which the Seljuks established their rule over the greater part of the Islamic world during the eleventh century, were Oghuzes. Yet to this eleventh century, in which the Oghuz migration under the leadership of the Seljuks took place, belongs a work that tells us of the division of the Oghuzes into 24 tribes. It is the famous *Diwân lughât at-Turk*, written in 1077[5] in Baghdad, in Arabic, {8} by the Turk Mahmûd al-Kâshgharî and dealing not only with the language but also with the geography, history and folklore of the Turks. In spite of this old testimony, the division of the Oghuzes into 24 tribes can scarcely be considered as an historical reality, but rather as a systematizing legend, attributing to Oghuz Khan, the '*heros eponymos*' of the Oghuzes, 6 sons, and to each of them 4 sons, the 24 grandsons of Oghuz Khan. Mahmûd al-Kâshgharî states that in his time two of the 24 tribes had disappeared, but there is little probability that the exact number of 24 ever existed.[6] At first there was in any case a certain number of tribal names, which later on were rounded off, by adding or selecting, to 24, in order to attribute them genealogically, four and four, to the 6 mythical Sons of Oghuz: the Khan of the Sun (*Gün Khan*), the Moon Khan (*Ay Khan*), the Stars Khan (*Yıdız Khan*), the Heavens Khan (*Gök Khan*), the Mountains Khan (*Dagh Khan*) and the Khan of the Sea (*Deniz Khan*).[7] It is curious that though Oghuz and his son Gök Khan are mentioned among Osman's ancestors, the most important name in an Oghuz genealogy, that of the grandson of Oghuz, the name that ought to indicate a really existing Oghuz tribe, does not coincide with any of the traditional names. I showed in an analysis of the Ottoman family tree that among its 52 names 31 are recognizable as a block that was introduced only later into the genealogy of Osman, most probably in order to remove the chronological inconsistency of a family tree that between Osman and Noah contained only 21 names.[8] The existence of this original family tree of 21 names is expressly attested by older chronicles of the fifteenth century. Thus Shukrullâh, an historian of the time of Sultan Mehmed II, writes that Ertoghrul, Osman's father, is descended from Noah by Oghuz in the twenty-first generation. Though he does not communicate the names of Ertoghrul's ancestors, the interpolated block of 31 names is visible enough to be eliminated and to permit thus the reconstruction of the primitive genealogy. We find, then, that in this primitive genealogy there stands after the name of Gök Khan, and as the grandson of Oghuz, a name – that of {9} Çamundur – in

which we may easily recognize Çavuldur, which indeed in the Oghuz legend takes its place as one of the 4 sons of Gök Khan, and which is, moreover, identical with Çavdar {W.: 'Tshaudar'}, a real tribal name.

The interpolation in the genealogical tree was introduced at latest in the time of Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, when, as we have seen, the older genealogy of 21 names was likewise still known. The fact that such an interpolation, which splits the whole genealogical connection, was possible and could establish itself proves that any tribal feeling {among the Ottomans}, if such ever existed, had already disappeared. This conclusion is supported by a number of other facts. We see, for instance, that in the time of Mehmed II very diverse origins were attributed to the dynasty of Osman – for example, an Arabic one. Among the ancestors given to the Ottomans by historians of this epoch appears even a Byzantine prince of the house of the Comneni, who in the twelfth century emigrated to Konia, was there converted to Islam and married a daughter of the Seljuk Sultan {of Rûm}. We see that an author's imagination was free to invent and was not bound to a strong and living tradition.

But the most successful amongs all these genealogies was again an Oghuzian one, which traces back the line of Osman to Kayı, the eldest of the 4 sons of Gün Khan, the eldest son of Oghuz Khan. This genealogy is incompatible with the other one, which leads to Gök Khan, and not to his brother Gün Khan, a contradiction that gave much trouble to such a conscientious and instructed Ottoman historian as, for instance, Sa'deddîn of the sixteenth century; he contented himself with setting the two Oghuzian traditions side by side.[9] Another Ottoman writer, Bayâtî, who in 1481 composed a special little genealogical work, resolved the difficulty by changing Gök Khan into Gün Khan and by introducing Kayı as son of the latter, leaving the rest of the names unaltered.[10] Modern authors simply neglected the Gök Khan tradition and believed in the descent from Kayı. Yet even Fuad Köprülü has not been able to renounce this tradition, and he still maintains that the Ottomans are Kayı-Oghuzes and {10} that their state was originally based on tribal links.[11] Nevertheless the truth is evident. Yet the fact that Kayı is the eldest son of the eldest son of Oghuz, and that therefore the tribe of Kayı, the heir-apparent of Oghuz, is the most distinguished among all the Oghuz tribes, ought to arouse our suspicion from the beginning. The situation would be totally different if the legendary rank of Kayı was attested only at a later period, when the Ottomans had already risen to imperial power. In that case we might accept the view that the

Ottomans were really Oghuzes of the Kayı branch, the exceptional rank of which could be explained as a later invention introduced in order to accommodate the tradition to the high political destiny of the Ottomans. But the tribe of Kayı holds this first place as early as the eleventh century, long before the Ottomans were even thought of. It is true that the Kayıs stand second in the list of the Oghuz tribes given by Mahmûd al-Kâshgharî, but this is as good as the first place, because the preceding tribe is that of the reigning Seljuk family, and in a work written at their court their tribe was necessarily placed first.[12] Now the Kayı tribe placed at the head distinguished itself – so far as is known from the history of the Oghuzes – very little; on the contrary, the more famous Oghuzian dynasties belong to other tribes. The legend has remedied this by making the prophecy that in the end the power would be restored to its legitimate owner – the tribe of the eldest grandson of Oghuz, the Kayı.[13] It was therefore very tempting to represent the Ottoman rulers as descended from this very tribe. It would be of great interest to know when exactly this genealogy was first introduced among the Ottomans, for it is a definite indication of the development of their imperial ideals. We can prove that this genealogy, which under Mehmed II penetrated into the family tree of the Ottomans, was already in existence in the time of Mehmed's father, Murâd II. A history written in the last years of Murâd II, the Turkish version of Ibn Bîbî's *Seljuk-nâme* made by Yazıjioghlu 'Alî, is completely dominated by this Kayı-tradition.[14] But we find also, in the reign of the same Sultan Murâd II, Osman's descent from {11} Gök Khan, which is incompatible with a descent from Gün Khan's son Kayı, put forward and credited not only by the Ottomans themselves, but also at the court of the Karakoyunlu Jihânshâh, an eastern Turkish ruler with whom the Ottomans entertained friendly relations.[15] It is scarcely by chance that we cannot trace these two contradictory Oghuz traditions further back than the time of Murâd II – that is, not earlier than the first half of the fifteenth century. In view of the literary development of that period we may assume that the Kayı tradition was brought up in the time of Murâd II, when a first 'romantic' movement sprang up and awakened an interest in the national Turkish antiquities. Already under Murâd II this Kayı tradition was evidently taken up by the Ottoman court, for a coin[16] issued by this sultan bears the tribal sign, the 'tamgha', of the Kayı – a sign that after -wards became the token of the armoury of Istanbul.[17]

The Gök version, on the other hand, though in its genealogical form a product of the same 'romantic' movement and period, is clearly

connected with older traditions. In an Alexander epic, the *Iskender-nâme* of Ahmedî, written about 1400, we find a chapter that presents a short history of the Ottomans.[18] This chapter is nothing but a versification of an already existing chronicle belonging to the end of the fourteenth century, which has not been preserved, but is, with the aid of Ahmedî's verses, still recognizable in later chronicles into which it was absorbed. In this oldest source we read of the fraternity of arms that allied Ertoghrul, the father of Osman, with a certain Gök Alp and several other Oghuzes.[19] It is in this passage that later genealogical speculation found the material for its Oghuz genealogy. Moreover, there is a trace showing that the Gök Oghuz tribe of the Çavuldur did actually play a part in the early Ottoman history. This tribe was at first a dangerous foe in the service of an important neighbour emirate, that of Germiyan, and gave much trouble to the Ottomans, but it was overcome and probably certain elements of that tribe were among the Germiyan people who settled later on in the Otto{12}man territory.[20] They are the 'Çavdar {W.: Tshaudar} Tatars' of the old chronicles. In the ruins of the large Roman temple of Æzani, today Çavdar {W.: Tshodar}-hisar**,** they possessed to the south of Kütahya a fortress-like base. It is therefore not at all surprising that the most ancient Oghuzian tradition found among the Ottomans is connected with the name of Çavuldur, Gök Khan's son. But the Ottomans themselves – I emphasize this important fact – have originally nothing in common with this tradition, which only later on was introduced into their history.

Let us now return to the official tradition. It relates the history of Sulaymân, the father of Ertoghrul and grandfather of Osman, who had been Pâdishâh of Mahân, but later on migrated from there when the Mongols devastated the country. He moved towards Rûm, the country of the Rhomæans or Byzantines – that is, into Asia Minor – but later on turned towards Syria and met his end by drowning in the Euphrates near Aleppo when crossing the river close by the castle of Ja'ber. This part of the tradition can also be traced back to the reign of Mehmed II, and once again we can establish the existence of another and different tradition concerning the grandfather of Osman, a tradition in which this grandfather is given quite a different name and Sulaymân and his exploits are not mentioned at all.[21] Moreover, we find in the oldest source – that is, in the historical chapter of Ahmedî – no information whatever going back beyond Osman's father, Ertoghrul. This all proves that here too we have to deal with later literary inventions and not with real historical facts. The elements of

which these inventions consist are clearly borrowings from legendary and historical stories well known in Turkish Asia Minor of this period. Mahân, in the country of Merv, between Khurasân and Turkestan, is the birthplace of Abû Muslim,[22] the pacemaker of the 'Abbâsids, who was looked upon by the Turks as one of their own and venerated by them as their national hero, celebrated by an old and famous popular romance.[23] The flight before the Mongols finds its analogy in the life of the greatest saint of Anatolia, Jelâleddin Rûmî the founder of the Mevlevî {13} dervish order. These evident connections are, moreover, pointed out by the oldest of the Ottoman chronicles themselves, where this account is to be found.[24] As to Sulaymân and his expedition to Rûm, this is clearly nothing but a borrowing from a legendary source, which doubtless at that time was very well known in Turkish Anatolia. For the occupation of Asia Minor by the Turks in the eleventh century is closely linked with the name of Sulaymân, the Seljuk prince Sulaymân ibn Kutlumush, who ruled for several years in Nicaea, until this city was conquered by the Crusaders in 1097. Afterwards he turned towards Syria and gained a victory near Aleppo, but perished soon after in battle, though certainly not by drowning. But his son Kılıç Arslân lost his life almost in the same country in the floods of the Khâbûr, a river the name of which easily could be changed – either by oral or literary tradition – into that of Ja'ber {W.: 'Ga'ber'}, a castle situated on the great Euphrates and already famous in Turkish legend.[25] It is quite probable that {a} popular story ascribed the tale of the death of the son to the father, who as the predominant personality of the period of the first Turkish invasion must have been the hero of legendary folk-tales among the Turks of Asia Minor. Such a tale was then introduced into the history of the Ottomans by making Sulaymân the grandfather of Osman.

Philological criticism of the tradition therefore concludes that the descent of the Ottomans from an Oghuz tribe, as well as the story of the fate of this tribe and its leader, is an artificial creation of later speculative historiography, and that all these legends, which were still completely missing in the oldest source from the fourteenth century, must be attributed to the fifteenth century. The fact that at this time the historians were free to invent contradictory accounts is a sufficient proof that a true tribal tradition did not exist. The unity of the Ottoman state therefore cannot be found in natural tribal connections, but must have been built upon another basis.

In spite of the overgrowth of later speculation we find in the historical tradition of the Ottomans sufficient indications {14} to

discern clearly this basis of their first political life. Philological criticism had first to clear the way for these traces of genuine tradition. Now that we realize the great importance of the oldest Ottoman historical source, the versified chronicle of Ahmedî, we can go on to see that Ahmedî gives us a very exact idea as to what the Ottomans felt about themselves – and their state – that they were a community of Ghâzîs, of champions of the Muslim religion; a community of Muslim march-warriors, devoted to the struggle with the infidels in their neighbourhood.

The chapter that Ahmedî devotes in his *Iskender-nâme* to the history of the Ottoman sultans, the ancestors of his protector Sulaymân Çelebi, son of Bâyezîd I, begins with an introduction in which the poet solemnly declares his intention of writing a *Ghazavât-nâme*, a book about the holy war of the Ghâzîs.[26] He poses the question: 'Why have the Ghâzîs appeared at the last?' And he answers: 'Because the best always comes at the end. Just as the definitive prophet Mohammed came after the others, just as the Koran came down from heaven after the Torah, the Psalms and the Gospels, so also the Ghâzîs appeared in the world at the last', those Ghâzîs the reign of whom is that of the Ottomans. The poet continues with the question: 'Who is a Ghâzî?' And he explains:

> A Ghâzî is the instrument of the religion of Allâh, a servant of God who purifies the earth from the filth of polytheism (remember that Islam regards the Trinity of the Christian as polytheism); the Ghâzî is the sword of God, he is the protector and the refuge of the believers. If he becomes a martyr in the ways of God, do not believe that he has died – he lives in beatitude with Allâh, he has eternal life.

It is under the aspect developed in these introductory verses that the whole of Ottoman history is treated by the author. One might ask the question: 'But is this not once more a mere literary form introduced by the author?' A glance at the oldest epigraphic document we have from an Ottoman ruler will dissipate all such doubt. In this inscription from 1337, dealing with the erection of a mosque in {15} Brusa eleven years after the conquest of this city,[27] the Ottoman ruler gives himself the following titles: 'Sultân, son of the Sultân of the Ghâzîs, Ghâzî, son of Ghâzî, marquis of the horizons, hero of the world',[28] an ensemble of titles absolutely unique in the Ottoman protocol, where generally the classical and quite different formulas of the Seljuk period are used. We can therefore be sure that this strange formula is the expression of an historical reality, of the same reality that dominates the chapter of Ahmedî.

{16}

II Turkish Asia Minor up to the Osmanlıs

The onslaughts of the Arabs, who immediately after the death of the Prophet had seized the whole of Syria from the Byzantines, were checked on the borders of Asia Minor, which, in spite of the repeated efforts of Muslim armies, Byzantium was able to hold. From the ninth century the Byzantines were able even to take the offensive and to push the frontier a considerable way towards the south and the east. But it was only a short episode, followed in the eleventh century by a definite reverse. The fate of Anatolia was decided in 1071 by the battle of Manzikert, in the highlands of Armenia, where the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslân inflicted an overwhelming defeat on the Byzantine army and took the emperor prisoner. A few years after this, Turkish bands flooded the whole of Asia Minor up to the western coast, and one of their chiefs, the Seljuk prince Sulaymân – we mentioned him in the first lecture – established his headquarters in Nicaea, not far from Constantinople. At first glance one might be tempted to view this conquest as a political and military action of the Seljuk state. Closer consideration, however, shows that this was not the case, but that the conquest was rather the spontaneous work of elements only loosely connected with the Seljuk state.

The Seljuk state was the result of an Oghuzian migration movement from Turkestan into the Muslim world. By the middle of the eleventh century the leaders of this movement, the family of Seljuk, had become the masters of Eastern Islam. The new dynasty soon submitted to the traditions of the conquered territory. Their state, entirely fashioned after the Perso-Islamic manner, became a genuine Muslim power that concentrated all its efforts upon the Muslim {17} world. In the first instance they aimed at extending the realm of orthodoxy – that is, of the ‘Abbâsid Caliphate – which they now controlled, over Syria and Egypt, both of which were under the domination of the Shî’ite Fatimids. Upon Byzantium the Seljuks had no intentions. On

the contrary, they desired to remain definitely at peace with it, in order to secure their flank while they were engaged in Syria. It was only because they saw that peace with the Byzantines could not be secured otherwise, that they undertook the expedition that ended with their victory at Manzikert. This is quite apparent from the behaviour of the conquerors: their army did not penetrate much further into Byzantine territory; they treated the emperor, who had been taken prisoner, with magnanimity and sent him back to his country, confident of having won his friendship.[29] Thus the conquest of Asia Minor that followed the battle of Manzikert was not at all the work of the Seljuk government.

In order to explain the forces that brought about this conquest, it is necessary to review briefly the frontier conditions between Byzantium and Islam.[30] The continuous wars between these two powers led to a special military organization in the districts on both sides of the frontier. The conditions in these districts, which we shall call 'marches', were quite analogous on both sides, on the Byzantine marches as well as on the Muslim marches. The population of the marches was destined to perpetual frontier warfare. These march-warriors are continually in readiness to parry the raids of the enemy, and in turn also undertake similar raids, frequently penetrating deep into the territory of the foe. Booty constitutes for the marches the principal economic basis of life. Between the military borderlands and the peaceful and industrious hinter -land there exists the greatest cultural contrast, and this contrast is further accentuated by racial differences. The increase of the warlike elements, brought together from the most distant parts of the world, gives rise on both sides of the frontier to a curious mixture of nationalities and languages, to a population quite distinct from that of the hinterland. Moreover, there are {18} strong political and religious tensions between the marches and the hinterland. The continuous frontier fighting created warrior clans, faithfully devoted to their chiefs and aspiring to the greatest possible independence, fully conscious of their own importance in their relations with the government. They tend to offer resistance to all administrative interference, and especially detest taxation; on the contrary, they claim from the government honours, pay and military aid. In religious matters, too, a similar resistance is offered. The heresies, persecuted by the state-Church, find here a secure place of refuge, often an enthusiastic reception.

All these tensions enumerated above easily lead to open conflict, and then the march-warriors are quite ready to go over to the enemy

on the other side of the frontier. For in the same degree that they differ from their own hinterland, they resemble the march-warriors of the foe. Deeply rooted in one and the same eastern Anatolia, mingling with the same native population and deriving their cultural features from the same conditions of life, they are in daily contact with each other, and, moreover, this contact is not always belligerent. Prisoners, deserters and women taken from the other side facilitate the cultural exchange and assimilation.

On the Muslim marches already in the ninth century the Turkish element became dominant. The Turks were at this time the main representatives of the military class. They dominated not only the regular armies, but also the widespread popular movement of the Ghâzîs that appeared at first in the east, in Khorasan and in Transoxania.[31] This movement of the Ghâzîs – that is, the 'Warriors of the Faith' – attracted to its banner all the unemployed and dis contented warlike elements for the purpose of fighting infidels and heretics. It was, of course, primarily the hope of booty that brought together these hordes. This Ghâzî movement must have existed also very early at the most import ant frontier of Islam, that of eastern Anatolia, where it became so dominant later on that we may designate the Muslim march-warriors on this frontier as Ghâzîs, just as we call {19} the Byzantine march-warriors *Akritai*, a name made famous by the Byzantine epic *Digenis Akritas*.

It was especially at the beginning of the eleventh century that the Ghâzîs who were attacking the Byzantine territory became very strong. It is true that a large portion of the Turkish element, those who had immigrated during the great Oghuzian movement led by the Seljuks, was incorporated in the new Seljuk state as a warrior class endowed with fiefs. But there still remained outside of this system a considerable number of more or less autonomous groups of warriors, as well as the numerous independent tribes who continued their nomadic life in the midst of the Muslim countries. These warrior groups and nomadic tribes were only loosely connected to the dynasty and often gave trouble. All these elements tended to push towards the frontier and join the Ghâzîs, whose raids now became more and more numerous and daring. Long before the battle of Manzikert they even pillaged large cities of central Anatolia such as Sebastia {Sivas}, Caesarea {Kayseri}and Iconium {Konya}.[32]

The last-mentioned fact shows, on the other hand, that the Byzantine military organization of the frontier districts was at this time beginning to decline. The centralizing policy of the emperors of

the eleventh century, their measures of taxation and their attitude towards Armenia and the Armenian Church, had deeply affected the vital interests and also the national and religious feelings of the marches, where the Armenian element played an important role. The defeat of the Byzantine army in 1071, and the confusion that arose in the empire after the capture of the emperor, gave the signal for a rebellion in the border districts. A number of independent Armenian principalities grew up in the Taurus district and in Cilicia – those that later on were united into the kingdom of Little Armenia – and similar Armenian principalities only just failed to establish themselves round Caesarea and Malatia {Malatya}. These attempts to create independent local principalities threw all these districts into a state of anarchy, and the Byzantine system of defence completely collapsed. Its increasing weakness during the {recent} past decades {20} had encouraged the Ghâzîs to still more daring enterprises, and the success of these had in turn attracted further bands; now its complete collapse still more strongly drew towards Asia Minor all those elements that were not yet firmly incorporated into the Seljuk state. The natural leadership of these large and heterogeneous masses lay in the hands of those Ghâzîs who, through their prolonged stay in the neighbourhood, were already well acquainted with the territory of Rûm – i.e. of Byzantine Anatolia. There they felt themselves at home, and the population of the conquered lands also could not consider them as complete foreigners. On the contrary, the Ghâzîs may have appeared as natural defenders against those Turks who had come from far distant countries, and still more against the nomadic tribes. Owing to the fact that the leading part in this Turkish conquest was played by the Ghâzîs who had been prepared for it, a complete rupture in the Anatolian traditions of culture was avoided. It is not at all as if the Turkish invasion simply swept everything away. The astonishingly large number of old place names that survived the conquest proves by itself that the local culture of the conquered territories continued to exist as an important element in their later development.[33] The mode of life imported by the Ghâzîs was easily assimilated by the autochthonous element, with which they had much in common. This mixed borderland civilization now became after the conquest of the eleventh-century characteristic for the whole of Turkish Asia Minor. It was really only the Byzantine varnish that vanished, to be replaced later on by an Islamic one. The local substratum survived. There were also many Anatolian and especially Armenian elements, who joined the conquerors. And according to an old tradition an Armenian origin

was even attributed to the Dânishmends, the leading family amongs the Ghâzîs who achieved this conquest. The Dânishmends themselves claimed to be related to Ghâzî Seyyid Battâl, the famous hero of the Muslim marches of the Euphrates as well as of later Turkish Ghâzîs in Anatolia, even, I may add, of Ottoman Ghâzîs in the Balkans.

{21} As we have seen, Asia Minor was conquered without the participation of the Seljuk government. But, of course, the latter had to take into consideration the accomplished fact, and had, for its part, to step on to the scene of action, in order to secure for itself control over the newly conquered districts. A prince of the reigning family was then sent to Asia Minor: Sulaymân, the son of Kutlumush. This Kutlumush had rebelled against the head of the dynasty and in so doing had lost his life. One gains the impression that in dispatching Sulaymân the intention was to get rid of this prince rather than to take a serious interest in the newly conquered Asia Minor. Sulaymân himself considered his mission only as a stepping-stone, as an opportunity that would enable him to form in Anatolia an army among the Turks, with the aid of which he could turn eastwards, in order to create a dominion for himself in the territory of Old Muslim civilization, as his more fortunate uncles and cousins had done. At the first opportunity he tried to put his plan into action, but in this enterprise he lost his life. His son, too, kept his eyes turned towards the Old Muslim world. This was Kılıj Arslân, whose death in the river Khâbûr, in Mesopotamia, was mentioned in the first lecture. Not until the middle of the twelfth century did the successors of Sulaymân, established in the country round Konia, learn to renounce their dreams of a career in the Old Muslim world and to appreciate Asia Minor as their home and field of action. It was only now that they became in reality what they are called in history: the *Seljuks of Rûm*. This change of attitude on the part of the Konia Seljuks towards Asia Minor involved an unavoidable breach with the Dânishmends, who until then had held the undisputed leadership in Turkish Asia Minor.

The struggle between the Seljuks of Rûm and the Dânishmends for supremacy in Asia Minor was a struggle between two fundamentally different traditions of policy and culture. The Dânishmends were and remained Ghâzîs; they proudly called themselves such, and, seeing their only task in the continuation of conquest, they never achieved any real {22} political organization of their territory. Their star declined as fast as it had arisen. For Byzantium had meanwhile, under the first Comnenian emperor and mainly through the help of the Crusaders, been able to recapture western Asia Minor and its northern

coastal districts – that is, those parts that had not yet come under the influence of the march civilization – while the central and eastern Anatolian districts, long since impregnated with the mixed culture of the borderlands, definitively remained in the hands of the Turks. Thus the new political frontier was nearly identical with {the} old cultural one. Byzantium erected here a new dam of defence against the invaders, which was able to check them. The Turkish conquests came to a standstill. This was to have important consequences for the invaders, because, living for and from conquest, they were now robbed of their very means of existence. The members of the house of Dânishmend, who shared the large estates of the family – reaching from Malatia into northern Asia Minor as far as Ankara and westwards – now that the struggle against Byzantium had become too difficult, turned against each other, and they consumed themselves in mutual feuds, in which Byzantium and Konia often played their part behind the scenes.

In contrast to the Dânishmends, the Seljuks of Rûm had been mindful of their relationship with the lords of Baghdad, Syria and Iran, and followed the governmental and cultural traditions of the countries of Old Muslim civilization. They had therefore concentrated on turning their lands round Konia into a real Muslim principality, which was to resemble the neighbouring emirates of Syria and Mesopotamia, not only in political and military power, but also in order, administration, prosperity and culture. The state and territory of the Seljuks were naturally influenced also by the same factors that had given the territories of the Dânishmends their characteristic features; here again we find the same mixed culture at first predominating, and the state in danger of disintegrating into small principalities. But the tendency to transplant into Asia Minor the life and the traditions of {23} the Old Muslim civilization is evident; it succeeds and leads to the establishment of a progressively more stabilized and prosperous state. The fact that the dynasty of Konia belonged to the famous family of the Great Seljuks gave to their state such a far-reaching prestige that it attracted in sufficient numbers from Syria, Mesopotamia and Iran the Muslim theologians, merchants and artisans necessary for its development.

It is clear that in the struggle between Seljuks and Dânishmends the victory would lie with the former. This struggle continues until 1180, with repeated intervention on the part of the Byzantines, of the kingdom of Little Armenia, of the local Muslim principalities on the eastern border of Anatolia and of the emirs of northern Syria and

Mesopotamia. About 1180 the Dânishmends were eliminated, and with them disappeared from Asia Minor the element of instability, on whose support the Byzantines had counted. Thus, it is no mere chance that simultaneously with the end of the Dânishmends, the period during which Byzantium and the state of Konia opposed each other with large armies comes to an end. The great campaign of the Emperor Manuel I, which ended in 1176 with the complete defeat of the Byzantines at Myriokephaloi, was the last attempt to bring about an essential change of the frontiers by means of a large military expedition. During the last years of the twelfth-century minor expeditions were undertaken, but on the whole an equilibrium was maintained; this was confirmed by the conclusion of peace, and even of an alliance, at the very beginning of the thirteenth century. This complete change in Turko-Byzantine relations demands an explanation.

We have said that in 1180 both powers recognized the fact that there could be no further real change in the existing frontiers. The border in question was not so much a frontier line, but rather a border zone, a fairly wide strip of no-man's-land.[34] On the Byzantine side the frontier was again organized as Akrit{ic} marches, following the old and well-proved tradition. The Byzantines had succeeded in regaining this frontier by repelling the Turkish invaders from the coastal {24} districts into the interior; therefore we naturally find concentrated in the no-man's-land along the frontier all those elements that had once victoriously advanced as far as the coast of the Aegean Sea and had then been forced to retreat. These elements are described in the sources as 'Turks of the *uj*' or as 'Turkomans'. *Uj* {Tu.: *uc*} means 'ending', 'point', 'frontier', 'march'; it is therefore the exact equivalent of the Greek ακρα {*akra*}, from which the Byzantine march-warriors derived their name of 'Akritai'. In the same way that the new Akritai on the Byzantine side continued the traditions of the former marches of the Taurus and the Euphrates, the Turks of the *uj* took up the traditions of the Ghâzîs of Malatya and Cilicia. For instance, the river Dalaman, which marked the frontier in the south-west, received at that time the name of Battâl river after Ghâzî Seyyid Batttâl, and in the centre of these marches an old Byzantine monastery was transformed to the famous sanctuary of Seyyid Ghâzî.[35] After the extermination of the Dânishmends these Ghâzîs were joined by kindred elements from the former Dânishmend possessions. Members of the deposed dynasty, together with their followers, found a refuge in the western marches, where they naturally played a leading part.

The name of 'Turkomans', by which the Turks of these districts were also known, refers more to the nomadic tribes for whom this hilly no-man's-land represented an ideal place of abode. According to the needs of the season, they could drive their herds into the Byzantine coastal regions, and equally into the interior of the Seljuk territory. Wandering from place to place, with their women and children and their herds, they gave the impression of being peaceful shepherds; but whenever the opportunity arose they very quickly changed into bold robbers and warriors. These nomads were especially dangerous to the few towns that, though situated in the no-man's-land, were still in the possession of the Byzantines. When once the Turkoman nomads had occupied the hills surrounding such a town, the latter not only found itself completely cut off from its hinterland, but hindered in all movements, even in the immediate neighbourhood of its {25} walls. If there was no help at hand from Byzantine troops there remained only one solution, temporary though it often was: to solicit the protection of the Sultan of Konia. It was in this way that quite a number of towns in western Asia Minor gradually came, during the last years of the twelfth century, under the sovereignty of the Seljuks after a period of complete isolation and hopeless effort to exist on their own resources.[36] The warlike young men among the Turkomans liked to join the ranks of the Ghâzîs, thus increasing the forces of the march-warriors; and the latter in return were ready to give armed assistance to the Turkomans. In this way many Byzantine towns in the no-man's-land of the frontier were taken also by force.[37]

In the twenty-five years after 1180 the Byzantine frontier broke up very considerably.[38] At that time there was great confusion in the imperial house, and this prevented any serious military expedition for the protection of the frontier. Further, we find that several Byzantine feudal lords attempted to establish independent local principalities in the marches. There appeared a number of Comnenian pretenders, who waged war with the empire from Seljuk territory, using troops they had enlisted among the Turks. Luckily for Byzantium, during just those last critical years of the twelfth century the state of Konia was also paralyzed by the internal quarrels of the dynasty. The incorporation of the estates of the Dânishmends proved to be a serious menace to the unity of the Seljuk sultanate, for the provinces, under the Seljuk princes who had been appointed as their governors, all tried to regain their former independence. The legitimate successor to the sultanate, Kaikhosrou I, had, during these internal struggles, to take refuge in Constantinople. One of his rebellious brothers, Rukneddîn,

succeeded in forcibly re-establishing the unity of the sultanate. In July, 1204, he took Ankara and thus put an end to the last separate Seljuk principality. But he died only a few days later, leaving a child as his successor.

The year 1204, in which the state of Konia definitively united under its rule the whole of Turkish Asia Minor, but {26} also suddenly lost the powerful creator of its unity, is similarly an important turning-point in Byzantine history. It was the year in which the Latins of the Fourth Crusade seized Constantinople and the European lands of the empire. Byzantium was reduced to its provinces in western Asia Minor, where it was reconstructed: we mean the Nicaean Empire. These events, though they were extremely harsh for Byzantium, had the most fortunate consequences for Greek Anatolia. For now these formerly neglected frontier lands represented the territory of the empire proper, in which the emperor and his whole army were resident and on which he concentrated the whole of his attention and care. In this way the frontiers received resources of defence such as they had never had before. Since the Byzantine Empire was really re-established in western Asia Minor, it was able to hold unimpaired all its territory throughout the whole Nicaean period. Its Turkish neighbours soon realized that any attack on the frontier meant nothing but a useless and unprofitable adventure. For more than half a century this frontier was free even from the raids of the Ghâzîs and the rapacity of the Turkomans. There was not only peace, but even an alliance between Byzantium and the state of Konia.

In Konia, after the death of the successful usurper Rukneddîn in 1204, it was impossible to leave the government to his son, who was still a child, and the lawful sultan, Kaikhosrou, who had lived in exile in Byzantium, was recalled to the throne. During his stay in Constantinople Kaikhosrou had gained the friendship of Theodore Lascaris, the later founder of the Nicaean Empire; later on, during the period of confusion caused by the Latin conquest, Kaikhosrou went somewhere in Greek Asia Minor, and there, near the frontier, got into touch with the descendants of the Dânishmends, established, as we have seen, in these Turkish marches.[39] It was with the help of these march-warriors, but also by the aid of the Byzantines, that he regained his throne in 1205. He therefore had good cause to be friendly with the Byzantines. The friendship with the Seljuks was of vital importance for the Byzantines during the first critical years {27} of the Nicaean period, and was interrupted only once, in 1210, by a war of short duration, which was caused not by the desire for conquest,

but through the intervention of the sultan in favour of the ex-Emperor Alexios III. At that time the Empire of Nicaea was already strong enough to repel this attack, which even cost Kaikhosrou his life. After this episode the friendship and alliance were soon re-established and, further more, persisted, proving that they were a necessity for both sides. The Byzantines were fully engaged with the Latins and wished for peace on the eastern frontier, the status quo of which they had accepted; the Seljuks realized that in view of the powerful position that the Byzantines now held in Asia Minor, any expansion in that direction was impossible. They therefore sought friendship with the Byzantines and directed their activities elsewhere.

We have seen that Kaikhosrou was restored to his throne not only by the help of the Byzantines, but also through the assistance of the chiefs of the marches. Consequently the links between the marches and the state of Konia grew stronger. The Dânishmends of the marches, who had come to the aid of the sultan, regained in return some of the former private property of their family, and, further, they were installed in high positions in the sultanate. The sultan, moreover, expressed his gratitude to the march-warriors by erecting magnificent buildings in Seyyid Ghâzî, at the site of their sanctuary.[40] The interest that the Seljuk sultan had in the Dânishmends is demonstrated by the fact that later on ‘Alâeddîn Kaiqobad, the son of Kaikhosrou, ordered the history of the deposed rival dynasty to be written down.[41] Nevertheless the Seljuks must always have clearly felt the contrast between themselves and the Ghâzîs, for although they took many titles, they always avoided that of Ghâzî. The close relations that existed now between the Seljuks and the Ghâzîs permitted the former to prevent the march-warriors from attacking the territory of their Byzantine friends, and to establish security and peaceful communications in this border zone. The state of Konia had, on the other hand, to provide some compensation for the Ghâzîs: {28} they were sent against Little Armenia, the Greek state of Trapezund, and Georgia; they even undertook an expedition overseas into the Crimea. The sultanate of Rûm was then at its zenith, and the name of the dynasty, which had once ruled the greater part of the Muslim world, and now existed only in this Anatolian branch, won new glory in the days of Sultan ‘Alâeddîn Kaiqobad I (1219–1236).

By their illustrious descent from the great rulers of the eleventh century the Seljuk sultans of Konia enjoyed an immense prestige in the Muslim world, and they themselves were conscious of a special legitimacy and dignity. At the height of their power they even may

have played with the idea of claiming a universal realm. But it would be quite wrong to speak of an Empire of Konia, for this state was, even at the best of times, a political power of only second or third order; in regard to cultural development it was, in the eyes of the Old Muslim countries, only a march at the edge of the Muslim world. For although mosques were erected in the high style of Islam in the towns of the sultanate of Rûm, and a great number of theologians expounded their learning in the medreses, though Muslim law and Muslim financial administration were established, even though Persian poetry was cultivated at the court of the sultan, and imposing caravanserais were built along the trade routes for the safety and comfort of the Muslim merchants who poured in from distant countries, yet this state displayed only too plainly the features of a mixed culture. This is not surprising, for the sultanate was established in territory taken from the Byzantines not more than 150 years before. The Christian population still existed, although it had suffered much during the conquest, and, moreover, its churches and monasteries maintained their connection with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. We even know of cases where the sultan forcibly removed the whole population of a Byzantine frontier district, and settled them in his territory as free peasants endowed with privileges.[42] The Christian element also had great influence at court. The sultans had Christian women in their harems; some of them had Christian mothers. Konia {29} was the natural refuge for Byzantine emigrants, who some times, without renouncing their faith, held important positions in the Seljuk state, in which, on the whole, Christian renegades played an important part. The mixed culture was still more obvious in the rural districts and in those parts that had recently belonged to the Dânishmends, and it was completely dominant on the frontiers.

What we have said of the conditions in the marches of the districts of the Taurus and the Euphrates holds good for these new border lands, only that here in Asia Minor the process of cultural assimilation was even more intensive. For this process was the continuation of what had already begun in the old marches of the east and now took place under far more favourable conditions. The Turks had now been living for generations in Anatolia, among the indigenous population, from whom the Ghâzîs chose their wives, and from whom they were joined by renegades, especially by warlike young men. A large part of the nomadic population had also settled down here; the old tribal units were dissolved and replaced by village communities.

As far as the Byzantine territory was concerned, the first Turkish

invasion in the eleventh century had left traces that could not be obliterated. Nomadic tribes continued to drive their herds far into the lowlands of the coastal districts and to some extent even settled down in that country. Later on, when the Empire of Nicaea was again securely established in Europe, hordes of Turks that, coming from southern Russia, crossed the Danube and penetrated into the Balkans were transplanted into western Asia Minor, in order to reinforce the military element in the Byzantine marches.[43] Such measures had become necessary since the middle of the thirteenth century, for in spite of the good relations with the sultanate of Konia, the pressure of the Turkish border elements was now again increasingly felt along the whole length of the frontier. The explanation of this renewed activity on the Turkish marches is to be found in the history of the sultanate of Konia.

We saw that in the beginning of the thirteenth century {30} the sultans had succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Ghâzîs and even in gaining their services for the purposes of their state. But in the last years of the reign of ‘Alâeddîn Kaiqobad this harmony was considerably disturbed. The terrible confusion that the Mongol invasion had brought upon the whole Orient diverted both large tribes of Turkish nomads[44] and also military bands from the dispersed armies[45] towards the state of Konia, which until then had been preserved from the Mongol attack. The fugitives were naturally dispatched into the pasture lands of the frontier districts and increased just those elements that were in latent opposition to the state of Konia. A new impetus was then given to the growing discontent, and under the son of Kaiqobad, in 1239, a strong religious and social revolt broke out among the Turkomans. This was the movement of Baba Ishâk, which was fiercely suppressed, but it met with much sympathy on the frontiers and continued to exist there;[46] it deepened the cleavage that already separated the marches and the state and deprived the latter for ever of the help of the most valuable warlike Turkish elements. The weakness of the sultanate became manifest at the first encounter with the Mongols in 1243: a detachment of the Mongol army was sufficient to rout completely the army of the Seljuks, in spite of their Byzantine auxiliary troops and even Norman mercenaries. Henceforth the sultans of Konia sank lower and lower and became the vassals of the Mongols, who used them as a convenient instrument for the fiscal exploitation of Anatolia.

On the other hand, the border lands kept their independence, and it became increasingly clear that they were cutting loose from Konia.

The Seljuk sultan now could no longer hinder them from attacking the Byzantine frontier. For these raids were by then more than ever a vital necessity for the marches. During the long period of peace the march-warriors had settled down and had increased in numbers. Their situation became precarious as soon as the sultan was no longer able to send them on raiding expeditions. More over, all those who had cause to fly before the Mongols now poured into the marches – leading personalities of the Seljuk {31} state who had fallen into disgrace with the new lords, peasants and citizens whom intolerable taxation had driven away, nomads who sought refuge here, fearing the plunder of their herds. In this steadily increasing mass of human beings, uprooted from their accustomed existence and composed of the most contrasting elements, once more the Ghâzîs were the deciding factor. They were joined by the military elements from among the newcomers, in the first instance by the prominent personalities of the Seljuk state, who had taken refuge here with their followers and naturally played a leading part. We must also make mention of another important element, that of the 'holy men', the shaikhs and dervishes, who had fled from Iran and Turkestan to Anatolia. As religious and at the same time political leaders of the population of their countries, they had been the leading spirits in resistance to the Mongols and naturally had to flee before the conquerors. As spreaders of heretical doctrines they were less welcome in the Seljuk towns, where, moreover, they would not have been safe from the Mongols. But in the marches they found security and a warm reception. They carried religious enthusiasm into those dense and excited masses, who were prepared for any daring enterprise. Here at the frontier, and in the milieu of the Ghâzîs, this enthusiasm soon took on the forms of a fanatic resolve to war against the infidel. Fresh attacks on the Byzantine frontiers soon made it clear to the Ghâzîs that the enemy no longer possessed his old power of resistance, and no longer had the sympathy of the Akritai. In many places the frontier was only sparsely garrisoned, and its defenders were easily persuaded to join the invaders. For Byzantium was no longer the Empire of Nicaea. It had once again gained ground in Europe. Since the Basileus had returned to Constantinople, the centre of gravity of the imperial policy again moved westward. Not only the army but also some detachments of Akritai were recalled from Asia Minor and sent to fight in the Balkans. The eastern frontier was therefore unprotected and the remaining Akritai felt the insecurity of their position. Further, grave discontent had been caused among {32}

the soldier-peasants by the agrarian and financial policy of the Palaeologoi, which favoured the great landlords, such as the nobility and the Church, but weighed heavily on the small peasant landowners; the situation was further complicated by a political conflict, by reason of the attitude that the Akritai, the supporters of the legitimate Lascarids, took towards the usurper Palaeologos.

The consequence of all this was soon made manifest. The resistance that was shown here and there, mainly by the towns, towards the oncoming Turks, broke down almost everywhere. In many places the enemy were even led into the country by the Akritai themselves. The Turkish hosts, driven by despair, lack of space, desire for booty and religious fanaticism, pressed on with astonishing force and number into the western provinces of Asia Minor, which by 1300 were hopelessly lost. The territory was divided into a number of Turkish Ghâzî principalities, of which that of Osman was predestined to attain the position of a world-empire.[47]

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III From the Emirate of the March-Warriors to the Empire

We have seen that the conquest of Asia Minor by the Turks was achieved in two stages. Although the Turks, towards the end of the eleventh century, had overrun the whole of Asia Minor, yet they were able to keep only the central and eastern parts of the peninsula. It was not till fully 200 years later, towards the end of the thirteenth century, that they became, by a second invasion, the lords of western Asia Minor also. Both invasions were comparable neither to a well-planned military occupation on the part of a conquering state, nor to the invasions of nomadic peoples. On the contrary, both were the outcome of a long existing tension, resulting from the increasing growth of the offensive power of the Turks and the continual decrease in the defensive forces of the Byzantines. A breach in the frontier dam gave a free inlet to long pent-up floods. Nomadic Turks, who still retained their tribal system, took part in both invasions — that is, they

followed the conquerors into the land after its subjugation. But in both cases they played a subordinate part in comparison with the Ghâzîs, those march-warriors who for generations had attacked and overrun the frontier and had become familiar with the country of their future conquests; it was these Ghâzîs who led and largely achieved the conquests. And naturally the leaders of the Ghâzîs became the princes of the emirates that were founded in the newly conquered lands.

On the other hand, we have seen that the invaders held only those regions that as border districts had already assimilated to a certain extent the cultural features of the invaders and that, as marches, stood in marked contrast to {34} their hinterland in regard to racial composition and to cultural, social, religious and political life. The invasion of the eleventh century was thrown back by the Byzantines to the old cultural frontier, and there came to a standstill. Although western Asia Minor was thereby saved, it was at the cost of itself becoming a march. It had already undergone marked changes in its cultural and racial elements during the twenty to thirty years of the first occupation, and it now received, during the next 200 years, the characteristics of the mixed culture so typical of the frontier districts. So, after generations in contact with their foe, who lived under the same conditions and with whom they were brought into closer contact by having a similar racial composition, these districts were now ready to fall permanently into the hands of the Turks at their next onslaught.

We have traced the history of Turkish Anatolia up to this second invasion, when there sprang up in western Asia Minor, in the second half of the thirteenth century, a number of Ghâzî emirates, established in the conquered lands. Among these was the emirate of Osman, the nucleus from which the Ottoman Empire later developed. In the first lecture we investigated the historical tradition of the origin of the Ottomans, and came to the conclusion that the oldest and best tradition, the only one which stands the test of historical criticism, clearly shows the Ottomans as Ghâzîs and their chiefs as leaders of an ever-growing and powerful Ghâzî organization. We now see how excellently this result of philological analysis fits into the picture that we have sketched by taking a more general view of the historica1 development. The other emirates of western Asia Minor were also Ghâzî emirates. Not one of them shows any trace whatever of tribal consciousness or of tribal origin; every one of them originated from the Ghâzî organization that had conquered the respective district and had as ruler its chief, who became the founder of a dynasty.

At first the Ottomans played a very modest part among the other

emirates. The emirate of Menteshe, in the extreme south-western corner of Asia Minor, seems to be the oldest, {35} and was at first the most important. I have dis cussed the peculiar origin of this state in a monograph, and have shown that its conquerors came by sea, from the Seljuk coast of Lycia and Pamphylia,where even such a great seaport as Adalia was already Turkish since the beginning of the thirteenth century. There the Ghâzîs combined with the seafaring inhabitants of the coastal districts in joint piratical expeditions. These Ghâzî pirates, originally a mixture of Turks and indigenous elements from the neighbourhood of Byzantine territory, had a free field by reason of the decline of the Byzantine fleet. For in 1284 the emperor had ordered, for the sake of economy, the dismantling of the fleet. Pachymeres, the contemporary Byzantine historian of these events, tells us that a large number of the Byzantine mariners were compelled, owing to their unemployment, to join the enemy, the pirates. Thus here on the coast we find conditions exactly com - parable to those of the land frontiers in the interior. The Ghâzî pirates settled permanently in the towns of the Carian coast and the valley of the Meander, which they reached on their ships. Taking under their leadership the Turks who were pouring in from the interior, they created the principality of Menteshe, which conquered even Rhodes. But as early as 1310 the Knights of St. John drove them out, and by establishing themselves in Rhodes prevented the pirate state of Menteshe from making any large-scale expedition against the coasts and islands of the Aegean Sea.[48]

Menteshe soon lost its leadership, which passed to its northern Turkish neighbour, the emirate of Aydın; this emirate, advancing from the interior, had taken possession first of the hinterland of Smyrna and then also of its coast. The Ghâzî corsairs of Menteshe, seeing themselves paralyzed by the Hospitallers, now rallied round the princes of Aydin. Under Ghâzî Umûr Beg they raided the coasts of Greece, Macedonia and Thrace. Employed as auxiliary troops during the internal conflicts of these countries, they penetrated deep into the interior and returned to the Anatolian coast, richly laden with booty. They were the forerunners of the Ottomans in raiding the Balkans, and when later they were {36} incorporated in the Ottoman state, they were able to make the important contribution of a regular navy as well as a pirate fleet. The latter usually carried out its daring expeditions on its own initiative, although for the most part with the knowledge and approbation of the government, and was at the service of the latter whenever it was required. The emirate of Aydin was a

particularly fortunate combination of land- and sea-Ghâzîs;[49] it required the alliance of Venice, Cyprus and the Knights of St. John, at papal instigation, to put a stop to their exploits. The forces sent by the Christian allies occupied the port of Smyrna in 1344, and four years later Ghâzî Umûr Beg fell when attempting to recapture it.

To the north of Aydin two other coastal emirates had developed from the conquests of the Ghâzîs: Sarukhan with its capital Magnesia (Tu.: Manisa), and Karasi in the Trojan plain, at the edge of the Dardanelles.[50] In the south of Anatolia, round Adalia, there was another coastal emirate, that of Tekke, and in the north that of Sinope {Tu.: Sinop}, the small pirate state of Ghâzî Çelebi, whose daring exploits were directed mostly against the Crimea and the Greeks of Trapezund. There were also a number of emirates of varying size in the interior, such as, for instance, that of the Jandar in Paphlagonia and that of Hamid to the north of Tekke, and, above all, the two large emirates of Germiyan and Karaman. The Ghâzî character of these two last-mentioned emirates is less evident.

Germiyan consisted of the old Turko-Byzantine march of Phrygia. Its capital Kütahya had already belonged to the Seljuks since the end of the twelfth century. The dynasty descended from a family that had played a prominent part in the Seljuk state; very probably they had retreated into the marches from the Mongols and here succeeded in creating an emirate. The emirate of Germiyan was already established when the Turkish conquests in western Anatolia began. It did not itself achieve these conquests, but certainly took part in them. For instance, the founder of the principality of Aydin was a military chief from Germiyan. The emirates {37} that grew up in the west were therefore independent of Germiyan, but showed to the latter the respectful attitude due to an older protecting power. In relation to these Ghâzî emirates Germiyan plays the role of a hinterland and is the heir to Seljuk traditions. It is not surprising that its rulers avoided the title of Ghâzî and left this to their western neighbours and vassals. Only the emirate of the Ottomans, Germiyan's neighbour to the north, was not under its influence. We even find in the sources traces of a former enmity,[51] which may be due to the efforts of Germiyan to bring the Ottomans as well under its suzerainty.

We still have to mention Karaman, which originally was doubtless a Ghâzî state; it arose out of the southern Seljuk marches, on the frontier of Little Armenia – that is, in the old frontier district of the Taurus. It seems that the religious and social movement of Baba Ishâk, which had broken out among the Turkomans in 1239 and strongly

affected the Seljuk state, played a part in the establishment of the emirate of Karaman. But after the disappearance of the Seljuks in about 1300 the Karamans increasingly took possession of the former Seljuk state and made Konia their capital. It was then that their state progressively accepted the old Seljuk traditions. The Karamans even suggested that they were the lawful heirs to the Seljuks, and they claimed a dominant position among the emirates of Anatolia.[52] We learn from this brief outline of the political structure of Anatolia during the fourteenth century that the Ghâzî character of the Ottoman state was not peculiar to it alone, but that quite a number of other emirates also owed their origin to the Ghâzî movement and continued its traditions.[53]

What, then, are these Ghâzî traditions? In addition to the common battle-cry against the infidels and the peculiar social and cultural individuality of the marches, do we find the Ghâzîs characterized by special institutions and regulations, by virtue of which they could feel themselves to be distinct from other communities, and which would give internal stability to their organizations and be of significance in building up a Ghâzî state? We know that the Ghâzîs {38} acknowledged the *futuwwa*.[54] The futuwwa, to give a brief explanation, was a canon of rules by means of which the virtuous life, as understood by Islam with its mystical inclination, might be lived. Various Islamic corporations were based on the futuwwa, which they took as their moral guide. For instance, in addition to the Ghâzîs, we find a futuwwa corporation called Akhîs, which was a brotherhood consisting of artisans and merchants. These futuwwa corporations were reorganized about 1200 by the caliph an-Nâsir. This last great ‘Abbâsid bent all his energies to restoring the secular power of the caliphate and organizing Islam against the attacks of the Crusaders. His regulation of the futuwwa probably served the same ends and aimed at marshalling all those forces that were of military importance and attaching them to the person of the caliph. Doubtless the guilds of artisans had military potentiality, but of far greater importance were the proper military organizations, led by their own leaders, the emirs. This element, socially and racially distinct from the rest of the population, obviously had to be organized in a corporation of a more chivalrous kind. The corporations of Ghâzîs admirably supplied the required qualities, and were excellently adapted to the programme of the caliph by reason of what was already their dominating idea – namely, war against the unbelievers. And, from the time of the caliph an-Nâsir onwards, the title of Ghâzî was held by powerful princes of

Syria and northern Mesopotamia, both countries that in the time of the Crusaders had become frontier districts, threatened by the Christians. These princes were bound to the caliph by the bonds of the futuwwa, which imposed on both the follower and the 'senior' ('seigneur') the obligation of mutual fidelity. Similar bonds evidently existed within the corporation between the emir and his 'knights'. Thus the popular Ghâzî movement, which in that time of struggle against the Crusaders found a sure response also in the centres of Islam and inevitably increased in prestige, became now, in Syria and Mesopotamia, an institution comparable to the European knighthood. In the far-off Anatolian marches the Ghâzî movement {39} doubtlessly remained a popular one. But, even so, many of the features that were characteristic of knighthood must have been inherent in this popular movement, and sooner or later some influences of the Ghâzî knighthood evolved in the Old Muslim countries could not fail to appear and to strengthen these features. In any case we have a whole array of facts showing that among the Ghâzîs of Anatolia there were current certain ideas, customs and bonds that on the one hand make clear their connection with the futuwwa, and on the other hand indicate that the Ghâzîs of Anatolia, or at least the leading elements among them, felt that they were a group, linked together by special bonds.[55] We find in the biographies of the Mevlevî shaykhs, by Eflâkî, written about the middle of the fourteenth century, clear traces of a ceremony of granting the title of Ghâzî, comparable to that of investiture with knighthood in the West. We are told how one of the emirs of the house of Aydin was designated as 'Sultan of the Ghâzîs' by the shaykh of the Mevlevî dervish order. From the hands of the shaykh he received the latter's war-club, which he laid on his own head and said: 'With this club will I first subdue all my passions and then kill all enemies of the faith'. This ceremony means that the emir accepted the shaikh as his 'senior', and his words show that the quality of Ghâzî also involved ethical obligations. Lastly, the conferring of a personal weapon by the senior corresponds to a well-known regulation of the ceremonial canon of the futuwwa. 'Âşıkpaşazâde, an Ottoman historian of the fifteenth century, tells a legendary tale the real meaning of which was no longer understood at his time. In this tale, Ghâzî Osman presents to one of his lieges, on the occasion of the granting of a fief, his own sword and a drinking-cup. Here we again have the presentation of a personal weapon. But the cup is certainly a survival of a Ghâzî ceremony, for we know that the cup plays an important part in the rites of the futuwwa. We know,

further, that the Ghâzîs distinguished themselves from the rest of the population by a special head-dress, a white cap, introduced among the Ghâzîs of the western Anatolian marches towards the end of the {40} thirteenth century and retained by the Ottomans until very late. These examples will suffice. We may be sure that the title of Ghâzî, held by certain emirs and avoided by others, was used with the intention of expressing the peculiar character and tendency of a state whose ruler was a Ghâzî.

A Ghâzî state was a body that aimed at military conquest. The chief had the allegiance of his followers in return for the obligation to provide them with the means of livelihood, which meant the acquisition of booty. At the time of its foundation a Ghâzî state was so entirely composed of the warrior elements that it at first lacked the elements necessary for the organization and utilization of the conquered territory, such as clergy, peasants, artisans, merchants. The country, after having suffered much through its conquest, was rapidly drained of its resources, and new conquests, or at least raids, soon became necessary. It was only when these conquests or raids came to a stop, and the conquerors were forced to fall back on their own resources, that they were faced with the task of reconstructing and organizing their country. Since they themselves had not the elements necessary for this purpose, they were forced to attract such elements into their land from outside. The only Ghâzî state that succeeded in solving this problem was that of the Ottomans. The rest fell back, after a short period of prosperity, the period of successful raids, into insignificance and weakness, and this decline was accompanied and accelerated by internal feuds, the same fate that had befallen the Dânishmends in the twelfth century, 200 years before.

What was it that preserved the Ottomans from a similar fate? I give the answer in advance: it was above all the tenacious resistance with which the Byzantines opposed them, a resistance that indeed was imperative against an enemy who threatened the immediate neighbourhood of their capital. While the armed expeditions that the Byzantines had dispatched from time to time against the other western emirates had already ceased – it was in 1304 that the last, that of the Catalan Company, was sent – and while these emirates had already consolidated their conquests, the Ghâzîs {41} of Osman had hardly achieved their first and very modest successes; for they were held up by a defensive system that here, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, was carefully maintained, and which included such strongholds as Nicaea, to whose assistance the whole imperial army

could be brought in a few hours.

But in the struggle with this extraordinary resistance the Ghâzî state of Osman developed its extraordinary strength. The grave sternness and tenacious courage that distinguish this state in its later history were deeply imprinted upon its soul during these years of its early youth. During this long period of fighting the Ghâzîs of Osman were joined by all those hosts of warriors who, in the other emirates with definitely established frontiers, found no further occupation. In this way the small state of the Ottomans disposed of disproportionally large war forces, and its dynamic power was thus tremendously increased. In comparison with the rate of the conquests in western Anatolia, success seemed at first to come very slowly: Brusa did not fall until 1326, Nicaea fell in 1331. Then, at about 1340, almost everything that could possibly be seized from the Byzantines in Asia Minor was conquered. Only a few towns on the coast in close proximity to the capital still held out. An attack on the capital itself, whose mighty walls and buildings arose on the other side of the Bosphorus, could not yet be dreamed of. So there was of necessity a pause.

During this interval of respite the frontiers of the emirate were probably extended eastward into the interior, where Mongol rule was rapidly declining. But, above all, they took advantage of this pause to settle down in the conquered regions. As we have emphasized, the Ghâzîs had in general very largely adapted themselves to the districts that they had conquered. This is especially true of the Ottomans, who had to confront the Byzantine Akritai for a period of half a century longer than the Turks of the other Ghâzî emirates. Owing to the slow advance of their conquest they had ample time to settle down in their newly acquired possessions and to make use of them. When they seized the fairly {42} large towns of Bithynia and its fertile plains, they already possessed the experience with which to administer such a country. The fact that the Ottomans had in such large measure adapted themselves to the civilization of the country that they attacked made it all the easier for the Akritai to join them in groups, and for forts and smaller towns to capitulate voluntarily. In view of the difficulty of their task, peaceful conquests of this kind and any increase in their forces were welcome to the Ottomans, and they certainly did everything to promote desertion among their adversaries. From the fact that a detachment of Catalans[56] joined them in 1305, we see that even totally alien elements entered their ranks. The famous Ottoman Ghâzî family Mikhaloghlu (‘Michael -sons’), which

still exists at the present day, never forgot that they were the descendants of a Christian renegade who had joined Osman.

Nor must we forget that the Ottomans were situated closer to the districts of Seljuk urban culture than any of the remaining Ghâzî emirates. At a short distance to their rear lay Eskishehir, the ancient Dorylaeum, a town on the important trade route Konia–Constantinople, which led, moreover, through the Ottoman territory. This connection with the Muslim hinterland is of the greatest importance, for only this hinterland was capable of providing the Ottomans with the elements indispensable for the organization and utilization of the conquered lands. It has quite rightly been pointed out that the Akhîs already appear in the first period of the Ottoman state as an important element. You may recall that the Akhîs were guilds of artisans and merchants, organized on the basis of the futuwwa. The presence of Akhîs shows that at a very early date numerous urban elements had joined the Ottomans from the hinterland. Of still greater importance are the ‘ulemâ, the Muslim clergy, who represented the forces capable of developing an administrative system. Immediately after the conquest of Brusa and Nicaea, schools of theology (medreses) were erected in these towns. This proves that the ‘ulemâ had already acquired a strong position in the Ottoman state. The early {43} intervention of the ‘ulemâ is also of importance in another way: together with the Old Muslim governmental traditions they brought the principle of tolerance towards Christians and Jews, which was closely connected with their financial policy, based on the payment of tribute by the non-Muslims in return for this toleration. Thus they exercised a very necessary influence over the Ghâzî state. For although the Ghâzîs were very tolerant regarding the civilization of the conquered country, they them -selves having long since taken root in that civilization, yet they were and remained the relentless ‘warriors of the faith’, continually incited by fanatical dervishes to force Islam upon the inhabitants of the conquered country. We may say that while a breach in the civilization was avoided thanks to the Ghâzî character of the conquerors, it is due to the early intervention of the ‘ulemâ that this civilization could continue to exist under the preserving forms of the old creed. This was especially the case in the towns, where the influence of the ‘ulemâ was predominant.

But the Ottoman inscription of 1337 on the mosque at Brusa, of which we spoke in our first lecture, shows us how strongly the leaders of this state felt themselves to be Ghâzîs. The pause that set in after

the conquest of Bithynia had been accomplished could only be a short one. Hosts of Ghâzîs, attracted by the fame of the new conquests, poured in ever-increasing numbers into the Ottoman state, and it was necessary to keep them occupied. A passing expedient was offered by the internal struggles in the Byzantine Empire: the Ottomans sent in 1345 large contingents to Thrace to aid the Emperor John VI Cantacuzenus against his rival John V Palaeologos. The Byzantines had formerly drawn their auxiliary troops from the coastal emirates, mainly from Aydin. But the latter was just then engaged in struggles with the forces of the Union of the Christian Levant powers, which had entrenched themselves in Smyrna. Therefore Cantacuzenus now turned to his Ottoman neighbour, and in so doing he recognized him as master of Bithynia, and even gave him his daughter in marriage. This interlude was of {44} the greatest importance: the Ghâzîs, returning from this expedition with rich spoil, made it clear to the Ottoman ruler in which direction lay his future conquests. The goal was Thrace and Macedonia, the way led over the Dardanelles and the peninsula of Gallipoli. Separated from the Dardanelles by the Ghâzî emirate of Karasi, the Ottomans took advantage of the fact that the latter had already entered upon a phase of external weakness and internal dissension, and seized it. Shortly afterwards the Ottoman troops in the service of Cantacuzenus were given a stronghold on Gallipoli by the emperor, and, a little later, after the great earthquake of 1354, this became the base for their occupation of the whole Gallipoli peninsula, the starting-point for their further expeditions into the Balkans.

But, before the Ottomans undertook these conquering expeditions in the West, they extended their eastern Anatolian possessions.[57] In 1354, the same year in which they settled in the peninsula of Gallipoli, they succeeded in taking Ankara, the first large town with the characteristics of the old Seljuk civilization. A coin struck in that town shows that until shortly before this, at least until 1343, the brilliantly organized administration of the Mongol (but naturally long since Iranized) Ilkhâns had been operative there. Ankara was a town of wholesale merchants and industrial citizens, and was a centre of Akhî corp orations. Such penetration into Asia Minor procured to the Ghâzî state those urban elements that it needed for the organization of its conquests. But this turning against Asia Minor, together with the annexation of the emirate of Karasi, had, of course, shown the Anatolian emirs very clearly the menace that the Ottoman state held for them. The Ottoman emir Murâd I, succeeding his father, Orkhan,

in 1362,[58] had to begin his reign by securing these newly acquired lands against a coalition headed by the emir of Karaman. With the help of his experienced and numerous warriors Murâd soon subdued his adversary and extended his power as far as Tokat, an old town with Dânishmend reminiscences. There he ordered the history of that Ghâzî dynasty to be written down in Turkish, from the Persian {45} work composed 150 years before by order of the Seljuk sultan ‘Alâeddîn Kaiqobad I; he may have become interested in this through the songs and stories that dealt with the Dânishmends and were current among his own Ghâzîs. Later on, Murâd had more than once again to fight the Karamans and their allied emirs, and he always returned victorious and with additional gains of Anatolian territory. But he also systematically increased his Anatolian possessions by peaceful methods. The bride of his son Bâyezîd, a princess of Germiyan, brought as dowry in 1381 a large part of this emirate, including its capital Kütahya. Later Murâd bought almost all the lands of another neighbour emirate, that of Hamid. He was indeed able to do this, for he was immensely wealthy by reason of the enormous booty brought home by the Ghâzîs from their raids in the West.

For, since about 1360, the invasion of the Balkans was in full swing. Again the Ghâzîs pushed forward the frontiers of Islam. As in the eleventh century this frontier had been moved from the Taurus and Euphrates to the western border of central Anatolia, and had advanced during the thirteenth century up to the Aegean Sea, in the same way now, in the fourteenth century, it was pushed on into the Balkans and successively carried further up to the Adriatic coast and the edge of the Alps. Only these actions were no longer spontaneously undertaken by independent Ghâzî hosts, but were deliberate and well-organized state enterprises. The state now had in its possession the equipment necessary for these expeditions, such as an army and an administrative executive. Yet it always felt it was a state of Ghâzîs serving the idea of the holy war, and it actually was now the Ghâzî state Κατ’εξοκην {(*kat’eksokin* (“*par excellence*”)}. The fact that the Ottoman emirate remained the only real Ghâzî state, the exclusively active and successful representative of the Ghâzî movement, whose renown spread far beyond its own borders, attracted the entire warlike youth of Anatolia and all those elements who were full of enthusiasm for religious war, for adventure, fame and spoil. The ‘potentiel militaire’ of this state was always larger than its own circumference, in spite of the {46} rapid growth of the latter. Thus this state must conquer, it must continue the ghazâ, the religious war. The renown of

its exploits increased with the extent of its conquests and attracted continually increasing numbers of volunteers from still more remote districts. While the Ottoman state continually grew in power and in size, the other emirates were fading away, for their warriors were drawn towards those places where they were sure of finding employment. In their weakness they felt the day drawing near when they would fall an easy prey. They therefore united round the strongest among themselves, the Karaman. The desperate attempts of these coalitions to escape their impending fate gave the Ottomans a pretext, and even compelled them to strike the final blow at these emirates.

In 1400 they had incorporated them all and were masters of almost the whole of Anatolia. By that time they had taken nearly all the European possessions of Byzantium, and there remained only Constantinople, rising with its thousand-year-old walls as an island amidst the Turkish floods. Bulgaria, too, had been conquered and Serbia reduced to a small part of her former territory, and even this rest was brought under Turkish suzerainty. The Turkish armies were already fighting in Bosnia {and} Albania, {and} in the Peloponnesus and Wallachia; Turkish Ghâzî raiders had penetrated into Hungary and the alpine valleys of Styria. Turkish pirate ships undertook daring raids into the Aegean Sea, defying the strongest fleet of those times, that of the Venetians. A century had passed since Christendom had lost its last possessions in the Holy Land, and now it saw itself menaced by the Muslims in the very heart of Europe. An army of knights, in whose ranks were the King of Hungary and a grandson of the French king, was sent out by the West to meet this danger, and it was literally annihilated in Bulgaria, near Nicopolis on the Danube, in 1396. After this victory Bâyezîd entertained the most daring plans. He held Constantinople besieged with one of his armies, while he himself attacked eastern Anatolia and is said to have contemplated the conquest of Syria. Surely, was not this state already an empire?

{47} History itself has answered this question in the negative. The conquests in the Muslim East, undertaken with so much energy by the Ottoman state, now brought it into conflict with another force. Tîmûr, whose ambition was directed to the creation of a large empire in the Old Muslim world, was determined to crush this rivalry at its very beginning. In 1402 he penetrated as far as Ankara, where he destroyed the army of Bâyezîd and took the latter prisoner. The circumstances under which this defeat took place are very significant: during the battle entire local contingents of the Ottoman army

deserted to the enemy. Just as significant were the consequences of this defeat: the emirates of Asia Minor were restored and regained their independence, and the remaining Ottoman territory was broken up into several parts. All this clearly shows that the structure of the Ottoman state was still a very unstable one, and that the imperial ideal had not yet succeeded in taking root. An empire, as Bâyezîd planned it, was only the premature dream of an audacious ambition. Not only did Bâyezîd overlook the fact that his state still lacked internally all that was necessary for the establishment of an empire, but he also failed to perceive the real direction in which the development towards an empire lay, the direction followed by his predecessors with unerring instinct. The propitious harmony that had up till then existed between the Ghâzî movement and the traditions of the Old Muslim world, between the conquest of Christian countries and extension towards the Muslim East, was lost under Bâyezîd. Both his internal and external policy abandoned the traditions of the Ghâzîs and displayed a unilateral inclination towards Islam. The ‘ulemâ, now too numerous and too powerful, not only succeeded in winning over the sultan to the more subtle habits, pleasures, and arts of High Islam, but also to their views on the organization of the state. This they now endeavoured to fashion according to Old Muslim traditions, much too fast and without regard to the existing conditions. Above all, the ‘ulemâ converted the sultan to their ideas of external policy, which naturally concerned the countries of High {47} Islam, which were their spiritual home. It was this that led to the conflict with Tîmûr and to the catastrophe of Ankara. The behaviour of Tîmûr after his victory was remarkable. Though he stayed for several months in Anatolia, he had no intention of incorporating it into his state, but aimed only to re-establish the Ghâzî emirates that had been annexed by Bâyezîd. The remaining Ottoman possessions he left untouched. There was only one more warlike act that he achieved in Anatolia: he conquered Smyrna, which had been held by the Franks since the days of Ghâzî Umûr Beg. After this he withdrew. Tîmûr’s behaviour must be understood as a demonstration to the public opinion of Islam that by his intervention in Asia Minor he desired nothing more than to recall to the Ottomans their real task – that is, the Ghâzî idea, which they were beginning to renounce. By achieving himself a deed worthy of a Ghâzî in taking Smyrna, he thought to win the approbation of the entire Muslim world. In this way the Ottoman state was saved by the prestige that it possessed as a Ghâzî state.

Its next task was to re-establish the unity of the state, which had

been divided up among the sons of Bâyezîd.[59] During those years of dismemberment it became clear that the Balkan provinces could not exist without the territories of Asia Minor and vice versa. The reunited Ottoman state once more openly recognized the Ghâzî movement as its leading idea. The restoration of the Anatolian emirates by Tîmûr directed the Ottomans again to the Balkans as their principal field of action. The capital is therefore moved from Brusa, the 'city of the theologians', to Adrianopolis, the 'city of the Ghâzîs'. But Anatolia was not lost to view, since its importance as a connecting link with the Old Muslim world had been clearly understood. The alternating movements of conquest in the West and extension towards the East soon begins again. But this time progress is made at a slower, more patient and more balanced pace, which shows that the Ottoman leaders knew how to weigh the forces and had understood the fundamental principles of their state. {49} The Anatolian emirates were again annexed one after the other, but now step by step, avoiding any appearance of deliberate conquest.

With regard to the European possessions, an important problem still remained to be solved. The Turks called this land 'Rûm-ili', meaning in this case the 'land of the Greek Christians'. The conquest of this land had been only to a small extent the achievement of the Ghâzîs; the large territories of the kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia and of the different principalities in the south of the peninsula had been acquired through the well-planned campaigns of the Ottoman army – that is, through state expeditions and had also been immediately placed under the administration of the state. Conversion to Islam had been practised only in those regions that were conquered by the Ghâzîs that is, in Eastern Thrace, which was taken at first, and then again later in the furthest western frontiers, in Albania and Bosnia, where again a long-disputed frontier district, a Ghâzî march, came into existence the vast territory between these two Ghâzî zones was allowed to remain Christian, thanks to the principle of toleration inherent in Muslim governmental traditions.[60] This was financially, as we have seen, of great advantage. But on the other hand it had the grave disadvantage that the larger part of the population of the state was lost for the most important institutions of the state, the political government, the administration and the army. At about 1430 this problem too was solved by Murâd II, and this in complete accord with the fundamental tendencies of the state: the custom was introduced of regularly taking military recruits from the Christian subjects while they were still boys;[61] they were forced to become Muslims and sent to special

educational institutions, where they were Turkicized and brought up mostly for the army, but those who showed greater talents were educated for service at court or as state officials. In this way two fundamental tendencies of the Ghâzî movement, conversion to Islam and the absorption of indigenous elements, were definitely incorporated in a state institution. We mean the corps of the Janissaries; it had {50} already existed before, but until then had consisted of boys captured by the Ghâzîs in the lands that they raided. Now, by the regular recruiting in their own provinces, this institution became one of the strongest pillars of the Ottoman state and meant much more than a regiment of guards in the army; it was the institution in which the very best elements of the native population were brought up to become the most faithful and devoted servants of the state. Owing to this institution, the indigenous Christian population furnished to the state its greatest statesmen and military commanders. The representatives of the Old Muslim traditions, the 'ulemâ, had now found their counterpoise. Moreover, the Old Muslim science and arts were no longer the exclusive spiritual content of the society: we notice at that time the 'romantic' movement, which we have mentioned as a national one in the first lecture, and which was especially interested in what we may call 'Turkish antiquities'. Murâd II, the restorer of the state, thought his creation so far stabilized that he retired to Manisa, leaving to his advisers both the affairs of state and the charge of his son Mehmed II, a boy of fourteen years. Murâd II, who had made it his life's work to make good the damage that had been done by the bold ambition of Bâyezîd, was himself doubtless cool towards the imperial idea. But how far the latter had already taken root around him is shown by the theory of the Turkish writers of that time, according to which the Ottomans were the descendants of the eldest Oghuz grandson Kayı, who was called upon to rule the world. Mehmed II grew up amidst the imperial ideas of this milieu, and his first action, the conquest of Constantinople, aimed at its achievement.

This achievement was in the first place the deed of a Ghâzî: the conquest of the Basileus' capital crowned the century-old efforts of the Ghâzîs of Rûm. It was also the realization of a dream of Old Islam: the conquest of Constantinople had been attempted since the days of Mu'âwiya, the first Umayyad caliph, but in the end had been practically given up, being reserved for the Mahdî, who would appear at the end of the {51} world.[62] And, lastly, it was an imperial deed; by it the conqueror defied the whole Western world, thus showing that

he alone was lord over the lands stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and that he alone decided their fate. And what {Mehemmed} the Conqueror proved capable of making out of that city was still more an imperial deed. He entered a city that had long before fallen into decay and was utterly destroyed by the horrors of the conquest. He set himself the task of magnificently rebuilding it, and for the rest of his life he performed this task with energy and devotion. It was the first and greatest cultural achievement of the Ottomans. They strengthened the defences of the city by fortifying the Straits and rebuilding its walls. By this a strong political and cultural nucleus was given to the empire. Islam found in the church of Aya Sofia a religious building that stood unrivalled. Schools and libraries, monasteries and charitable institutions were created and the town became a centre of Muslim life. But at the same time the patriarchate of the Greek Christians was re-established, and there were numerous Christians and Jews among the crowds who were forcibly brought to settle in the town. Opposite this city, divided from it only by the Golden Horn, lay Galata, which kept all the characteristics of a Frankish town. A Turkish author wrote soon after the conquest: 'How curious is this city of Istanbul; for one copper coin one can be rowed from Rûm-ili into Frankistan'.[63] And in this way the capital reflected the true image of what was to be the fundamental feature of this state: the welding together of the indigenous cultural traditions of the old Byzantine orbit, and even already of occidental influences, with the traditions of Old Islam. The 'Sultanate of Rûm' had found its fulfilment. It was doubtless now an empire, an empire firmly established in its territory, where the indigenous traditions became more and more amalgamated with that of Old and Turkish Islam; an empire, with its own determined and determining features, recognizing no limits to the further extension of its frontiers.

Notes

a Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 8.

b *The Rise*, Preface, v.

c Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 12.

d Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 12–13.

e *Das Fürstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13. – 15. Jahrhundert* (Istanbul: Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, 1934 [= Istanbuler Mitteilungen, 2]). Cf. *The Rise*, v, 'Preface'.

f 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', *Festschrift für Georg Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 329–354.

g 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64. {See, for corrections to Wittek's article, Jeanne and Louis Robert, 'Le persistence de la toponymie antique en Anatolie', in *La Toponymie antique. Actes de colloque de Strasbourg, 1975*' (Leiden, 1981), 11–63, *passim*}.

h Th. Menzel, 'Die ältesten Türkischen Mystiker', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgen ländischen Gesellschaft*, N.F. 4 (79), 1925, 269–289. Wittek's contribution is at pp. 288–289.

i For an analysis of Menzel's article as the ideational basis for many of Wittek's later pronouncements concerning the Ottoman state, see Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', 16–17.

1 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', in *Festschrift Georg Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 329–354. – *Das Fürstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte West kleinasiens im 13. –15. Jahrhundert.* (Istanbuler Mitteilungen, hg. von der Abteil ung Istanbul des Archaeologischen Instituts des Deutschen Reiches, ii), Istanbul, 1934, xvi, 192 pp. – 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64. – 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 285–319.

2 R. Tschudi, *Vom alten osmanischen Reich*, Tubingen, 1930; W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background', *American Historical Review*, xxxvii (1931), 468–505.

3 M. Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman*, (Études Orientales, publiées par l'Institut Français d'Archéologie de Stamboul, iii, Paris, 1935); {English translation, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, tr. and ed., with additional material, by Gary Leiser (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992)}.

4 My lectures have been published, with additional references and bibliography, in 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 285–319; {see ch. III in this volume}.

5 See for the date A. Zaki Validi{Zeki Velidi Togan}, 'Dîvân-ı Lugât üt-Türk'ün te'lîf senesi hakkinda', *Atsız Mecmuası*, ii, no. 16 (Istanbul, 1932), 77–78; Köprülüzade M. Fuat, *Turk Dili ve Edebiyati* (Istanbul, 1934), 35, where the former author's thesis is well reproduced. {Köprülü was to write extensively on Kâshgharî: cf., *inter alia*, his *Ilk Türk dilicisi Kâşgarlı Mahmut* (Ankara, 1938), and *Kâşgarlı Mahmut* (Istanbul, 1970), and in his 'La littérature de l'époque des Karakhanides', in *Philogiae Turcica Fundamenta*, ii (Wiesbaden, 1964), 267–275.}

6 Mahmûd b. al-Husayn b. Muhammad al-Kâshgharî, *Kitâb Diwân Lughât at-Turk*, ed. Kilisli Mu 'allim Rif'ât [Bilge], (Istanbul, 1333–1335 [1915–1917]), iii, 307, 5 s. {There is a later edition by B. Atalay, *Divanü Lûgat-it-Türk* (3 parts, translation, facsimile and index,Ankara, 1939–1943); see Robert

Dankoff and James Kelly (ed. and tr.), *Türk şive lügatı . . . Compendium of the Turkish Dialects* (3 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1982–1985)}.

7 This genealogical arrangement appears first about 1300 in Rashîd ad-Dîn's *Jâmi' attawârîkh*; see M. Th. Houtsma, 'Die Ghuzenstämme', in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ii (1888), 219–253. {See Karl Jahn, *Die Geschichte der Oguzen des Rašid ad-Din* (Vienna, 1968: Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 100).}

8 {P. Wittek}, 'Der Stammbaum der Osmanen', *Der Islam*, xiv (1925), 94–100. {For an overlooked 'precursor' of this, Wittek's first significant writing on the subject, see F. von Kraelitz, 'Das osmanische Herrscherhaus und die Gründung des osmanischen Reiches', *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 40.Jg (1914), 38–40.}

9 Sa'd ed-Dîn, *Tâj at-tawârîkh*, (Constantinople, Istanbul, 1279–1280), i, 13 ult. and 15.

10 Hasan b. Mahmûd Bayâtî, *Jâm-i Jem âyîn*, ed. 'Alî Emîrî, (Constantinople, 1331 {1912}).

11 M. Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman*, 82–86.

12 {Mahmûd al-Kâshgharî}, *Diwân Lughât at-Turk*, i, 56 f.

13 See the first lines of the *Kitâb Dede Korkud*, ed. Kilisli Mu'allim Rif'at [Bilge] (Istanbul, 1332). {There is now an excellent English translation, with an introduction, by the late Geoffrey Lewis, *The Book of Dede Korkut* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1974)}.

14 A fragment of this Turkish *Seljuq-nâme* or *Oghuz-nâme* has been published by M. Th. Houtsma, *Recueil de textes relatifs a l'histoire des Seldjoucides*, (Leiden, 1891–1902), iii; cf. P. Wittek in {'[Review of] Fr. Babinger, *Die Geschichts schreiber des Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927)'}, *Der Islam*, xx (1932), 202 f.

15 See the passage of Shukrullâh quoted by Köprülüzâde M. Fu'âd, *Türk edebiyâtında ilk mutasavvıflar* {Early Mystics in Turkish Literature}, (Istanbul, 1918), 278, n. 2. {2nd revised edn, 1966; rpt. Ankara, 1981}.

16 Khalîl Edhem, *Meskukât-i 'othmâniye* (Istanbul, 1334), i, nos. 159, 193 and 225.

17 See, e.g. the helmet in the Victoria and Albert Museum, reproduced on pl. 13 of *100 Masterpieces, Mohammedan and Oriental*, London, 1931; one will notice the *tamgha* of the Kayı – a sign like (I Y I) – just above the semicircular opening for the right eye.

18 Cf. P. Wittek, in *Der Islam*, xx (1932), 205 f., and 'Deux chapitres', *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 304, n. 1 {112, n. 40 in this volume}.

19 F. Giese (ed.), *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, i, (text; Breslau, 1922), 3, l.12 and ii (German translation; Leipzig, 1925), 7, l.6.

20 {Wittek cites} Neshrî {only} in the passages dealt with by Th. Nöldeke, {'Auszüge aus Nesrî's Geschichte des osmanischen Hauses'}, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, xiv (1859), {176–218 and xv (1861),

333–380, at xiv},193 and 209. {See Fr. Taeschner (ed.), *Gihânnümâ. Die altosmanische Chronik des Mevlânâ Neschrî* (2 vols, Leipzig, 1951–1955), i, 21, 36. On Neshrî see V. L. Ménage, *Neshrî's History of the Ottomans. The Sources and Development of the Text* (London, 1964).}

21 See the genealogy given by Rûhî {i.e. in J. H. Mordtmann, 'Ruhi Edrenewi'}, *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, ii {(1923–1926)}, {129–136, at p.} 135, and Karamanî Mehmed Pasha, {*Tawârîkh al-Salâtîn al-Osmâniyah*, tr. and ed. Mükrimin Khalîl [Yinanç]}, *Türk ta'rîkh enjümeni mejmû'asi*, xiv [(1924)], 87. {See also Fr. Babinger, 'Die Chronik des Qaramani Mehmed Pascha, eine neuerschlossene osmanische Geschichtsquelle', *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, ii (1923–1926), 242–247, repr. in *idem, Aufsätze und Abhandlungen* (3 vols, Munich, 1962–1976), ii, 1–5.} Both {Ruhi and Karamani Mehmed Pasha} were historians of the last half of the fifteenth century: {see, for overviews, Halil Inalcik, 'The Rise of Ottoman Historiography', in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), 152–167, and V. L. Ménage, 'The Beginnings of Ottoman Historiography', ibid., 168–179, *passim*.}

22 Yakût {*Mu'jam al-Buldân*}, ed. F. Wüstenfeld {4 vols, Leipzig, 1866–1873}, iv, 379, {l.} 22, and 380, {l.} 4.

23 See W. Barthold in *Encyclopaedia of Islâm*, s.v. Abû Muslim.

24 *Die altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i 4 (ii 10).

25 See Ibn Khallikân, tr. MacGuckin de Slane (Paris–London, 1843–1871), i, 329.

26 *Die altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i 1, s. (ii 5, s.).

27 Ahmed Tevhîd, in *Ta'rîkh-i 'othmânî enjümeni mejmu'asi* v, (1914), 318 ff., has made a first attempt to read this inscription. {For a discussion of this inscription and the use made of it subsequently to Ahmed Tevhîd by Wittek and others, see Colin Heywood 'The 1337 Brusa Inscription and its Interpreters', *Turcica*, xxxvi (2004), 215–230.}

28 *Sultân ibn sultân al-ghuzât, ghâzî ibn al-ghâzî, Shujâ' ad-daula wa'd-dîn, marzbân al-âfâk, bahlavân-i jihân, Orkhan ibn 'Othmân*.

29 See Cl. Cahen, 'La campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources musulmanes', in *Byzantion*, ix (1934), 613–642. {The voluminous literature on Manzikert – the battle that 'simply will not stay in the past' (Hillenbrand, 5) – is evaluated and the Muslim sources comprehensively reassessed in Carole Hillenbrand, *Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert* (Edinburgh, 2007).}

30 For the following cf. Wittek, 'Deux chapitres', *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 290 f., and *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 5 ff.

31 See W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion* (Gibb Memorial Series, N.S. V), London, 1938, 214 ff. and 287.

32 J. Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoucides dans l'Asie occidentale jusqu'en 1081* (Nancy, 1913), 24 ff.

33 E.g. Ankara (Ancyra), Amasia, Eregli (Heracleia), Kayseri (Caesarea), Konia (Iconium), Niksar (Neocaesarea), Sivas (Sebastia), etc.; cf. our 'Von der

byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', in *Byzantion*, x (1935), 12–64.

34 Cf. *Byzantion*, x, 38–41, 46.

35 *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 2.

36 *Byzantion*, x, 44.

37 *Byzantion*, x, 39.

38 This period has been studied in *Byzantion*, x, 17–31.

39 *Byzantion*, x, 24.

40 *Byzantion*, x, 30.

41 See P. Wittek in *Der Islam*, xx, 203.

42 Nicetas Chon{iates}., 856, Bonn.

43 {Wittek}, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, ch. i.

44 Nesâwî, *Histoire du Sultan Djelâl ed-dîn Mankobirti*, tr. O. Houdas (Paris, 1895), 264, gives an instructive example how the nomadic tribes were set in movement by the Mongol invasion.

45 Such as the remnants of the Khwarezmian army; see Ibn Bîbî (Houtsma, *Recueil*, iv, 188 and 191 f.).

46 So the sanctuary of the march-warriors at Seyyid Ghâzî became the centre of the Kalender dervishes (and later on of the Bektashîye), who continuated the Baba Ishâk movement.

47 *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, ch. ii.

48 {Wittek}, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, ch. ii.

49 *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, chs iii and iv.

50 The emirs of Karasi claimed to descend from the Dânishmends (see *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 21); this is a clear proof of the Ghâzî character of this state.

51 See p. 42 {11} in this volume.

52 *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 52.

53 A short bibliography relating to the Anatolian emirates is to be found in *Byzantion*, xi, 301,n. 2.

54 Cf. *Byzantion*, xi, 306–308.

55 Cf. *Byzantion*, xi, 308–310.

56 Pachymeres, ii, 580, Bonn.

57 For the following cf. Wittek, 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', 346–354.

58 The right date is given by the short chronicle published by J. Müller in *Sitz.-Ber. Akademie Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl.*, ix (1852), 366 ff., and in Βραχεα Χρονικα{*Brakhea Khronika* ['Short Chronicles']}(in Μνιμεια της Ελλενικης Ιστοριας {*Mnimeia tis Ellenikis Istorias* ['Studies on Greek History']}), i , Athens, 1932–1933, no. 52.

59 This chapter has been studied in my Parisian lectures of 1938: ‘De la défaite d’Ankara à la prise de Constantinople’, which will be published in the *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* {in this volume, ch. V, 135–160}.

60 See my ‘Le Sultan de Rûm’, in *Annuaire de l’Institut Oriental*, vi, Brussels, 1938 {in this volume, ch. II, 73–96}.

61 See J. H. Mordtmann in *Encyclopaedia of Islâm*, s.v. ‘Dewshirme’.

62 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, (Bonn and Leipzig, 1923 ff.), i, 169 f.

63 Tursun Beg, *Ta’rîkh-i Abû ’l-Fath*, ed. M. ‘Arif [*Ta’rîkh-i ‘othmâni enjümeni mejmu’asi*, v–vii, ‘Ilâve; Istanbul, 1330], 38.

Part II
Precursors of *The Rise*

II ‘The Sultan of Rûm’

Introduction

Of the eight studies collected in the present volume, ‘The Sultan of Rûm’ is the only one (apart from the short 1933 essay on Mehmed II) that was not written by Wittek as a text to be delivered as a lecture or as a discourse to a live audience. As a result, it is consciously more ‘learned’ in style than the others: the footnotes are bulkier and more numerous; the source quotations are in a variety of languages, Greek, Latin, fourteenth-century German, Arabic, Turkish; and the language of Wittek’s discourse makes fewer concessions to the reader than in the other pieces collected in this volume. In fact, except in terms of its length, it bears a considerable degree of resemblance to much of Wittek’s later work from his London years in the 1950s, being an excursus, albeit a massive one, on a single term, in this case the term Rûm. *Wittek develops his theme in a masterly fashion, tracing the use and evolution of the term from the pre-conquest Muslim geographers down to his own day, and ending with an impassioned plea for the continuing use of the term in the new, Republican Turkey of his day. It is worth quoting in full:*

> There has been much searching in recent years for a term that might replace that of ‘Ottoman’, which has become an antipathy to the young Turkish republic, and which in any case has not met the demands of our science since the discovery of the importance of Turkish life in Asia Minor before the Ottomans, and alongside them. To this day not one new term has been proposed that takes account of both the geographical expanse and the cultural character belonging to the people known until now as *‘Osmanli*.We believe that the term ‘Turks of Rûm’ answers entirely the requirements that one can make: it embraces Anatolia just as well as Rumelia, the Dânishmend and Seljuk eras as well as those of the emirates and of the Ottoman empire; it includes the diverse Turkish elements of nomad, rural, urban, true Turk and ‘Turkicised’; it expresses the immense part that the soil of the old ‘Roman’ empire and its cultural traditions played in the formation of Turkish life in its new habitat; it has the advantage of having been abundantly in use among these Turks themselves and their Muslim neighbours; and finally, in associating the great name of Rome with the Turks, it recalls that which is their greatest glory, the foundation of the empire that if only for its duration and expanse will always constitute one of the most important chapters in history.

Wittek adds, in a final quixotic footnote:

> To my acute regret my Turkish friends do not seem to approve of the term that I propose here and that I have already been using for some time. I hope, at least, that they don't hold it against me. For how should not Turkey be seen in the world, according to Ibn Battûta? *Ash-shafâkat fi'r-Rûm*, 'kindness is in Rûm'.[a]

It goes without saying that Wittek's openhearted appeal for a greater dimensionality (if one may call it that) on the part of the new Turkish republic towards its multilayered past found no listeners in the world of narrow and exclusivist nationalisms that by the late 1930s had other countries besides Turkey in their iron grip. Wittek's 'The Sultan of Rûm', therefore, may be seen not merely as a learned historical excursus on a term that had become redundant – rather, had had redundancy forced on it – well before the end of the Atatürk era, but as a document of its time written with passionate urgency, a humanist plea for the Turks of Atatürk's Turkey to be aware of other dimensions than the narrowly nationalistic ones that still existed, submerged and out of popular sight, in the history of the bilâd ar-Rûm*, the lands of Rûm. For that reason alone, as well as for its scholarly merits, it deserves its place in the present volume.*

* * *

'The Sultan of Rûm'

{361} The use of the learned term Byzantium, introduced by Greek and Western humanists, has never let it be forgotten that this Byzantium, however it became ever more medieval, Christian, Oriental or even barbarian, was not until its end anything other than the Roman empire: these 'Byzantines', in fact, referred to themselves only as *Romaioi*, 'Romans', and similarly their lands continued to be known in the West as Romania (or better, the Romaniae)[1] and in the Muslim Orient as *bilâd ar-Rûm*, 'the land of the Romans'. Less well known is the fact that Rûm, this Islamic form of the name of the Romans,[2] outlived the Byzantine empire, to designate not only Greek Orthodox Christians fallen under Muslim rule, but also the victors {362} themselves and their political creations, above all the Ottoman empire. We will attempt to trace the history of this last usage of the word, and to show the sense in which it has been understood and extent to which it has been in use.[3]

For the Muslims of the eighth and ninth centuries, and primarily for those in the frontier regions, the term Rûm, alongside its political meaning of 'Roman empire', must have acquired a geographical meaning that was attached more narrowly to the land of Anatolia, especially those districts situated along the frontiers of the Taurus and the Euphrates. Indeed, these territories, which for three centuries were the object of continuous incursions by Muslim *limitanei*, quite simply *were* the empire, tying them more intimately to the name of Rûm. However, these provinces, frontier lands that bore the particular aspect of an 'akritic' civilisation characterised by a mixture of cultures, constituted a geographical entity that was visibly distinct from the rest of the empire. The term Rûm, limited in its geographical sense to the provinces of eastern Anatolia, therefore had associations for its Muslim neighbours that were more alive than those suggested by its political sense. This being the case, it comes as no surprise that the geographical meaning prevailed. This explains why, during the tenth and eleventh centuries only, the territories situated beyond the Taurus and the Euphrates that were {re}incorporated into the {Byzantine} empire after a long period of Muslim rule, were no longer regarded as belonging to the *bilâd ar-Rûm*, despite{their once again} having become Byzantine provinces. In fact, the term Rûm was subsequently only applied to lands situated short of the old frontier.[4] Moreover, the recovered provinces seem no longer to have been considered as truly 'Romania' by the Byzantines them selves: it is {363} only on leaving the passes of the Taurus (after {passing} Podandos {the present-day Bozanti}) that the emperor Romanus IV Diogenes (returning from Syria and Cilicia, which also were Byzantine provinces) 're-enters the land of the Romans'.[5] A strange coincidence: even today, in a Turkish nomad song recorded in the Taurus during the Great War, the traveller who leaves the plain of Adana by the Cililcian Gates for Eregli and Nigde sings that his path, after passing the Çifte-Han, descends towards Rûm.[6] Now this Çifte-Han is very close to Bozanti, the Byzantine Podandos. . . . So it is that in the twentieth century, just as in the eleventh, 'Romania' begins at the same place.

The battle of Manzikert, lost to the Seljuks in 1071 by the same Romanus IV we have just mentioned, opened the doors very wide to the Turkish masses who – protagonists of the holy war in the Muslim world of the time – occupied the border regions of the empire and from there undertook their increasingly numerous raids, advancing further and further into the Anatolian heartland. After Manzikert, the system by which the empire defended itself from incursions, a system

that had long since started to break down, completely disintegrated. Here and there akritai leaders, Byzantine *limitanei* (mostly of Armenian nationality), still tried to carve out local dominions, while among the Turks who were dispersed in bands across the whole peninsula a leader of Muslim akritai, or ghâzîs ('warriors for the faith'), succeeded in creating the first Turkish and Muslim emirate in Asia Minor.[7]

{364} Now, this emirate, founded by Dânishmend Ghâzî in the region of Sebastaea (Sivas), received the name of Rûm; for the conquerors, this term that had initially, as we have said, designated Anatolia and principally its eastern part, must now necessarily have been attached to their first state founded in this land. Two facts allow us to conclude that the Dânishmendite state was called Rûm:

(1) Even in Ottoman times, the province of Sivas that, with its seven sub-provinces ('districts'; *sancak*) of Sivas, Amasia, Bozok (Yozgat), Canik, Çorum, Divrigi and 'Arabgir more or less corresponds to the early Dânishmendite emirate, bears the name Rûm. The vilâyet is simply called Rûm in the list of provinces that Mustafâ ibn Celâl, the Koca Nisanci, made in his history[8] in the middle of the sixteenth century, as it is in the *Kânûn-nâme* of 'Ayn-i 'Âlî, composed in 1607.[9] Half a century later, this no longer seems to be the single, contemporary appellation. In the geography by Hâcî Halîfe (second half of the seventeenth century), we read: 'the vilâyet of Sivas which is also called Rûm'.[10] Similarly, while in sixteenth century examples of official letters addressed by the Ottoman Porte to foreign courts[11] the province of Rûm figures among those provinces listed as possessions of the Grand Signior, along side Rumeli, Anadolu, Karaman etc. {365} in examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Sivas is listed in its place.[12]

The {Ottoman} historians provide us with further evidence. Thus, in the {Ottoman} anonymous chronicles of the fifteenth century, we read that after defeat at Ankara in 1402 the future Sultan Mehmed I escapes to Amasya with a contingent from Rûm (*Rûm çerisi*).[13] He had taken part in the battle as chief of the troops from Amasya, of which he was governor; the *Rûm çerisi* is there -fore nothing other than the contingent from his vilâyet of Rûm, that is to say of Amasya-Sivas.[14] In Sa'deddîn (sixteenth century) the same area is referred to in several places as Little Rûmiya,[15] 'Little' obviously {366} being employed to prevent any confusion with the 'Greater' Rûmiya – Rûmiya being a more literary form of Rûm – which for this author is the entire

Ottoman empire.[16]

(2) On the coins of the Dânishmendid prince Mâlik Muhammad Ghâzî (1134–1142), which have Greek legends, we read: ό μέγας μελήκις л άσης Ρωμανίας κεί 'Ανατολής {o megas melikis pasis Romanias kai Anatolis}, 'the great king of all Romania and Anatolia'.[17] What is signified by the term 'Anatolia' in this legend? We believe we are not mistaken in the assertion that it refers to lands recently acquired by the Dânishmends, whose early state (that of Sivas) had indeed expanded, mostly {367} to the west. The principal stronghold possessed by our Mâlik Muhammad in these lands was Ankara.[18] This very Ankara was later, in the Ottoman era, the capital of the large province of Anadolu, of which we can consequently suppose it was the hub.[19] It is very plausible that as early as the time of the Dânishmends, this area belonged to a region known as Anatolia,[20] and that this is the Ανατολά {Anatolí} on our coins. It follows that the second element of the title, Ρωμανίε {Romanía}, refers to the Dânishmends' earliest possessions in the Sivas-Amasya region.

The Dânishmends, ghâzî chiefs and as such devoted to the conquest of new lands and to the – at least nominal – conversion of their inhabitants, had no cultural ambitions. In their emirate was established the meagre civilisation of conquerors, that is, a mixture of cultures borne from a long exchange between Muslim and Byzantine akritai; and it was established alongside the indigenous civilisation, itself an akritic civilisation, which is to say that it too was pro foundly influenced by the culture of the adversaries. The Dânishmends' indifference in cultural matters gave free rein to a mutual penetration of these 'akritic' cultures {368} that were already so close to each other, from whence the curious, mixed civilisation that is so characteristic of formerly Dânishmendite provinces, and is still recognisable today in their architectural monuments.

The cultural aspect of the political creation undertaken by a branch of the house of Seljuk, not long after the Dânishmends and in the same area, was altogether different. Descendants of the masters of the ancient Muslim world, these princes necessarily aimed to build, in the land delivered to them, a state inspired by the traditions of high Islamic civilisation. From its beginnings this civilisation had counted among its constituent elements a tolerance towards native Christians, whose work and tributes were the principal tax resource; and, from the time of the 'Abbâsid caliphate onwards, it had become peaceable, economically relying for the most part on a 'managed' agriculture. It is

not by chance that the Seljuk princes chose as the centre of their future state the plain that extends from Konya towards Kayseri (Caesarea), the only territory of all those so far securely conquered in Anatolia to possess an agriculture founded on a man-made system of irrigation. In addition, it was this region of Asia Minor that, in Byzantine times, had least taken on an 'akritic' character: along with Greek nationality it had retained a more highly developed civilisation.[21] Moreover, thanks to the traditions of classical Islam introduced by the Seljuks, Christianity and 'Greekness' (*grécité*) were able to persist there. It is there that, even today, the clearest traces of Anatolian Greek can be found.[22] Here too, toponymy proves extremely instructive: the vilayet of Konya was until Ottoman times known as *Yunân vilâyeti*, the 'province of the Greeks'.[23] {369} The numerous Greek population must have seemed quite characteristic of this area: it plainly contrasted with the Muslim milieu that was spreading here in forms that were imported from the centres of Islam, and were consequently very foreign to this land.[24]

Accordingly, this Seljuk state, which initially developed slowly in the shadow of the Dânishmendite power, would in the end gather all the Turkish and Muslim territories of Asia Minor into one single, flourishing sultanate. This state too bore the name Rûm, if not officially, then at least in everyday usage, and its princes appear in the Eastern chronicles under the name 'Seljuks of Rûm' (Ar.: *Salâjika ar-Rûm*). There are many examples of this new use of our term,[25] and Eastern historians are not in the least {370} embarrassed by the fact that they still mention, alongside the Seljuks of Rûm, the *mâlik ar-Rûm*, who is the Byzantine emperor,[26] the *fasilyevs* (Βασιλεύς {basileus}) of *Istenbol*.[27]

One can even say that the term Rûm, in its political sense, continued to be reserved for the {Byzantine} Empire, and it is uniquely in its geographical sense that it was used by the Turks to indicate their states founded 'in the lands of Rûm': first the early Dânishmendid emirate, then the Seljuk sultanate. While this geographical term was initially attached more specifically to the eastern provinces, with the expansion of the Seljuk sultanate towards the west it must increasingly have indicated the whole of Asia Minor. Despite a certain association with this state – referring to it exclusively in everyday, and not official, usage,[28] {371} it retained the flavour of a geographical term, and as such outlived the sultanate of Rûm to designate all the emirates that had divided up the Seljuk territories,

plus those that had been formed since 1300 in the recently conquered western regions.[29] *Bilâd ar-Rûm* now equated Asia Minor in its entirety:

> And we headed for the Turkish land that is known by the name: the land of Rûm. It was named after the Rûm because it was once their land. It is thence that came the ancient Rûm and Yûnânî. Afterwards the Muslims conquered it, and many Christians can now be found there under the protection of Muslim Turks.

With these words Ibn Battûta, in his famous account of his travels, comes to the description of Asia Minor, which he travelled through in 1333.[30] For him Rûm equates to Turkey, that is to say to an Asia Minor that was already almost entirely Turkish. And yet he too uses the same name, Rûm, to refer to Byzantine territory (now exclusively situated in Europe!), {372} reigned over by the mâlik al-Kostantinîye, who is called 'Tekfûr'.[31] A contemporary of Ibn Battûta, al-'Umarî, gives the following title to the chapter on Asia Minor in his geographical encyclopaedia: 'Of the Country of the Turks in Rûm'.[32] For him too the Empire is no more than 'the land of Kostantinîya',[33] although he does add – in a learned archaism drawn from Arab geographers of a much earlier age – that this town, the Istanbul of its time and the old Byzantium, is the capital of the 'land of the Rûm', which is the 'land of the Kaysar'.

Albeit disguised by the rather inept translation as 'Greece', the term 'Rûm', employed as an equivalent of 'Turkey', can equally be found in the *Histoire orientale*, dictated in French by Haiton ('Lord of Curchi',[34] {373} 'relative of the King of Armenia') to Nicolas Salcon and subsequently translated into Latin in 1307. We are obliged to quote it from the anthology by Bergeron,[35] who unfortunately only presents what seems to be a retranslation of the Latin into French:

> Chapter XII: of the Kingdom of Turkey. . . . The Kingdom takes its name Greece from the various nations of the East,[36] because long ago the Emperor of the Greeks regarded Turkey as his own, and it was commanded by his Commandants and Officers; but after the Turks seized this country and inhabited it, they chose for themselves a Lord, whom they called Soldan, which is the same as King in Latin (!). Since that time, this country has been called Turkey by the Latins'.[37]

As for the author's assertion that the Latins employed the term 'Turkey' – which is current among Easterners too at this stage, {374} as we have seen – let us note that there was no traditional reason for the Latins to call a land dominated by the Turks 'Romania'. Even Villehardouin, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, only ever referred to Asia Minor using the name 'Turkey'.[38] For him, the term

'Romania' only applies to the {Byzantine} Empire, and is consequently limited almost entirely to provinces situated in Europe;[39] but there, it oversteps actual frontiers, expanding to cover all territories claimed by the {Byzantine} Empire.

This is the beginning of an evolution in meaning that would transform the term 'Romania' from a political to a geographical one in Europe too. This evolution was complete by the beginning of the fourteenth century, when the Turks, who had become masters of all Anatolia, began to ravage European Romania, where the Ottomans would settle in 1354 and go on to subjugate the greater part of the area by the end of the century. This Romania, then, already only belonged in very small part to the Byzantine Empire: there were Bulgarian principalities there, and a Serbia that claimed the imperial title as its own, and the 'Frankish' principalities . . . , and yet 'Romania' it remained. The term lived on in this geographical sense even after the {Balkan} peninsula became an Ottoman possession. Thus a short chronological note in Greek, written not long after 1411 and dealing with fighting among the sons of Bâyezîd I for possession of the Ottoman provinces in {375} Europe, mentions that in 1410, 'the strongholds of "Romania", along with the whole of the land', recognised Mûsâ [Çelebi] as their master.[40] Similarly, in a letter that informs the senate of Ragusa of the death of the said Mûsâ, fallen on 5 July 1413 in battle against his brother Mehmed I, we read that the latter peacefully won all the regions of 'Romania', which until that time had been occupied by Mûsâ.[41] Alongside the term 'Romania' there appears, with entirely the same sense, 'Grecia'[42] – a translation that is obviously explained not by the Greek character of these regions but rather by the name *Imperium Graecorum* given to Byzantium by the Latins,[43] and kept by the European provinces that were once part of the empire. So we read, in a letter sent by the Venetian senate to the bailo of Constantinople on 26 July 1410: '*et in casu quo Musulman Zalapi (Süleymân Çelebi) habet dominiani Grecie* . . . {and in case that Süleymân Çelebi holds power in Romania}', and the following August, the Serbian prince Vlk requests that Venice sends ships to transport {his lord Süleymân Çelebi from Anatolia into Romania,} '*dominum suum Musulman Zalapi* . . . *de Turchia in Greciam*'.[44] And the German Johannes Schiltberger, taken prisoner by the Turks during the battle of Nicopolis in 1396, writes:

> Ich bin och gewe{se}n in Kriechen, do heist die hoptstat Adranopoli . . . Es lit och ein grosse start by dem weissen (correction of welschen) meer in Kriechenland und haist salonikch . . . . Es ligt och ein mächtige stat in

> Kriechenlant, genant Seres. Und was land zwüschen den tünow und des mers ligent gehorent dem turckischen (correction of tütschen) künig zu. Es ist ein stat und ein vest genant Chalipoli; da fert man uber das {376} gros meer. Da selbs fur ich über in die grossen türkey: . . . {I was also in Greece, where the capital is called Adrianople. . . . Another large city lies on the Aegean, called Salonica. There lies also a strong city in Greece called Serres. And the lands lying between the Danube and the sea belong to the king of Turkey. There is [also] a town and fortress called Gallipoli, where one crosses over the main sea. There I crossed over into the Great Turkey.}[45]

While Bertrandon de la Broquière, the excellent French observer in the service of the Duke of Burgundy who toured Turkey in 1432–1433, does use the term 'Grèce' to indicate the group of Turkish possessions in Europe,[46] he mostly applies it, in a restricted sense, to eastern Thrace: leaving 'Andrénopoly' {Edirne}, he arrives after two days horse-riding along the Maritza, 'par la Grèce', in the 'pays de Macedoine',[47] whose regional centre is 'Philipopoly' {Filibe; Plovdiv},[48] and which extends as far as the Trajan Gate.[49] From there he crosses 'Vulgairie' to the Morava, 'rivyere qui depart la Vulgairie et la Rascie ou Servie (the river that separates Bulgaria and Rascia or Serbia)'.[50] These countries, including even the more or less independent Serbia, together form the 'Grece' of Jehan Torzelo's *Advis* of 1439; of the arrival of an army at 'Bellegrade' he writes:

> et la Dunoe passée, la puissance dessus dicte seroit en la Grece . . . La a en soy trois seigneurs chrestiens . . . le seigneur de la Rascie qui est tributaire au Turc . . . Albanye où sont deux seigneurs . . . la seigneurie de la Morée qui est de Monseigneur l'empereur' {and the Danube passed, the above-mentioned force will be in Greece . . . in which there are three Christian lords . . . the lord of Rascia, who is tributary to the Ottomans . . . Albania where there are two lords . . . [and] the signory of the Morea, which belongs to the [Byzantine] emperor}.[51]

No doubt this extension of the term 'Greece' is explained by the fact that all these countries belonged to the Greek church. It is for the same reason that there would later be an identical extension of the term *Rumeli*.[52]

{377} *Rûm-eli*, 'the land of Rûm', is the term by which the Turkish conquerors translated the Greek 'Romania', a translation that – being a compound formed with {the Turkish word} *el*, meaning 'land' – clearly shows that the term was understood in a purely geographical sense. Rumeli was for the Turks the opposite of Anadolu, 'Anatolia', a term that for them signified the eastern part of Asia Minor from whence they came, while Rûm remained reserved for regions that had been part of the Seljuk sultanate. Rumeli therefore corresponds to

what the Byzantines named Δύσις {Dísis}, and later comprised all the territories conquered by the Ottomans in the Balkans, from Çatalca and Vize to Shköder in Albania, to the Morea and to the Danube, all the way from its mouth to Belgrade.[53] Nevertheless the growth of the vilâyet of Rumeli stopped at these limits; Western lands conquered later were organised into the new vilâyets of Bosnia, Temesvar {Timisoara}, Budun (Buda) etc. It can therefore be noted that the frontier of Rumeli coincided almost exactly with the demarcation line that once separated the eastern and western halves of the *imperium Romanum*, and has survived to this day as (more or less) the border between the domains of the Orthodox and Catholic churches. This coincidence is certainly not a matter of chance. Rumeli, organised as it was in the vilâyet of that name, was considered by the Turks to be an 'essential' province that formed, with the vilâyet of Anadolu, the hub of their empire, while the vilâyets of Bosnia and Hungary were no more than a sort of exterior bastion to them. In setting Rumeli's limits they must have been guided by a strong feeling that beyond that line lay the soil of another civilisation, where they no longer felt as sure of themselves and at ease as they did in lands whose civilisation had been formed by Byzantium and its church, as Anatolia had been, from whence they came after a long period of cultural assimilation. The one trait common to all the regions of this vast Rumeli, home to many nations that had even had their own national states, {378} was the Orthodox church – and it was the most important trait in this area, particularly in Muslim eyes. If the term Rumeli, in its origin a simple calque of *Romania*, could designate a province whose expanse surpassed Romania's by far and eventually encompassed the whole domain of the Orthodox church on Ottoman soil in Europe, but did no more than that, it is evidently because this term had evolved towards a meaning it leant itself to readily: Rûm signifying equally, as we know, 'Orthodox Christian'.[54] Rumeli had therefore received as its new, or at least secondary, meaning, 'land of the Orthodox Christians', 'land of the Rûm'. Moreover we have seen that, in the Westerners' language too, the whole Orthodox world of the Balkans was designated by the common name 'Greece', meaning the lands inhabited by Christians of the Greek church.

The Christian character of Rumelia in effect survived across the length and breadth of the vilâyet, excepting three regions where Islam had won a solid majority; two in the east, in Bulgaria – one in the Rhodope massif, the other between the Black Sea and the lower Danube – and the third in the south-west of Serbia, stretched along

the frontier of the vilâyet. An explanation of this phenomenon must be sought in the history of the Turkish conquest. This conquest began with the exploits of the ghâzîs who, once settled in the Gallipoli peninsula, seized the neighbouring territory and, according to their traditions, won it over to Islam, without preventing some of the converted from retaining their Slavic nationality. But these first ghâzî conquests had to be followed by the vast expeditions of the Ottoman state: great battles were joined against Balkan states and armies, battles whose outcome would decide the fate of whole nations. Victorious, the Ottoman state installed itself and its administrative apparatus in the conquered lands; and this state was already no longer of an exclusively ghâzî character, but had in the meantime inherited from the Seljuk sultanate the traditions of high Islam, and had consequently become a fiscal state – even a tolerant one. The vast territories conquered in this way remained Christian countries, under the fairly light yoke of Turco-Muslim domination. It was only at the new frontiers, transported by the state's massive conquests in one fell swoop across the peninsula to the banks of the Danube and the Adriatic coast, that the ghâzîs once more found a sphere of action and a habitat where Islam was preached and even imposed, though there too the converted were left with their own nationality (Albanian, Greek, Slav) in considerable numbers.

The conquest of the Balkan peninsula was more or less completed in the first years of the reign of Bâyezîd I, immediately after the decisive victory claimed by Ottoman arms at Kossovo Polye in 1389. In those same years, the Ottoman state established itself as the sole power on the other side of the Straits too, assimilating one by one all the Anatolian emirates from the Aegean sea to the Taurus and the Euphrates, in the same way that Rumeli, the Romania of the west, so Asia Minor, or Rûm, had become Ottoman. There remained between the two parts of this new power the last bastion of the Byzantine empire, Constantinople – and it too was finding itself closely encircled and assailed by the Ottoman troops that would besiege it for seven years. The emperor, meanwhile, was nothing more than the *Istanbul tekfûru*. To the Turks 'tekfûr', a title of Armenian origin, does mean 'king', but in this period it was severely devalued, attached in Turkish chronicles to the commandants of smaller Byzantine towns and fortresses.[55] It goes without saying {380} that the term Rûm was no longer applied to this meagre remnant of the Empire; in its political sense it no longer existed or rather, it had become expendable.[56]

And so it is that we find Bâyezîd {I}, master of Rûm and Rumeli and

already anticipating the conquest of Istanbul, sending an embassy to Egypt:

> *In the year 797* (which began on 27th October 1394) *the sultan* (Barkûk) *returned to Cairo* (he arrived there on 13th December[57]); *and the ambassadors of the Ottoman Bâyezîd presented themselves before him with gifts, requesting for the former his investiture as sultan of Rûm by the caliph* (Al-Mutawakkil I); *and the sultan arranged this matter for him'*.[58]

It is true that the Ottomans had taken the title of sultan in their inscriptions long before this investiture, ever since the earliest example where Orhan already appears as *sultân ibn sultân al-ghuzât*, 'sultan son of sultan of the Ghâzîs'.[59] However, this title – which they had assumed under their own authority or had had conferred by a sheikh of more or less local reputation – held no weight outside of their own country. When, under Bâyezîd I, the Ottomans began to hold an increasingly important place in the Muslim world, it was quite necessary that their title of sultan receive the sanction required by Muslim public law, that of the caliph. The caliph was in a situation of complete dependence on the sultan of Cairo; it was of the latter, therefore, that the request should be made. Although there was a tendency in Egypt to recognise only one legitimate sultan – the sultan of Cairo[60] – in this case, threatened by Tîmûr, against whom the Ottoman state had become an indispensable ally, it would have been difficult to refuse Bâyezîd the title he claimed. Nothing could be more natural than for this sultanic title to be 'Sultan of Rûm', which had carried weight in the Muslim world ever since the time of the Seljuks of Konya, and which therefore reverted automatically to the new {382} master of the Seljukid territories. So, for example, the fact that the caliph had conferred on Bâyezîd the title of sultan of Rûm surely did not influence Tîmûr's historian, who refers to the Ottomans as Rûmîyân, '{the} people of Rûm', and who quotes, in his account of their defeat at Ankara, the first words of the famous Sûra XXX of the Koran, the Sûrat ar-Rûm: 'vanquished are the Romans'.[61]

Nevertheless, given the position that Bâyezîd now occupied in the two Romanias, we believe that the Ottoman ruler was no stranger to the idea of reviving the Roman empire. Married to a princess of the same Serbia that had itself attempted this endeavour half a century earlier, *tsar* to his Slavic subjects, *imperator* to the Latins, Bâyezîd was too familiar with the political traditions common to the territories assembled under his rule not to submit to their seductive influence. And indeed, Bâyezîd's policies betrayed, in their bold plans of

conquest, his dream of establishing a universal empire, laying equal claim to the Christian West and the Muslim East. The connection between this empire and that of the Romans was made, moreover, by a contemporary, the historian Ibn ‘Arabshâh, who lived at the Ottoman court under Mehmed I and Murâd II. According to him, it was as successor to the Roman emperors and as if responsible for their actions that Bâyezîd, after [his] defeat at Ankara, had to endure the same humiliations at the hands of Tîmûr (‘the Iranian’) that a Kaysar had once inflicted on the Persian king Shâpûr.[62]

We do not seek to exaggerate. The situation is not the same as in the case of the Bulgarian {tsar} Simeon, who in the early tenth century could imagine no other imperial title for himself than that of Βασϊλεύς ΡωμαΙων {*Basileus Romaion*, ‘Emperor of the Greeks’} and who in his boldest dreams of glory and power dedicated himself to the idea of the Roman empire.[63] Neither is the situation the same as in the case of the Latins of the Fourth Crusade, for whom no empire could be taken into account other than the Roman Empire, the *Imperium Romaniae*, the *Imperium Romanorum* . . .[64] ‘The newcomers, they who belong to the world that Byzantium described as “barbarian”, are only giving a dynasty, or trying to give a dynasty, and soldiers too, to an Empire which remains always of the same essence’.[65] This statement, so true of the Latins of 1204, will certainly not do for the Ottoman Turks. Their ‘Sultanate of Rûm’ was of a very different essence to that of the empire for which it substituted itself.[66] It was impossible that this Muslim theocracy, a product of the union between the political traditions of the ghâzîs and those of high Islam, should maintain without pause the political and cultural traditions of Christian Byzantium. It is only to Westerners that the Ottoman sultans, seen from very far and in a superficial light, could appear to be *imperatores Constantinopolis* {emperors of Constantinople} in the sense of true successors to the Βασιλεϊς {the [Byzantine] emperors – *basileïs*} to Westerners, and also to Christians who had become subjects of the Ottoman empire, and who,already mistreated by the Byzantine state and lowered to the level of ‘re’âya’ well before the Τουρκοκρατία {*Turkokratía*; ‘Turcocracy’}, had no longer any active part in the government under which they had to live: {384} *Basileus, tsar’* or *soultán*, for them it was always the same αυθέντης {*authentis*, lord or} Efendi.[67] Neither should we lose sight of the fact that the title ‘Sultan of Rûm’ evoked for the Muslim Ottomans the memory of the Seljuks, whose legitimate heirs they claimed to be.

Nevertheless, despite these restrictions, it must be noted that from

this point and this point only is the term Rûm employed in a political sense to indicate a Muslim state, and that this usage is no longer hindered by the existence of another power going by the same name; the name Rûm is therefore reborn as a political term, designating a state that reunites the lands, from the Adriatic to the Euphrates, which had once formed the Byzantine patrimony.

Even so it is surprising to note that the title 'Sultan of Rûm' did not take a greater place in the official acts of the Ottoman state. In explaining this lack of success it must first be remembered that, less than eight years after the title was officially conferred, the terrible defeat at Ankara (1402) brought an abrupt end to Bâyezîd's imperial dreams. It would take half a century to erase all trace of this defeat, to save the unity of the state and to allow it to recover the expanse and importance it had enjoyed before the catastrophe. This was the task of Mehmed I and his son Murâd II. Mehmed I, it seems, did give himself the title of sultan (but not 'sultan of Rûm') from the beginning {of his rule}, for by this title he claimed hegemony over the other parts of the state that were now in the hands of his brothers, the emirs. If he avoided the name of Rûm in his title, it was because Rûm, Asia Minor, was once more largely in the hands of the old dynasties restored by Tîmûr. {385} Furthermore, the Ottoman province that fell to him after Ankara was exactly the region of Amasya and Sivas that had borne the name Rûm since the time of the Dânishmends. This name had therefore to be avoided in a title intended to express that one was not at all satisfied with what one had, but that one laid claim to it all. As for Murâd II, after a vain and premature attack on Constantinople undertaken right at the start of his reign in 1422, he is seen to calm down quickly and follow a considered and realist path, even, one could say, a modest one, considering the enormous power he had at his command. He was manifestly handling the last independent emirs in Asia Minor with great care, and that would be reason enough for him to remove mention of Rûm from his title. Moreover, this sovereign even seems to have preferred to make do with the title of Bey or Emir. But why then did the title 'sultan of Rûm' not gain in importance under Mehmed II, who achieved the subjugation of Asia Minor as well as the Balkans, and won for this empire of Rûm its natural and traditional capital, Constantinople, whose capture must have seemed the very keystone of the sultanate of Rûm? I believe that it is this capture exactly that prevented the Conqueror from adorning his tide with the name of the vanished empire. This conquest, which realised a secular dream of the Muslim world, and which that world

had practically renounced the better to win it at the end of time (of which it was to be a portent), this conquest, in the mouths of the conquerors, with the Koranic verse 'vanquished are the Romans', must necessarily revive Rûm in its classical sense; it could not have been followed by a resurrection of the name of the obliterated state. Besides, the title of sultan of one of the Muslim states must, after this victory, have seemed markedly inferior to that of 'sultan of the Ghâzîs', which Mehmed inherited from his ancestors.[68] This title now indicated the sultan of the whole of warlike Islam, {386} 'dynamic' Islam as it were, as opposed to the 'peaceful' Islam of the holy centres that the Ottomans still left under the protection of the sultan of Egypt.[69] Also, this empire – which was increasingly transforming itself into a theocracy of the classic Muslim type – found in the Muslim traditions concerning the caliphate, and in the historical traditions of Alexander and the Chosroes of Persia (which were familiar to the Muslim world, thanks to poetry), all that was required to equip itself with a solid ideological foundation.[70] What is more, it could even revive an ancient Turkish legend, the legend of the universal domination of Oghuz Khan and his twenty-four sons.[71] Nevertheless, on the fringes of all this the memory of the imperial traditions of Rûm and its capital survived, cited still by poets and historians.[72] However, among official titles, alongside those that indicate the supreme Muslim dignity (Caliph) and national dignity (Khakan), there was no longer any place for a 'Sultan of Rûm'.

It is only in later documents, where it was necessary to display titles as numerous and pompous as those used by the Habsburg chancellery, that 'land of Rûm' appears, beside 'Persia' and 'Arabia', to evoke the empire's grandeur.[73] Let us note that Rûm precedes Persia and Arabia – it continues to be considered as the hub of the empire. In this correspondence, the heir to the throne of the *Kaysar* (of *Rûm*) writes to the *Çasar* of *Roma*![74] But this is just a play on words and a display of historical erudition. The term Rûm was too closely linked to its classical sense, in which it indicated nothing for the Muslims but the lands beyond the Euphrates and the Taurus, to be able to include the ancient Muslim provinces conquered since [the reign of] Selîm I; it had to be completed with 'Persia' and 'Arabia'. It is the dynasty that gives a representative name to the political unit formed by all these lands: *Devlet-i 'Osmâniye*, 'the Ottoman empire'.

But if 'Rûm' and 'sultan of Rûm' had no more than a modest career in official usage, their success was complete in literary usage and probably in practical usage too, so complete that it is hard to choose

from the immense number of passages that testify to it. I must content myself with giving with a few indications. For the author of the famous *Muhammadiye*, written in Turkish verse under Murâd II, his sultan is simply the 'sultan of Rûm'; at the end of his poem, he shows us his friends advising him to present his work to one of the great sovereigns of the Muslim world {388}:[75]

> {they said 'since your book is such, o friend
> that its equal has not been seen by anyone}
> Present your book to the sultan of Persia
> Or in the throne room of the sultan of Egypt
> Or even present it to the sultan of Rûm,
> To Murâd, son of Mehmed khan, of Rûm'.[76]

Similarly, around 1500, the Ottoman author of a universal history entitles the section that deals with Ottoman history: 'History of the sultans of Rûm of the house of 'Osmân Ghâzî'.[77] One hundred years later, another Ottoman historian, treating the titles in use in different countries, introduces the usage of his homeland with these words each time: 'and in Rûm . . .'.[78] For him too the Ottoman sultan is the 'Rûm pâdishâhi' or the 'sultân-i Rûm'. In the work of historians of more literary language can be found the learned forms of *Rûmî* (plural: *Rûmiyân*) for Ottoman, and *Rûmîya* for Rûm.[79] The great poet Bâkî, lauded for having made the 'language of Rûm'[80] the equal of {389} Arabic or Persian,[81] himself boasts of having taught the 'poets of Rûm' the ghazal genre.[82] Alongside these 'poets of Rûm', the *su'arâ-i Rûm*, one finds the *'ulemâ* ('theologians')-*i Rûm*, the *mesâ'îh* ('sheikhs')-*i Rûm*, the *Rûm abdâllari* ('dervishes of Rûm'),[83] and even the Pleiad of Ottoman calligraphers is called 'the seven masters of Rûm' (*esâtid-i sab'a-i Rûm*). . . .[84]

If the term Rûm knew such popularity with those it designated, its success was no less great with their Eastern neighbours and in the Muslim world in general, where Rûm and Rûmî became the common terms for 'Anatolia' and 'Anatolian' to begin with, and then for 'Ottoman empire' and 'Ottoman'.[85] From the great mystic poet Celâleddin Rûmî onwards, many great men given to Islam by the lands of Rûm spread the name of their homeland throughout the world by their ethnic epithets.

There has been much searching in recent years for a term that might replace that of 'Ottoman', which has become an antipathy to the young Turkish republic, and which in any case has not met the demands of our science since the discovery of the importance of

Turkish life in Asia Minor before the Ottomans, and alongside them. To this day not one new term has been proposed that takes account of both the geographical expanse and the cultural character belonging to the people known until now as *'Osmanli*. We believe that the term 'Turks of Rûm' answers entirely the requirements that one can make: it embraces Anatolia just as well as Rumelia, the Dânishmend and Seljuk eras as well as those of the emirates and of the Ottoman empire; it includes the diverse Turkish elements of nomad, rural, urban, true Turk and 'Turkicised'; it expresses the immense part that the soil of the old 'Roman' empire and its cultural traditions played in the formation of Turkish life in its new habitat; it has the advantage of having been abundantly in use among these Turks themselves and their Muslim neighbours; and finally, in associating the great name of Rome with the Turks, it recalls that which is their greatest glory, the foundation of the empire that – if only for its duration and expanse – will always constitute one of the most important chapters in history.[86]

Notes

a See p. 96, n. 85 in this volume. It is worth remembering that in 1939 Franz Taeschner,Wittek's former collaborator ('Die Vezirfamilie der Gandarlyzâde', *Der Islam*, xviii (1929), 60–115) contributed a warmly appreciative review article – 'Wittek[s] . . . inhaltreichen Aufsatz' – of 'Le Sultan de Rûm' (mentioning also 'De la défaite'), entitled 'Rumtürkisch', to the pages of the *Orientalistische Literatur zeitung* (*OLZ*, xlii/2, 76–82), which also quotes the entirety of the above passages.

1 'C'est au IVè s{ièсle} qu'apparaît le mot *Romania* pour désigner tous les pays conquis par Rome', H. Pirenne, *Mahomet et Charlemagne* (Paris–Brussels, 1937), 1, n. 1{see *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, tr. Bernard Miall (London, 1939), 17, n. 1: 'The term *Romania*, denoting all the countries conquered by Rome, made its appearance in the fourth century'}. The term can equally be found in Greek: in an inscription from the end of the sixth century (*Eranos Vindobonensis. {Festschrift zur 42. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Wien, dargebracht von der Philologisch-archäologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*}, Vienna, 1893, 331 ff.), a Balkan *Rhomaios* implores God to 'strike down' (*terrasser*; cf. H. Grégoire {[Review of] G. I. Bratianu, *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1936)}, *Byzantion*, xii (1937), 688) the Avars and to protect Ρωμανία {Romania}. The interpretation that G. I. Bratianu (*Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'empire byzantine*, Paris, 1936, 63 f.) has given of this term – that it relates to

the Latin character of the region commended to divine protection – does not seem acceptable to us; it must refer here to the Roman empire, without regard to language (or nationality, as one likes to say these days). Thus the region of Ravenna is called the Romagna not because it distinguishes itself in northern Italy by its latinity (which is certainly not the case), but simply because it has belonged to the empire for the longest time. In the sense of Ρωμανία [(Romania)] one has also Ρομαϊς {Romais}: cf. Georgius Acropolita, {*Opera*, ed. Augustus} Heisenberg (Leipzig, 1903), i, 13 = *Annales* (ed. I. Bekkerus) Bonn, {1836}, 15 (on the *Partitio Romaniae*): των γουν 'Ιταλων εις π ολυμέρειαν τά της 'Ρωμαϊδος χλιρωσαμένων {'The Italians had parcelled out the [land] of the Roman[s]'}; p. 13 Heis{enberg} = p. 36 B{ekker}: πολλήν τε χώραν της ΄Ρωμαϊδος {'. . . and much land of the Roman[s]'}.

2 A form already sanctioned by the Koran ({Sûra} XXX, 1: *Sûrat ar-Rûm*).

3 One is astonished by the poverty of the article 'Rûm'{by Fr. Babinger} in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, {1st edn}, an article that is almost exclusively drawn from the brief (and actually quite well done) account in the *Kâmûs al-A'lam*, the Turkish 'Dictionary of History and Geography' by Shemseddîn Samy Bey Fraschery, 3rd edn, Constantinople, 1891, s.v. 'Rûm'.

4 See for example 'Âşıkpaşazâde, an Ottoman historian of the fifteenth century (F. Giese (ed.), *Die altosmanische Chronik des Â{šikpašazâde}* (Leipzig, 1929), 185, 1.13): 'Cem went from Adana to Rûm' – that is to say, from Cilicia to the lands on the other side of the Taurus, in Karaman.

5 Attaliata,{Michael, *Michaelis Attaliatae historia*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1853)}, 120: καί οὕτω (*scil.* Cilicia), χαὶ τὸν Ταῦρον τὸ ὄρος π ανστρατιᾷ ὑπ ερβάς, εἰσβάλλει τῇ (γῇ) 'Ρωμα'ιων {'Thus he passed through that land [Cilicia], crossed the Taurus mountains with his entire army, and entered the [land] of the Romans'}. It will be noted that our interpretation of this passage differs, without contradicting it, from that given by J. Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs seldjoucides* (Nancy, 1913), 70.

6 W. Heffening, 'Tahtagi-Lieder aus dem Taurus', in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, xci (1937), 157 f.:

Çiftehandan yolum asar – Urum inesine düser 'my path passes beyond the Çiftehan, then it arrives at the descent towards Rûm'.

7 For all that concerns the historical events mentioned in this article, I refer the reader to my 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 285–319 {Chapter III in this volume} and to ch. 2 of my *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1938 {see pp. 45–56 in this volume}.

8 J. v. Hammer, *Des osmanischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung* (Vienna, 1815), ii, 449.

9 'Ayn-i 'Âlî, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i 'Osmân* (Istanbul, 1280 {/1863; repr. Istanbul, 1979}), 22.

10 Hâcî Halîfe (Kâtib Çelebi), *Cihânnumâ* (Istanbul, 1145/1732), 622: *eyâlet-i Sivas dahi eyâleti Rûm derler* {'They also call the province of Sivas the province of Rûm'}. Listings of the 7 sancaks that make up the vilâyet of Sivas can be

found here, in the passages cited in the two notes above, and also in Ferîdûn, *Munsâ'at as-salatîn*, 2nd edn (Istanbul, 1274–1275), ii, 405.

11 See the letter from the Grand-vizier Ibrâhîm Pasha to Charles V dating from {937/}1530 (F. Babinger, {'Die älteste türkische Urkunde des deutsch-osmanischen Staatsverkehrs'}, *Der Islam*, x (1920), {134–146, repr. in *idem, Aufsätze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante*, ii (Munich, 1966), 227–239} at pp. 140 and 144, n. 1 {= 237, n. 1, where} J. H. Mordtmann observes that 'Rûm' here indicates 'Sivas'), and those [letters] from Süleymân the Magnificent to Ferdinand I dating from the years 1535 (R. Tschudi in *Festschrift G. Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 323), 1545 (or 1547?) ({Ahmed} Ferîdûn {Beg}, *Munsâ'at* {*al-Salâtîn*, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1274–1275/1858)}, ii, 78) and 1554 (L. Fekete, *Einführung in die osmanisch-türkische Diplomatik* (Budapest, 1926), 13 {see Anton C. Schaendlinger, *Die Schreiben Süleymãns des Prachtigen an Karl V., Ferdinand I. und Maximilian II*, 2 vols (Vienna, 1983)}).

12 See the peace treaty signed in Vienna in 1616 (Ferîdûn, 2nd edn, ii, 419) and that of Vasvár of 1664 (cf. Franciscus à Mesgnien Meninski, *Institutiones linguae turcicae*, 2nd edn, ed. A. F. Kollar, (Vienna, 1756), 202–208; cf. Râshid, *Ta'rîh*[*-i Râshid*], 2nd edn (Istanbul, 1282/1865), i, 88), and finally the letters addressed to Frederick II of Prussia in the years 1763–1774 (H. Scheel, {'Die Schreiben der türkischen Sultane an die preüssischen Könige in der Zeit von 1721 bis 1774 und die ersten preüssischen Kapitulationen vom Jahre 1761'}, *Mitteilungen des Seminars fur orientalische Sprachen*, Berlin, xxxiii/2 (1930), {1–82, at pp.} 31, 34 and 37).

13 F. Giese, (ed.), *Die altosmanische Chroniken*, i (Breslau, 1922), 40 (= ii, 55). Giese translates: 'mit dem rumelischen (!) Heer'. (Clearer still is the passage of Neshrî that I published in *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, i (1921/22), 113 {= *Gihânnümâ*, ed. Taeschner, 98–99}: Mehmed flees with the warriors of Rûm towards Rûm and reaches Tokat.)

14 Cf. {*Altosm. anon. Chroniken*}, i, 55, l. 21: a messenger is sent to Rûm to announce to Murâd II the death of his father. In place of Rûm, the MS W2 has Amasya (as in Uruc (F. Babinger, ed., *Die frühosmanischen Jahrbücher des Urudsch* (Hanover, 1925)), 45 and 112); and {*Altosm. anon. Chroniken*}, i, 5, l. 5: *Amasya tarafikim Rûmîlerdir* (translated in ii, 11, as: 'die Umgebung von Amasya gehörte (!) den Rhomäern'); Uruc, 81, l. 15: *Rûm vilâyetinde Sivas*; Ahmedî (in *Tâ'rîh-i 'Osmânî Enc. Mecm.*, i (1911), 51, 1. 6): *Rûmdan Sivas ve Togat* {Tokat} *aldi ol* ({Wittek adds:} 'on another passage by the same author see infra, 24, n. 38' {[*sic*], but his reference appears to be unattributable}); Sükrullâh, ed. Th. Seif, {Der Abschnitt über die Osmanen in Sükrüllâhs persischer Universal geschichte'}, *Mitt. z. osm. Gesch.*, ii (1924), 63–128, at p. 108, l. 18; *der Rûm ya'nî Amasiyya ve Tokat ve havâlî-i înhâ* {('in Rûm, that is to say Amasya and Tokat and those regions')}.

15 Sa'deddîn, *Tâc et-tevârîh* (Istanbul 1279–1280/1863), i, 568; ii, 4, and in several other places. In i, 286 one reads *Rûmîya-i sugrâ ve Ermenîya-i kubrâ* {('Lesser Rûm and Greater Armenia')}. Cf. Meninski's dictionary {Francisci a Mesgnien Meninski, *Lexicon Arabico-Persico-Turcicum*} (Vienna, 1780) s.v. 'Rûmiyya', where this passage is rendered by *Graecia minor, seu Anatolia, et*

Armenia major, which is inferior by far to Bratutti's translation, also cited {i.e. in Meninski; Vincenzo Brattuti, *Chronica del'origine e progressione della casa ottomana composta da Saidino Turco*, vol. i (Vienna, 1649); vol. ii (Madrid, 1652)}: *Romania minore e Armenia maggiore*. Once more it is none other than the *vilâyet* of Sivas-Amasia that is in question. As for *Ermenîya-i kubrâ*, 'greater Armenia', cf. Marco Polo, *Le Livre de Marco Polo*, ed. M. G. Pauthier, 2 vols (Paris, 1865), i, 37: 'La grant Hermenie' (between Georgia and Mosul, with Erzincan, Erzerum and Ercis as its principal towns), and Johannes Schiltberger, *Reisen*, ed. K. F. Neumann (Munich, 1859), 5 {*The Bondage and Travels of Johann Schiltberger, 1396–1427*, Hakluyt Soc., 1st series, no. 58 (London, 1879), 61}: 'das gros armenia'; {'the Great Armenia'}.

16 This sense of Rûm = 'vilâyet of Sivas' is ignored by the dictionaries (Meninski, Bianchi and Kieffer, Zenker, Chloros, Sami {Frascheri}) excepting that of Redhouse (s.v. 'Rûm') and the *Lehce-i 'osmânî* of Ahmed Vefîk Pasha {2 vols, Istanbul, 1876} s.v. Rûm: *Sivas memleketine dahi Rûm ve Türkmenlike Erzerum deyinur*). Let us note, furthermore, that in 'Âşıkpaşazâde, ed. F. Giese, 182, l. 21, the vilâyet of Sivas-Amasia bears the name Artana [Ertene], after the prince who had ruled over this region in the middle of the fourteenth century; cf. Neshrî, ed. Th. Nöldeke, in *Zeitschr. d. Deutschen Morgenl. Ges.*, xv (1861), 371 {ed. Taeschner, i, 93}, where Artana is replaced by Amasya in the corresponding passage. In {our 'Von den byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie'}, *Byzantion*, x (1935), 25, n. 2 and 31, n. 1 we have pointed out that a part of the vilâyet of Sivas, the region of Niksar and Koyluhisar, was called Dânišmend-ili, 'land of the Dânishmends', after the dynasty of that name.

17 A. Tevhîd, *Meskûkât-i kadîme-i islâmiye katalogu*, iv (Istanbul, 1321), nos. 102–104. Similarly, item no. 72 in Ismâ'îl Gâlib, *Takvîm-i meskûkât-i 'osmânîye* (Istanbul, 1307), should figure in this series, although it is attributed there to Sultan Mehmed II Fâtih; Halîl Edhem rightly excluded it from his catalogue of Ottoman coins (*Meskûkât katalogu*, vi (Istanbul, 1334)).

18 See P. Wittek, 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', in *Festschrift G. Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 340.

19 The vilâyet of Anadolu encompassed the whole of western Asia Minor with its 14 sancaks: Ankara, Aydin, Bolu, Teke, Hamid, Hudâvendigâr, Sultân önü, Saruhan, Kastatmonu, Karahisâr-Sâhib (= Afyon Karahisâr), Karasi, Kangri (= Çankiri), Kütahya, Mentese (cf. Hâcî Halîfe, *Cihânnumâ*, 631 and Ferîdûn, 2nd edn, ii, 404). Ankara became an Ottoman possession for the first time in 1354, at the same time as Gerede (Krateia) – see Cantacuzenos, iii, 284 B{onn}, and definitively in the first year of the reign of Murâd I (1362; see P. Charanis, {'Les Βραχέα Χρονικά comme source historique'}, *Byzantion*, xiii (1931), {335–362, at}349 ff.). On the transfer of the seat of the beylerbey (governor) of Anatolia from Ankara to Kütahya in 1451, see Sa'deddîn, i, 416.

20 I hope that a Byzantinist will be able to decide if it is necessary to propose a very extensive application of the name of the Anatolikon theme, or simply of the Greek term Ανατολή [Anatoli], which would after all have been in use in the west of the peninsula. The Arabic orthography 'N'TWLY, which suggests to us as an old pronunciation of 'Anatoli', speaks in favour of the latter

possibility{; cf. *EI*2, s.v. 'Anadolu (i) The Name, (by F. Taeschner), which would appear to support Wittek's hypothesis}.

21 Cf. J. Laurent, {Byzance et les Turcs seldjoucides}, 69–71.

22 See R. M. Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1916).

23 Here are a few examples: (1) Uruc, ed. Babinger, 50, l.20: *Karaman vilâyetine ol vakt Yûnân vilâyeti derlerdi*, 'at that time the vilayet of Karaman (= Konya) was called Yûnân vilayeti'; (2) Solakzâde, *Tâ'rîh* (Istanbul, 1297), 10: *memleket-i Yûnânda pây-taht ki sehr-i Konya'dir*, 'in the land of Yûnân, the capital, which is the town of Konya'; (3) 'Âshikpashazâde, ed. Giese, 182, l.21: Bâyezîd and Cem, the sons of Mehmed II, are sent away during their father's lifetime, one to the capital of Artana, and the other to the capital of Yûnân; in Neshrî (in *Zeitschr. d. Deut schen Morgenl. Ges.*, xv (1861), 371 {*Gihânnümâ*, ed. Taeschner, i, 219–220}) we find Amasya for Artana and Karaman for Yûnân in the corresponding passage. The vilâyet of Konya, composed of the 7 sancaks of Aksaray, Aksehir, Begsehri {Beysehir}, Konya, Kirsehir, Kayseri and Nigde (Hâcî Halîfe, *Cihânnumâ*, 615), was mostly known by the name Karaman, after the dynasty which had ruled over that region in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Let us also note the name, Sücâ'eddîn (*Cih{ânnümâ}*, 618), formerly borne by one region of this vilâyet, the district (*kazâ*) of Ulukisla in the sancak of Nigde: a toponym that harks back to a prince of that name who had ruled over this region at the beginning of the fourteenth century (see P. Wittek, s.v. Nigde, in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* {1st. edn, iii, 910 f.}).

24 We certainly do not wish to suggest that some kind of mixture between Christianity and Islam, Greek life and Turkish life, did not take place in Konya as well. It is only that this interpenetration of the two worlds there took place mostly in high society, or – in the intellectual domain – among certain exceptional individuals. Cf. for example J. H. Mordtmann, 'Um das Mausoleum des Molla Hunkiar in Konia', *Jahrbuch der Asiatischen Kunst*, ii (Leipzig, 1925), 197–204 and P. Wittek, 'L'Epitaphe d'un Comnène à Konia', in *Byzantion*, x (1935), 505–515 {not 105–115, as in *Schriftenverzeichnis*, 3, no. 25}, and 'Encore l'Epitaphe d'un Comnène à Konia', *idem*, xii (1937), 207–211.

25 It suffices to observe the many passages, indicated in the index under 'Rûm', in Ibn Bîbî's history of the Seljuks of Rûm (M. Th. Houtsma, *Recueil de textes relatifs a l'histoire des Seldjoucides*, iv (Leiden, 1902). In the great majority of these passages (for the others see the two following notes) the term Rûm indicates the territory of the Seljuk state or the state itself. I only wish to quote a few: *Recueil* iv, 75 and 110: *leshker-i Rûm*, 'the Seljuk army'; 245: *akâbir ve a'yân-i mamâlik-i Rûm az Kaysariya vä Malatya vä digar jawânib* {'the grandees and notables of the lands of Rûm in Kayseri and Malatya and other districts'}; and 246: *Sâhib Shamseddîn vä sâ'ir akâbir-i Rûm*, where *akâbir-i Rûm* = 'the grandees of the Seljuk state'; 248: *vuzarâ'-i Rûm* 'the viziers of Rûm' {see H. W. Duda (ed.), *Die Seldschuken geschichte des Ibn Bibi* (Copenhagen, 1959), *passim*}.I note as a curious singularity that Kara Çelebi-zâde, an Ottoman historian from the middle of the seventeenth century, refers to the Seljuk sultan Mas'ûd II with the title 'Kaysar-i Rûm' in his *Rawdâtu'l-*

Ebrâr (Bulak, 1248), 275; this explains the strange expression that one finds two pages previously: 'Osmân is invested in his emirate by the *kaysar-i kisver-i Rûm* {'the emperor of the land of Rûm'}.

26 See for example Ibn al-Athîr's account (*ad ann.* 601; {*Al-Kâmil fî'l-Ta'rîkh* (12 vols, Cairo 1301}), xii, 93) of the accession to the throne of Kaikhosru I in 'the land of Rûm' and his escape to Constantinople, home of the 'king of Rûm'; or Ibn Bîbî, *Recueil*. iv, 36 {ed. Duda, 47}: 'holy war against the land of Rûm that obeys Lashkarî (Laskaris)', and 334: 'Izzeddîn Kaika'us II flees towards the land of Rûm and stays there a while at *Istenbol*.

27 Ibn Bibi, *Rec*., iv, 297: *Sultân 'Izz al-dîn . . . bi-Istânbûl nezd-i Fasilyûs raft. Malik al-Rûm der-ta'zîm-i û mubâlagahâ kard*: 'Sultan 'Izzeddin . . . went to Constantinople (Istenbol) to the house of the βασιλεύς {'Fasilyevs'; *basileus*}; the *malik ar-Rûm* showered him with honours' {cf. Ibn Bibi, ed. Duda, 283–284}.

28 To my knowledge it is only in the inscription at Egerdir {Egridir}, dated 635/1237–1238, that a Seljuk sultan calls himself 'sultan of the land (!) of Rûm', and even here this title only appears in an expansion of the strictly official titulature, and this in close connection with the names of lands considered to be answer able to the sultan: *Sultân bilâd ar-Rûm wa'l-Arman wa'l-Shâm wa Diyârbakr wa'l-Afranj*, 'sultan of the land of Rûm, of Armenia, of Syria, of Diyarbekr and of the Franks'. See B. Moritz in F. Sarre, *Reise in Klein-Asien* (Berlin, 1896), 159 f., and F. Giese, 'Die Bauinschrift der Medrese zu Egherdir', in *Mitt. d. Seminars f. Orient. Spr. Berlin*, xi/2 (1908), 255 f. One must even ask oneself if Rûm, appearing here in a list of dependant countries, does not indicate the Byzantium of Laskaris: *bilâd-i Rûm ki be-leshkerî mansûb ast* (Ibn Bibi, *Rec*. iv, 36 {ed. Duda, 47}, cf. 74, n. 1 in this volume.

29 It must always be remembered that the Turkish conquerors of these western regions preferred to call them Anadolu, a term that we have already said harks back to the time of the Dânishmends (see p. 79 {367} f. in this volume).

30 Ch. Defrémery and B. R.Sanguinetti (ed. and tr.), *Voyages d'Ibn Batoutah* (4 vols, Paris, 1853–1859 {reissued, with intro. and notes by St. Yérasimos, 3 vols, Paris, 1982}), ii, 255: *wa qasadnâ barr al-Tûrkîyah al-ma'rûf bi-bilâd ar-Rûm wa-innamâ nusibat ilâ al-Rûm li'annahâ kânat bilâdahum fî al-qadîm wa minhâ al-Rûm al-aqdamûn wa al-Yûnânîyah thumma 'staftahahâ al-Muslimûn wa bihâ al'ân kathîr min 'l-Nasârâ tahta dhimmat al-muslimîn min al-Turkmân* {cf. H. A. R. Gibb (ed. and tr.), *The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D. 1325–1354*, 4 vols (Cambridge, 1958–1994), ii, 415}.

31 {Ibn Battûta, ed. Defrémery,} ii, 418 {ed. Gibb, ii, 500}. Ibn Battûta describes his arrival at the fortress of Mahtûlî, where the territory of Rûm begins. This locality should be looked for on the land route that leads from southern Russia to Constantinople. We will not hide the fact that the whole of this part of the manuscript is quite suspect: to go to Constantinople, not from Bursa or from Nicaea, which our author had visited previously, but from Sudak, and this not by sea but across the steppes; that the Byzantine princess married to the Khan of the Golden Horde, in whose company Ibn Battûta was travelling, has the same name – Bay{a}lûn – as the wife of the {contemporary} Ottoman {ruler} Orkhan – all this is just too implausible. {Orhan's wife, of course, was

named Nîlüfer, which is easily enough misread in a defective Arabic scription as 'Bay{a}lûn': NYLFR > BYLWN (cf. Gibb, ii, 532–533); Bayalûn is 'apparently a frequent name (or title) for the wife of a khan' (see B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde* (Leipzig, 1943), 85, n. 4, cited by Gibb, *loc. cit*).} Above all, the itinerary between Mahtûlî and Constantinople is absolutely fanciful. This being the case I dare not seek {to establish} the location of Mahtûlî (it is tempting to correct Mahtûlî {MHTWLY in Arabic orthography} to Nikboli {in Arabic: NKBWLY}; Nicopolis on the Danube). {It may be noted that Gibb, ii, 500, n. 313 equates Mahtûlî with the Byzantine frontier city of Diampolis (Yambol), on the Toutzos/Tunca river in Bulgaria.} Nevertheless {Wittek concludes} it is still true that for our author, there existed in Europe a territory called Rûm, which was the Byzantine empire.

32 F. Taeschner (ed.), *Al-'Umarî's Bericht über Anatolien*, i (Leipzig, 1929), 1.

33 Op. cit., 53 f.: wa ammâ mamlakat al-Qustantiniyya wa hiya al-'ân tusammâ Istanbûl {'STNBWL} wa qadîman Bîzântînîyah (BYZ'NTYNYH) fa'innâhâ kursî mamlakat al-Rûm . . . wa hiyâ mamlakat al-Qaysar.

34 Curchi = Κούρικος {Kourikos}, the *Korkene* of Bertrandon de la Broquière (1432), ed. Ch. Scheffer (Paris, 1892), 100 (166: 'Corco'), today's Çokören (the modern toponym is explained by the metathesis of a form Korikon, with palatalization of the initial *k*) on the Cilician coast, to the east of Selefke = Σελεύκια {Seleukia}; cf. Tomaschek, 'Zur hist. Geographie von Klein-Asien im Mittelalter', in *Sb. Ak. d. W. Wien, Ph.-h. Cl.*, cxxiv (1891), 65. Furthermore, Sa'deddîn, ii, 23, l. 8 writes KRKWS, *Korikos*.

35 Pierre Bergeron, *Voyages faites principalement en Asie dans les XIIe, XIIIe, XIVe, et XVe siecles* . . . (La Haye, 1735), col. 16. {See, however, *Recueil des historiens des croisades, Documents arméniens*, 2 vols (Paris, 1906), ii, 271–272: *Haytonus, Flos historiarum terre orientis*, cap. XIII [*sic*]: 'De regno Turquie'}.

36 That is to say, 'the kingdom takes the name Rûm which it is given in the various nations of the East . . .' {*Recueil*, ii, 271: 'Regnum Turquie a diversis nationibus parcium Orientis Grecia appellatur . . .'}.

37 Haiton goes on to list the eight provinces of this 'Greece' or 'Turkey' and their capitals. This passage is reproduced, from a MS in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, by Pauthier in his edition of Marco Polo {cf. 78, n. 15 in this volume}, i, 36, n. 2; I follow the names according to Bergeron with the readings from the MS in square brackets, although these are not always the better ones {cf. *Recueil*, ii, 271, with variant readings}. Here are the eight provinces and their capitals: 1. Ligonie [Elconie] (Lycaonia) with Comi [Elconie] (Konya); 2. Capadoce with Césarée de Grèce [Césaire la grant de Grèce]; 3. Sauria (Isauria) with Séleucie [Salerne]; 4. Briquia [Liquie] (Phrygia) with Zichia [Nichie] de Grèce (Lazikia = Laodicea ad M. ?); 5. Quisitan (Albistan) with Epheson [Enfesson] ([Arabic text:] 'FSS or 'BSS), which stem from the old name Αραβισσος [Arabissos], itself still recognizable in the modern name Yarpuz: it is the Ephesus of the orientals, where the Cavern of the Seven Sleepers is situated; cf. Mukrimin Halîl {Yinanç}, in *Türk Tâ'rîh Encumeni Mecmû'asi*, xv (1926), 91, n. 1); 6. Bithinie [Putanie] with Nichor [Nique] (Nicaea); 7. Paphlagonie and Gynapolis [Guianopolis] (Ιωνοπολις, Inebolu); 8. Genech [Genesti] (arm.: Chavnivk, Chanet'; osmanli:

Canik; Ibn Bîbî: Jânît {J'NYT}; Schiltberger, ed. K. F. Neumann, 63: Genyck; 64: tcyenick; 95: Zegnikch) with Trapezonde. It will be noticed that Caesaraea and Laodicaea are flagged as being 'of (Greece =) Rûm'; this is probably to distinguish them from Caesaraea in Palestine and Laodicaea, the Syrian port {of Latakiya}.

38 Geoffroi de Ville-Hardouin, *La Conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris, 1872), 70 (§ 125): *Avie* (Abydos) *qui siet sor le Braz-Saint-George* (Dardanelles) *devers la Turquie*' {Abydos, which is situated on the Straits, opposite Turkey}; 270 (§ 453): Theodore Lascaris, *qui tenoit la terre d'autre part del Braz devers la Turquie* {T. L., who holds the land on the other side of the Straits across from Turkey}. Note that Marco Polo (ed. Pauthier, i, 35 ff.; {cf. ed. Philippe Ménard, *Marco Polo. Le Devisement du monde*, 5 vols (Geneva, 2001–2009), i, XIX, 22; XX, rub. 1}) refers to Asia Minor with the name *Turquemenie*, a name that Bertrandon de la Broquière, {Ch. Schéfer (ed.), *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière* (Paris, 1892)}, 83, applies only to the region surrounding the gulf of Alexandretta {Iskenderun} (*pays de Turquemanie que nous appelons Armenie dont est le chief une grande ville qu'ilz nomment Entequeye {Antakya} et nous l'appelons Antioce* {[the] land of Turko mania that we call Armenia of which the chief place is a large town that they call Antioch {Antakya}}). In {Ahmed Vefîk Pasha}, *Lehçe{-i 'Osmânî*, 2nd edn (Istanbul, 1306/1890)} , s.v. 'Türkmenlik', the term is applied to the regions of Erzincan, Erzerum and Tabriz.

39 Only the town of Nicaea is regarded {by Villehardouin} as being part of Romania, despite its being located in Asia Minor; 180 (§ 304): *la duchee de Niqué, qui ere une des plus halte honors de la terre de Romenia, et séoit d'autre part del Braiz, devers la Turquie* {the duchy of Nicaea, which was one of the most important fiefs of the land of Romania, and situated on the other side of the Straits, towards Turkey}.

40 Papadopoulos-Kerameus, Ἱεροσολυμιτική Βιβλιοθήκη {Hierosolimitiki Biblio theki}, iv (St Petersburg, 1899), 32 = Lampros, Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων {Neos Hellenomnimon}, vii (Athens, 1910), 151 (cf. N. Jorga, *Gesch. d. Osman. Reiches*, i (Gotha, 1908), 349, n. 2): ἐπ ροσκίνισαν τὰ κάστρη τῆσ Ῥομανήας σὶν τὸν τόπ ον ὅλον {*eproskinisan ta kastri tis Romanas sin ton topon holon*: 'The fortifications of the Romans, along with the entire land, subjected themselves [to him]'. See P. Schreiner, *Die byzantinische Kleinchroniken*, 2 vols (Vienna, 1975–1979), i, 636; ii, 395–396.}

41 {G. Gelcich and L. Thallóczy,} *Diplomatarium* {*relationum reipublicae Ragusanae cum regno Hungariae*} (Budapest, 1887)}, no. 226: tocius Romanie oras antehoc per Mussiam occupatas . . . dicioni sue hactenas benigne submittens {'all of Romania previously occupied by Mûsâ . . . peacefully submitting to his [Mehmed Çelebi's] rule'}.

42 We have already met the term 'Greece' as a translation of 'Rûm'; see p. 82 in this volume.

43 The Slavs, by the way, also designated Byzantium by the name of царство гръцко {*tsarstvo gr'tsko*; 'the Greek empire'}.

44 S. Ljubic, *Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium* (Zagreb,

1868 and after), vi, 102–106.

45 K. F. Neumann (ed.), *Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger aus München in Europa, Asia und Afrika von 1394 bis 1427* (Munich, 1859), 93 f. {cf. Valentin Langmantel (ed.), *Hans Schiltbergers Reisebuch nach der Nürnberger Handschrift herausgegeben* (Tübingen, 1885), 53, with variant text-readings}.

46 Schéfer, *Bertrandon*, 182–185 and other passages; 198: 'Beguelarbay, le seigneur de la Grèce' = the *Rumeli beglerbegisi* ({the *beylerbey* of Rumeli}; cf. 171, 180, 183 and 188).

47 We also meet the term Macedonia in Sa'deddîn, *Tâj üt-Tevârîh*, i, 435, l. 5: 'the land of *Mâkedûn*, known today by the name Rûm-eli'. Besides Macedonia, Bertrandon also knows (171 f.) Epirus ('Pirrhe'), which by his account would be the region of Seres ('Lesseres'), and (268) Thessaly ('Thezale').

48 *Bertrandon*, 199 f.

49 *Bertrandon*, 201.

50 *Bertrandon*, 205.

51 *Bertrandon*, 264: cf. 266: *Et de la Hongrie à passer dans la Grèce n'y a à passer sinon la Dunoe et tantost on est en la Grece*; {And to pass from Hungary into Greece one has but to cross the Danube and immediately one is in Greece}.

52 *Bertrandon* (212) does not fail to note the location where, on his return, he heard again for the first time the mass celebrated according to the Roman rite, even though it was *en langage esclavonien* {'in the Slavonic tongue'}: it was at Semlin {Zemun}, thus already outside the future {boundaries of} Turkish Rumeli.

53 J. von Hammer, *Rumeli und Bosna* {*geographisch beschrieben, aus dem türkischen übersetzt*} (based on Hâcî Halîfe {Kâtib Çelebi, *Cihân-nümâ* (Istanbul, 1151/1732)}), (Vienna, 1812).

54 Cf. {the following definitions from Yanko} Chloros, Λεξικν τουρκο-'ελληνικόν {*Leksikon Tourko-hellenikon* (Turkish-Greek Dictionary)} (Constantinople, 1899), s.v.: '*Patrîk* (Patriarch)': *Der se'âdet patriki* ὁ ἐν Κωνσταντινιπ όλει π ατριάρχης τῶν Ῥωμαίοω, ἤτοι ὁ Οἰκουμενικὸς Πατριάρχης ('the Patriarch of the Romans in Constantinople, or the ecumenical patriarch'). *Kuds-i serîf Rûm patriki* şerîf Rûm patriki ὁ π ατριάρχης τῶν 'Ιρθοδόξων 'Ιερουσαλήμ, etc. ('the patriarch of the orthodox in Jerusalem, etc.'). *Rûm Patrikhanesi* π ατριαρχεϊον τῶν Ρωμαίων ('the patriarch of the Romans'); s.v. 'Millet': *Rûm milleti* τό ἔθνος τῶν Ῥωμαίων ('the people of the Romans', sc. the Orthodox community); s.v. 'Hâiḫ-u-Rûm': ὁ ἐξ Ἀρμενίων ὀρθόδοξος ('the orthodox among the Armenians').

55 We have already encountered this title in the passage by Ibn Battûta (see p. 82 {372} in this volume). Cf. P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* (Istanbul, 1934), 39, n. 1. Let us quote a particularly explicit passage from Al-'Umarî, ed. Taeschner, 53, l. 14 f.: *wa malik Tarâbzûn yasammâ al-takfûr ki-mâ yasammâ malik al-Arman*: 'the king of Trebizond is called *takfûr*, as is so called the king of Armenia', and Schiltberger, ed. Neumann, 148: *Und ihren patriarchen haissent sie* (sc. the Armenians) *Kathagnes* (Katholikos) *und einen künig haissents takchaver* [And they (the Armenians) call their patriarchs

Kathagnes and a king is called *takchaver* (tekfûr)].

56 There is but one passage where an Ottoman designates the emperor of this time with the title of *kaysar* and the empire with the name of Rûm: the verses of Ahmedî that recount Murâd I's first battles (see *Die altosm. Anon. Chroniken*, ed. Giese, i, 19, ll. 23–26); as I will show elsewhere, the poet, in versifying a chronicle, has misunderstood the meaning of Rûm that in this case indicates merely the region of Tokat (Amasya); after this misunderstanding, it is not surprising to see him introduce the *kaysar* into the account, the term being so intimately linked with that of Rûm in Muslim literature.

57 See G. Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, 5 vols (Mannheim, 1846–1862), v, 55, n. 1.

58 (Wa fî sanat 797) 'âda al-Sultân ilâ Misr[a] fa-hadhara ileyhi rusul Abî Yazîd ibn 'Uthmân bi-hadâyâ wa tuhaf fî talab[i] tashrîf[in] min al-khalîfah lahu bi-an yakuna sultân[a] al-Rûm fajahhaza al-sultân[u] lahu dhâlika (Ibn al-Shihna, Raudat al-manâzir fî akhbâr al-awâ'il wa'l-awâkhir, in the margin of Ibn al-Athîr, Ta'rîkh al-Kâmil (Bulak, 1290), ix, 207); I quote from F. Babinger, 'Zwei türkische Schützbriefe für Georg II. Rákóczi, . . . aus dem Jahre 1649', etc. in *Le Monde Oriental*, x (1921), 115–151 {= *idem, Aufsätze und Abhandlungen*, i, 406–437} 132, n. 1 {= 420, n. 2}, where the passage is reproduced (the interpretation of it given by Babinger is erroneous: it is in fact not Barkûk but the Caliph who confers this title). Cf. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 2nd edn, i (Pest, 1827), 195; C. H. Becker, 'Bartholds Studien über Kalif und Sultan', in *Der Islam*, vi (1916), {350–412, at}378; T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924), 106. This embassy of 1394 is but one of many exchanged between the Ottomans and Egypt around this time; to those listed by Weil, *Gesch. d. Chalifen*, v, 47, n. 1, could be added the embassy of which Schiltberger, ed. Neumann, 57; {ed. Langmantel, 8}, speaks: he says that it goes, after the victory at Nicopolis (1396), to the '{chönig}soldan (Sultan {Barkûk}) mit LX Knaben zu einer erung' {with sixty youths in his honour}. Barthold {see Becker, 'Bartholds Studien', 378} would surely not have persisted in his doubts about the historicity of Ibn al-Shihna's account if he had had the original text before him, and not merely the very inaccurate citations given by Hammer and d'Ohsson. The difficulties he sees in the fact that the Ottomans bear the title of sultan in their inscriptions well before this embassy, and that on the other hand their title of sultan was not recognized in Egypt during the fifteenth century, are easy to eliminate: it is quite natural that the Ottomans should call themselves *de facto* sultans before seeking *de jure* recognition of the fact; and it is also natural that the Egyptians should refuse recognition of the title once the Ottomans had become their most dangerous adversaries.

59 The text of this inscription from Bursa, dated 1337–1338, that Ahmed Tevhîd gives in {'Bursa'da eñ eski kitâbe'}, *Tarîh-i 'osmânî encümeni mecmû'asi*, v (1330), 318{–20}, requires several corrections and restitutions {cf. Colin Heywood, 'The 1337 Bursa Inscription and its interpreters', *Turcica*, xxxvi (2004), 215–232}. For the titles of the first sultans, see F. Taeschner, 'Beiträge zur frühosmanischen Epigraphik und Archäologie', *Der Islam*, xx

(1932), {109–186, at}131 f.

60 Becker, 'Bartholds Studien', *Der Islam*, vi (1916), 370 f. and T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, 202 f.

61 Nizâmuddîn Sâmî, *Zafarnâma*, ed. F. Tauer, i (Prague, 1937), 257, l. 14 and 258, l. 1.

62 Ibn 'Arabshâh, *'Ajâ'ib al-makdûr fi nawâ'ib Tîmûr* (Cairo, 1285), 146. Cf. M. F. Köprülü, 'Yildirim Bâyezîd'in esâreti ve intihâri hakkinda', *Belleten*, i (1937), 596. The assertion that Shâpûr (I) was put in an iron cage by the emperor (Valerian) is naturally a grave historical error, since it was, on the contrary, the latter who was taken prisoner, in {A.D.} 260.

63 F. Dölger, 'Bulgarisches Cartum und byzantinisches Kaisertum', *Actes du IVè Congrès intern. des Études Byzantines (= Bull. Inst. Arch. Bulgare*, ix and x), i (Sofia, 1935–1936), 57–68.

64 See for example G. L. Fr. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgesch. der Republik Venedig*, 3 vols (Vienna, 1856–1857; repr. 1964) ii, 37–42 (no. 176): *Romanie imperium*.

65 N. Jorga, 'France de Constantinople et de Morée', *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, xii (Bucharest, 1935), 81.

66 The common but far too naïve opinion on the continuity of Byzantine institutions in the Ottoman empire must, after the study by Köprülüzade M. Fuat, 'Bizans müesseselerinin osmanli müesseselerine te'siri' ('Remarks on the influence of Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institutions'), *Türk hukuk ve iktisat Mecmuasi*ι, i (1931), 165–313{English translation by Gary Leiser, ed. and tr., *Some observations on the influence of Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institions* (Ankara, 1999)}, be definitively abandoned.

67 Let us note in passing that Greek chronicles from the time of the *Tourkokratía* also use the verb βασιλεύειν {*basileíein*, 'to rule'} in respect of the sultans (Dorotheos of Monemvasia, {Dorotheos of Monemvasia (Book of History)} (Venice, 1637), 533: βασιλεύων δ ὁ Σουλτὰν Μουράτης εἰς τὴν ᾽Αδριανούπ ουλιν καὶ ὁ κὺρ Ιωάννης (John VIII) εἰς τὴν πόλιν {('Sultan Murâd ruled in Adrianople and Emperor John in The City [Constantinople]')}, and sometimes even give them the title of *basileus* (for example Βραχέα χρονικά {*Brakhea Khronika*}, ed. Sp. Lampros (Athens, 1932), no. 5, dating from 1535: ὁ δέκατος βασιλεὺς τοὺ ᾽Οτουμανιδῶν γένουσ Μαχουμέτης ('the tenth basileus of the Ottomans, of descent from Muhammad [*sic*]'}.

68 *Sultân al-ghuzât wa'l-mujâhidîn* {'sultan of the ghâzîs and the fighters for the faith'} is the title given to Mehmed II by Shukrullâh (ed. Seif, *Mitt. z. osm. Gesch.*, ii, (1924), 68), a historian and contemporary of that sultan; this author gives the same title again to Murâd II (112), and that of *sultân al-ghuzât* to Bâyezîd I (94). Cf. 90 {381} in this volume.

69 See {Wittek, 'Deux chapitres',} *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 310 {117 in this volume} on the two groups into which Islam divides itself according to 'Âşıkpaşazâde (ed. Giese, 220, 1. 2); n. 2 on the cited page of my article {see p. 117 n. 62 in this volume, corrected} should read: 201, l. 16.

70 See Köprüluzâde M. Fuat, {'Bizans müesseselerinin'}, ch. xii: 'Imperatorluk ve hakimiyet telâkkileri'; {ed. and tr. Leiser, 108–113: 'Concepts of emperorship and sovereignty'}.

71 See my *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, 7–11 {see 38–41 in this volume}.

72 To give but one example: Sa'deddîn, {*Tâj üt-Tevârîh*}, i, 429, calls Istanbul 'the fine and beautiful {city} of the lands of Rûm, which, since ancient times, had always been the home of sovereigns and the seat of the Kaysars'.

73 Cf. the certificate of investiture of 1608, published by F. Behrnauer in *Archiv für Kunde österr. Geschichtsquellen*, xviii (1857), 307: *Benki sultân-i salâtîn-i sark wa garb, sâhibkirân-i mamâlik-i Rûm wa 'Acem wa 'Arab* – 'I who am the sultan of sultans of East and West, {lord of the conjunctions} of the lands of Rûm, of Persia and of Arabia'.

74 Letter from the sultan Ahmed I to the emperor (*Rûmâ Çâsâri*) Matthias, in Ferîdûn, *Munsâ'at*, 3rd edn, ii, 419 (see p. 77, n. 12 in this volume): *Benki . . . Hakân-i Mamâlik-i fasîha-i Rûm ve 'Arab ve 'Acem ve vâris-i evreng-i kaysar*. {Khakan of the spacious realms of Rûm and Arabia and Persia and inheritor of the throne of the *kaysar*.} In Meninski's dictionary, s.v. 'Rômâ', one finds, to indicate the emperor of the Holy Empire, *Rômâ imperâtôru* and *Rômâyi çasâri*, the latter term translated as *Romanus Caesar*. Beside *Rômâ,* borrowed from Italian, there also existed the form *Rîm*, borrowed from Slavic (see Meninski's dictionary, s.v., which gives as an example *Rîm halki*, 'Romanus populus', and Hasan b. Mahmûd Bayâtî, *Câm-i Cem âyîn* (composed in 1481), ed. 'Alî Emîrî (Istanbul, 1331), 48 ult.: *Rîm pâpâ*, 'pope of Rome'); cf. Fr. Miklosich, *Lexicon palaeoslovenicograeco-latinum* (Vienna, 1862–1865), s.v. 'Rim', where the glagolitic and Serbian expression *Rim-papa* is indicated, among others.

75 Yazicioğlu Mehmed, *Muhammediye* (completed in 1449), Lith. Constantinople, 1305, 469:

Dediler çûn kitâbiñ bu dur ey yâr
Ki görmedi aniñ mislini dayyâr
Ilet ani 'Acem sultânina sen
Ve yâ sultân-i Misr ayvânina sen
Ve yâ ilet ani sultân-i Rûma
Murâd ibn-i Muhammed hân-i Rûma.

76 Meeting Prince Cem, who had just lost the fight for the Ottoman throne, at Mecca in 1481, a poet sought to console him with the verse: *Olsan sâhinsâh-i Rûm olmazdi hacc nasîbiñ*, 'If you were the shâhinshâh of Rûm, the grace of this pilgrimage would not have been your lot' (Hasan b. Mahmûd Bayâtî, *Câm-i Cem âyîn*, 10).

77 Neshrî, ed. Th. Nöldeke in *Zeitschr. der Deutschen Morgenl. Ges.*, xiii (1859), 184 {ed. Taeschner, i, 18–19}.

78 'Alî, *Kunh al-ahbâr* (Istanbul, 1277–1285), v, 16 f.; cf. Müneccimbasi, *Sahâ'if al-ahbâr*, (Istanbul, 1285), i, 542: '(The calendar in use) in the land of Rûm which is our land'.

79 See for example the passage by Sa'deddîn at p. 78 {365} in this volume.

80 *Zebân-i Rûm* clearly equates here to 'the Turkish language' and especially to 'the Ottoman language'. We already find *lisân ar-Rûm* used in the sense of 'Turkish of Asia Minor' in Ibn Battûta (ii, 270; {tr. Gibb, ii, 424): he says that the word 'Çelebi', an unquestionably Turkish word, means 'my lord' 'in the language of Rûm'. Cf. P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 143, n. 2. Less conclusive is the passage that we discussed in the *Festschr. G. Jacob*, 351, n. 4, where it is said that *Efendi* is a term of the people of Rûm, since the word in question here is of Greek origin. In general it must be said that, as far as language is concerned, the term Rûm has always tended to mean 'Greek'. It is with reason that Meninski, 2nd edn, gives '*graece, graeco idiomate*' for '*rûmge, pro rûmîge, vulg. urûmge*'. *Rûmge* (*rumca* or *urumca* today), indeed, is the equivalent of ῥομαίικα [romaika]; cf. Chloros: *rûmge, lisân-i rûmî* = νεοελληνικΣ γλῶσσα {'a neohellenic word'}.

81 See Jan Rypka, *Bâqî als Ghazeldichter* (Prague, 1926), 49 f. The passage by 'Atâ'î: *mu'addil-i mîzân-i zebân-i Rûm*, translated thus by Rypka: 'der Ausgleicher (gegenüber den anderen poetisch hochentwickelten Sprachen, namentlich der persischen) der Wage der turkischen Sprache' [the equalizer of the balance of the Turkish language (compared to the other highly developed languages of poetry, specifically Persian)].

82 *Öyrendi gazel tarzini Rûmuñ su'arâsi* (quoted as according to Rypka, op. cit., 50).

83 See M. Fuad Köprülü in *Türk Halk Edebiyati Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1935), 29.

84 For practical usage, let us cite as examples the Ottoman calendar called *tâ'rîh-i Rûmî* (Müneccimbasi, *Sahâ'if al-ahbâr*, i, 27), and also *sâl-i Rûmî*, ἔτος οἰκονομικό, {'a fiscal year'}(Chloros), and the Ottoman gold coin called *Rûmî*, and that in the nineteenth century, under Mahmûd II (Ismâ'îl Ghâlib, *Takvîm-i meskûkât -i 'osmânîye* (Istanbul, 1307), 504).

85 Even in 1867 a Persian poet speaks of the Ottoman empire under the name Rûm: see A. Bricteux, *Mirza Dja'far Qaradjadaghi, L'Avare* (Liège, 1934), 5 and 9: *safar kardom az râh-i daryâ be-Rûm*: 'crossing the sea, I made a voyage in the Ottoman empire'.

86 To my acute regret my Turkish friends do not seem to approve of the term that I propose here and that I have already been using for some time. I hope, at least, that they don't hold it against me. For how should not Turkey be seen in the world, according to Ibn Battûta (ii, 255; {ed. Gibb, ii, 416})?: *Ash-shafâkat fi'r-Rûm*, 'kindness is in Rûm'.

III ‘Two Chapters in the History of Rûm’

Introduction

The historiographic significance of Wittek’s ‘Deux chapitres’, both within his own oeuvre *and for the development of the study of pre-Ottoman and Ottoman ‘Rûm’, cannot be easily over-estimated. Professor Rudi Lindner has described it recently as ‘the framework we have lost* (scil. *for the study of Anatolia in the late-Mongol and early Ottoman period)*.[a] *Rereading ‘Deux chapitres’ in conjunction with the latest scholarship on the subject, it is not difficult to agree with Lindner’s observation. But our loss may be even greater than Lindner has realized. In his ‘Deux chapitres’, Wittek twice makes reference to a forthcoming work, entitled ‘Rumtürkische Studien’ that, he says (p. 302, n. 1), ‘will soon appear’* (qui paraîtront sous peu). *The context is his discussion (p. 302) of the ‘ghâzî problem’ and the linked problem (p. 304) of the reading and interpretation of the celebrated 1337 inscription from the mosque of Orhan in Bursa, the latter one of the two evidential pillars on which he erected his ‘ghâzî thesis’. It is clear that the forthcoming work would have dealt in greater detail – ‘plus amplement traité’ – with the whole ‘ghâzî problem’ in Ottoman history, i.e. going beyond what we have in §2 of ‘Deux chapitres’ (1936) (and also in abbreviated form in Wittek’s* The Rise of the Ottoman Empire *(1938). However, after receiving passing mention in ‘Deux chapitres’, ‘Rumtürkische Studien’ vanishes from sight.* The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, *despite being published in 1938, two years after ‘Deux chapitres’, makes no mention of any ‘forthcoming’ (or published) study by that name. It needs to be said that had Wittek’s ‘Rumtürkische Studien’ appeared at this time it would have rounded off and brought to conclusion his writings from the middle (Brussels) period of his career, of which we have only an epitome in his 1937 London lectures.*

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I Essential traits of the Seljuk period in Asia Minor

It was towards the end of the last century that the history of the Seljuks of Asia Minor began to attract the interest of scholars. The Dutch scholar M. Th. Houtsma edited a fragment of the Turkish version of a work specially devoted to that history, and afterwards he published a Persian abridgement of the original of the work: I have in mind the history of Ibn Bîbî,[1] written in Persian in 1281, of which the {286} unique manuscript – the whole work is still unedited – lies in the library of Aya Sofya in Constantinople.[2] The Frenchman Huart was the first to systematically scour Anatolia for the epigraphic vestiges of that epoch.[3] Later he gave us, in French translation, the 'Lives of the saints of the whirling dervishes' by Eflâkî,[4] written around the middle of the fourteenth century, an incomparable source that allows us to animate the list of historical facts so dryly recounted by the chroniclers. The German Sarre reported on his travels in Anatolia with plans and photo graphs of the truly admirable architecture of the Seljuk epoch.[5] Since then, the efforts to enrich our knowledge have multiplied. The tireless Van Berchem was full of enthusi asm for the epigraphy and history of the Seljuks of Asia Minor. In collaboration with Halil Edhem, he produced in his Corpus, published by your Institute in Cairo, {287}, a handsome volume on Sivas and Divrigi,[6] and Halil Edhem continued to furnish precious material in many articles[7] and especially in a magisterial monograph on the city of Caesarea {Kayseri}.[8] These efforts have continued until the present, and much progress has been made. On the Turkish side, epigraphy[9] and numismatics[10] have, above all, been the object of remark able works. Seljuk architecture is studied in a rigorous fashion In the magnificent volumes of the *Monuments Turcs d'Anatolie* by Albert Gabriel.[11] The work of Chalandon on the Comneni,[12] the labours of Joseph Laurent of Nancy on the entry of the Turks into the history of Asia Minor,[13] based in large part on the Byzantine sources, contain

intelligible and solid syntheses. Fuad Köprülü by his studies of the religious history of Anatolia[14] and recently by his studies on the administrative {288} organization of the Seljuk state,[15] has provided us, besides rich data, entirely new ideas and questions. There are many other names and publications that could be cited as well.[16]

At this point in the development of the field, where so much is already accomplished and so much remains yet to be done, it is worth the trouble to take a broad look at the epoch and to pose ourselves the question: in what lies, truly, the certain charm of these studies, what is their real importance for us? What place does that epoch hold in the entirety of historical evolution?

It is obvious that a state neighbouring that Byzantium (which will always be dear to us, because it remained until its last breath the guardian of the noblest traditions) offers us, because of that neighbouring position, a very lively interest, and that interest can only grow because our crusaders of the eleventh, twelfth, and even thirteenth {289} centuries had to fight or to negotiate with the Turkish masters of Asia Minor. But all this is still relative and does not suffice at all to justify so great a scholarly effort. Let us take a look from the side of Islam. There also, one must not deal in illusions. The Anatolia of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries played only a very peripheral role in Islam. We should not be too influenced by the splendour of its monuments, even though they are truly worthy of admiration and enthusiastic study. This art could no doubt be better studied in Persia, their source, if the monuments in Persia had been better conserved and if those still in existence were more accessible to us. The sole glory of Seljuk Anatolia consisted, from the point of view of the Islam of the time, in the fact that it became a hospitable refuge for art and the Muslim spirit in a time of terrible evils and incessant perils. By itself, it cut a rather poor figure in the spiritual movement of the Muslim world, in which it occupied a small and distant corner and, even as a political power, it never played more than a role of second rank. To be sure, it became the homeland of a Jelâleddîn Rûmî (d. 1273), the poet-saint, whose nickname Rûmî obtained for the land of Rûm, a country wrested from the *Rhomaioi*, the Byzantines, a resounding fame in the Islamic universe, assuring it a grateful memory for all of humanity. Even if one is aware that the work of Jelâleddîn bears very important traces of the land where it was created, this would still not justify the concentration of so much scholarly effort on this Seljuk episode, which has left so few documents and is so hard to study.

But there is something else. Last year, you listened to Fuad Köprülü speak here of the origins of the Ottoman empire. I congratulate your Centre for having given that excellent scholar an occasion to destroy completely some puerile opinions that have reigned too long without contradiction among the wider public and even among scholars, even though the real specialists have already abandoned them some years ago. It was a great accomplishment to offer those lectures and then to publish them in the series of your Institute in Constantinople.[17] Not that I would subscribe to all that Monsieur Köprülü {290} said – you will hear me develop in my next lecture some rather different views. But Köprülü has clearly demonstrated for everyone that the Ottoman state was not at all the creation of a nation (*un peuple*) newly arrived in Asia Minor; on the contrary, it was a political formation born in the already existing framework of Turkish life in Seljuk Anatolia.

I need not evoke here the global importance of that historical phenomenon we call the Ottoman empire: six centuries (from the end of the thirteenth century up until 1918) of a history that included the defeat of a European chivalry at Nicopolis, the fall of Constantinople, the conquests of Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Hungary, naval wars in the Persian Gulf and near the straits of Gibraltar, two sieges of Vienna, victorious expeditions as far as the Caspian Sea, Persia, and Podolia, a political consolidation of the Muslim world the like of which had only existed in the most splendid period of the Caliphate, and a concentration of cultural life that made Constantinople the rival of Cairo and Baghdad.

Of this Ottoman empire that, with regard to its long life and enormous territorial extent, is a historical phenomenon of the first rank, one of the rare stable and universal empires that also represented a cultural epoch and which, because of that, left traces visible long after its disappearance, of this empire Seljuk Anatolia was the cradle; it is necessary to seek there the explanation of that formidable power whose rapid development and force of resistance seem to the mind a miracle, or at least a mystery. This is the point of view that, it seems to me, we should adopt in order to disentangle the essential traits of the history of the Seljuks of Anatolia. The essential traits will be, for us, those that point the way to the Ottoman future.

Anatolia had been, for some centuries, the objective of the attacks of Islam. That age-old struggle resulted, on the Muslim as on the Byzantine side, in a special organization of the frontier.[18] In these frontier zones, it was those {291} soldiers, who became permanent residents of the region, who devoted them -selves to the defense of the

land, to almost daily skirmishes with the enemy, and to inzursions – to the *ghazwa*, the 'razzia' – in the enemy's territory. This population was reinforced by militant elements flowing from the hinterland, impelled by love of adventure, of glory, and of booty, if not by religious zeal. It is easily understood that on these frontiers a population very distinct from that of the interior would have been created. At first this population was so attached to the soil that it relied, by necessity, on the natives. Then, the daily struggles, an economy (if we can call it that) based essentially on plunder, gave to this population sentiments, an allure, and customs entirely apart from the customs of the pacific and industrious residents of the hinterland. This very warlike milieu gave rise to chiefs to whom their warriors were blindly devoted, chiefs who defended the interests of their soldiers against the central power with a brutal energy and the pride of one who knew his value and importance. The frontiersmen expected from the hinterland assistance, pay, and honours; they demanded free disposition of their booty and a complete exemption from taxes. Heresies as well, persecuted by the state, could find a sure asylum on the frontiers, where they were sheltered from the ecclesiastical authorities and the secular arm. These conditions were much the same on both the Byzantine and the Muslim side. Even more: the ethnic stock (*fonds*) of these two 'limitanei' populations – the native population – was the same on both sides: daily contact with the enemy, prisoners, abducted women, deserters and renegades could not but cause an intense exchange in all the domains of life. What danger for the hinterland when the inevitable tension with the frontier provinces reached such a degree that the frontiers made common cause with the enemy! I believe that the fact that the Muslim *limitanei* defected was related (*ne fut pas étranger*) to the astonishing successes that the Byzantines began to enjoy on the eastern frontier after the beginning of the tenth century. And an analogous defection, this time of the Byzantine *limitanei*, of the Akritai, explains the sudden loss of all Anatolia after the famous battle of Manzikert in 1071.[19]

{292} Monsieur Cahen, of Paris, has recently shown, in an article in *Byzantion*, that the Seljuks, masters of the eastern Muslim world, never had the intention of conquering Byzantine territory.[20] Their goal was Syria and Egypt. From the Byzantines, on their right flank, they only wished an assured peace. The expedition against the emperor, which finished for him with the disaster of Manzikert, was to assure that peace. Actually, the victory was never exploited; the emperor, made prisoner, was released: the Turkish side counted on his amity. But

events turned out quite differently, despite the political projects of the Seljuks.

The defeat of the emperor was the signal for defection of the Byzantine *limitanei*, the Akritai. They had many reasons to find the imperial regime insupportable. The fiscal policies of a Constantine Monomachos had gravely affected their vital interests,[21] and the policies that the eleventh century emperors pursued towards the Armenians were profoundly to wound the religious and national sentiments of the *limitanei*, who for the most part were Armenians. Already well before Manzikert there was a progressive enfeeblement of the Byzantine defence. The razzias of the Muslims became more and more numerous and even reached such cities as Konya. One must not lose from sight the fact that at the same time as the Byzantine *limitanei* were becoming more indifferent to their duties, their adversaries, the Muslim *limitanei*, the Ghâzîs, had grown in force and in action.

We have already said that the population of the frontier received all sorts of reinforcements. Now, at least since the ninth century, these reinforcements were recruited in the first instance among the Turks who, more {293} and more exclusively, constituted the military element of Muslim society. The massive immigration of Turks, following the Seljuk rise to power in all the lands of the ‘Abbâsid Caliphate, naturally reinforced the Turkish element that became more powerful than ever and that found employment above all on the frontiers.[22] Their predecessors had already, to a certain extent, Turkicized the marches: the new arrivals thus found a milieu that would be familiar to them and to whose influence they submitted without resistance. When the enfeeblement of the Byzantine defence began to ease the way of the Muslim incursions, the news of this success could not but spread, {294} and the prospect of such rich booty progressively attracted bands of warriors from the farthest reaches.

There you have the situation on the eve of Manzikert. We have said that the Byzantine defeat was a signal for the defection of the Akritai. This was only in part a defection; it was also a revolt with a view to the formation of akritic Armenian dominions. Thus were formed the small Armenian principalities of the Taurus and Cilicia that, later, were united to form the kingdom of Lesser Armenia. It was not by much that Armenian principalities failed to develop at Caesarea[23] and Melitene.[24] These essays at political establishments had to lead to anarchy, and this anarchy did not fail to be exploited, for the most

part, by the Muslim *limitanei*, the Ghâzîs, whose force and activity had enlarged formidably, and who no longer found before them an imperial army nor even the Akritai, these last having been completely absorbed in local battles among their chiefs.

That which the government of the Great Seljuks had not wished, took place by itself: I have in mind the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks. It is important to note that if this conquest was not the work of the Seljuk army, it was also not the work of the Turkish nomads. True, there were nomad tribes present, and these took the occasion to penetrate Anatolia, which offered them rich pastures and easy prey in its villages. But those who were the true conquerors, who captured the cities and defeated the local armed forces, those who improvised an initial organization in the conquered territory, were the *limitanei* of the old frontier, the Ghâzîs so 'acclimatized' already in all respects to the territory of Rûm. They did not see themselves as strangers, and, on the other side, the Anatolian population could not consider them as foreign intruders (*intrus exotiques*). On the contrary: against the Turcoman danger, the harrying menace of the nomads who transformed themselves so easily from quiet shepherds into merciless brigands, there was no defence more sure than a pact with the Ghâzîs. {295} Thanks to the fact that, in this Turkish conquest, elements already well prepared for conquest were in the lead, a complete rupture in the cultural traditions of Anatolia was avoided. It suffices, in this respect, to note the great extent to which the former names of cities and even of villages were conserved. We are just beginning to understand, thanks to the researches of Monsieurs Grégoire, de Jerphanion, Honigmann, Louis Robert[25] and others, that what was imagined on this subject is well short of the truth.[26] What disappeared with the Turkish conquest was only the Byzantine varnish (*vernis*), afterwards replaced with a Muslim varnish. But the local substrate (*le substrat local*) survived.

It was the Dânishmend family that directed the conquest and created its first organization. From that Melitene (Malatya) on the Euphrates that was the city of the Akritai *kat' exochen* {'above all'}, they claimed as ancestor the legendary Seyyid Battâl Ghâzî, the most famous hero of the Ghâzîs of Rûm. The traditions of the Ghâzîs of the Euphrates now spread throughout Anatolia, and everywhere in Anatolia the primitive culture of the frontier assumed a form whose characteristic is a mélange of Muslim and Christian elements on top of an indigenous base.

Whether it so wished or not, the Seljuk power had to reckon with

this Anatolia, now Turkish. It sent there Süleymân, a prince from a lateral line of the dynasty, whose father Kutlumus had perished in a revolt against the chief of the house. One gets the impression, then, that the Seljuks did not have much regard for this new conquest. Süleymân also looked at Anatolia as only a simple episode in his career. For their part, the Byzantines perhaps viewed this Seljuk installed at Nicaea, so very close to the capital, as a functionary of the empire, as a general of federated forces.[27] Süleymân himself only thought to go to the rich reservoir of Turks in Anatolia and draw from it a force that he might lead eastward, where he wished to carve out for himself from the Muslim provinces a domain similar to those of his cousins. {296} But he died in the effort.[28] All the same, the successors of this founder of the Anatolian branch of the Seljuks had their eyes fixed on the patrimony of the Great Seljuks. It was only about the middle of the twelfth century that they recognized Anatolia as their homeland (*patrie*) and as the field of their essential activity. Hence they had to eliminate the Dânishmends who, until that epoch, had been incontestably the leaders (*dirigeants*) of the Turks of Anatolia. If the Dânishmendids were the successors of the former *limitanei* now become masters of Anatolia, the Seljuks, conscious of their filiation to the masters of Baghdad, of Syria, and of the Persian provinces, represented the Islam of the hinterland, the Muslim high culture. Their ideal was, inevitably, the transformation of Anatolia into a land that could rival the principalities of Syria and Mesopotamia in political force as well as in organization, riches, and culture. Thus the combat between the Dânishmends and the Seljuks became a combat between two political and cultural traditions. The Seljuks gained the victory. About 1180, the remains of the Dânishmendid possessions were incorporated into the state of Konya. The political situation simplified. As long as the Dânishmendids remained, there had only been a succession of wars and alliances between Dânishmends, Seljuks, Byzantines, Armenians, crusaders, and the Muslim principalities of northern Syria. With the Dânishmends there disappeared from the interior of Anatolia that unstable element on which the foreign powers, Muslim and Christian, had been able to count. It is not by chance that the great Byzantine–Seljuk wars ended with the battle of Myriokephalon in 1176, at a time when the power of the Dânishmends had practically been annihilated already.

By 1180 the Seljuk state was consolidated in this manner. It also had frontiers, although these, in the direction of the Christian states, Byzantium and Armenia, were more in the nature of zones than

strictly-drawn lines – fairly broad mountainous zones.[29] In the years following Manzikert, Byzantium had recovered – mostly thanks to the Crusades, it must be said – {297} the western Anatolian provinces and most of the other coastal areas of the peninsula. The conquering Ghâzîs had to draw back into the interior. They rooted themselves in this new frontier zone, in the mountains cutting off the centre of the peninsula from the western provinces, the Pontus, Lycia, and Cilicia. It was chiefly in this zone that the ghâzî traditions of the Euphrates survived: here they were renewed in analogous conditions. Once again the Ghâzîs mingled with the native population, which supplied them with women and renegades. Once again they faced Akritai who themselves kept up the age-old traditions of the East, and once again they battled daily, once again they enjoyed an uninterrupted cultural exchange with the Akritai. Pushed back, as we have seen, by the Byzantines from the coasts towards the interior, the Ghâzis did receive from the centre an important reinforcement of kindred elements: expelled by the Seljuks, the remnants of the Dânishmends and their partisans came to them, fortifying them but also aggravating the natural tension with the hinterland, the state of Konya. And another important element settled down on the frontier zones: the Turcomans. These last were not attached to a particular territory. The nomads pastured their herds where it seemed best to them, on Seljuk as well as on Byzantine territory. It was, however, natural that the mountainous marches between the two territories would attract them most of all. Their warlike youth made common cause with the Ghâzîs and enlarged their ranks. The herdsmen changed easily, in that case, into brigands, and they found occasion to rob caravans passing from Konya to Constantinople or to one of the Black Sea, Aegean, or Mediterranean ports. The pastoralists also insinuated themselves, peacefully at first, into Byzantine territory, one by one isolating the cities and villages, squeezing them as in a vice. Their daring and hostility both grew. Finally, the local powers in the urban centres, cut off from imperial power, had no choice but to surrender. Although the great wars between Byzantium and Konya had officially ended, the Turkish marches, quite independent of Konya, enlarged themselves continually in this fashion, to the detriment of Byzantium.

Then took place an event that changed this situation: the conquest of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204. {298} Byzantium was removed to Asia Minor, to those close-by western provinces that, up till then, had only been marches. And this event was accompanied by another: the Seljuk sultan, exiled by his brother to Constantinople,

returned to power with the aid of the Ghâzîs of the west, commanded by some Dânishmendids.[30] Afterwards, the Byzantine possessions in western Anatolia became much more stable. The central power and the imperial army were now close to the frontier, whose guardians, the Akritai, became the object of all the government's solicitude and, in fact, the decisive element of this Anatolian Byzantium. Since the danger from the Latin regions did not become any less imminent, however, this increase in power was not used to push back the Turks; on the contrary, the Byzantines sought peace in the east: even more, an alliance. Konya accepted, in light of the power of this near and restored neighbour. Thanks to the good terms on which the Sultan now found himself with the Ghâzîs of the western marches, he succeeded in preventing them from attacking the Byzantines; but he had to find some compensation for them. It was not at all enough for him to give their Dânishmendid chiefs a portion of their properties from their family's former possessions, or that he raised them to ministerial rank, or that he established for the Ghâzîs of the west a shrine in honour of their hero Seyyid Battâl Ghâzî;[31] he had as well to find an outlet for these warriors, to win them over to exploits in other directions: against the Greeks of Trebizond, from whom Sinop was conquered, against Antalya, seized from a Latin, against Lesser Armenia and later against Georgia, against their Muslim neighbours; even an expedition to the Crimea.

The state of the Seljuks of Rûm was at the summit of its power. The reign of Sultan 'Alâ'eddîn Kâykôbâd I (1219–1236) marked the apogee of its political and cultural glory. Then, and only then, Muslim high culture began to take root truly in Anatolia, at least in the cities. The Dânishmendid tradition withered away. The Sultan himself had them gathered in a work whose character is more poetic and legendary than historical[32] – but it was a purely literary feat. {299} Remembrance of the Ghâzîs survived only on the frontiers.

However, this state, as flourishing and harmonious as it appeared, does not seem to have pleased its subjects. Was the pacification of the Turcomans too radical an undertaking? As for the fiscal burdens that allowed those edifices we still admire today, and the life of luxury that was not limited to the court, did these press too heavily upon the population? The foreigners, Muslims from Persia and Syria, and the numerous renegades, Greeks and Armenians, did these become unbearable to the natives, or, perhaps, was the strict orthodoxy of the Sunni clergy displeasing to those elements infused with the heretical leanings (*éléments infestés de tendances hérétiques*) of the Ghâzîs?

Probably all of these causes together contributed to provoke, already under the successor to ‘Alâ’eddîn {I} a revolt of the masses, a revolution that naturally had a religious slogan, but that grew from a general discontent. To believe the historians, the movement was chiefly sustained by the Turco -mans. But we have seen that Turcomans and Ghâzîs were very close to each other, and this movement (which broke out close to the same region that had been, in the ninth century, the hearth – never completely extinguished, it seems – of Paulicianism) appears to have recruited adherents as well in the marches, opposite Armenia and Trebizond. The revolt was suppressed with a terrible cruelty.[33] However, a few years later, the state of Konya succumbed to the Mongol assault at the battle of Kösedagh in 1243. Even though the army of the Seljuk Sultan had been reinforced by Byzantine contingents and Frankish mercenaries, and even though it was only a detachment of Mongols that had entered Anatolia, disaster could not be avoided. Without doubt, the Seljuk state was consumed from inside. More and more, the sultans of Konya became vassals of the Mongols. It seems that at the beginning, the Mongols were not sufficiently interested in Anatolia to suppress that well-worn (*vétuste*) dynasty that, through its great prestige, could be useful to them. {300} For the fate of Anatolia, the Seljuk dynasty, in the second half of the thirteenth century, during the last fifty years of its existence, had lost all significance. Again it was the frontiers that incited and led the way to the future.

On the frontiers all those who had reason to flee Mongol power sought a haven: nobles of the state of Konya with their entire families and followers; city-dwellers driven by terror; peasants whose villages were in ruin or who no longer endured the heavy fiscal burdens imposed on them to pay the tribute claimed by the Mongols. The Mongol power had also caused a new migration of Turkish tribes who penetrated Anatolia from the Caucasus and Iran, settling chiefly in the march regions. Let us give special mention to another element that became very important for the frontiers: the crowd of holy men, sheykhs, and dervishes who flowed in en masse from all the provinces invaded by the Mongols, especially from Iranian lands and even from distant Transoxania; as these had been not only religious but also political leaders of the populations among whom they had lived, they especially had reason to flee before the invading Mongols, against whom they had preached and organized resistance. Refugees in Anatolia, in the frontier zones now saturated with inflamed masses, where ambitious and experienced chiefs awaited the occasion for new

endeavours, they supported an agitation that, naturally and necessarily, had to lead to a revival of the age-old ghâzî traditions, to a limitless enthusiasm for the holy war, for the conquest of the rich and fertile coastal lands that were still in Byzantine hands. At Konya, there was no remaining central power to restrain this movement; and, by a strange coincidence, no longer any strong resistance from the Byzantines. Just at this moment, the Empire of Nicaea was in the act of reconquering the Byzantine provinces in Europe and its capital, Constantinople. The centre of Byzantine policies was no longer in Anatolia. In fact, once again, just as before 1071, the Akritai were in full revolt. It was no surprise, as a consequence, that the entire Turkish frontier advanced west -wards in an irresistible movement. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, all of west Anatolia, save a few coastal cities and the shores of the Marmara, which {301} the Byzantines held for a few more years, once again, and this time definitively, became Turkish.[34] A dozen new Turkish principalities,[35] imbued with the ghâzi traditions were established there, and among them, – to cite the one that became the most important – opposite the *defensiones* of Constantinople, the principality of ‘Osmân, the future Ottoman state. By an analogous evolution, opposite Lesser Armenia, in the Taurus marches, the state of Karaman formed, to become later the only serious rival of the Ottomans in Asia Minor. The sultanate of Konya died peacefully. In the central provinces of Anatolia, the power of the Mongols and of the succeeding local princes lived on for a century and also maintained the ‘high Muslim’ culture of the centres where the Seljuks had planted it. What counted henceforth, however, were the new marcher principalities of which one was to become a worldwide and time-honoured power: the Ottoman Empire.

I have finished this sketch of the essential traits of the Seljuk period in Asia Minor. In order not to tire you, I have had to avoid all the details. This was too summary a sketch, – I do not deny it – and much of it has had to be oversimplified. Still, I think that I have established the basis for my second lecture, which I hope will show you how the traits of the Seljuk period developed in the course of the following epoch and produced a phenomenon justly belongs {302} to universal history, and which fully justifies the interest and effort that we devote to the study of this Seljuk Anatolia that prepared the way for that phenomenon.

II The Ghâzîs in Ottoman history[36]

In the preceding lecture I discussed, in broad terms, the developments that gave birth to that multitude of Turkish principalities in west Anatolia, one of which became the Ottoman empire. We have shown how Anatolia was first conquered by the warriors of the old frontier between Byzantium and the Muslims in the Taurus and on the Euphrates, and how, afterwards, under the Seljuk sultans, Muslim high culture was planted in the heart of Anatolia, although the frontier warriors, with their own traditions, were confined on the new marches between the centre of the peninsula and the coastal regions, and how, at the end of the Seljuk era, these new frontiers and their populations became once again the most important force in Anatolia, in the land of Rûm whose conquest the Ghâzîs rapidly accomplished. We have said that the traditions of the Ghâzîs of the Euphrates and Taurus, conserved and renewed in the new frontiers of western Anatolia, animated the conquerors at the end of the thirteenth century. Where are the traces of this development? What happened to the Ghâzîs as a result?

If we question the historical tradition of the only one of these principalities to survive, the Ottoman principality, we do find the Ghâzî title borne by the first chiefs of state and even by some of their lieutenants; it is even said that Ertoghrul, the father of ‘Osmân, eponymous founder of the State, came to the Turco-Byzantine frontier to fight the infidels, and the holy war does not cease to animate the entire tale. {303} But nothing helps us to fathom why the role of the Ghâzîs, these champions of the faith, should be of such basic importance in this story. On the contrary: as the nucleus of the State there appears a tribe of Oghuz Turks, from the noblest branch of the Oghuz, the Kayi.

The official genealogy of the Ottoman sultans originates with Kayi, ancestor of the tribe and the eldest of the twenty-four grandsons of Oghuz, ancestor of all the Oghuz.[37] Fuad Köprülu correctly rejected all the legends set forth about the tribe of ‘Osmân, under the leadership of its imaginary ancestors, migrating from the transcaspian lands of Merv to Anatolia where they settled down in the Eskishehir region to found a state; Köprülü accepts, nevertheless, the tradition according to which the kernel of the Ottoman state was an Oghuz tribe of the Kayi branch.[38] However, that tradition also is more than suspect. I have demonstrated, more than ten years ago,[39] how that genealogy was

fabricated on several occasions. The genealogy is one result of the erudition of the first romantic Turkish movement that began under Murâd II and continued throughout the reign of Mehmed II Fâtih. The mere facts that at one and the same time there were many genealogies of this sort, and that one could attribute to Mehmed II an Arab origin and even a Comnenid origin, these prove clearly that there was no trustworthy tradition on this subject. But let us examine the oldest historical witness on the Ottomans drawn up by them -selves, the chapter of the *Iskender-nâme*, the 'Book of Alexander', {304} written just after 1402 by Ahmedî,[40] which tells us in Turkish verse the history of the house of 'Osmân. We encounter here no trace of a tribal origin for the State, nor any trace of the famous genealogy going back to Kayi. On the contrary, the Ottomans appear there as Ghâzîs, as champions of the faith, and only as such.

The chapter on the Ottomans opens with an introduction in which the poet declares solemnly that he is writing a *Ghazavât-nâme*, a book on the holy wars of the Ghâzîs; and he begins with this question: why were the Ghâzîs the last to come? To which question he responds: because the best comes last. As the definitive prophet Muhammad came after the other prophets, as the Kur'ân alighted from heaven after the Torah, the Psalms, and the Gospel, so have the Ghâzîs appeared as the last in history, the Ghâzîs whose reign is that of the Ottomans. The poet continues: what is a Ghâzî? A Ghâzî is the instrument of God's religion, a servant of God who cleanses the earth of the stain of polytheism (recall that the trinity of the Christians, in Islam, is but polytheism); the Ghâzî is the sword of God; he is the protector and the refuge of the believers. If he becomes a martyr in the path of Allah, do not believe that he is dead – he lives, blessed, with God, he enjoys eternal life.[41]

It is from the point of view developed in these introductory verses that the history of the Ottomans then is recited. But are we not dealing here with a purely literary form? Is there a reality corresponding to this – perhaps only poetic – conception? A glance at the Bursa inscription of 1337,[42] an inscription decorating the oldest great mosque that the Turks erected in the city, eleven years after its capture, will quell all doubts on the subject. {305} Orkhan, the son of 'Osmân, who had this mosque built, terms himself in its inscription: 'Sultân, son of the Sultân of the Ghâzîs, Ghâzî, son of Ghâzî, marquis of the horizons, hero of the world'. This is a titulature completely unique in Ottoman epigraphy that, in general, limited itself to imitating the classical formulas of the Seljuk epoch. There is thus no

doubt: there is a reality expressed in that titulature, the same reality that dominates the historical chapter of Ahmedî.

In addition to the Ottoman example, we find the title Sultân of the Ghâzîs, with the same emphasis, among the inscriptions of another Anatolian prince, the emir of Aydin, a contemporary of 'Osmân and Orkhan.[43] These last epigraphic proofs have a special value, for we know from the Lives of the 'saints of the whirling dervishes' of Eflâkî that a Mevlevî shaykh appointed the prince of Aydin Sultan of the Ghâzîs.[44] We shall return to this. Besides these very old and eloquent inscriptions, the simple title of Ghâzî was not particularly rare among the inscriptions of the different Turkish emirs of the fourteenth century.[45] We are, thus, in the present of an entire Anatolian movement, not at all reserved to the Ottomans. But let us cast a glance backwards.

We find Ghâzîs already in the ninth century in Khurasan.[46] This is a popular movement under whose colours malcontents gathered to be led in combat against unbelievers and heretics. Certainly it was not zeal for the faith alone that impelled them, but also and especially the hope of booty. In the army Mahmûd of Ghazna led to India there were no less than 20,000 of these ghâzîs.[47] These bands constituted, for governments, a reservoir of very valuable auxiliaries {306}, but they could easily become a formidable danger if they were not fully occupied. Although this movement was not at all a national movement, it is clear that already at the time when the military forces were being recruited, at least in the eastern half of the Muslim world, in preference among the Turks, and chiefly in the farthest eastern provinces, the ghâzî movement was to be a Turkish movement. We do not know if, on the other frontiers of Islam, especially on the Byzantine frontier, there had been an analogous movement earlier. The term *ghazwa* – 'Razzia' – already existed, but we find the term ghâzî only later. In any case, the ghâzî movement, if it was not yet in existence, was also to be introduced in this frontier zone, which was for Islam far from the most important, just when the Turkish element began to enter it, at the latest in the ninth century.

We have described, in our earlier lecture, the special character that the warrior population of this zone displayed. This character, due to the place and the conditions of life, could not help but impose itself on the new arrivals. That alongside Arabic, Turkish was increasingly spoken on the frontiers could only make more manifest the sharp distinction between this population of *limitanei* and that of the hinterland, and that did not prevent their strong resemblance to the

limitanei of the enemy, to the Byzantine Akritai. We have also shown that it was these Ghâzîs who had conquered Anatolia after the battle of Manzikert in 1071, led by the Dânishmends.

The Dânishmends were the first princes to carry the title Ghâzî, and they boasted of their excellence as champions of the faith. Towards the middle of the twelfth century, other princes, in the north of Mesopotamia and of Syria, followed their example.[48] We are then in the crusading epoch, which made of these lands frontier lands, and it is only natural that the idea of religious warfare there gained in force and repute. At that moment Caliph al-Nâsir, whose policy aimed at a renaissance of the secular power of the Caliphate and the organization of the defence of Islam against the attacks of the crusaders, {307} reorganized – or rather organized – corporations based on the futuwwa.[49] The futuwwa, to give a simple and brief definition, was a canon of rules for the virtuous life, a 'mirror of virtues'. It was a purely formal and theoretical foundation, accepted by many Islamic corporations that were in reality very different from each other in purpose and social status. Up till now there has been too much insistence on this theoretical foundation, to the neglect of the realities established on that foundation, realities that alone are of importance for the historian. Now, the Khurasânian Ghâzîs of the ninth and tenth century were already bound to that futuwwa,[50] just as were the brother -hoods of youths in the cities and the corporations of artisans, the Akhîs.[51] When the Caliph al-Nâsir introduced to those futuwwa corporations an organization at whose head he placed himself, he could have had no other intention than to assure himself warlike forces bound to his person by a new and strong link. Such a militant force was surely the urban youth, and even the urban artisanate could have some importance on that account. But without doubt the premier goal was the army chiefs, the emirs. They, nevertheless, formed a very distinct class and could not join the urban corporations; they needed a separate organization for themselves, with a chivalric character. Here the ghâzî movement presented itself. It is actually from this point, the end of the twelfth century, that we see the Ghâzî title carried by Muslim princes and also princes allied to the Caliph by the ties of the futuwwa, which imposed on the 'disciple' and on his 'senior', his 'lord' (seigneur), obligations of reciprocal fidelity. The Ghâzîs were no longer the feared and despised adventurers they had been in an earlier era; they became noble knights (*chevaliers*) among the ranks of whom the princes would wish to take their place. The Ghâzî title had so grown in esteem {308} that princesses bore it as a proper name:

Ghâziya.[52]

Having devoted a few words to the history of this ghâzî chivalry, let us return to fourteenth-century Anatolia. But let us not forget that the marches of west Anatolia were rather removed, from the cultural as well as the geographical point of view, from the milieu where this later evolution of the Ghâzîs occurred. A comparison is necessary: think of the great difference that must have existed between the crude knights of the Teutonic Order, who during this same era conquered Prussia and the Baltic, and the refined chivalry of France. In the Anatolian marches, the Ghâzîs remained a mass movement. However, the evolution towards chivalry would have had, there also, certain results. We have seen a prince of the house of Aydin designated Sultan of the Ghâzîs by a Mevlevî shaykh of Konya. The latter thereby became the 'senior', the 'lord' of the prince, who, for his part, at the same time as his sons became the 'disciple' of the shaykh. We may suppose that it was on the occasion of this nomination that the shaykh gave him his club, as Eflakî also related.[53] The emir took the club of the shaykh, put it on his head, and said: 'I shall smite my passions with this club, and I shall fell the enemies of the faith'. Besides the vow expressed in these words, there are other clues to make us believe that the Ghâzî status included not only the obligation to fight against the infidels, but also such obligations of a moral character as the struggle against one's passions. The presentation of a personal weapon by the 'lord' to his 'disciple' could replace, in the futuwwa, the required ceremony of the granting of trousers, of which we find no trace in Anatolia.[54] We note that this ceremony is almost the equivalent of the embrace in western chivalry.

But let us return to our Ottomans. Armed with the knowledge we have just acquired, we shall still find in the Ottoman chroniclers, not in such late authors as Sa'deddîn, but in {309} those of the fifteenth century, many traces of this ghâzî chivalry. For example, in one of the poems inserted into the chronicle of 'Âshikpashazâde we read this verse: 'Put on the white cap for the ghazî!'.[55] However, Eflakî informs us that the white cap was introduced into the marches of the west by a Ghâzî of the marches and that the white cap became the characteristic headgear of the Ghâzîs.[56] We also read in 'Âshikpashazâde a legendary account in which 'Osmân, granting a fief, in place of a diploma (which he did not know how to write), gave his sword and a cup.[57] Is not this on the one hand the presentation of a personal weapon and, on the other, a souvenir of the fact that the cup played a great role in the ceremonies of the futuwwa?[58] We note that

the holders of fiefs, the Sipahis, were much later still called Ghâzîs, and that they wore white headgear.[59] In these chronicles of the fifteenth century, we already find the legitimist legend according to which the last Sultan of Konya had invested the Ottomans with their authority; nevertheless, this investiture, in all the chronicles, displays the features of the nomination of a Ghâzî; even in ‘Âşıkpaşazâde, where the meaning of this scene is most strongly obscured, the sultan dispatches, as insignia of investiture, a standard and some horses, in short, all the ‘requisites for the ghazâ’.[60] If we ask who, in truth, was the ‘lord’ of ‘Osmân, who conferred on his ‘disciple’ the title of Ghâzî and even of {310} Sultan of the Ghâzîs, we should think of Shaykh Ede Bali, whose daughter ‘Osmân married. The custom of a holy man’s girding the Sultan with a sword, at his accession to the throne, seems to me to go back to this period and to continue the traditions of the ghâzî futuwwa.[61] It is likewise ‘Âşıkpaşazâde who informs us that there were in Rûm four sorts of corporations: the Ghâzîs, the Akhîs, the Abdâls (i.e., the dervishes), and the Bâjîs (i.e. the sororities of women).[62] He terms these corporations *seyyâh*, i.e. ‘travellers’, a term whose explication another passage provides, in which the authors tells us that the Muslim world is divided into two groups, the one of the *Padishâh-i kibla-i Islâm*, i.e. the master of Mecca and Medina, and the other of the *Pâdishâh-i seyyâh-i Islâm*, who is the Ottoman Sultan.[63] Thus, the *seyyâh* comprise conquering Islam, ‘dynamic’ Islam. These are matters of detail, but it is better to reread the chronicle of an ‘Âshikpashazâde as a whole from this new point of view: one breathes, so to speak, the air of a ghâzî milieu still ‘present’ and living for the author, who began to write under Murâd II and continued his work until the days of Bâyezîd II, and who belongs thus to the entire second half of the fifteenth century.

We have said that the principality of the Ottomans was just one among so many others, all similar, all devoted, as it was, to the Ghâzî ideas and tradition. Yes, but with one great difference: the Ottoman Ghâzîs had before them the weightiest task and an immense field of work. For they were placed in the immediate neighbourhood of the Byzantine capital, in the neighbourhood of that vast city, protected by age-old walls, a city whose conquest had often been attempted in vain by the youth of Islam, to be postponed at last until the coming of the Mahdi. This city was by itself an obstacle that resisted the assaults of the Ottoman Ghâzîs for a century and a half-century more. Although the other Ghâzî emirates of west Anatolia were at close quarters with the {311} expeditionary corps sent against them by the emperors but

inevitably called back after a time, the Ottomans clashed not only with the system of fortifications carefully provided for the protection of the capital – a system including such a fortress as the city of Nicaea – but also with the main body of the imperial army that could assemble in a few hours, ready to battle the invaders. But a greater effort responded to a greater obstacle. So, although the other emirates were already secure and well established with stable frontiers, and although they enjoyed a more or less peaceable existence, for the Ottomans the wars continued. The successors of ‘Osmân gather under their standards all the remaining warrior and enthusiast elements in Asia Minor, in order to lead them in combat against the unbelievers. The progress was slow: Brusa fell only in 1326, Nicaea and Nicomedia in 1331. As to Constantinople, the glitter of whose brilliant edifices was visible to the conquerors from across the Bosphorus, they could not venture to attack it for another half-century. At first they avoided it in order to attack, after having crossed the Straits (in 1353), the European Byzantine possessions and the other Christian states of the Balkans, the princes of Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, and the Morea. The frontier had advanced one more time. As it had been moved, two centuries before, from the Euphrates and the Taurus to the west margin of central Anatolia, it was displaced in the fourteenth century from Anatolia to the centre of the Balkans, ultimately to advance as far as the Adriatic and Hungary. Thus the emirate of the Ottomans became the Ghâzî State *kat’ exochen*.

What is the import of this fact? We have already spoken of it: all Anatolia dispatched to this State its warrior youth and all who still pulsed with enthusiasm for the ghâzî ideas, all who sought adventure and booty. The military potential of this state thus grew in a measure greater than the extent of its territory warranted. This state was forced to conquer, to continue the ghazâ, and since Anatolia offered no more possibilities, it had to cross the straits and attack the lands of the Balkans. The more it conquered, the greater became its prestige, and also the greater became the influx of Ghâzîs who, from more and more distant lands, hastened to muster beneath its banners. As it grew so in numbers, force, and grandeur, so its neighbour emirates lost their warriors and became, so to speak, anaemic; {312} they became so enfeebled that they could only envision the day when they would become easy prey for the Ottomans. By the very force of circumstances they gathered about the strongest among them, the emir of Karaman who, himself chief of the Ghâzîs opposing Armenia, was the only one capable of a certain degree of success in the defence.

These coalitions of Anatolian principalities, with their hopeless plans for liberation from an impending yoke, forced the Ottomans to war against them. It was a war very much contrary to the ghâzî ideas. Ahmedî, of whom we have spoken, felt some embarrassment in justifying his ghâzî heroes in their con quests of their co-religionists in Anatolia. An easy situation for the great Ghâzî Murâd I, martyr of the battle of Kossovo in 1389, who was truly lenient to his adversaries, contenting himself with defeating their coalition without touching the independence of the emirs; Ahmedî described these as rebellious brothers who threatened Murâd from the rear, just as he prepared a holy war against the Emperor.[64] But for Bâyezîd I, who abolished these principalities, he found no excuse; he even allows a certain reproach to show through his verses; he also refuses Bâyezîd the Ghâzî title, and the tragic end of this sultan, his catastrophic defeat at Ankara in 1402, appears as a merited punishment.[65] In fact, one hundred years after the appearance of the Ottoman state, the ghâzî idea had clearly been abandoned. The jurisprudents, the theologians, representatives of Muslim high culture, had secured control of the State, which they began to organize after the model of the age-old Muslim traditional states. Gathering about the Sultan, they distanced him from his Ghâzîs and gained him to their views on the State, on foreign affairs, on customs and life.[66]

Master of the Balkans and of Asia Minor, Bâyezîd turned his eyes already towards Syria, even towards Egypt, which provoked the intervention of Tîmûr, the great Turco-oriental conqueror. The army of Bâyezîd was strong enough to form a resistance, but a general discontent paralyzed it.[67] {313} Bâyezîd suffered the most disastrous defeat at Ankara. It could have meant the end of the Ottoman state. Why did Tîmûr content himself with restoring the Anatolian princes dispossessed by Bâyezîd, leaving to the sons of Bâyezîd their possessions? Was it not the prestige of this Ghâzî state that prevented Tîmûr from exploiting his victory and from completely destroying a rival so arrogant, so formidable? Our feeling is confirmed by one act: after his victory at Ankara, Tîmûr undertook only one task, to seize the famous city of Smyrna from the Franks, the last menacing Christian fortress in Anatolia, a city that one century before, one of the most famous Ghâzîs of Rûm, Ghâzî Umûr of Aydin, had lost, falling himself as a martyr of the faith. So Tîmûr – I believe, at least, that one should interpret the deeds in this way – proved to the world that he had not wanted to destroy a ghâzî state, that his intent had solely been to lead it back to its essential task, to the holy war, and in

order to demonstrate his own adhesion to ghâzî ideas and destroy the false impression produced by his war against the Ottoman Ghâzîs, he himself undertook that ghazâ against Smyrna.

Besides the political prestige that saved it from abolition, and besides the military force of which we have spoken, the Ottoman state owed still more of its aspects to its character as a ghâzî state. First, the numerous representatives of the Muslim high culture that, under the Seljuks, settled in the centre of Anatolia. It was from these cities and villages of the centre that an emigration began towards the cities and villages of the newly conquered territories. Thanks to that emigration, the conquered cities and villages received a Muslim population that watched over the indigenous inhabitants and assured their fidelity. It has justly been remarked that already during the first Ottoman conquests, the Akhîs – members of corporations of artisans and traders, corporations based also on the futuwwa – played a certain role. But it is going much too far to pretend that {314} the Ottoman state was itself only a product of the akhî movement.[68] This is a clear error, one that ignores the essentially pacific character of these good city-dwellers, even if there were, doubtless, among the young Akhîs some spirits smitten with adventure and some enthusiastic souls burning for the holy war. Thus, ever since its debut, the Ghâzî state had city-dwellers at its command. It was entirely natural that among these last, the merchants especially would follow the conquerors closely: the booty in gold and silver, in precious fabrics, in livestock and especially in prisoners of both sexes opened the gate to a considerable business. But of the greatest importance was the influx of the ulema, the jurisprudents, the theologians. News of the conquests lured them even from very distant lands with the very justified hope of large donatives and influential positions. Coming from the lands of the Muslim high culture, they brought to the young Ghâzî state the science of administration, and they gave it an organization. They introduced to it – and this is of the greatest importance – along with the fiscal system, a practice closely tied to it: tolerance towards the Christians and the Jews.

We have shown, in our first lecture, how the Ghâzîs who conquered Anatolia in the eleventh century had been ‘acclimatized’ by long proximity to the life of the land. But so easily were they assimilated to their subjects and, reciprocally, so easily did they assimilate the latter, that we must not forget that these were Ghâzîs, warriors for the faith. It is true that this was a faith not entirely consistent, and moreover corrupted by heresies and superstitions, but a faith centered with

vehemence on its mission, propaganda, and proselytism. These Ghâzîs would, without difficulty, leave a Greek monk to guard an ayasma near his sanctuary, and this miraculous fountain would continue to be frequented and might even have the newcomers as clients, on the sole condition that the holy man pronounce the formula, which made of him a Muslim. As indulgent as the conquerors were for the culture and even for the language, just as heavy was their yoke on those who remained true to their faiths. For these last, the Muslim usage of the centres, (315) such as it was introduced by the Seljuks, was a deliverance. What a contrast between the oppression of the Dânishmends, who decreed, one fine day, the closing of all the churches of Kayseri (Caesarea), and the noble tolerance, if not the sympathy, that the Seljuk Kilij Arslân II showed to the monks and Christian priests! Completely similar circumstances may be seen in the Ottoman conquests. The Ghâzîs of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were still better 'acclimatized' than their predecessors of the Taurus and Euphrates to their future homeland. And on the other side, the environment was well prepared to receive the new masters. The Byzantine state had been, during the Anatolian interlude (the 'Empire of Nicaea'), an Akritic state. It was therefore profoundly orientalized. In removing itself to Europe, it implanted there, with its Akritic traits, many oriental ways. And how many Turkish groups were introduced into Rumeli, as auxiliaries, during the foreign and especially domestic battles? One can well say that they prepared, much more than they blocked, the way for the future conquerors, the Ottomans. It is thanks to the ghâzî character of the conquerors that there was no cultural rupture, neither in Anatolia nor in the Balkans. But it was thanks to the prompt intervention of the ulemâ', alone, that the indigenous culture was able to continue its existence under the form of an age-old belief. So the different tendencies that took shape as early as the Seljuk period combined in the most fortunate manner to procure for the new state the possibility to take root rapidly in the immense conquered territories, to guard and deepen its Muslim character, and to respect the subjected populations not only in their national culture but also in their beliefs, which placed their labours at the service of the State and made of them a very important element for the treasury, the economy, and for culture in general.

Let us cast a rapid glance at the two pillars of the Ottoman state, its feudal system and the institution of the Janissaries. As to the first, we have already said, in speaking of the legend that has 'Osmân granting the investiture of a fief through the presentation of a sword and a cup,

that we believe this feudal system to have been originally closely linked to the traditions of the ghâzi futuwwa. As we may recall, the feudal forces, the Sipahis, did not cease to term themselves Ghâzîs. Let us further recall that the fief was called a *kiliç*, that is, a 'sword'. But, setting aside this hypothesis, there is another very important matter. {316} The class of Sipahis was a closed class; only the son of a Sipahi enjoyed the right of claim to a fief. To be sure, a closed class has great power, but can also waste away. In fact, to fight on the frontiers, to gain distinction as a ghâzî, was (during the entire era of Ottoman feudalism) a qualification that opened the gates to the feudal class, gates that were thus not hermetically sealed, but which continued to receive the reinforcement of vigorous elements.

As to the Janissaries, in them we see an appropriate ghâzî institution: these troops, originally based on young Christians, prisoners of war forced to convert to Islam, appear a worthy continuator of the ghâzî traditions, including the white felt cap. I ask: if the Ottoman state had truly been the creation of a tribe, if it had truly been based on a tribal consciousness, how could it, especially at a time still so near to its origins, have put up with this institution so completely contrary to a consciousness of consanguinity? It is, of course, possible that the creation of the Janissary corps was the work of a theologian inspired, perhaps, by the Mamlûks of Egypt. Nevertheless, in the form it received from the Ottomans, that institution would have been difficult to realize in any but a ghâzî milieu.

We still have to explain how it happened that this ghâzî movement, to which we attribute so much importance, almost completely disappeared, at least in the memory of historians. Let us immediately say that in reality it never dis -appeared. It continued on the European frontiers, but on these distant marches it again became as anonymous, as foreign to the central government, to literature, and to historiography, as it had been in the age of the heroes of the Euphrates and Taurus, even though the Ottoman empire never ceased from proclaiming itself the incarnation of the holy war, even carrying on its wars against Persia (Muslim, but Shî'ite) with the slogan 'struggle against heresy', and retaining the Ghâzî title as the supreme distinction of a victorious sultan, general, or admiral. But the Ghâzîs, with their own traditions, their mentality, and their special customs, were banned from the centres, where the Muslim high culture gained the victory. What occurred in the Seljuk epoch in Anatolia was repeated in the Ottoman empire: the elements that accomplished the

conquest had to cede their position and {317} once again mount the guard at the frontiers, which were now advanced as far as the heart of Europe. These were the *ehl-i hudûd*, the 'people of the frontier', whom one finds scarcely mentioned in the political meditations of the philosophervezir, but who nonetheless represented a vital element of the Empire. Without the devotion of these heroic Ghâzîs, always ready for combat, the Empire could never have maintained for so long a time its frontiers to so great an extent.

We have seen that Bâyezîd I had already abandoned the ghâzî ideas, and oriented his policy more towards the East, towards the conquest of the lands of the age-old Muslim culture. Tîmûr returned the Ottomans, accordingly, to their true role, and until Murâd II, thus during a half century, the Ottomans became once more devoted Ghâzîs. But Mehmed II Fâtih, who by the conquest of Constantinople realized the boldest dream of Islam and became the greatest Ghâzî of them all, took up again the premature attempts of Bâyezîd I. If he succeeded, this is thanks to the fact that he, more of a ghâzî than his great-grandfather, had been able to harmonize the ghâzî tendencies with Muslim high culture. By this act of grand policy, he became the true founder of the Empire. What he had inherited from his ancestors was a great state with a considerable dynamic force, but not an Empire, not a power enjoying a cultural physiognomy of its own and an uncontested superiority, a power dominating, without a possible rival, a large portion of the world, imposing on all its neighbours, in Europe as in Asia, the need to reckon with it first in all their projects. If Mehmed II succeeded at this, succeeded so admirably that his work did not cease to grow for more than two centuries and, afterwards resisted destruction for more than two centuries further, this is because Mehmed II himself stood above the two tendencies that he had to harmonize. It was this man, fervent adherent of the Renaissance, humanist, free thinker, admirer of the progress realized in his epoch, this man who lured a Bellini to his court and collected the paintings of the great Italian masters, who required from the republic of Ragusa that its tribute be paid in works of learning that had just appeared in Italy, it was this man who took the decisive step towards the state of Muslim high-culture, towards the state of the theologians, the clerical, theocratic state. But at the same time, he had already forever guarded the ghâzî character of his empire by the first important act of his reign, by the conquest of Constantinople. That conquest alone merited him the glory of being the greatest Ghâzî of all time. {318} There is a very interesting detail in the chronicle of

Neshrî:

> Until Mehmed II [he says] the Ottomans, when they set out on campaign, practiced the custom of standing when the military music was played, at the hours of prayer; and this is because the Ottomans are Ghâzîs. The military music is the call for the ghazâ. They stand to say: 'For the love of God, we are ready!' However, Mehmed II suppressed this custom, saying: 'Why stand on account of a band of good-for-nothings!?'[69]

What a crisis of prestige! It is not surprising that the historiography that so attentively discusses the smallest happenings at court, remains mute about the Ghâzîs. These did not exist any the less, however, and they continued their task, their traditions. It was the descendants of the famous Ghâzî Mikhal who, from distant Rumeli, sent presents to the Anatolian sanctuary of Seyyid Battâl Ghâzî and who erected there some monuments decorated with inscriptions, the sole witness to their existence, so important for the Empire.[70] And a happy chance has preserved for us the lays of a Ghâzî Hasan of Temesvar in Hungary, who discloses to us sentiments already much discouraged among the frontier guards of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thus from the epoch of decline.[71]

But would we know of the Byzantine Akritai and of their importance if we did not possess the epic of Digenis, which has become, thanks to the inspired researches of Henri Grégoire, a capital source for Byzantine history! We possess, for our Ghâzîs of Rûm an analogous source, the Romance of Seyyid Battâl Ghâzî, which has even been translated into German, by Ethé, but is still insufficiently studied.[72] For the Ottoman Ghâzîs, we can hope that the archives of Constantinople, once they are classified and opened to scholars, will furnish us with more ample information.

The subject that I have had the honour to treat here is associated with a very great historical problem, the problem of the frontier and of its role, its special culture. For there have everywhere and always been similar frontiers, and their situation has often been similar to the one we have discussed here. A strong frontier is an advantage, {319} as long as the society of the hinterland remains intact. Otherwise, the frontier risks asserting itself everywhere, which can allow of an increase in power, but in general leads to a terrible decline in culture. For a frontier culture will be, in most cases, necessarily primitive; it will be a cast-off (*un déchet*) from the high culture of the interior, mixed to such a degree with the waste products of the enemy's culture, that it will share nothing essential in common with that

culture whose defender and champion it vaunted itself as being.

Notes

a Rudi Paul Lindner, 'Anatolia, 1300–1451', in Kate Fleet (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, I. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453* (Cambridge, 2009), 102–137, at pp. 103–104.

1 M. Th. Houtsma, *Recueil de textes relatifs `al'histoire des Seldjoucides*, vols iii and iv (Leiden, 1902) (the first part of vol. iii had already been published in 1891, and Ch. Schéfer had given some extracts of the work already in 1889, in *Publications de l'Ecole des langues orientales vivantes*, 3rd series, vol. v). Let us add the small but important work that Houtsma published under the title 'Over de geschiedenis der Seldjouken van Klein-Azië' in *Verslagen en Mededeelingen d. K. Akad. v. Wetensch., Afd. Letterk*., 3rd series, part 9 (Amsterdam, 1893), {133–153}, dealing among other topics with a short history of the Seljuks, written in Persian by an anonymous author after 1363 in a city of central Anatolia. Most of the excellent articles on the Seljuk Sultans appearing in {the first edition of} the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* are due, if I am correctly informed, to the erudition of M. Th. Houtsma (see *EI*., arts. 'Kaika'us I, II'; 'Kaikhusraw I, II, III'; 'Kaikobad I, II, III'; 'Kilidj Arslan I, II, III, IV'; 'Seldjuks'). Besides the original of Ibn Bîbî and the anonymous *Seljuknâme* studied by Houtsma, there remain unedited and even unstudied (except for several extracts given by Köprülüzade M. Fu'ad in *Türkiyat Mecmuasi* ii, 17) the historical work of Aksarâyî, written in Persian in 723–1323 (cf. F. Tauer, 'Les mss. pers. hist. des bibliothèques de Stamboul', in *Archiv Orientalni* iv (1932), 93). Also, the MS Fatih 4519 that Tauer, l.c., n. 2 cites only, and which seemed to be the Persian work mentioned by Khalil Edhem, *Düveli Islamiye*, 212, n. 1 as an historical collection composed towards the end of the thirteenth century at Kayseri, still awaits analysis, if not an edition. {See Fikret Isiltan (ed. and tr.), *Die Seltschuken-Geschichte des Akserayi* (Leipzig, 1943); Osman Turan (ed.), *Müsâmeret ül-ahbâr: Mogollar zamaninda Türkiye Selçuklulari tarihi* (Ankara, 1944).} A history of the Seljuks of Rûm, composed in Persian verse, probably in the last years of the thirteenth century, by a Khwâja Dahhônî, is known to us only as a name; cf. Köprülüzâde M. Fu'âd, {'Selçukiler devrinde Anadolu saîrleri'} *Hayât Mecmuasi* i (1926), 4–5. and {'Selçukiler devri edebiyati hakkinda notlar'}, ibid., iv (1928), 488. Without doubt a history of the Seljuks of Rûm was used by Hamdullâh Mustawfî Kazvînî in his *Târîkh-i Güzîde*, written about 1330 (ed. and French translation by Jul. Gautin [Paris, 1903] and Browne and Nicholson, text and abridged English translation, 2 vols [London, 1910; Gibb Memorial Series, 14]), on which the chapter in Mîrkhwând (ed. and German translation by J. A. Vullers, {*Historia Seldschukidarum Persice*} (Giessen, 1837–1838) depends.

2 For the date of the composition, see {H. W. Duda, 'Zur Geschichtsforschung

über die Rum-Seldschuken'}, *ZDMG*, N.F. xiv (1935), App., 19*–20* {and H. W. Duda (ed.), *Die Seldschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi* (Copengagen, 1956), 1 ff.}, where Duda discusses his plan to use the original work. Other information about the work, the abridgement, and the Turkish translation is in {P. Wittek, 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie'} *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64, at p. 13, n. 1. {See also Adnan Sadik Erzi (ed.), *El-Evamirü'l-'Alâ'iyya fi'-umûri'l-'Alâ'iyye*, facsim. ed. (Ankara, 1956); *El Evamirü'l-'Ala'iyya fi'l-Umur al-'Ala'iyye* (*Selçuk-nâme*), Turkish tr. by Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara, 1996); Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, *Selçukname* (Istanbul, 2007).}

3 Cl. Huart, 'Epigraphie arabe d'Asie Mineure', in *Revue Semitique* ii–iii (1894–5), also published separately, Paris, 1895. We note that F. Grenard, in {'Note sur les monuments Seldjoukides de Siwas'} *Journal Asiatique*, 9th series, xvi (1900), {451–458; 'Note sur les monuments du moyen âge de Malatia, Divrighi, Siwas, Larendeh, Amasia et Tokat', *idem*, xvii (1901), 549–558}, and E. Blochet, {'Note sur quatre inscriptions arabes d'Asie Mineure'} *Revue Semitique* vi (1898), 75–83, 152–156, also published inscriptions of the Seljuk era, as also did M. Belin already in 1852 {'Extrait d'un voyage de Paris à Erzeroum'}, *Journal Asiatique*, 4th series, xix, 365–378.

4 {Cl. Huart (ed.) *Les saints des derviches tourneurs*, 2 vols (Paris, 1918–1922; repr. 1978), Bibl. des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses, 32, 36). Let us add his small work: Cl. Huart, *Konia* (Paris, 1897).

5 F. Sarre, *Reise in Kleinasien* (Berlin, 1895), and 'Konia, Seldschukische Baudenk mäler' (extr. from F. Sarre, *Denkmäler persischer Baukunst* (Berlin, 1910). Let us also mention his precious *Seldschukische Kleinkunst* (Leipzig, 1909), with important inscriptions on furniture, studied by B. Moritz, to whose care was also confided the epigraphic work in *Reise in Kleinasien*.

6 {Max van Berchem, *Materiaux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum*, iii/1 (Cairo, 1917; *Mém. de l'Institut Franc. d'Archéol. orient. du Caire*, 29). Further, Van Berchem published Anatolian inscriptions of the Seljuk period in C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, *Materialien zur ältesten Geschichte Armeniens und Meso potamiens* (Berlin, 1907); in M. Freiherr von Oppenheim, *Inschriften aus Syrien, Mesopotamien und Kleinasien* (Leipzig, 1913); in {'Épigraphie des Danish mendides'}, *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* xxvii (1912), 85–91, and in M. van Berchem and J. Strzygowski, *Amida* (Heidelberg, 1910).

7 All {too numerous to list here (ed.) } appeared in Turkish in the excellent *Târîkh-i 'Osmânî Encümeni Mecmuasi*, Istanbul, 1329/1911 and subsequently.

8 Khalîl Edhem, *Kayseriye Shehri* (Istanbul, 1334/1918).

9 Besides the articles of Khalîl Edhem it is necessary to cite, among others, those of Ahmed Tevhîd, published in the same journal {equally too numerous to list}, and the following works: Hüseyn Hilmî, *Sinop Kitâbeleri* (Sinob 1339/1923); Süleymân Fikrî, *Antalya livâsi târîkhi* (Istanbul, 1340/1924); Mehmed Behcet, *Kastamoni* (Istanbul, 1341/1925); Mubârek Ghâlib, *Ankara*, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1925–1928); Isma'îl Hakki, *Kitâbeler*, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1927–1929); Isma'îl Hakki, *Kütahya Shehri* (Istanbul, 1932); Rizvân Nafîz and Isma'îl Hakki, *Sivas Shehri* (Istanbul, 1928); Mehmet Yûsuf, *Konya Asar-i Atika Müzesi rehberi* (Konya, 1930); M. Ferit and M. Mesut, *Sahip Ata ile ogullarinin*

hayat ve eserleri (Istanbul, 1934); Ali Kemali, *Erzincan* (Istanbul, 1932).

10 Isma'îl Ghâlib, *Takvîm-i Meskukât-i Seljûkiye* (Istanbul, 1309/1892); Ahmed Tevhîd, *Müzei Hümâyûn Meskukât-i kadîme-i islâmiye kataloghu* (*Cat. des monnaies islam. du Musée Imp.*), iv (Istanbul, 1321/1913).

11 Albert Gabriel, *Monuments turcs d'Anatolie*, 3 vols, of which vols 1 and 2 have appeared (Paris, 1931, 1934). {The third volume of Gabriel's work, referred to by Wittek, was never published.}

12 Ferdinand Chalandon, *Les Comnènes, études sur l'empire byzantin aux XI*e*-XII*e *siècles: Essai sur la règne d'Alexis Ie Comnène; Jean II Comnène (1118–1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143–1180)*, 2 vols (Paris, 1900, 1912).

13 Joseph Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs seldjoucides dans l'Asie occidentale, jusqu'en 1081* (Nancy, 1913).

14 Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fu'âd, *Türk edebiyâtinda ilk mutasavviflar* ('The first mystics in Turkish literature') (Istanbul, 1918, {2nd revised ed. Istanbul, 1966; repr. 1981}; Engl. tr. and ed. Gary Leiser and Robert Dankoff, *Early Mystics in Turkish Literature* (London, 2006)}; {*idem*}, 'Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasiens', in *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte* ii (1921–1922), 203–222; {*idem*}, 'Anadoluda Islâmiyeti' ('Islam in Asia Minor'), in *Istanbul Edebiyât Fakultesi Mecmuasi* ii (1922), 281–311, 385–420, 457–486 {*Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion*, tr. and ed. Gary Leiser (Salt Lake City, UT, 1993)}; {*idem*}, 'Les origines du Bektachisme', (Paris, 1926); extract from {Societé Ernest Renan}, *Actes du Congrès intern.d'Histoire des religions*, tenu à Paris en octobre 1923 {2 vols in 1 (Paris, 1926), ii, 391–414}.

15 M. Fuad Köprülü, *Bizans müesseselerinin osmanli müesseselerine te'siri hakkinda bazi mülâhazalar* ('Some observations on the influence of Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institutions'), *Turk hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmuasi*, i (1931), 165–313 {repr. in book form, Istanbul, 1981; tr. and ed. Gary Leiser, *Some observations on the influence of Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institutions* (Ankara, 1999)}.

16 Let us cite, to make up for the most unfortunate omissions, H. Glück, *Die beiden 'sasanidischen' Drachenreliefs (Grundlagen zur Seldschukischen Skulptur*) (Constantinople, 1917; Publ. du Musée ottoman, 4), and his 'Eine Seldschukische Sphinx', in *Jahrbuch d. Asiatische Kunst* ii (1925), 123; then two important works in which Seljuk architecture holds a large place: G. de Jerphanion, *Mélanges d'Archéologie anatolienne* (Beirut, 1928; *Mel. de l'Université Saint-Joseph*, 13) and R. M. Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in southwestern Anatolia* (Cambridge, MA, 1930), where in the epigraphic section I have studied many Seljuk inscriptions. A rich epigraphic volume is due to J.H. Löytved, *Konia* (Berlin, 1907). For the Dânishmends, see P. Casanova, 'Numismatique des Danichmends' *Revue Numismatique*, 3rd series, xii (1894), 307–321, 433–460; xiii (1895), 389–402; xiv (1896), 210–230, 306–315; J. H. Mordtmann in *E.I.*, art. 'Dânishmend'. Let us still add *E.I.,* art. 'Mangüdjek', by M. Th. Houtsma, and *E.I.,* art. 'Mu'în al-Dîn Sulaymân Parwâna', by J. H. Kramers. Some questions relative to Seljuk history are also treated in Nikos A. Bées, *Die Inschriftenaufzeichnung des Kodex Sinaiticus Graecus 508 (976)*, etc.

(Berlin, 1922), a somewhat confused work, and in my 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64, and 'L'epitaphe d'un Comnène à Konya', *idem*, 505–515. On the very rich scholarly works produced by Turks during the years 1918–1928, see more ample information in my reports published in *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* (1928), cols 172–176, 556–562; (1929), cols 73–90, 244–250; (1931), cols 412–420. A recent Turkish work, Mükrimin Halil {Yinanç}, *Türkiye Tarihi, Selçuklu devri, I: Anadolunun fethi* (Istanbul, 1934; {= *Anadolu Selçuklulari tarihi* (Ankara, 1944)}), has for its subject the Turkish conquest of Asia Minor.

17 Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman* (Paris, 1935; *Etudes orientales*, published by l'Institut français d'Archéologie de Stamboul, 3) {English translation: *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. and tr. Gary Leiser (Albany, NY, 1992)}.

18 E. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches von 363–1071* (Brussels, 1935; *Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae*, 3). For the frontier districts on the Muslim side, see *E.I.*, the arts. 'Awâsim', by M. Streck, and 'Thughûr' by E. Honigmann.

19 See on the Byzantine Akritai the classic pages of A. Rambaud, *Etudes sur l'histoire byzantine* (Paris, 1912), 65–108, and the fundamental work of P. Moutavtchiev, 'Military organization and military fiefs in the Byzantine Empire' (in Bulgarian), in *Revue de l'Académie bulg. des sciences*, xxvii, Cl. d'hist. etc., 15 (Sofia, 1923). On the Muslim adversaries of the Akritai see P. Wittek, 'Zur Geschichte Angoras im Mittelalter', in *Festschrift für Georg Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 336 ff., and *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* (Istanbul, 1934); *Istanbuler Mitteilungen*, published by the Abteilung Istanbul of the Archäol. Inst. d. Deutschen Reiches, 2), 5 ff.

20 Cl. Cahen, 'La campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources musulmanes', *Byzantion*, ix (1934), 613–642.

21 P. Moutavtchiev, op. cit., 62, citing (n. 3) Kekaumenos, *Strategikon* {ed. B. Wassiliewsky and V. Jernstedt (St Petersburg, 1896, repr. 1965)}. Skylitzes, {*Compendium historiarum*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1838–1839)}, ii, 608 {*Empereurs de Constantinople*, ed. and tr. B. Flusin and J.-C. Cheynet (Paris, 2003)}; Zonaras, {Joannes Zonaras, *Epitomae Historiarum*, ed. T. Büttner-Wöbst, 3 vols (Bonn, 1841–1897)}, iii, 647; Attaleiates, {Michaelis Attaliotae, *Historia*, ed. I. Bekker} (Bonn, 1853)}, 44 {ed., with Spanish translation, I. Pérez Martin (Madrid, 2002)}.

22 The Turks had possessed, from the middle of the sixth to the middle of the eighth centuries, an empire extending from the Volga as far as the walls of China, one of those immense empires that, creations of one tribe victorious over the others, succeeded from time to time in Central Asia. This empire, which had, under Justin II, diplomatic relations with Byzantium (mission of Zemarchos in 568), fell apart after the decisive defeat, which the Arabs, having entered Transoxania, inflicted on them in 738, after a war lasting almost a century (on that struggle see H. A. R. Gibb, *The Arab Conquest of Central Asia* [London, 1923]). This decomposition was followed by wars and disturbances which led to the end in 840 of the Uighur state and put the Central Asian tribes into motion. There resulted, in the ninth century, a

migration of peoples that led the Turks to the steppes of south Russia and even into the Balkans as well as into Transoxania, Khurasan, and the Caucasus. At first the Turkish element was felt in the Muslim world by infiltration into the army where Turkish soldiers, bought as slaves or voluntary immigrants, more and more replaced the Arabs. The chiefs of the Turkish troops rose to hold posts as all-powerful generals or as the almost independent governors of provinces (ninth century). Later, the immigration became massive, with entire tribes and even agglomerations of tribes penetrating the Muslim provinces of the East, which their immigrant chiefs took over and of which they became independent princes, sultans. Around the year 1000, Mahmûd of Ghazna, the first of these Turkish sultans, had carved out for himself a domain of vast extent in the Far East of the Muslim world. A few years later, a great confederation of tribes crossed the Oxus under the leadership of the Seljuk family who, about the middle of the eleventh century, dominated the entire eastern Muslim world, tolerating the Caliph only as an instrument of its power, the only real power. (For the history of the Turks before their entry into the Muslim world, one may consult with great profit the first six chapters of the magisterial work of W. Barthold, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, German version by Th. Menzel (Berlin. 1935) Suppl. to *Die Welt des Islams*, 14–17; a more succinct treatment is in P. Wittek, 'Türkentum und Islam', in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 59 (1928) 489–525.

23 Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs*, etc., 67–69, 78 ff.

24 Ibid., 82, 84, 89, and *EI*, art. 'Malatya' by Honigmann, on Philaretus of Melitene.

25 L. Robert, *Villes d'Asie Mineure, études de géographie antique* (Paris, 1935); *Etudes orientales*, published by the Institut français d'archéologie de Stamboul, 2.

26 See my 'Von der byzantinischen zur turkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x, 1935. 11–64; {see, as a corrective to some of Wittek's views, J. Robert and L. Robert, 'La persistance de la toponymie antique dans l'Anatolie', in *La toponymie antique: Actes du colloque de Strasbourg, 1975* (Leiden, *c*.1981), 11–63}.

27 J. Laurent, 'Byzance et les origines du sultanat de Roum', in *Mélanges Charles Diehl*, i (Paris, 1930), 177 ff.

28 K.V. Zetterstéen in *E.I.*, art. 'Sulaimân b. Kutulmish' (let us note that it is high time to write, at last, the name of the father of Süleymân as it is attested by the oriental and Greek authors, that is, in its correct Turkish form: Kutlumush).

29 I have indicated these frontiers in my 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 46.

30 Wittek, 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x, 24–30.

31 Ibid., 30.

32 The 'Dânishmendnâme' of Ibn 'Alâ, composed in Turkish under Kayka'ûs II;

cf. Wittek in {[Review of] Fr. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (1927)}, *Der Islam*, xx (1931), 197–207, at p. 203.

33 On the subject of the Turcoman revolt in 637/1239 under Baba Ishâk, which extended from the banks of the Euphrates as far as Mar'ash and Amasya, see *EI*, art. 'Kaikhusraw II', and Köprülüzâde M. Fu'âd, *Türk edebiyatinda ilk mutasavviflar* (*'The first mystics in Turkish literature'*), 232 ff., and the same author in {'Anadolu'da Islâmiyet: Türk istilâsindan sonra Anadolu târîh-i dînîsine bir nazar ve bu târîhin menbalari' ('Islam in Anatolia: A review of the religious history of Anatolia after the Turkish invasion and the sources for this history'), *Dâr ül-Funûn* [= Istanbul University]}*Edebiyât fakültesi mecmuasi* ii (1922), 281–311, 385–420, 457–486, at pp. 302 ff. {See Gary Leiser (ed. and tr.), *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena)* (Salt Lake City, UT, 1993), 13–15.}

34 It is necessary to note the exception of Philadelphia (Alashehir), which remained a Byzantine enclave until 1390.

35 For these principalities see E. v. Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam* (Hanover, 1927; repr. Osnabrück, 1976), 148–160 and chart 1; Khalîl Edhem, *Düvel-i Islâmiye* (Istanbul, 1927), 269–335; Köprülüzâde M. Fu'âd, 'Anadolu beylikleri tarihine ait notlar' ('Notes on the history of the Anatolian beyliks'), *Türkiyat Mecmuasi* ii (1928), 1–32, 412–414, 417–426; in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, the articles 'Karaman', 'Karamanoghlu', and 'Karasi', by J. H. Kramers; 'Germiyanoghlu', 'Hamid', 'Isfendiyar-oghlu', 'Kastamuni' and 'Izmir' by J. H. Mordtmann; 'Sarukhan', 'Teke-eli', 'Tekeoghlu', 'Menteshe-eli', and 'Menteshe-oghullari' by Fr. Babinger; 'Milas' by P. Wittek. The history of many of these principalities has been studied in the works of Isma'îl Hakki [Uzunçarsili] (see p. 99, n. 9 in this volume) and three among them have been the objects of special monographs: J. H. Mordtmann, 'Über das türkische Fürsten geschlecht der Karasi in Mysien' *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse* (Berlin, 1911), 2–7; Mükrimin Halil, *Düsturnamei Enveri, Medhal* (Istanbul, 1930), treating the history of the Aydinoghlu; P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–15. Jh.* (Istanbul, 1934; Istanbuler Mitteilungen, 2).

36 I have pointed out the problem to be treated in this chapter for the first time in a short note {appended to Th. Menzel, 'Die ältesten türkischen Mystiker', *ZDMG*, N.F. iv (lxxix; 1925), 269–289, at pp.} 288 f. and I returned to it in my book *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* and especially in my lecture to the eighth Congress of the Dutch Society of Orlentalists in January 1936 (see Oostersch Genootschap In Nederland, *Verslag van het achtste Congres* [Leiden, 1936], 2–7;{published in this volume, 129–133}). This problem will be more fully treated in my *Rumtürkische Studien*, to appear shortly. {Wittek's 'Rumtürkische Studien' never appeared (see the *Introduction* to this chapter, 97); I deal with the problem more at length in a forthcoming study entitled 'Spectrality, "Presence" and the Ottoman Past: *Rûmtürkische Studien* and other Problems'}.

37 On the legendary genealogy of the Oghuz tribes, see M. Th. Houtsma, 'Die Ghuzenstamme', in *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes* ii (1888),

219–233. The grouping of the grandsons of Oghuz, in which the first position was given to Kayi, was not at all recent; it is in Rashîd ed-Dîn, and so previous to the Ottoman era. But already In the time of Mahmûd al-Kashgharî (eleventh century) the Kayi (or Kayigh, as in the *Dîvân*, i, 56) should have figured at the head of the Oghuz tribes, because in the list of Kashghari they are preceded only by the Kinik tribe, which received first place because it was to them – as the author does not fail to remark – that the ruling dynasty of the Seljuks belonged. If the Kayi tribe had thus occupied for so long this dominant place among the others, even though the great Turkish dynasties had not been of the Kayi, the legend reported in the introduction of the *Kitâb-i Dede Korkud* (fifteenth century), according to which, at the end of time, the rule (*Khanlik*) would return to the Kayi, clearly merits to be considered as an age-old tradition {see Geoffrey Lewis (ed. and tr.), *The Book of Dede Korkut* (Harmondsworth, 1974)}.

38 M. Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman*, 82 ff. {*The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, 72–77.}

39 In {my 'Der Stammbaum der Osmanen'}, *Der Islam*, xiv (1925), 94–100.

40 Unfortunately this very important text has never been edited; we have to be content with what has been published in the journal *TOEM* i (1911), 46–52, and in F. Giese, *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, i (Breslau, 1922), 1–3, 6, 13, 14–15, 19–20, 26–27; ii (German translation, Leipzig, 1925), 1–8, 12, 21, 22–23, 28–29, 36–37, 38. Cf. P. Wittek in '[Review of] Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen*', *Der Islam*, xx (1931), 205 f. {See M. F. Köprülü, *IA*, s.v.; N. S. Banarli, 'Ahmedî ve Dâsitân-i Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân', *Türkiyât Mecmuasi* (1939), 49 ff.; *EI* 2, s.v. Ahmadi (G. L. Lewis); Ismail Ünver (ed.), *Iskender-nâme (Inceleme; tipki-basim)* (Ankara, 1983).}

41 F. Giese, *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, 1 f.

42 Ahmed Tevhîd has published a very insufficient copy in {his 'Bursa'da eñ eski kitâbe'}, *TOEM* v (1914), 318 ff {see, for a discussion of the problem, Colin Heywood, 'The 1337 Bursa Inscription and its interpreters', *Turcica* xxxvi (2004), 215–232}. The inscription will be studied at length in my *Rumtürkische Studien* {see p. 111, n. 36 in this volume}.

43 Cf. P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 136, where the same title is recovered in an inscription of another contemporary of Orkhan, a prince of Menteshe.

44 Cl. Huart, *Les saints des derviches tourneurs*, ii, 392. Cf. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, 37 and 67.

45 For example, *TOEM* ii, 422 (Sinob, 722/1322: Ghâzî Celebi); 704 (Ermenek, 740/1339: Karamanoghlu Musa); 704 (Karaman [Larenda], epitaph of 750/1349: Karamanoghlu Ahmed).

46 W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (London, 1928; Gibb Memorial Series, N.S., especially 214 ff.

47 Op. cit, 287, after 'Utbî.

48 The Zengids of Mosul Seyfeddîn Ghâzî I and II in the twelfth century; the Ayyûbid of Aleppo az-Zâhir Ghiyâtheddîn Ghâzî, 1193–1216; the Ayyûbid of

Mayyafarikîn al-Muzaffar Shihâbeddin Ghâzî, 1210–1220, and others.

49 H. Thorning, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des islamischen Vereinswesens* (Berlin, 1913; *Türkische Bibliothek*, 16), 206. – P. Kahle, 'Die Futuwwa-Bündnisse des Kalifen en-Nasir', in *Festschrift für Georg Jacob* (Leipzig, 1932), 121–127, and 'Ein Futuwwa-Erlass des Kalifen en-Nasir aus dem Jahre 604 (1207)', in *Aus fünf Jahrtausenden morgenlandischer Kultur, Festschrift Max Freiherr von Oppenheim* (Berlin, 1933), 52–58.

50 R. Hartmann, 'As-Sulami's Risalat al-Malamatija', *Der Islam*, viii (1918) 191.

51 F. Taeschner, 'Die islamischen Futuwwabunde', in *ZDMG*, N.F. xii (1933), 6–49.

52 Ghâziya Khâtûn, daughter of the Ayyûbid of Aleppo 'Azîz Muhammad Ghiyâtheddîn, married in 636/1233 to the Seljukid of Rûm Kaykhosrev II.

53 Cl. Huart, *Les saints des derviches tourneurs*, ii, 391.

54 P. Kahle, 'Die Futuwwa-Bündnisse der Kalifen en-Nâsir (622–1225)', *Festschr. G. Jacob*, 119: 'Und die Sunna liegt im Takmîl (final act of entry into the corporation) mit dem Serâwil (trousers). Und erlaubt is es auch mit etwas anderen, wie der Kleidung und den Waffen'. Cf. Thorning, op. cit., 217; {Th. Menzel, 'Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Derwisch-tag', *Festschr. G. Jacob*, 174–199}.

55 *Die altosmanische Chronik des Ašikpašazade*, ed. F. Giese (Leipzig, 1929), 40, l. 13

56 Cl. Huart, op. cit., ii, 10. This person was Beg of the *uj* (marches) and probably identical with that Muhammad Beg who played an important role in the Jimri affair of 1276 (see Ibn Bibi, *Rec.*, iv, 323, f.,{ed. Duda, 314 ff}).

57 *Âşıkpaşazâde*, ed. Giese, 10.

58 Thorning, op. cit., 201. L. A. Mayer, *Saracenic Heraldry* (Oxford, 1933), 11, refrains from deciding if the cup, so often found among the arms of the Mamlûks, was the symbol of the cup of the futuwwa, or simply the insignia of the cup-bearer's office. But let us add that J. Deny, in the *E.I.* article 'Tîmâr', writing of the technical term *tapu*, which played an important role in the Ottoman feudal system, noted the expression *tapu sahragi*, 'cup of honour'; it is then possible that we ought to see, in the presentation of the cup, the survival of a very old Turkish tradition.

59 J. H. Mordtmann, {Untitled Note} in *Mitteillungen d. Seminars f. orient. Sprachen* v/2 (1902), 166.

60 *Ašikpašazade*, ed. Giese, 13: *ghazâ yaraklari*.

61 For the ceremony, see F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, 2 vols (Oxford, 1929), ii, 604 ff., and J. P. Brown and H. A. Rose, *The Dervishes* (Oxford, 1927), 263 f., and especially F. Taeschner in {[Review of] F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1927)}, *Der Islam*, xix (1931), {181–186, at}184–186.

62 Ed. Giese, 201, l. 16.

63 Op. cit., 220, 1, 2.

64 Giese, *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, i, 19; the translation of this passage (ii, 28) was corrected by Wittek in the *Festschrift Georg Jacob*, 352.

65 *TOEM* i, 51.

66 Even in Ottoman architecture, we find for the first time, instead of the massive forms of the first edifices, the elegant lines of a refined art.

67 In *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, i, 29–33; ii, 40–46, one reads an entire series of tales that echo the discontent of the 'wholesome people' caused by the preponderance of the *ulemâ'* and their favorites, as well as by the 'avarice' of the sultan, i.e. by his fiscal policies. See also 'Alî, *Kunh ul-Akhbar*, 5 vols (Istanbul, 1277–1285 [= 1861–1869]), v, 92, where the Ghâzîs protest against 'the avarice of Bâyezîd' {but cf. Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600)* (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 286: according to 'Alî, the universal 'orthodox' Muslim monarch – i.e. here, Tîmûr – is superior in status to the regional *ghâzî* warrior for the faith}. The outcome of the battle of Ankara was determined, to a great extent, as we know, by the defection of whole contingents from the Ottoman side.

68 F. Giese, 'Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches', *Zeitschrift fur Semitistik* ii (1924), 246–271. It is surprising to see M. Fuad Köprülü, (*Les Origines de l'Empire ottoman*, 18), cite and utilize this work whose absurdities he had elsewhere so brilliantly demonstrated (in the journal *Hayât* i (1926), 202–222).

69 {Th. Nöldeke, 'Auszüge aus Nesrî's Geschichte des osmânischen Hauses'}, *ZDMG*, xiii (1859), 207 f. {ed. Taeschner, i, 32}.

70 Th. Menzel, {'Das Bektâši-Kloster Sejjid-i-Ghâzî'}, *Mitt. d. Sem. f. orient Sprachen*, xxviii/2 (1925), 92.

71 Köprülüzâde M. Fu'âd and Veled Çelebi, {'Temesvarli Gâzî 'Âsik Hasan'}, *Türk Yurdu*, new series, no. 19 (July 1926), 18–23; no. 20 (August 1926), 111 f.

72 H. Ethé, *Die Fahrten des Sejjid Batthal Ghazi* (Leipzig, 1871). See Yorgos (George) Dedes, *Battâlnâme: Introduction, English translation, commentary and facsimile*, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: 1996).

IV Two Conference Papers from Leiden (1936)

Introduction

Like most of his work collected here, Wittek's two short studies, 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische Beziehungen' ('Byzantine–Seljuk Relations') and 'Die Glaubenskämpfer im Osmanenstaat' ('The Warriors for the Faith in the Ottoman State'), were written for delivery to a learned audience, in this case the assembled members of the Dutch Oriental Society (Het Oostersch Genootschap in Nederland), on the occasion of its eighth congress, which was held in Leiden early in January 1936. Alone among Wittek's post-1933 lectures, they were written, and delivered, in German. [a]

'Die Glaubenskämpfer' is a short work, only some 2,000 words in length, exactly fitted to the familiar dimensions of a twenty-minute conference paper. 'Byzantinisch-Seldschukische Beziehungen' is even shorter. Both papers, in the form we have them in the Proceedings *of the congress, are devoid of text references. It may be wondered, therefore, what purpose may be served in republishing them here. The answer is that the two papers lay down an important 'marker' for Wittek's three epochal London lectures on* The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. *These were not delivered until the spring of the following year, 1937, but the decision by the University of London's Board of Studies in Oriental Languages and Literatures to recommend that the University should invite Wittek to lecture in London had already been made in the autumn of 1935, and we may safely assume that, through the agency of either H. A. R. Gibb or Sir Denison Ross, who were Wittek's two active sup porters on the Board of Studies, Wittek was quickly made aware of this.* [b]

A reading of 'Die Glaubenskämpfer' and its twin paper confirms this hypothesis in many details, both in terms of the sequence of argument and in the turns of phrase involved. We may see in them, therefore, elements of the German Urphrasäologie *of Wittek's thoughts that underlie the occasionally somewhat unidiomatic English phraseology of* The Rise.[c] *Clearly, already by the latter part of 1935, when these short papers for a*

Dutch orientalist congress must have been written, Wittek had already begun work on formulating the arguments for his classic exposition of the roots of Ottoman history that would find a permanent and a better-known locus in the London lectures of 1937. Only the last – and somewhat controversial – paragraph of Wittek's 'Glaubens kämpfer' paper fails (thankfully, one feels) to find its equivalent in the last pages of The Rise.

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I 'Byzantine–Seljuk Relations'

{29} The Anatolian Seljuk state, a very peripheral concern in both political and intellectual terms as seen from a Muslim perspective, derives its world-historical significance thanks to its close relationships with Byzantium. It represents the fulfillment of the penetration, in sharp opposition, of the Christian-Greek and Turkish-Islamic spheres, without which the universal-historical phenomenon of the Ottoman Empire, this Muslim legacy of the entire Byzantine world, could not have emerged.

For centuries the Muslim border warriors (*die muslimische Grenzkriegerschaft*) had undertaken, as if according to schedule, annual raids, or razzias, into Anatolia. Since the beginning of the eleventh century it had predominantly been Turkish warbands (*Kriegerverbände*) that had undertaken these attacks. The raids began to become more dangerous when, around the middle of the eleventh century, the Byzantine border defences began increasingly to break down. The Akritai, the group that suppled this border defence, stood in many respects opposed to their state. Completely idiosyncratic in cultural and social terms, they inclined towards heresies and in ethnic (*national*) terms were strongly mixed, with a preponderance of Armenians. The unhappy Armenian policies of the emperors of the eleventh century, and the tax policy of Constantine {IX} Monomachus {1042–1055 C.E.}, made the borderers ready for defection. The defeat of the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071 provided the signal.

The Great Seljuk {Sultan Alp Arslan}, who scored this victory, had wished his expedition to force East Rome to make peace; in no sense had he sought to conquer it. The Seljuk state initially gained no profit from the anarchy that now broke out thanks to the open revolt of the Byzantine border warriors in Asia Minor. But {30} this {situation}

only presented to those groups, that had undertaken the razzias in Asia Minor, the singular opportunity (*die einzigartige Chance*) to overrun the entire peninsula as far as the coast of the Aegean. The razzias developed into waves of conquest (*Eroberungszügen*), whose successes attracted yet newer bands (*Scharen*). Behind the warbands, tribes of Turkish nomads were drawn in. Anatolia became Turkish, and the Greek resistance forces (*Gegenwehr*) could only recover western Asia Minor and coastal areas in the north and south. Moreover, in the southeast {of Asia Minor} there arose from the newly independent domains of the rebel {Armenian} border warriors the kingdom of Lesser Armenia.

The leadership among the Turkish conquerors was unquestionably in the hands of the Dânishmend family, Muslim border warriors from the Euphrates, manifestly the element that felt itself most easily at home in Rûm. They took into their ranks the remnants of the disloyal Byzantine border defenders, with whom they felt very near not only socially and culturally but also, just as much, ethnically. Thus, the decisive stratum (*die massgebende Schicht*) of the Turkish conquerors of the land in no way acted as entirely foreign oppressors (*vollig fremde Unterdrücker*).

Only later did the Great Seljuks dispatch princes of their house to the land, conquered without their assistance or wishes. Remaining at first completely in the shadow of the Dânishmendids, it took a considerable time for this Asia Minor branch of the Seljuk house to relinquish its plans for the acquisition of Syria or Mesopotamia and to dedicate itself to the establishment of a polity that would emulate the states of high Islamic culture. This {Rûm-Seljuk} state, {established} at Konya, had of necessity to come into conflict with the Dânishmendids, who better represented the older traditions of frontier warfare. The Seljuks {of Rûm} overcame them around 1180 and thus gathered the whole of Muslim Asia Minor within their power. Against Byzantium and Lesser Armenia a stable frontier was established, not a border (*Linie*) but a zone (*Zone*). In this zone the petty warfare continued. Here there lived on the traditions of the old frontier warfare (*Grenzkriegertum*) that the Dânishmendids had spread from the area of the Euphrates across all of Asia Minor. The {Turkish} nomad tribes (*Wanderstämme*) were also very much at home in these frontier zones, and they ranged as much over Byzantine as over Seljuk lands. On the other hand, the great Byzantine–Seljuk wars came to an end with {the complete defeat of the Byzantines at the battle of} Myriokephalon (1176).

Thus, Byzantine–Seljuk relations were played out in three spheres: at the court in Konya and in those areas (*Kulturgebieten*) directly under its influence (especially the cities of the Seljuk lands), at the East Roman court and in Byzantine territory, and finally, in the frontier zone of the Muslim ghâzîs and the Akritai opposed to them. And to begin with the last: here there continued more intensively {31} that process that had originally begun in the Euphrates area, the mutual assimilation of both {Christian and Muslim} communities of border warriors, both of which had continued the old traditions. But in the two remaining spheres as well such an assimilation was also under way. On Seljuk soil there were numerous Christians, who remained in communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. We read in the work of the contemporary Michael the Syrian in just how friendly a fashion the sultan acted towards the Christians. More than one of the sultans had a Christian mother, and all had Christians in their harems. The same holds for the Seljuk grandees, of whom a large number were renegades. Byzantines were no rarity at the court of Konya, for all those who had, for whatever reason, to flee the Empire found asylum here. Intensive trade with Byzantium promoted the equalization (*Ausgleich*) of material culture. On the other hand, since the Turkish irruption of the eleventh century, the {lands of the} East Roman Empire had been saturated with Turkish groups, to which may be added those Turks from the Pontic steppe (*Südrussland* {*sic*}) who had streamed across the Danube into the Empire. Two of the four national {*sic*} corps of the {Byzantine} army were Turkish. Turks rose to the highest offices, even to becoming related by marriage to the imperial family. Seljuk sultans came to {the second} Rome[1] as visitors or in exile. At {the Byzantine} court, Turkish ways from time to time practically became the mode. In the vicinity of the {Byzantine} imperial palace was constructed a building in 'Persian' style, {within which} the walls had been decorated with frescoes that celebrated the deeds of the Seljuks. It was not only the Turkish neighbors, but the influence of the entire Orient that made itself felt in Constantinople. That the West was making its influence felt at the same time only strengthened this development, for just at this time the Crusades themselves fell under the spell of the East.

What held for the twelfth century was true all the more so in the thirteenth. Byzantium, expelled from Constantinople and its European possessions, reconstituted itself in the frontier lands of Asia Minor. The entire {Byzantine} state thus became a frontier land (*ein Grenzerland*), and as such it took on the strong orientalizing tendencies

of these lands. A lasting peace reigned with the Seljuks, broken only once in 1210 by the battle at Antioch on the Maeander. And that {conflict} was over a {Seljuk} intervention on behalf of the deposed Emperor Alexius III! Since the Seljuk state at this time experienced an exceptional prosperity and was able to place its frontier warriors under sharper super vision, the lesser frontier clashes came to an end. However, after the middle of the thirteenth century, the state power of the Seljuks, despite the military assistance of the Byzantines, was progressively weakened by the Mongols. The influence of the Seljuks over their frontier warriors, {32} an influence that had grown numerically and culturally in the years of peace, thus disappeared. Mongol pressure also brought the frontiers into uproar. The ghâzîs once more stormed the Byzantine frontiers, and once again the Akritai, on the other side of the frontiers, were aroused against their government and ready to defect. Byzantium, entirely dedicated to the recovery of its European provinces and Constantinople {from the Latins after 1261}, lost its Anatolian possessions in a few decades. Here, around 1300, a number of Turkish emirates appeared. They did not bear the Seljuk imprint but rather were influenced by those frontier groups that on the one hand, had stood culturally distant from the ruling classes (*der herrschende Schichte*) of the Seljuk state, but {also} had grown much closer to the soil of Rûm and its popular culture. One of these new emirates was the Ottoman state, which was soon to reach across {the Straits} to Europe. In the meantime, East Rome bore its orientalized ways (from the Anatolian era of the so-called “Empire of Nicaea”) to its European provinces and its capital, rather more forerunner than foe (*Wegbereiter als Widersacher*) of its Turkish conquerors and heirs.[2]

II ‘The Warriors for the Faith in the Ottoman State’

{2} Towards the end of the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldûn formulated the historical and philosophical proposition that states, in general, last only three generations, emerging, growing, and declining within about 120 years. Although this view (which had already been articulated before Ibn Khaldûn) arose inevitably from pondering the accumulated experience provided by the Muslim polities, it also

represents an expression of the sense of weariness of that sorely afflicted age and conforms to the universal mood of Islamic society in the great centres of the Muslim *oikoumene*, centres consequently of Islamic high culture (*der Hochislam*).

But on the most distant frontier of this *oikoumene*, in proximity to the Muslims' oldest adversary, the Byzantines (who now, it is true, held little more than their capital and its environs), the Ottoman state had even then grown, a state of whose existence Ibn Khaldun was aware, without of course having suspected how fully it would give the lie to his theory.

The state of Osman, which had emerged around 1300 from the most unpretentious origins, was, by 1400, already a mighty power that menaced Constantinople, that had annexed Bulgaria, Serbia, as well as the {3} various Turkish states of Anatolia, and that had defeated a great army of western Christendom at Nicopolis. To be sure, in 1402 it appeared mortally wounded as a result of Tîmûr's victory near Ankara, so this case too seemed to verify Ibn Khaldûn's teaching. But the Ottoman state swiftly put its parts back together, resumed its victorious course, and in 1453 realized the dream of Islam in the conquest of Constantinople. Down the centuries, then, it dominated considerable portions of three historic continents and still played an important role during the {First} World War, in which it succumbed after a glorious career of 600 years. The formation of a lasting great power in the late middle ages might have lain in the trend of the time. But in any case one must also seek an internal cause (*einem inneren Grund*), one that guaranteed this state (*diesem Staatswesen*) an existence of such extraordinary length. As such, the fact presents itself that the Ottoman state emerged as the embodiment of the idea of the Muslim holy war and, internally, never entirely freed itself from this idea.

The tradition that the Ottoman state arose from a tribe (*ein Stamm*) has proved to be both recent and spurious. In contrast, the Ottomans appear in the oldest historical witness as *ghâzîs*, warriors for the faith, and as nothing else. The earliest evidence is a section of the *Iskender-nâme* (Book of Alexander) of Ahmedî, entitled 'the Book of the Holy War'. It begins with a theory of history quite unlike Ibn Khaldun's; according to it, the warriors of the faith enter history as the last, because the best happens to come at the very end. Ahmedî sets forth a ghâzî's obligations in this life and his expected recompense in the next. Then follows a history of the Ottoman rulers up to about 1400, from the ghâzîs' ideological point of view (*die Gesichtspunkt des*

Ghâzitums). The epigraphic evidence confirms the great role of the ghâzî ideal (*das Ghâzitum*). This was not confined to the Ottomans, but we also meet it in the other Turkish emirates of Asia Minor. We are thus dealing with an entire movement, whose history can be followed back further.

We find ghâzîs in ninth-century Khurâsân. They constitute a popular movement, under whose standards discontented elements gather, to be led in battle (with the promise of booty) against unbelievers and heretics. These associations (*Verbände*), in which the Turkish elements predominate, naturally find entry also into Islam's most important frontier zone, the front against East Rome. Islam and Byzantium had faced off here in a centuries-long match. Both powers {4} had founded frontier defences in much the same fashion, whose representatives came in time to bear an imprint very different from that of the hinterland, whereas they became in many respects extremely similar to the hostile frontier warriors facing them. There was likewise no lack of friendly relations across the frontier. If the borderers rebelled against their own state, for which there was often reason, they easily made common cause with their – so intimate – enemy. As a consequence, {we witness} the astonishing Byzantine conquests of the tenth century, when the Muslim border defence on the Euphrates broke down; also the sudden Turkish conquest of Anatolia after 1071, when the Byzantine border defenders deserted the empire. The borderers differed ethnically from the hinterland: Armenians were the preponderant element on the Byzantine side, Turks on the Muslim side, but there were also Turks on the Byzantine and Armenians on the Muslim sides. Here and there warrior clans assembled around confident leaders, inclined to be as independent as possible, eager for booty, extra pay, and honours from the state, {but} who opposed every extension of the state's administration into the frontier territory (especially tax collection). The same local culture, permeating the frontier district, as well as the permanent mutual contacts of both frontier military forces, added to their common ways and views of life, gave them a uniform character. Heroic, knightly, romantic (*heroisch, ritterlich, romantisch*), they stood as close to each other as they stood apart from their hinterlands. They gladly absorbed heresies persecuted by the state authority of the hinterland, but which were here secure from the clutches of the state. However great a role religion played here, it was more a slogan than content moulding the men. Thus the Muslim border warriors who absorbed the Turkish ghâzî bands from the east were already thoroughly acclimatised to the land of Rûm, and

the fresh arrivals also swiftly throve in the new surroundings. The Turkish conquest of Asia Minor is not an accomplishment of the Seljuk government, rather the work of the frontier warriors who invaded, after the collapse of the Byzantine border defences (whose remnants gladly joined them), followed by new warrior bands and nomad tribes (*Wanderstammen*), but as they had been long familiar with the surroundings, maintaining their leadership. These elements were represented by the princes of the house of Dânishmend, who called themselves ghâzîs, traced their descent back to the hero of the Anatolian warriors of the faith, Seyyid Battâl Ghâzî, and bore the traditions of the Euphrates frontier throughout Asia Minor. In this {5} Asia Minor, now become Turkish, a branch of the house of Seljuk then established a regular state (*ein geordnetes Staatswesen*) with the resources and ambitions of the high culture of Islam (*der Hochislam*).

Once again the ghâzîs were exiled to the frontiers, dislodged by the Byzantines from west Anatolia and by the Seljuks from the inner Anatolian cultural domain (*Kulturgebiet*). Again they were face to face with a Byzantine border force, and once again there ensued a cultural assimilation, a new acclimatization. When, in the second half of the thirteenth century, this frontier was again stirred up, the Turkish ghâzîs, once again invited and supported by a revolt of the *akritai*, conquered west Anatolia with ease, where they founded a number of emirates. The Ottomans, whose sphere of action was the neighbourhood of the Byzantine capital, had to struggle the longest and with the greatest difficulty, for the Byzantines were supported by the west and for long defied them. In fact, because of the difficulty and duration of this struggle, the Ottomans became the leaders of the Anatolian ghâzîs (*Führer des anatolischen Ghâzitums*). Always ready to be led in new wars, the aggressive elements from the – by now – saturated emirates flocked to them. Hence the expeditions to the Balkans and the great European conquests, preceding the fall of the Byzantine capital.

The Dânishmendids were the first princes to bear the ghâzî title. The crusades transformed the princes of Mesopotamia and Syria also into border warriors; and, after the middle of the twelfth century, we find the title borne by the Zengids and Ayyubids. The ghâzî was, consequently, no longer the adventurer of the earlier era, but now instead this title had the ring of chivalry and nobility (*Rittertum und Adel*), recognized throughout the Islamic world. From the very beginning the ghâzîs were connected, with the futuwwa, to that ‘moral philosophy’ which served as the basis for a whole array of

corporate movements. When the Caliph an-Nâsir, at the end of the twelfth century, sup -ported an organization based on the teachings of the futuwwa, he seems to have had the ghâzî movement foremost in mind. To forward his policy, aimed at a renewal of the Caliph's power, depended surely on securing devoted soldiers. The futuwwa, with its comradely spirit between master and junior, presented a first class means to that end.

Among the Anatolian ghâzîs there was, it is true, nothing like the custom of the *serâvil*, i.e., the investment with a pair of trousers worn by the master. On the other hand, according to the rules of the futuwwa, the trousers could be replaced by a weapon. In fact, we know of a ghâzî initiation ceremony (*Ghazi-Weihe*), in which the initiate (a prince of the west Anatolian emirate of Aydin) placed a club, presented to him by the master, on his head, by which act he took the vow {6}, to crush first his own passions and then the enemies of the faith. Thus, the ghâzî was bound not only to the holy war as a duty, but also by a definite ethos.

As we have already pointed out, the Ottoman state, as the ghâzî state κατ᾽εξοχην {*kat' exochen, par excellence*} controlled a military force incommensurate with its territory. It was thus compelled to a career of incessant conquest, and its prestige grew immensely in the Muslim world. The number of its adherents grew steadily, the neighbouring emirates became steadily drained of blood (*immer blutleerer*) and were absorbed from necessity by the Ottoman state. Theologians, sheykhs, and dervishes from the entire Islamic oikoumene flocked in, hoping for agreeable livings (*gute Pfründen*) in the newly conquered lands. They brought to the new state the learning and administrative skills of the lands of Islamic high culture, and in this way they made the organisation of such a rapidly growing state possible. This prestige, as a state based on the holy war (*Glaubenskämpferstaat*), saved the Ottoman state after the catastrophe of 1402. Tîmûr dared not injure its essence, rather he contented himself with dissuading the Ottomans from expanding into Muslim lands and leading them back to their proper task, the holy war.

As warriors for the faith, the Ottomans had long been acclimatized to the former Byzantine soil. By no means, then, did they appear in west Anatolia and in the Balkans as wild nomads; on the contrary, they were already at home in the world they entered as the new lords. The transfer of rule happened without a cultural breach, and the new state could profit from the institutions of its predecessors and the skills of its subjects. From that popular strength (*Volkskraft*), as well, thanks

to the Janissary establishment, already called to life by Murâd I, yet with manifold connections to ghâzî institutions, indeed whose early establishment is conceivable only in a ghâzî state. A state sup -ported by a tribal consciousness (*Stammesbewusstsein*) would have neither agreed to nor endured such a systematic introduction of alien (*volksfremder*) elements into the warrior caste (*Kriegerkaste*), and this already in the midst of its beginnings.

It is true that high Islamic culture (*der Hochislam*), established in the centers of the empire and thence spread into the provinces, totally eclipsed the ghâzî character of the Ottoman state. Although the old traditions were maintained among the lesser ranks of society (*in den populären Schichten*), they remained truly alive only on the frontiers. There, deep in Europe, the spirit of the frontier warriors now lived on under the same conditions, and with the same ethos, as it had once on the Euphrates and then in west Anatolia, as the border guardian of Islam. Without the daily exploits of these borderers (*Grenzervolk*), of which the court chronicles, of course, make no mention, {7} the mere formal continuance *(rein aüsserliche Bestand*) of the empire would have been impossible.

Once the Ottoman Empire, after a duration of 600 years, collapsed in the {First} World War, the popular classes (*die populäre Schichten*) arose for the 'Defence of the Rights of the Caliphate', although the Caliph was siding with the enemy: an attitude typical of the *akritai*! In this struggle, the leader (*der Führer*) [Mustafa Kemâl Pasha] was awarded, as a reward for victory, the ghâzî title! More significant yet is the fact that a large number of the leading men of this new state, with the Ghâzî at its head, are natives of the ancient Ottoman borderland, that – more deeply affected than the Levantines (*das Levantinertum*) of the capital and the port cities – for centuries had basked in the rays of European culture (*europäischen Ausstrahlungen . . . empfangen hatte*), rays gathered through many means. In the Turkish republic of Atatürk the borderland spirit unmistakably rules – and part of that, also, is an immoderate (*übersteigerte*) and thereby shallow nationalism. Thus even this reconstruction of the Turkish state, represented as so apparently rational and unqualified, rests on a spiritual (*seelischen*) and social basis that boasts a lengthy prehistory in the spirit of the holy war (*Glaubenskämpfertum*).

Notes

a *Verslag van het achtste Congres*, 29–32 and 2–7, respectively.

b See, for the detailed chronology of the London invitation, Colin Heywood, 'Wittek and the Austrian Tradition', *JRAS* 1988, 8, 11–12 [= *idem, Writing Ottoman History*, § VI]. It was not until some time later, possibly in late 1936 or early 1937, that the proposed single lecture was officially expanded into three lectures, the texts of which we now possess in *The Rise*.

c I hope to develop this theme in a forthcoming short study of Wittek's German, French and English phraseology.

1 {sic: 'Rom' (and not Rûm') in the original, a curious lapse indeed. Read, of course, the 'second Rome', i.e. Constantinople.}

2 Comment appended to the text: 'Dr. {J.H.} Kramers pointed out the significance of Anatolian place names in the context of this paper, the study of which could in many cases lead to the revision of previously-held facts and opinions'. Wittek's response is not given, but Kramers seems to have been unaware of his recently-published study, 'Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie', *Byzantion*, x (1935), 11–64.

V ‘From the Defeat at Ankara to the Conquest of Constantinople’

(A Half-century of Ottoman History)

Introduction

As Wittek indicates in his first footnote to this article, the two lectures that comprise it were delivered at the Sorbonne in March 1938. In Wittek’s own words, they form a continuation of another pair of lectures, ‘Deux chapitres de l’histoire de Roum’, which he had delivered in the same location two years previously, in March 1936, and published in the same year in Byzantion *(reproduced here in translation, ch. III). The ‘De la défaite’ pair ends the series of Wittek’s pre-war lectures, republished here, in two ways. First, they were the last of a peripatetic series, reissued here, which he delivered in the two years 1936-1938 in those European centres of scholarship – Paris, Leiden, London – which had still had not fallen under fascist domination. After returning from Paris, Wittek was busy with the arrangements for the 20th International Congress of Orientalists, which was held in Brussels in September 1938, in the shadow of the Munich crisis. Thereafter, with war in Europe clearly imminent, there was to be no more travelling until his flight from Brussels to London in the confusion of the German invasion, in the summer of 1940. Second, in terms of its subject matter, the ‘De la défaite’ it is the only paper from these years to deal with the critical half-century of Ottoman history that, as the title indicates, extends from the defeat of Bâyezîd I by Tîmûr at Ankara in 1402, via more than a quarter-century of dynastic and social strife, to a seemingly miraculous recovery of the state’s fortunes within the space of less than three decades that culminates in Mehmed II’s conquest of Constantinople in 1453.*

'De la défaite' has not had an easy ride at the hands of its critics. Colin Imber, in particular, in a lecture given at the London Wittek-Tagung *in 1984, criticised it harshly, in terms both of what he saw as its factographic inaccuracy and of Wittek's interpretation of the motives and actions of the main dynastic protagonists in the* fetret devri*, the Ottoman 'Time of Troubles', an analysis of which dominates the first lecture.*[a] *There is, certainly, an imbalance in Wittek's treatment of the period, reflecting his known preferences and, one may say, prejudices. Mehmed I, who effectively reunited the Ottoman state after the first phase of the* fetret devri*, is perhaps overpraised; Murâd II, the real rebuilder of the state's fortunes between 1425 and his death in 1451, gets remarkably short shrift, while the persona of Mehmed II, as the conqueror of Constantinople, is endowed with a charismatic, almost apocalyptic quality that reflects both the* Endzeit *overtones of 1453, and the darkening mood of Europe at the time 'De la défaite' was written.*[b]

* * *

The half-century that will occupy us here begins with a defeat, inflicted on the Ottoman state at Ankara in 1402, at the first peak in the state's history, during a period of rapid expansion; this defeat very nearly caused its dissolution and complete disappearance. The fifty years that followed this disaster were to be almost entirely devoted to restoring the state's position to what it had been before the catastrophe. However, they were brought to a close by a success, the importance of which in Ottoman history cannot be exaggerated: I am referring to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The half-century that led to this conquest led also to the transformation of the Ottoman state into an empire.

The Ottoman state had begun to expand at the beginning of the fourteenth century, slowly and tenaciously at first, and then, from 1354 (the date of its installation at Gallipoli), at a more and more accelerated pace; and after crushing the final resistance of the Balkan states at Kossovo in 1389, it saw an expansion so ferocious in the final decade of the century that it conferred on its architect, the sultan Bâyezîd I, his epithet of Yildirim, 'the lightning bolt'. Bâyezîd's state, which already embraced almost all {2} the territories stretching from the Adriatic and the Danube to the Taurus and the Euphrates, could, it is true, already have seemed an empire on the eve of Ankara: its daring sovereign himself thought of it as such, and modern historians end their studies of the foundation of the Ottoman empire with the

battle of Ankara, or at dates even earlier than that. But in truth, what crumbled at the battle of Ankara was only the dream of an empire: a prophetic dream, but a premature one. All the problems that the realisation of this dream posed were still awaiting solutions. The task of finding these solutions was to fall to the following half century. The conquest of the imperial city with which our period of study comes to an end is a sign that that task had been accomplished.

One can therefore say, a priori, that the half-century under scrutiny is an entirely decisive period in the formation of the Ottoman empire, and, at the same time, one of the most instructive: first of all, the study of the causes and circumstances of the defeat will allow us to understand the political problems that were posed; then the history of the following fifty years will show us what solutions were applied.

I[1]

Before examining our subject, it is important that we fully understand the particular character of the Ottoman state. Especially in Bâyezîd's time, it appeared to be one of those renowned historic nomadic powers that, from nothing and in a very short space of time, conquered a large but generally short-lived empire; and indeed, after Ankara, the Ottoman state was close to sharing their fate – a sudden disappearance. But the very fact that it survived, and that, from a limited but intact core, it was able to reconstruct itself in accordance with its innate traditions, is enough to demonstrate that this state belongs to an entirely different category of political creations than the nomadic empires with which it is generally grouped.

Originally, the Ottoman state was one of the numerous principalities that {3} were formed in Western Anatolia at the end of the thirteenth century.[2] These principalities had their roots in bands of 'holy warriors', or ghâzî bands that formed themselves in the regions of the Seljuk–Byzantine frontier from a population established there as guardians of the Muslim hinterland. In this hinterland, Muslim life was blooming in the forms of high Islam, imported from the neighbouring Arabic and Persian provinces: a peaceful and tolerant civilisation, based on agriculture, industry and commerce, on stable administration and on a considerable general culture.[3] Life on the frontiers was of another character altogether. As in the old marches of

the Euphrates and Taurus, from whence their traditions were transplanted, the ghâzîs, guardians of the frontiers, preserved rather the traditions of primitive Islam, its warlike ardour and its religious fanaticism; but they also resembled them in their cultural poverty and in the ease with which they fell under the influence of the environment in which they settled. The Turkish ghâzîs of the Seljuk–Byzantine frontier had, over two centuries, adjusted well in every respect to life in Western Asia Minor, when, pushed by the Mongols, and encouraged by the weakness of the Byzantine defences, they resumed the offensive and in a few years seized all that remained in the hands of the Byzantines in Anatolia. It was thus that the principal chiefs of the ghâzîs established their principalities; the only one of these to have any future was 'Osmân's.

Two main reasons can be stated to explain the privileged destiny of 'Osmân's principality, both resulting from its geographical position. Situated almost opposite the Byzantine capital itself, its struggle was the hardest, its progress the slowest, and the ghazâ or holy war, its *raison d'être*, remained a perpetual task, {4} while the other emirates, with nothing left to conquer, were already weakening from lack of booty and from dissent, and were watching their warriors migrating to the Ottoman flag. But this location opposite Constantinople equally meant that the Ottoman territory found itself crossed by the principal routes leading from central Anatolia to the Byzantine capital. Thanks to these roads, this ghâzî state was more intimately in contact with the Muslim hinterland than the other emirates, and therefore was open from the beginning to elements, which alone were capable of organising the conquests of the ghâzîs into a stable state. I am referring first to the *'ulemâ*, those theologians who, in a Muslim state, and even more so in a ghâzî state, were the only ones to organise and serve the administration. These 'ulemâ brought to the young Ottoman state the administrative principles of high Islam: that peaceful and tolerant Islam, which, rather than converting subjugated peoples, preferred to leave them to their ancient beliefs, to the greater profit of the taxmen, who collected a special tribute from non-Muslims. We note the presence of the Muslim clergy from the beginning in the first large towns to be occupied, Bursa, Nicaea and Nicomedia, where medreses or schools of theology were founded immediately after conquest; and it is surely thanks to the influence of this clergy that wherever they were present, therefore especially in the towns, the fanatical proselytism of the ghâzîs gave way to tolerance. As well as theologians, the Muslim hinterland supplied city dwellers – craftsmen

and merchants – whose fraternities of akhîs we see immediately established in conquered towns. These city dwellers, who had voluntarily left central Anatolia, which was at that time plunged into poverty by the Mongol troubles, soon allowed the Ottoman state to lean on a faithful and fairly large Muslim element in the conquered towns, who further guaranteed a high level of commerce and industrial productivity.

These two tendencies, which we shall abbreviate as the 'ghâzî tendency' and the 'Muslim tendency',[4] were of equal importance to the Ottoman state, {5} and its principal task would be to harmonise them.

To demonstrate the cooperation of the ghâzî and Muslim tendencies, let us examine how the Turks settled in the Balkan peninsula. As I have shown elsewhere, the collective name the Turks gave to the Balkan countries, *Rûm-eli* or 'the lands of the Rûm', a term in its origin merely a simple calque on [the Greek] *Romania*, had evolved towards a meaning to which it easily leant itself: Rûm signifying among other things 'orthodox Christian'. Rûmeli, as the collective name of the Balkan countries, took the meaning 'lands of the orthodox Christians'.[5] Indeed, orthodox Christianity remained the characteristic trait of Rûmeli throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula, excepting the three regions where Islam had won a solid majority: the first in Thrace and in the south-east of Bulgaria, in the Rhodope massif; the second to the west, in Albania and in the south-west of Serbia, stretching the length of the frontier of the vilayet of Rûmeli; and the third in north-east of Bulgaria and between the Danube and the Black Sea, in the Dobrudja. An explanation of this curious phenomenon must be sought in the history of the Turkish conquest, and it is there that we find once more the two trends, ghâzî and Muslim, alternately at work.

The conquest of the Balkans started out with the exploits of the ghâzîs who, once settled in the Gallipoli peninsula, seized the neighbouring lands in an uninterrupted guerrilla war and, according to their traditions, won it over to Islam, while allowing some of the converted to preserve their Slavic language. This is the first of the Islamised regions: Thrace and Rhodope with its Pomaks, or Bulgarian Muslims.

But the first ghâzî conquests would soon be followed by vast state expeditions. Now it was a question of insuring these early conquests against the military response of the Balkan states, and to do battle with their armies. The victories achieved by the Ottomans in these

battles rendered them, in one fell swoop, masters of entire provinces. Now, in these provinces, it was not {6} the ghâzîs that settled, it was the state, with its administrative apparatus, representing a fiscal and tolerant Islam. The vast countries conquered in this manner therefore remained Christian, under the fairly light yoke of Muslim domination.

It was only at the new frontiers – transported by the massive conquests of the State across the whole peninsula, as far as the Danube and the Adriatic coast – that the ghâzîs once more found a sphere of activity and a settlement where Islam was imposed. There too they left the converted with their own languages: hence the Greek Muslims of the Pindus, the Albanian Muslims of Albania and Serbia, and the Slavonic Muslims of Serbia and Bosnia.

As for the third Muslim territory, that of the north-east of Bulgaria, it remained a ghâzî settlement for centuries; from there, the ghâzîs would under -take their raids into Wallachia, and across Wallachia into Transylvania and Hungary. The fact that there were no non-Turkish Muslims in this region is easily explained: as a neighbour of the steppes of southern Russia, and being open to incursions by Turkish tribes of which the Pechenegs, the Comans and the Ghuzz were only the latest to arrive, it was already turkicised before the arrival of the Ottomans – the existence of Turkish Christians in this area can be taken as proof of this.[6]

If the cooperation, or rather the alternating, of the ghâzî and Muslim tendencies can explain the situation in the Balkans, the latter can in turn furnish an explanation of the policy that the Ottoman state necessarily had to follow in Anatolia.

{7} From the beginning, it is already possible to note that the Ottomans sought to counter-balance each expansion in Europe by an enlargement of their base in Asia Minor: thus their settlement in the Gallipoli peninsula in 1354 was immediately followed by the occupation of Gerede (Krateia) and Ankara,[7] and the great conquests of Murâd I were accompanied by the systematic acquisition of the Anatolian provinces, an acquisition preferably accomplished by peaceful means such as marriage or purchase.

In fact, this was an urgent necessity. For if those volunteers of the holy war, the ghâzîs, came forth in sufficient numbers, those elements from the Anatolian hinterland that the state needed so badly to set up their administration in the vast, newly-conquered Christian lands were much more difficult to attract; as long as Anatolia remained under the rule of independent emirs, the influx of ‘ulemâ and city dwellers from these regions could happen neither freely enough nor in great enough

numbers.

Bâyezîd Yildirim, ‘the Lightning Bolt’, provided a brutal solution to this problem. With his elite troops, the Janissaries, formed from young captives who had fallen into the hands of the ghâzîs in the course of raids on Christian lands, and with the auxiliaries that the Balkan princes, including the so-called ‘emperor’ of Constantinople, had to bring to him personally, Bâyezîd had at his disposal a crushing superiority over these emirates. Indeed, they had been doomed ever since their young warriors, finding no more employment at home, had begun to emigrate to join the ranks of the Rumelian ghâzîs. In a few expeditions, Bâyezîd drove the emirs off their thrones one after another, and seized almost all of Turkish Anatolia as far as Adalia, the Taurus and the Euphrates. Just like Rûm-eli (Western *Romania*), Rûm (Asia Minor) had become Ottoman. Between the two halves of this vast dominion there still remained, like a coveted ‘missing link’, Constantinople, the final bastion of the Byzantine empire; but it was itself closely surrounded by Ottoman troops.

{8} So it is that, at the end of the year 1394, we find Bâyezîd, the ruler of Rûm and Rûmeli and already anticipating the conquest of Istanbul, sending an embassy to Egypt to demand of the ‘Abbâsid caliph of Cairo his investiture as the Sultan of Rûm.[8] Given the position that the Ottoman sovereign had just reached at the time he was soliciting this title, he could not help but be seized by the notion of reviving the Roman empire. And indeed, in his bold plans of conquest, his policy betrayed that it was in fact a universal empire, laying equal claim to the Christian West and the Muslim East, that he dreamed of establishing.

Of course, it was always a Muslim empire that was in question, and in itself the idea of such an empire combining Christianity and Islam presented a close union of the ghâzî and Muslim tendencies. In reality, the idea would meet with resistance in both camps. The policy of force adopted by Bâyezîd against the Muslim princes obscured to a greater and greater extent his position as ‘sultan of the ghâzîs’, on which the authority of the Ottoman sovereign principally rested with regard to his subjects as well as in the Muslim world. The mass of ghâzîs that the holy war and the hope of spoils had attracted had no desire to fight against Muslims, nor to fight in wars where it was more or less necessary to refrain from pillaging.[9] Bâyezîd therefore had to wage these wars with those troops of Christian renegades, his Janissaries, and with the contingents sent by his Christian, Serb and Greek vassals. He was therefore leading infidels against Muslims in

these expeditions, and this unavoidably made an unfortunate impression on all his subjects. The direction Ottoman policy took towards the Muslim world seems, it is true, to have been inspired by some theologians in high office, whose ideas and sentiments had remained attached to the old centres of Islam, from whence they had come as destitute adventurers, and to which they would have been very keen to return as the wealthy ministers of a new ruler. But apart from these few exceptions, {9} the great majority of the clergy would have been scandalised. Furthermore, the clergy too was interested only in the conquest of Christian lands, which alone promised the creation of new positions in the administration and new funds for mosques and schools. In reality, the imperialist policy that Bâyezîd was pursuing therefore had neither the support of the ghâzîs nor that of the 'Muslims'. This sultanate of Rûm appeared to be a piece of 'infidel business' (*affaire du mécréant*). It is perhaps for this reason that Bâyezîd sought to get himself duly invested by the caliph with a title that, in practice, was probably already in use: he sensed the necessity of a religious sanction.

The sources for Ottoman history yield more than one anecdote to show that Bâyezîd had exposed himself to the disapprobation of his own people. He is to be found in conflict with the clergy on several occasions.

Let us examine one of these anecdotes, in which it is reported that the Serbian princess whom he had married taught him the pleasures of banquets accompanied by wine.[10] In general, one can say that the Turks faithfully observed the Koranic law that forbids Muslims intoxicating drinks, a law that preserved them from the danger to which so many barbaric peoples of antiquity had succumbed. According to a passage in Suidas, the Bulgarian khan Krum, asking what had caused the ruin of his predecessors the Avars, learned that they had perished through their drunkenness, after which he ordered the destruction of all his country's vines.[11] In Bâyezîd's case, the reproach was evidently aimed not at drunkenness but at the breach of religious law, and perhaps at something else again, of which the wine presented by Bâyezîd's wife is but a symbol: by this I mean the introduction to the Ottoman court of the ideas and customs that prevailed in the palaces of the Christian princes of the Balkans. Olivera, the daughter of Lazar, the Serbian king killed at Kossovo, had married Bâyezîd one or two years after her father's death. Her brothers Stefan and Vuk had brought her to the sultan, with whom they spent some time {10} every year, and whom they accompanied

on his campaigns with their troops, revealing themselves to be his most faithful vassals. The influence on Bâyezîd of these Serbian princes and their sister seems to have been great enough and manifest enough to have left its mark on tradition. Olivera, it is true, was not the first Christian to enter the harem of an Ottoman sultan; but none before her had kept in such intimate contact with her own people, nor consequently had been able to exercise a similar influence.[12] To add further to this, these Serbian princes maintained intimate relations not only with Bâyezîd's court, but also with that of the king of Hungary. Consequently, if all the Balkan princes of the time, including the Byzantine 'emperors', were more or less westernised, these Serbs must have been so above all.

But it is exactly this 'latinisation' of the Balkan princes that had cost them the sympathy and affection of their subjects. Balkan history has a particularly anarchic aspect in the fourteenth century. Everywhere, pretenders rise up against more or less legitimate sovereigns. Even among the Ottomans, such a pretender did not prove lacking: it was an elder brother of Bâyezîd, who allied himself with the son of the Byzantine emperor with the intention of dethroning their respective fathers Murâd I and John V. These pretenders always found supporters. This proves the existence of great discontent across large social strata.

Before the incursions of the Turks and the devastation they caused, the Balkan populace had already felt themselves in distress. They saw the cause of their distress in the growing Latin influence: 'Frankish' merchants {11} everywhere, and, economically united with them, the princes who, moreover, had 'frankicised' themselves, and so had become foreigners to their people. A watchword of the Greeks, and assuredly not only the Greeks, at that time was 'it is better to fall into the hands of the Turks than into the hands of the Franks';[13] admittedly this watchword was only directly aimed at the true 'Franks', the Venetians above all, but it could not help but touch on the latinised native princes and weaken resistance against the Turks. If the new Turkish rulers now let themselves be led down the same paths as the Balkan high society (and the court's example must quickly have been followed by the Turkish nobles, some of whom were true princes), this signified for the Ottomans the loss of the attractive force they had enjoyed in appearing to be 'the lesser of two evils'; this in turn meant the perpetuation of the state of affairs that had caused social tension in the Balkans. We shall have cause to return to this point when we discuss the series of pretenders who caused perpetual trouble during

the twenty years that followed Ankara, trouble that we will recognise as being largely of a social nature.

Among the anecdotes preserved in the chronicles, there are several that betray Bâyezîd's avarice and the corruption, greed and ignorance of the 'ulemâ.[14] They reveal to us the profound discontent that the introduction of the administrative system of high Islam, and above all the taxation it imposed, awoke in the population – and not just among the subjugated Christians, whose discontent was condemned to silence, but also among the Turks: we read in the popular chronicles of the fifteenth century that 'when the 'ulemâ arrived among the Ottoman princes, they filled the world with all sorts of trickery. Accounts and cadastral surveys were unknown beforehand. When they came, they drew up accounts and cadastral surveys. The custom of accumulating money and building up a treasury comes from them'.[15]

{12} We shall later see further proof that the representatives of the ghâzî and Muslim tendencies found themselves set one against another in more or less open opposition. Did the group that surrounded the sultan – servants of the state, conscious guardians of its traditions and protagonists of its ideal as perceived by the sovereign – have sufficient power and influence to act as intermediaries and conciliators between the two tendencies? The events that followed Ankara show that such a group, if it existed at all, had only just formed itself and was, in any case, very weak. The cooperation of the two tendencies was not guaranteed by any superimposed institution, but was achieved rather by the personal cooperation of their representatives. Thus we see Murâd I, at the end of his reign, putting both Evrenos Bey and the theologian vizier Khaireddîn Pasha in charge of the conquest of Macedonia.[16] This double command is easily explained: one was the ghâzî chief, the other represented the State and its administration.

This vizier, Khaireddîn Çandarli, is the ancestor of a family for whom the position of vizier was hereditary throughout our period of study.[17] Their place at the head of the administration brought the Çandarli great wealth. Their economic interests led them to Byzantine Constantinople – still the commercial centre for the whole of the Levant. It was in Constantinople that it was easiest to establish relations with the world of commerce, to deposit or invest money, or if the State coffers were in difficulty, to borrow. Hence the graecophilia of the Çandarli, so often criticised in Turkish sources. It was to them that the emperor's ambassadors and other Christian princes went to settle their affairs with the Porte. It was they who served as intermediaries in the great political game that the ambitious

minor lords, the Venetian lord of Andros and the Genoese lord of Lesbos, were leading at that time between the great powers – the Ottomans and Venice – and the minor ones: the emperor of Constantinople, the various {13} Greek and Slavonic princes of the Balkans, the Knights of Rhodes and the other Frankish dominions of the Levant. The Çandarli were the Ottoman state's first 'ministers for foreign affairs'. It can be supposed that it took them some time to succeed in finding their bearings amid the complex interplay in which the family was too often involved, in places still completely beyond their influence and even their understanding: I am referring to Papal Rome and to the courts of France, Burgundy and Hungary. But at least they already had some idea of the complexity of the situation, and of the strengths of the forces involved. 'Alî Pasha and Ibrâhîm Pasha, Khaireddîn's sons, are presented in the sources as prudent counsellors who endeavoured to lead Bâyezîd towards a policy of caution and moderation. But it would not be until the next generation that these early Ottoman diplomats would acquire enough experience to serve the state with a foreign policy that was no longer exclusively based on force, but that also exploited the possibilities offered by the wavering political situation. As regards domestic policy, the Çandarlis' position was determined by the fact that they belonged to the class of the 'ulemâ: they are explicitly described as such in the sources. This, and their wealth, and their relations with the foreign world, suffice to explain why the chroniclers, ghâzî spokesmen in the main, are not very favourable towards them.

This, then, was the situation in which the Ottoman state found itself on the eve of Ankara. From whatever angle we examine it, we can only see crises, tensions and dangers. The greater part of Anatolia, won only recently and in wars waged against legitimate Muslim princes with the aid of 'infidel' forces, in such a way that the fidelity of these provinces could not be counted upon; the still-Christian Rûmeli, in some ways hardly occupied by the Muslims at all, and all the Balkan holdings, covered by the very loose and barely coherent network of an administration that had only just {14} established itself there, and that with most insufficient means; between these two halves of the state, Constantinople – already menaced, it is true, by a siege that would last at least seven years before being lifted at the arrival of Tîmûr[18] – Constantinople, still Byzantine, and the straits that granted passage from one half to the other, under the control of Frankish fleets; the two fundamental tendencies on which the state

rested, if not in open discord, then at least in a state of acute tension, and both of them alienated by an imperialist policy that visibly took its inspiration from the Byzantine imperial, 'Rhomaean', tradition. It was this policy that would lead to disaster.

Initially, six years before this disaster was to happen, the Ottoman state brilliantly survived a severe test. We cannot believe that the crushing victory at Nicopolis, achieved in 1396 over an army of crusaders recruited from almost the entire European knighthood, could purely have been due to chance. This crusade had been undertaken in an outdated spirit and with insufficient means: the lukewarm attitude that the political realists of Venice showed toward this venture is the best proof of this. Even a victory for the crusaders could, at the very most, only have succeeded in lifting the siege at Constantinople and recapturing a few provinces in the Danube region from the Turks. What was due to chance at Nicopolis was the ease of the victory. This ease must have given the Ottoman sovereign an impression of his forces that was far removed from the reality. There are victories that are worse than defeat.

After this triumph, we see Bâyezîd pushing as far East as the Euphrates and already menacing Mamlûk Syria. Now, the Mamlûk sultanate had been a powerful ally against the grave danger that Tîmûr, and his plan to unite the whole Muslim world under one sceptre, constituted for the both of them. Not only was Bâyezîd alienating this ally, but the appearance of his troops at the gates of Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria must have been considered by Tîmûr to be an illicit competition, a menace, and a provocation.

{15} Had Bâyezîd still been a ghâzî sultan, he would probably have remained safe from an attack by his formidable racial brother (*frère de race*). For, in the Muslim world, he who represented the ideal of holy war would have enjoyed such prestige that he would even have inspired respect in someone like Tîmûr. But had the holy war, which after all had been the founding ideal and the great glory of the Ottoman state, not been visibly abandoned? Were there not half a dozen deposed Anatolian princes in Tîmûr's camp who also laid claim to the ghâzî title? The final conflagration was deliberately provoked and hastened by Bâyezîd. Evidently he hoped for victory, and expected that it would bring him an empire greater than he had ever dared to dream of.

The meeting of the two armies took place on the 28th of July 1402, not far from Ankara. The Ottomans' defeat was comprehensive. The *sipâhîs* (feudal cavalry) from the recently conquered provinces

defected to their legitimate emirs, whom they saw among Tîmûr's ranks. In the resulting disorder, only the Janissaries and the Serbian auxiliaries stood fast. The sipâhîs of Ottoman Anatolia and Rûmeli dispersed, each detachment seeking to regain its home ground. With them fled the great men of the state, saving one or other of the Sultan's sons in their flight. Then the auxiliaries fell back too. Bâyezîd fought to the bitter end. When he surrendered with the remainder of his guard, he must have known all too well that his dreams of an empire had come to an abrupt end.

II

In the following months, the defeat at Ankara was revealed to be so grievous in its consequences that, eight months after the battle, in March 1403, Bâyezîd Yildirim, judging his state's situation to be hopeless, ended his own life.[19] Forced by his conqueror to accompany him across the whole of Anatolia, he must have seen the appalling suffering inflicted on his ravaged country with his own eyes. And furthermore, he had {16} learned that it was Tîmûr's intention to drive the Ottomans out of Asia Minor, where at the very most they would be allowed to keep their land of origin, Bithynia, including Bursa. Assuredly, and with reason, he must have suspected that what remained in his hands – Rûmeli, basically detached as it was from Asia Minor – would not be viable, all the more so because he could forsee that this remainder would be disputed between his sons. It is not necessary to stress the personal humiliations that the unhappy sovereign had to undergo in order to explain his despair.

Immediately after Ankara, Tîmûr had restored to their principalities the emirs that Bâyezîd had formerly deposed. A brief note, written by a contemporary on an empty page in a Greek manuscript, informs us that as early as the 17th of August, only three weeks after the battle, the emir of Sarukhan entered his capital, Manisa.[20] From Erzinjan on the Euphrates to Menteshe, the old principalities were re-established. The biggest of these was that of Karaman, which, based at Konya, the old capital of the Seljuk sultans, claimed as their legitimate heir to have the right of primacy over all Asia Minor, and was consequently the Ottomans' most dangerous rival. Karaman even found itself considerably enlarged: now including the whole loop of the Sakaria, it

stood between Ankara and Bursa.[21] According to Tîmûr's plans, it would exercise a hegemony over the minor principalities of Anatolia, and constitute a nucleus around which they could unite in an imposing coalition if ever the Ottoman danger should be renewed. Indeed, this principality of Karaman would not cease to give the Ottomans great difficulty as an adversary throughout the whole of our period of study.

Shortly after Bâyezîd's death, believing affairs in Rûm to be duly settled, and called back by the obligations his vast empire put him under, Tîmûr left Asia Minor. Before leaving, he resolved {17} to confirm Mehmed, one of Bâyezîd's sons who had escaped at the Ankara disaster, in possession of his province of Amasya, where he had managed to hold his own despite the attempts of neighbouring emirs and Tîmûr's own troops to drive him out. For his own part, Mehmed recognised Tîmûr's sovereignty, whose name he put on his earliest coinage.[22] But this bond of vassalage would have neither consequence nor duration, since Tîmûr's death, which occurred as early as February 1405, very quickly diminished the influence of his empire. Thanks to the heroic courage of Mehmed and his people, the Ottomans had managed to maintain a strong position in Asia Minor, despite the wishes of the conqueror and the Anatolian emirs; it is from this [stronghold of Amasya] that the rebuilding of the Ottoman state would take its starting point.

Another of Bâyezîd's sons, the eldest, Süleymân, had escaped to Europe, accompanied by the vizier 'Alî Çandarli, the Aga of the Janissaries and the principal statesmen of the western provinces. Established at Edirne ('Adrianople'), he immediately sought and obtained Tîmûr's seal of approval, which confirmed him in his Balkan holdings. His situation was far more favourable than that of his brothers in the East. His provinces had not been invaded, and it is very unlikely that Tîmûr ever contemplated crossing the Straits. While the state army was going to meet Tîmûr, the Rumelian frontiers had remained under the faithful guard of the ghâzîs. Despite its defeat in the East, the Ottoman empire had therefore not suffered any loss in its western territories. It was only with the establishment of Süleymân at Edirne that the Ottomans ceded any territory. Salonica and Thessaly, the area surrounding Constantinople, the coast of the Black Sea and a few islands were returned to the Byzantine emperor, to whom a brother and sister of Süleymân's were also handed as hostages. Greater still was the profit Venice made from this, enlarging and rounding out its holdings in Albania and the Morea, and ensuring the

necessary privileges for its trade. How can we explain so timid a policy from Süleymân? What threat was Rûmeli under?

{18} It can be affirmed that no external conflict was imminent. In Serbia, Vuk, a nephew of Stefan's, had risen up against his uncle immediately after Ankara; with the aid of Süleymân's troops, he had succeeded in seizing a part of Serbia that he ruled from then on as a vassal of the Ottomans. In order to gain access to his country, his uncle Stefan, returning from Ankara, was obliged to round the Balkan peninsula by sea, only disembarking at Ragusa. If he then leant on Hungary against Vuk, it put him in conflict with Venice, at war with Hungary at that time, rather than with the Ottomans.[23] The conciliatory attitude observed by Suleymân towards the powers of the Levant must therefore have been dictated by reasons other than those of foreign policy.

Indeed, it is Rûmeli's internal situation that seems to have been critical. Süleymân himself traditionally appears as an effeminate prince, a lover of the pleasures of baths and wine. He must therefore have continued in the lifestyle that had established itself at the Ottoman court under his father's reign. He too would come to marry a Christian princess, a close relative of the Byzantine emperor.[24] All this, and his foreign policy, demonstrate that he was following the ways of the latinised Balkan high aristocracy: and we have seen that it was precisely this 'Latin' orientation that had lost those princes the sympathies of their subjects. The Rumelian Turks, so few in number and so recently settled in Christian lands, now cut off from Anatolia, had no option but to draw closer to the local population. Largely, they were ex-ghâzîs who had become sipâhîs, that is to say, modest feudal knights. Under the 'Muslim' influence on the one hand and, on the other, due to their continual dealings with the Christians among whom they lived, they had become tolerant. The poverty of their own civilisation had caused them to adapt very quickly to that of their new homeland. We will even soon see them united with the Christians in a common action. A lord like Süleymân, emulator {19} of those latinised Balkan princes whose people had turned away from them, would have attracted the hate of a large social group composed of both Christians and Muslims. One can easily imagine how much this tension was added to by the fiscal system that, under a vizier like 'Alî Çandarli, could not help but be continued according to the old forms. Taxation became more onerous still now that the state no longer had the spoils of victorious wars at its disposal, and so had to draw everything from its own subjects. As for the ghâzîs of the frontiers,

who remained true ghâzîs, it was natural that, during those years when the state had been completely involved in Anatolia and had come out of it so weakened, they should gain great independence and find themselves in some opposition with a government who was, purely by its pacifism, so little to their taste. We see a great ghâzî chief of the time, Yigit Pasha, continuing to fight the Venetians in the Albanian mountains, without the slightest regard for the peace that Süleymân had made with them.

It was evidently the thought of having to face up to so many domestic difficulties that mandated the Rumelian ruler's policy of caution concerning his neighbours. He acted with no less caution in Anatolian affairs. He made no moves against his brother 'Isâ, who had established himself at Bursa, and he maintained friendly relations with his brother Mehmed at Amasya. He even avoided the title of sultan, which in this situation would have implied that he meant to exercise a hegemony over the other Ottoman princes, his brothers, if not over all the Anatolian emirs. And yet he was the eldest of the Ottoman princes, he had his father's vizier with him, and he ruled over the largest and richest of the provinces that were still Ottoman.

His brother Mehmed's attitude was altogether different. Although threatened by thousands of dangers in his small principality, he did not hesitate to proclaim his right to every province in Asia Minor from the very beginning. He turned against his brother 'Isâ at the first opportunity, whom he deposed. After this victory, his power stretched as far as the Straits; Bursa, the capital, was in his hands. The boldness he had shown in this enterprise singled him out to Süleymân as a future enemy. Nonetheless, {20} the latter, prudent as he was, preferred not to intervene directly but rather to encourage his brother 'Isâ, who had taken refuge in Constantinople, to win back his provinces. 'Isâ tried his luck once more; he allied himself with several of the Anatolian emirs, who had been alarmed by Mehmed's success. Mehmed came out of this battle, after which 'Isâ disappeared, not only victorious, but even more powerful than beforehand: he added the principality of Sarukhan to his possessions and accepted the tribute of fidelity paid him by the other emirs of western Anatolia. This success was too worrying not to force Süleymân to act. The ruler of the vast and wealthy Rûmeli had enough forces at his disposal to seize Bursa without meeting any opposition. The Anatolian emirs, up to that point Mehmed's vassals, recognised the new master of the situation soon enough. Süleymân then began to attack his brother at the very heart of his possessions. Although Mehmed proved to be invincible there,

and although his brother's progress would win him the sympathy of those emirs who were still independent, his situation had become extremely difficult. He therefore sought a way out by sending Mûsâ, another brother of his who had accompanied Bâyezîd in his captivity and who had finally settled with Mehmed after his father's death, to Wallachia. From Wallachia, whose prince Mircea had, it seems, been won over to this plot, Mûsâ was to establish relations with all those in Rûmeli who were displeased with Süleymân, organise a general uprising and attempt to seize power. In resorting to this method, Mehmed had probably only wished to force his brother to abandon Anatolia, and he had surely not forseen the devastating success Mûsâ would have.

Mûsâ's initiative is of an exceptional nature. He entered Rûmeli with the help of the prince of Wallachia, and Stefan of Serbia lent him the help of his troops.[25] He must, equally, have enjoyed the assistance of the Rumelian Christians: the Bulgarian chronicle informs us that his army was composed of Vlachs, {21} Serbs and Bulgarians.[26] We read nothing of all this in the Turkish sources. However, we find there a detail of the greatest importance: Mûsâ chose as his Kadiasker or 'judge of the army', that is to say as the highest dignitary in his clergy, the same Shaykh Bedreddîn who, a few years later, would be the head of a vast social and religious movement that preached a kind of communism and fraternisation with Christians. Mûsâ's arrival on Ottoman territory must have taken place at the end of 1409. On the 13th of February 1410, he won a victory over the beylerbey of Rumeli so complete that the entire country recognised him as ruler. Frightened, Süleymân left Anatolia and hastily crossed the Bosphorus on Byzantine ships. Mûsâ, who was waiting for him at the foot of the walls of Constantinople, was defeated there on the 15th of June (at the battle known as 'the battle of the Kosmidion') and, after having suffered a second defeat on the 11th of July not far from Adrianople, he disappeared. But he reappeared the following year and, at the head of a considerable force, marched on Adrianople. 'Then all of Süleymân's army' – I quote from a contemporary Serbian source – 'passed over to Mûsâ. When Süleymân, who was drinking in company, learned this, he fled with his companions towards Constantinople. It was night, and they had lit torches. When the inhabitants of the town saw them, they said to each other: 'The Sultan is escaping'. This news spread rapidly through the country. Then the people came out from all the forests and ran after the fugitive. His several companions were killed one after the other. Finally he was caught himself, and

strangled'.[27]

Süleymân's death, which according to a Greek source[28] took place on the 17th of February 1411, goes to show how detested the prince {22} was by his people and even by his army, who had visibly been affected by Mûsâ's propa ganda during the year he had been lying low. Since the watchwords of the movement that his Kadiasker, Shaykh Bedreddîn, would inspire a little later on are to some extent known to us, we can guess what ideas were being disseminated among the masses by this propaganda.

The attempt that Süleymân had made to re-establish the unity of the Ottoman state had failed. In the long term, Ottoman Rûmeli, born of the holy war and for the holy war, could not withstand having to renounce its vital function: its social and economic structure, and its morale, had decayed. Was Mûsâ's new, revolutionary Rûmeli viable?

The new regime immediately decided to resume the holy war: in Thrace, Thessaly and Serbia. Mûsâ's armies began to win back those towns and areas that Süleymân had ceded; and the raiding or, more properly, the ghazâ, stretched as far as Carinthia. At Byzantium, Mûsâ claimed the tribute that had been abolished for so long. He even attempted to attack Constantinople. All this demonstrates that he had fully realised what it was that Rûmeli needed. Furthermore, the country's great men did not waste time in putting themselves at his service. But Mûsâ was suspicious of those who had served his brother, only to betray him. This is what the Turkish sources offer as an explanation for his malevolent attitude towards these aristocrats.[29] As for us, this attitude reveals rather what a revolutionary he was.

This austere, hard-hearted and fanatical young man that the people, the Muslim and Christian countrymen, had brought to power in two years full of trials and tribulations, detested these feudal lords and wealthy theologians as if they were aristocrats. Let us remind ourselves of his past. He had been the only one of the Ottoman princes to share his father's captivity after Ankara. He had watched him die and had buried him. Since then he had lived with his brother Mehmed, permanently threatened by {23} the cruel custom that required that only one male member of the dynasty should outlive his father.[30]Thus his was a very sad youth, and one most likely to turn the prince into a sombre fanatic. He eventually caused genuine terror to spread among the aristocrats and major functionaries of his state; these lords began to escape to Constantinople, to Serbia, to the frontiers, to join the great ghâzî chiefs who felt equally threatened, and above all to Mehmed, who had in the meantime retaken

possession of all the Anatolian provinces. They implored him to intervene. The Byzantine emperor promised to transport him to Europe. Mehmed accepted.

Once again, Mûsâ awaited the Anatolian army near Constantinople, and this time, despite the defection of one of Rumeli's greatest lords, he was victorious (the battle of Incegiz, July 1412). Mûsâ and his 'people' had shown themselves to be much stronger than Mehmed had feared. One can imagine how much more pronounced the 'popular' tendency would become, how much it would outgrow itself, after this victory. Mehmed's intervention remained the ardent desire of all those who felt humiliated and in danger.

This time Mehmed did not fail to prepare his expedition with painstaking care. Not only did he assemble all the forces that his provinces and his Anatolian vassals and allies could furnish him with, but he also made agreements with the emperor, with Stefan of Serbia and with the major ghâzî chiefs of the western frontiers: all these princes, alarmed by the social danger that Mûsâ represented, readily gave him aid.

Mûsâ retreated before forces so superior to his own. But, on the 5th of July 1413 in the mountains of Sofia, he was forced to enter a battle that had already been lost. He fought valiantly before seeking safety in flight. He was captured and strangled.[31]

{24} It is the nature of the sources that so complicates the study of the ten years that would pass, after Bâyezîd's death, before the Ottoman state regained its unity. Of all the Turkish sources, it is Neshrî who provides the most import -ant account of this period, drawn, no doubt, from a contemporary source; but it must be considered that this whole account was written by an Anatolian partisan of Mehmed's who knew only vaguely what had happened in the other camps.[32] Alongside this Anatolian account we still have the Rumelian version of events preserved in 'Âşıkpaşazâde and the anonymous chronicles, but this too was written by a partisan of Mehmed's. Happily we have at our disposal a number of other sources of information on this period. First I will mention the Bulgarian chronicle written in 1417 by a Bulgarian, for Bulgarian readers, which is, in content, simply a chronicle of the Turks, beginning with Osman and ending with Mûsâ's death.[33] Another Slavonic source is the biography of king Stefan of Serbia; but even this *vita* of a Serbian prince, written by the Bulgarian Constantine the Philosopher, an intimate friend of Stefan's, deals for the most part with Ottoman history.[34] It can therefore clearly be seen

that neither the defeat at Ankara nor the internal wars had weakened the Turks' preponderance in the Balkans. This preponderance is equally reflected in the various minor Greek chronicles,[35] and even in the great Byzantine historiography of the century: in the works of the passionately orthodox {25} Phrantzes and the latinophile Ducas, not to mention the Athenian humanist Chalcocondyles who, as an emulator of Thucidides, had well understood that, in order to write a history of his time, it was necessary to write a resolutely Ottoman history. The documents in the archives of Venice, Genoa and Ragusa equally refer to Ottoman affairs with greater and greater frequency; these treatises, directives, and reports, these letters from merchants sending news to their town authorities, constitute some especially precious material and allow the chronology of this turbulent period to be established.

In order to build up, with the help of all the details furnished by these sources, an overview that corresponds to historic fact, it is always necessary to start from an analysis of the internal situation. It is this that we have attempted to do here, and I have insisted on studying this period because, on the one hand, it allows better than any other the structure of the state and of the society to be made out, and on the other hand, because this chapter of Ottoman history has until now remained particularly confused. In what follows, I can take a much more summary approach and refer to the well-known works of Hammer, Zinkeisen and Jorga. I will only speak of facts and events that are likely to supply answers to the different problems we have encountered.

Let us first examine why it was Mehmed and his eastern province that prevailed in this ten-year struggle, and succeeded in restoring the unity of the Ottoman state. Mehmed was not the eldest of Bâyezîd's sons, and he did not have his father's principal advisors and generals by his side. The region that had ended up in his hands was neither the largest nor the richest; moreover, it had particularly suffered from Tîmûr's invasion. And yet it was Mehmed who was the first to assume the task of rebuilding Ottoman unity, despite all the dangers that surrounded him. He, and he alone, had taken the title of sultan, and did so in 1407 at the latest, as we learn from a coinage.[36]

{26} Since Mehmed was barely an adolescent then, the credit for this loyal attachment to the patrimony left by Bâyezîd must be attributed to the prince's guardian, Bâyezîd Pasha, a man of Albanian origin who, probably taken prisoner at an early age and converted to

Islam, had grown in importance in the seraglio and had become one of Bâyezîd's best soldiers and most faithful servants. He can be recognised as the first representative of that group whose existence we were not able to detect in Bâyezîd [I]'s time, but who grew in number and strength from that point on and were able to nurture the concept of the statehood. When Mehmed I died in 1421, at a moment when the horizon was dark with danger, this group of servants was already powerful enough to attempt the pious deceit of concealing the sultan's death until the heir to the throne, Murâd II, had arrived at the capital, Bursa from his Amasyan province. And, twenty-three years later, this same Murâd II would entrust his fifteen-year-old son Mehmed II, together with the government of the state, to the care of a group of advisors whose devotion and experience gave him every guarantee of their safety, and allowed him to abdicate and rest from a very busy reign in tranquil Ionia. He would, it is true, come out of retirement only a few months later when the king of Hungary invaded Ottoman territory with a formidable army; and even after victory (Varna, 1444), he judged it necessary to stay on the throne. And it must also be recognised that his son Mehmed would deal ruthlessly with these same advisors, whom he considered to be too much of a threat to his authority. However, as can be understood, these advisors were mostly of an outdated sort; at their head there still remained one of those hereditary viziers, Khalîl Çandarli, who was stigmatised on account of his financial relations with the outside world as a *giaur ortaghi*, an 'associate of infidels'. It was necessary for this type to give way to a new breed of advisors, whose first representative we have met in Bâyezîd Pasha, the Albanian who had been brought up in the seraglio as a blind instrument of imperial policy. The fact that Mehmed II was able to rid himself of these old advisors proves that the new group of servants was already able to supply their replacements.

There still remains the question of why, after Ankara, it was {27} the eastern province that was taken as the starting point for the reconstruction of the state. Let it be remembered that, at the time of the Turkish invasion of the eleventh century, Amasya had been the first region in all Asia Minor to see the establishment of a Turkish ghâzî principality, that of the Dânishmend ghâzîs. Although this ghâzî state had subsequently been absorbed by the Seljuk sultanate of Rûm – who represented the civilisation of high Islam, it had nevertheless retained its original character and its Turkish and ghâzî traditions. For the young Ottoman prince to be confined to this mountainous country for ten years, where Turkish life still largely continued in the ways of

the nomads, was for him to be re-immersed in his national traditions and consciousness. Mehmed I knew enough to recognise this fundamental value inherent in the eastern province: it was there that, in his turn, he would later send his son, the future sultan Murâd II, as governor. The 'national' influence under which Mehmed I found himself revealed itself in his choice of wife. Although he was the ruler of Bursa and consequently a neighbour of the Byzantines, Mehmed did not marry a Christian princess, but instead took as his wife the daughter of a powerful Turkish sovereign from western Anatolia, a princess of the house of Dulgadir. Similarly, his son Murâd II chose to marry a Turkish princess, the daughter of the emir of Paphlagonia, of the house of Jandar (or Isfendiyâr). It is true that later on Murâd married the Serbian princess Mara; but by this time the Turkish and Muslim nature of the Ottoman seraglio was so securely anchored in its own traditions that this Christian could not exercise the slightest influence there, despite enjoying complete freedom of action on behalf of her Church. From his earliest youth, Murâd II had grown up in a milieu where even intellectual life was principally Turkish. The literary movement that is sometimes known as 'early Turkish romanticism' rose to prominence under his reign. Thus the Oghuz legends[37] became popular and the Ottoman state became a forum for national poetry. {28} Murâd II is the first Ottoman sultan by whom poems in Turkish can be found.

But what were the solutions that the Ottoman state, after finding unity once more, applied to the various pressing and serious problems that had been brought out by the defeat at Ankara and the critical period of the ten following years?

The fact that the ghazâ, the holy war, constituted the basic principle and even the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman state was recognised in its entirety. Mehmed I proved it by reconquering the area opposite Constantinople on the Asiatic shore, and by sending the ghâzîs on large-scale raids into Hungary and Styria. The sultan's residence was transferred from Bursa (*Dâr al-'ulemâ* or 'city of the theologians') to Edirne (*Dar al-ghuzât* or 'city of the ghâzîs'). Murâd II even began his reign with a siege of Constantinople. This siege of 1422 only lasted two months, but was, although premature, much more serious than the siege that Bâyezîd undertook. In 1430 Murâd II conquered Salonica, and conquests in the Morea, Epirus, Albania and Serbia systematically enlarged Ottoman domination in Europe. The raids into Hungary continued, and the defence against them caused a sort of Christian ghâzîs to spring up around the person of Hunyadi, whose

exploits gave rise to a perpetual holy war. It must be said, however, that despite their number and importance all these warlike enterprises in Europe were limited to what a ghâzî state was duty bound to do. On this subject, let us cite the opinion of an excellent observer, the Frenchman Bertrandon de la Broquière, who, charged with an information-gathering mission in the Orient by the Duke of Burgundy, had met Murâd II early in 1433: 'I have also been told', he writes of the sultan, 'that he {29} quite hates war and so it seems to me, for if he wished to use the power and the great revenue he has, given how little resistance he meets in the Christian world, it would be a small thing for him to conquer a great part of it'.[38] This moderation, which, moreover, the sultan himself confessed to before an ambassador from Milan,[39] can be seen as a sure indication that the state, while serving the cause of the holy war, did not let itself be blindly led by it, and kept the freedom to pursue its other tasks with the necessary effort.

How did the rebuilt Ottoman state find a counterbalance for its expansion in Europe? For we have seen that a fundamental principle of the Ottoman state was to enlarge its base in Asia Minor the further it progressed into Christian lands. This principle too was fully recognised and followed as far as was possible without making Bâyezîd's mistakes. The Anatolian emirs were handled carefully, even when they dared attack and acted in common accord with the Christian powers, enemies of their enemy. The Ottomans now pre ferred to pursue their coveted goal patiently and by peaceful means, only ever using procedures that were, in appearance at least, legitimate. A large principality, that of Germiyan, came into the Ottomans' hands as the bequest of its aged emir. Two emirates, Karaman and Kastamonu, were still surviving at the end of the period under study. The Ottomans had allied themselves with these two dynasties by marriage; thus there would always be Ottoman partisans in these families, if not a pretender on whose behalf the all-powerful uncle would not fail {30} to intervene – regularly, of course, for his own profit. It must nevertheless be recognised that, there too, the use of brute force was anxiously avoided, and that, while firmly pursuing their final goal, the Ottomans wisely and patiently let time work for them rather than comprise themselves again in the public opinion of the Muslim world.[40]

Moreover, their possessions in Asia Minor were sufficient to supply the Muslim 'elements' that the state needed. For colleges, or medreses, had been opened everywhere in order to build up a powerful body of 'ulemâ, the majority of whom were destined to serve in the

administration. Furthermore, the most richly endowed of these medreses began to attract pupils, teachers, and even celebrities from all corners of the Muslim world.

The social threat still remained. We have seen Mûsâ was carried to power on the discontent of a large social group, and we have shown how his campaign had the character of a revolutionary movement uniting Muslim and Christian Rumelians. Mûsâ's kadiasker, the great scholar Shaykh Bedreddîn – who had made long voyages of study in the Muslim world before returning to his Rumelian homeland – had not stayed quietly in Iznik, where he had been exiled after Mûsâ's downfall. While Mustafâ – another of Bâyezîd's sons, who had suddenly reappeared after disappearing at Ankara (the Ottoman court had always considered him to be an impostor, a *düzme*), was agitating Rûmeli in the summer of 1415, Bedreddîn was working on the people of Rûmeli and western Anatolia through his emissaries. When revolt broke out in the *vilâyet* of Aydin, Bedreddîn, who was in accord with Mircea (formerly Mûsâ's protector and now Mustafâ's), escaped to Wallachia and entered Rûmeli from there. On the subject of this revolt, we have the accounts of the Turkish historians and even a life of Bedreddîn written by his grandson, plus a very detailed chapter {31} on the Aydin revolt in Ducas.[41] Thanks to these sources, it can be recognised that the revolt was driven by a kind of charitable communism, itself borne on a surge of mystical love of God, which disregarded confessional differences. Even under Bâyezîd, a preacher from Bursa had dared declare that Christ was no lesser a prophet than Mohammed.[42] The welcome given to this declaration by the faithful goes to show how ready the mind of the people was to accept a doctrine teaching that Christianity and Islam were basically one and the same religion. Now accompanied by a great social uprising, this bold doctrine threatened to become the common faith of the masses. It represented a terrible threat to a state that was the personification of the ghâzî ideal and that, furthermore, rested entirely on the institutions of high Islam and its representatives.

The force and cruelty with which this movement was quelled are understandable. But these negative measures were not the only response. This period also saw the rise of a new form of Muslim piety whose representative was Hâjjî Bayrâm, the saint of Ankara. Hâjjî Bayrâm did not repudiate the religious law or the social order that was based on it. But, while respecting them, he preached the love of the poor, for whom {32} he organised 'social security'.[43] This, then, was a movement that met the requirements of the time but was, at the

same time, acceptable to the government, which did not fail to encourage it. However, this movement evidently touched the Muslim element alone.

What was to be done with the Christian masses of the Balkans who, in the long term, must constitute an intolerable threat to the state? Could these Christians, who by far made up the majority in a Rûmeli that was becoming more and more central to the state, forever be excluded from the army and the administration?[44]

Since the army was based on the ghâzî ideal, and the administration on Muslim institutions, the problem seems, in fact, to be insoluble. The solution that was found under Murâd II in around 1430 is so inspired that it deserves our most profound admiration: every five years, commissioners {33} were to travel the length and breadth of Rumeli and recruit young boys suitable for military service from the Christian population.[45] They were converted to Islam and sent to Turkish families to learn the language. Later on, they were made into professional soldiers, who would, from now on, exclusively form the body of the Janissaries. The most brilliant of these young men were kept in the seraglio to become, thanks to a careful education, the future holders of high position, servants blindly devoted to the interests of the state. Let us free ourselves of the preconceived idea that this was a barbaric practice. On the contrary, it gave the Christian element access to government. The conversion of these recruits to Islam did not necessarily prevent them from keeping family ties; there are even examples of these now-influential converts being able to intervene usefully on behalf of their Christian relatives. This institution of the *devshirme* or 'child levy' relieved the economic situation of the Christian peasants while partly curbing overpopulation, which was considerable because the Christians had not been suffering any losses from war. Furthermore, since this excess population had been composed of the warrior youth, the danger that the Christian population represented to the state was, to a great extent, suppressed. And how this solution appealed to each of the two fundamental tendencies of the Ottoman state! Converting Christians to Islam was very much in line with the ghâzî tendency; finding a way to leave subjugated peoples in the position of tributary infidels, without inconveniencing the state, conformed fully to the requirements of the 'Muslim' tendency.

Thus it can be noted that all the problems that were already apparent before the defeat at Ankara, and that had become all too terribly real during the fratricidal struggle that followed, had been

resolved under Mehmed I and Murâd II; and it can also be noted that the Ottoman state had very nearly regained the compass it had enjoyed before the catastrophe.

However, the state, such as it was when it passed to Mehmed II, still suffered from a serious flaw. Of its two capitals, Bursa and Adrianople, the one represented Anatolia and the 'Muslim' spirit, the other Rûmeli and the spirit of the 'ghâzîs'. To choose one would be to sacrifice the other. Furthermore, neither of these two {34} towns was important enough to deserve to be the capital city of so great a power as the Ottoman state at that time. The predestined capital of this state was the town situated at the point where Anatolia and Rûmeli met: Constantinople, for over a millennium the traditional capital of the 'lands of Rûm' that were now reunited under Ottoman rule. Although the conquest of the town was already a matter of urgency, Murâd II and his advisors had always shrunk from a feat of arms, which, they foresaw, would cause formidable repercussions throughout the whole of the West. It took the courage of a young prince, brought up with the idea of a universal empire, to tackle a task that represented a serious test of his power. He was to come out of it victorious and, thanks to his victory, aware both of his strength and of the weakness of the West. Thus, by the conquest of the imperial city in 1453, Mehmed II not only crowned the reconstructive work undertaken by his father and his grandfather, but at the same time opened a new chapter in Ottoman history: the era of the empire. Fifty years after the forefather, on seeing his dream shattered, had taken his own life, the great grandson had realised that dream.

Notes

a Colin Imber, 'Paul Wittek's "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople"', *Osmanli Araştirmalari*, v (1986), 65–81, reissued in *idem, Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul, 1996), 291–304.

b Wittek's two short essays on Mehmed II, dating from 1932 and 1953 respectively, are published in this volume, ch. V.

1 Lectures given at the Sorbonne on 29 and 31 March 1938, at the invitation of the *Centre d'Études Turques* of the University of Paris. The lectures are a continuation of those that I delivered at the same location in March 1936: 'Les traits essentiels de la période seldjoucide en Asie Mineure', and 'Les

Ghazis dans l'histoire ottomane', published, enriched with notes, under the title of 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in *Byzantion*, xi {(1936, 285–319)}. For the present publication I have abridged, as far as possible, the passages that have been borrowed from works that have appeared in the interim, making reference to the places where they occur. Conversely, I have added some notes, especially to those topics that I deal with here for the first time, pointing out here and there a number of specific points chosen to illustrate my theme.

2 For what follows, cf. my 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in *Byzantion*, xi (1936), 285–319, and my *Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938).

3 We understand under the term 'High Islam' (*Islam de la haute epoque*) Islamic civilization as it had developed on the soil of the civilizations of the Ancient Orient. The idea that these ancient civilizations had undergone a sort of 'renaissance' under Islam in the time of the 'Abbâsid caliphate has been developed in my 'Islam und Kalifat', in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, liii (1925), 370–426, where I analyse the structure of society and of Muslim thought acquired in the course of the first four centuries of Islam {republished in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), *Orientalism: Early Sources, I. Readings in Orientalism* (London, 2000), 349–403}.

4 Here and in what follows, 'Muslim' represents that which is part of 'the civilisation of high Islam'; in German I would say *hoch-islamisch*. Cf. the preceding footnote.

5 P. Wittek, 'Le Sultan de Rûm', *Annuaire de l'Institut d'Histoire et de Philologie Orientale et Slave*, vi (1938), 361–390 {see pp. 73–96 in this volume}.

6 As early as the end of the thirteenth century, a group of Turks that had been settled by the Byzantines in the Dobrudja had been Christianised: these were Anatolian Turks who had accompanied the Seljuk sultan 'Izzeddîn Kaika'us II, who had taken refuge with the Byzantines. The discovery by the Bulgarian scholar G. Balaschev that this sultan's name Kaika'us survives to this day in the current name for the Christian Turks of this region, the Gagaouz, seems not to have attracted the attention its scope merits. It is, it is true, hidden in a footnote in a publication that itself is difficult of access: Γεώργιοσ Δ. Μπαλάστζεφ, Ὁ αὐτοκράτορ Μιχαὴλ Η′ ο Παλαιόλογοσ {etc.} (Étude communiquée au IIIè Congrès des Byzantinistes, tenu à Athènes), Sofia, 1930, 19, note. {Wittek develops this theme in his 'Yazijioghlu 'Alî on the Christian Turks of the Dobruja', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* xiv/3 (1952), 639–668 (see 641, n. 2, for further information on Balaschev and his flawed work), and 'Les Gagaouzes – les gens de Kaykâûs', *Rocznik Orientalisticzny*, xvii (1951 [1953 published]), 12–24.}

7 Cantacuzenos, III, 284, Bonn.

8 See my article 'Le Sultan de Rûm'.

9 F. Giese (ed.), *Die altosmanischen Chroniken*, i (Breslau, 1922), 34 = ii (German translation; Leipzig, 1925), 46 f.

10 *Altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i, 29 (= ii, 39).

11 {Suidas, *Lexicon*}, ed. A. Adler, {5 vols (Lipsiae, 1928–1938)}, i, 483 f. (s.v. Βούλγαροι). I owe the knowledge of this interesting passage to the fact that it has been studied in the Byzantine seminar of M. Henri Grégoire, at the Institut Oriental of the Université Libre of Brussels.

12 Leaving aside the cases of Nilüfer, daughter of the Greek lord of Aëtos (Aydos), and of Theodora, daughter of John VI Cantacuzenos, both well known as wives of Orkhan, I wish to do no more here than bring to mind Tamar, the daughter of the Bulgarian tsar Alexander and a Jewish woman, and sister of the tsar Ivan Šišman III, given in marriage by the latter to Murâd I (see the *Bulgarian Chronicle* published by J. Bogdan, {'Ein Beitrag zur Bulgarischen und Serbischen Geschichtsschreibung', *Archiv für Slavische Philologie*, xiii (1891), 526–535, translated into Latin by V. Jagic, ibid., 536–543, where one finds on 528 (538) a mention of this marriage, and in a footnote an indication of other sources that mention it (*inter alia* Chalcocondyles, {*Laonici Chalcocondylae Atheniensis Historiarum libri decem*} ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1843), 37. Cf. also P. Nikov, 'The Turkish conquest of Bulgaria and the fate of the last Šišmanids' (in Bulgarian), in the *Izvestiya* of the Historical Society of Sofia, fasc. vii–viii (Sofia, 1928), 61 ff., where the date of this marriage is discussed (it had not taken place, certainly, before the death of the tsar Alexander on 17 December 1371), and where an interesting passage from the *Synodic* of Boryl is cited, informing us that Tamar remained a Christian.

13 Ducas, *Ducae . . . Historia Byzantina*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1834), 291: κρεῖττον ἐμπ εσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας τῶν Τούρκων ἢ Φράγκων.

14 *Altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i, 29–33 = ii, 40–46.

15 *Altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i, 30 = ii, 42. Cf. {Gelibolulu Mustafâ}'Alî, *Kunhu'l-akhbâr*, 5 vols (Istanbul, 1277–1285), v, 92, 4th 'happening'.

16 Sa'deddîn, *Tâj et-Tevârîh* (Istanbul, 1279–80), i, 91, 103.

17 Cf. F. Taeschner and P. Wittek, 'Die Vezirfamilie der Ğandarlyzade', *Der Islam*, xviii (1929), 60–115.

18 An important, but generally neglected account of this first siege of Constantinople by the Ottomans is given in the 'Bulgarian Chronicle', ed. I. Bogdan, in *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, xiii (1891), 532 ff. (540 ff.){see p. 143, n. 12 in this volume}, which gives the siege a duration of seven years.

19 On the suicide of Bâyezîd see {Mehmed} Fuad Köprülü, {'Yildirim Bâyezîd'in esareti ve ölümü hakkinda'}, *Belleten*, i (1937), 591–603.

20 Βραχέα χρονικά, ed. Sp. Lampros (Athens, 1932), no. 41; cf. my *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* (Istanbul, 1934), 90, n. 1.

21 The regions of Sivrihisar and Beypazari had been incorporated into it; see *Altosm. anon. Chron.*, i, 46 = ii, 63, and 'Âşıkpaşazâde, ed. Giese (Leipzig, 1929), 72.

22 Khalîl Edhem, *Meskûkât-i 'osmânîye*, i (*Catalogue des monnaies islamiques du Musée imperiale*, vi; Constantinople, 1334), nos. 88–91.

23 St. Stanojevic, 'Die Biographie Stefan Lazarevic's von Konstantin dem

Philosophen als Geschichtsquelle', *Archiv für Slavische Philologie*, xviii (1896), 435 ff.

24 The daughter of the Despot Theodore: Georgius Phrantzes, *Chronicon*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1838), 87 {tr. Marios Philippides, *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes* (Amherst, 1980), 22 (Phrantzes in fact says very little about Süleymân Çelebi)}; Chalcocondyles, {*Historiarum libri decem*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1843)}, 92.

25 Stefan Lazarevic even took part on the side of Mûsâ at the battle of Kosmidion: see Stanojevic, op. cit., 443, and the 'Bulgarian Chronicle' in *Arch. f. slav. Philologie*, xiii, 534 (543).

26 *Archiv für slavische Philologie*, loc. cit.

27 The 'Life of Stefan Lazarevic' by Constantine the Philosopher; cf. Stanojevic, op. cit., 443.

28 The contemporary short Greek chronicle, published by Papadopoulos Kerameus, Ἱεροσολιμιτικὴ Βιβλιοθὴκη, iv (St. Petersburg, 1899), 33 f. = Lampros, Νέος Ελληνομ -νήμων, vii (Athens 1910), 151; {P. Schreiner, *Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken* (2 vols, Vienna, 1975–1977, i, 639; ii, 401}. The date is confirmed by Turkish historiography: the ancient chronicles such as *Die altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i, 49 (= ii, 67) and *'Âşıkpaşazâde*, ed. Giese, 73, give the year 813 (6 May 1410–1424, April 1411), which is repeated by Sa'deddîn, i, 220. On p. 256 the same author attributes to the reign of Süleymân a duration of 8 years, 2 months and 10 days, which, starting from 14 Sha'bân 805, date of the death of Bâyezîd, brings us to 18 February 1411 (1 Muharram {A.}H. {1} = 15 July 622; cf. *Der Islam*, xviii (1929), 90, n. 2). If Sa'deddîn adds immediately afterwards, in contradiction of his own words and our calculation, that the death of Süleymân took place at the beginning of the {Hijrî} year 814, which commenced on 25 April 1411, that must be as equally erroneous as the date 5 June 1411, which is furnished by the Serbian annals (cf. Stanojevic, loc. cit.).

29 *Altosm. anon. Chroniken*, i, 49 f. (= ii, 68).

30 This Ottoman custom, which became a fundamental state law under Mehmed II (see this sultan's *Kânûn-nâme*, ed. M. 'Ârif, (Istanbul, 1330) (*'Ilâve* ('Supplement') to the *Ta'rîkhi 'Osmânî Enjümeni Mecmû'asi*), 27, and {Joseph von} Hammer, *Das Osmanischen Reiches Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung*, 2 vols (Vienna, 1815), i, 98) was of such antiquity that even the emperor John VI Cantacuzenos, who died in 1383, could speak of it: Cantacuzenos, {*Ioannes Cantakuzeni ex imperatoris historiarum libri IV*, ed. L. Schopen, 3 vols (Bonn, 1828–1832)}, iii, 111: Νόμος γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς βαρβαρικός πάντα τόν πρός τήν αρχήν ἀμφισβητήσοντα ἀπ οκτιννύναι, καὶ μηδεμιᾶς φείδεσθαι μήτε ἡλίκιας μήτε συγγενείας . . . ἔθος γὰρ αὐτος οὐ π ρός ἀλλοφύλους μόνον, ἀλλά καὶ π ρὸς τοὺς ὁμοφύλους τοιαῦτα π ράττειν . . . {'For it is their barbaric rule to kill everyone who might have a claim to rule, and to spare nobody, neither with respect to age nor to relationship . . . for their custom is to do such as this not only to foreigners but also to their own.'}

31 See the letter of 18 July 1413, in Gelcich and Thálloczy, *Diplomatarium*

reipublicae Ragusanae cum regno Hungariae (Budapest, 1887), no. 226, cited by Stanojevic, op. cit, 444: die quinto presentis . . . soltanus Crissiai . . . manus commiscens com Mussia eius fratre contra eundem Mussiam ipsiusque sequaces victoriam laudabiliter obtinuit . . .

32 Since this author has still not been edited, it is necessary to make use of Leonclavius, *Historiae Musulmanae* (Frankfurt, 1591), which furnishes us with a translation of Neshrî, in {the shape of} the *liber Hanivaldanus*. Cf. my study 'Zum Quellenproblem der altesten osmanischen Chroniken', in *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, i (1921–1922), 113, f. {See Fr. Taeschner (ed.), *Gihânnümâ. Die altosmanische Chronik des Mevlânâ Neschrî*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1951, 1955). On the period under review see i, 95–141.}

33 Published by J. Bogdan; see p. 143, n. 12 in this volume. The date of its composition is indicated at the end (p. 525 = p. 543) by 'in the year 6925 (= 1417)'. This date has nothing to do with what precedes it: one must read, therefore: 'Exhalavit et Musi beg anno 6920 (= 1413) eique Krishchi soltan (Sultan Mehmed I, named Küresci, 'the wrestler') successit. Anno 6925 (= 1417/18)'.

34 See the article by St. Stanojevic, cited on p. {10}, n. 22 in this volume.

35 See my article 'Chroniques mineures byzantines', *Byzantion*, xii (1937), 309–323.

36 Khalîl Edhem, *Meskûkât-i 'osmânîye*, i, no. 92.

37 It was under Murâd II that Yaziji-oghlu 'Alî composed his *Oghuznâme*, a Turkish translation of the history of the Seljuks of Rûm by Ibn Bîbî, enriched with numerous interpolations, poetic for the most part, dealing with the Oghuz legends and traditions, and preceded by the legend of Oghuz Khan and his descendants, as well as a history of the Great Seljuks (see P. Wittek, {[Review of] Fr. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (1927)', *Der Islam*, xx, 1932, 197–207, at p.}202 f.). It was equally under Murâd II that the *tamgha* of the Oghuz tribe of the Kayı, which the Ottomans then began to appropriate for themselves, and which was to become the mark of the state armoury at Istanbul, makes its appearance on Ottoman coins (Khalîl Edhem, *Meskûkât-i 'osmânîye*, i, nos. 159, 193 and 225). Under Mehmed II, the Oghuz legend was so much in fashion that the names of two grandsons of the sultan, the sons of the princes Bâyezîd and Jem, were borrowed from it: Korkud and Oghuz Khan (Sa'deddîn, ii, 3). Nothing is more surprising than the prince Jem, encountering at Mecca an amateur scholar of these legends, Hasan b. Mahmud Bayâtî, asked from him the little sketch of Oghuz genealogy, *Jâm-i Jem âyîn*, ed. 'Alî Emîrî (Istanbul, 1331). Cf. also the first chapter of my *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* {see pp. 33–44 in this volume}.

38 Bertrandon de la Broquière, *Le Voyage d'Outremer*, ed. Ch. Schéfer, (Paris, 1892), 181 f. According to this author the sultan possessed a treasury of between half a million and one million ducats and an annual revenue of two and a half million ducats (182 and 185, f.); he had at his disposal an army of 100,000 to 120,000 men, including 40,000 fairly badly equipped infantry, 40,000 to 50,000 feudal knights, 10,000 'slaves that they called Janissaries

("Jehaniceres")', the remainder being composed of Christian auxiliaries of which Serbia alone provided 3000 knights (182–185 and 268). But above all, the Turkish warriors 'are very obedient to their leader, and none are so grand as to dare, for their lives, to disobey his orders. And I think that this is one of the things that has helped him to achieve such great successes and conquests in battle' (211 f.).

39 De la Broquière, op. cit., 196: 'And (the duke of Milan) was well satisfied with the fact that, out of regard for him, he (Murâd II) had often postponed making great conquests at the expense of the kingdom of Hungary, which he could easily have done had he wished to.'

40 Let us note that from the time of Mehmed I, the Ottomans sought to win over Muslim public opinion by making large donations towards the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina (Sa'deddîn, i, 304).

41 A detailed paraphrase of this Life, the *Menâkib-i Seyh Bedreddîn*, written in 2,500 verses, is in M. Serefeddin, 'Simavne kadisi-oglu Seyh Bedreddin'e dair bir kitap', in *Türkiyat mecmuasi*, iii (1935), 233–256. The same author has devoted a monograph to Bedreddîn: *Seyh Bedreddin* (Istanbul, 1925). This richly-documented study, as well as the 'Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Klein asiens', published by Köprülüzâde M. Fuad, in *Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschichte*, i (1921–1923), 203–232, continues in a felicitous way the study by F. Babinger, 'Schejch Bedr ed-dîn', in *Der Islam*, xi (1921), 1–106 (and Addenda, in *Der Islam*, xii (1922), 103–109).

42 Kastamunili Latîf, *Tezkire*, (Istanbul, 1314), 56 (other sources in E. J. W.Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry*, i, 232 ff.). It is very significant that it was an Arab Muslim (or Persian) who opposed this daring doctrine, while the majority of the people of Bursa backed its preacher. It is said that this debate might have inspired Suleyman Çelebi (who took the 'Muslim' side) to write his immortal poem on the birth of the Prophet, the *Mevlîd-i Serîf*, a passage of which, indeed, puts forward the superiority of Mohammed over all other prophets. But even this poetic work, which stresses the Muslim point of view regarding a concept that could easily lead to a fraternization between Muslims and Christians, is itself essentially imbued with Christian feeling: as G. Jacob put so well (in the dissertation of his student I. Engelke, 'Suleyman Tschelebis Lobgedicht auf die Geburt des Propheten', (Halle, 1926),34). Mohammed had taken the place of Christ in this poetry; many passages mention the 'heavenly bride', and the Muslim believer holds the same love for his Prophet as the Christian does for his Lord. Let us remember that that same Bursa of Bâyezîd's time had, for several years, held within its walls a certain Plethon, who dreamed of superimposing a philosophical religion on Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and that Plethon's mentor, the Jew Ellisaios, had been burned there 'for polytheism' (see F. Taeschner, 'Georgios Gemistos Plethon', in *Der Islam*, xviiii (1929), 236 ff., and in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, viii (1930), 100–113). In the end I wonder if it was just chance that among the sons of Bâyezîd Yildirim there had been, alongside Mehmed and Mustafâ, a Süleymân (Solomon), Mûsâ (Moses) and 'Îsâ (Jesus), or rather if these names do not reflect a general current that dominated the spirit of the time and even the Sultan's court.

43 Hâjjî Bayrâm begged in the streets of Ankara for the money he needed for his charitable works. To this end, he would even have organized processions with drums and banners. Ak Shemseddîn (who would become the famous shaykh of the army that conquered Constantinople) was so scandalized by this at first that he refused to become a disciple of the saint. When he finally joined him he found him busy working in the fields with his disciples (Tasköprüzâde, Es-sakâ'ik en-nu'mânîye, Turkish translation by Mecdî, Istanbul, 1269, 240). On Hâjjî Bayrâm see Bursali M. Tâhir, Hâjjî Bayrâm Velî (Istanbul, 1331; new edn, 1341); M. 'Alî 'Aynî, *Hâjjî Bayrâm Velî* (Istanbul, 1343); Abdulbâkî [Gölpinarli], *Melâmilik ve Melâmiler* (Istanbul, 1931), 33–39.

44 Several passages in the account of Bertrandon de la Broquière demonstrate that the Turkish population was very small in Rûmeli. Between Çorlu and Burgaz, our traveller passed through Misterio (Misini?) 'which is a small, closed place and contains only Greeks excepting the one Turk to whom the Grand Turk had given the town' (169); he found Plovdiv ('Philippopolis') peopled 'mostly by Bulgarians who hold to the Greek rite (*de Vulgaires qui tiennet la loy greguesque*)' (200). At Sofia, the majority of the town's inhabitants were Bulgarians as well, 'and in the villages a few Turks are to be found, to ensure that not everybody is local; the locals would greatly desire to be out of servitude if only they could find some help' (202). The same author tells of a plan (197), never to be implemented, in which the Bulgarians were to declare their support for the King of Hungary and massacre all of the Turks in their country; he himself believed in the possibility of such as uprising among the Rumelian Christians in the event of a Western army attacking the Turks (224). Cf. the 'Advis' of Jehan Torzelo, of 1439, which assures that the 50,000 'Christian men who are Turkish subjects, as soon as they see the power of the Christians, will rebel against the Turk and will be the ones who contribute most to his destruction (de la Broquière, 265).

45 See J. H. Mordtmann, art 'Dewshirme', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

VI Two Essays on Mehmed II

‘Muhammed II.’ and ‘Fath Mubîn’

Introduction

The Fall of Constantinople or, more broadly, the reign of Mehmed II as a totality, marks the chronological terminus in time of Wittek’s work in Ottoman history. Apart from a few, uncharacteristic, and for the most part minor contributions, down to 1940 he published little on Ottoman history after 1453, and virtually nothing on the Ottoman state after the death of the Conqueror.[a] *Some possible reasons for this state of affairs I have alluded to elsewhere; certainly it is to be regretted that Wittek did not write more at length on Mehemmed II and his reign: what we might have had from his pen, in terms of a work on the lines of Kantorowicz’s* Friedrich II.*, inspired both by Wittek’s deep scholarship and command of the sources and, like Kantorowicz’s study, by the compelling ethos of the* George-Kreis*, can only be conjectured.*[b] *As it turned out, after his escape from Brussels in 1940, displacement and exile effectively put paid to Wittek’s work on pre-1453 Ottoman history for over a decade.*[c]

In an attempt to rebalance the content of the present work in order to give more weight to the post-Ankara period of Ottoman history, as opposed to the pre- and early-Ottoman centuries that precede it, we have included here two short pieces on Mehmed II that furnish, if not by any means a detailed examination of the man and his reign, at least a summation of Wittek’s ambivalent attitude towards the conqueror of Constantinople. The two essays also usefully bracket chronologically the other pieces published here. One, simply entitled ‘Muhammed II.’ [sic]*, was written for the second, expanded edition (1933) of a collective work, edited by P. R. Rohden, and published by the long-established Viennese firm of L. W. Seidel und Sohn, entitled* Menschen, die Geschichte machten (‘Men who made History’).[d]

Wittek’s 1933 essay presents something of a publishing mystery. There

was in fact already an article on Mehmed in the first edition (1931) of Menschen, die Geschichte machten*, written not by Wittek but by his one-time collaborator and later fierce critic, Friedrich Giese.*[e] *This first edition had been jointly edited by Rohden and Wittek's near-contemporary, the eminent Russian-born, later Yugoslav Byzantinist Georg Ostrogorsky.*[f] *Yet more strangely, when Wittek came in January 1966 to compile a bibliography of his published work, 'Publications by Paul Wittek – a selective list' (published as 'Paul Wittek: Schriftenverzeichnis',* Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, *lxviii (1976), pp. 1–7), he carefully noted against the entry for 'Muhammed II.' that it had appeared in the second (1933) edition of the work, but cited his article as appearing (without any volume indication) at pp. 197–207. Why Giese's not particularly noteworthy but unexceptionable article on Mehmed II should have been withdrawn from the second edition of* Menschen, die Geschichte machten*, and Wittek's substituted, presumably at the behest of Peter Rohden, must at the present time remain a mystery.*[g] *In their published versions, neither of these two essays carried footnote references. Fortunately, Wittek's own archive copy of an offprint of his 1933 essay, meticulously footnoted in a minute hand, survives among the collection of his works that he presented to the Library of the Oriental Institute in Vienna in the mid-1970s.*[h] *These footnotes have been incorporated into the text of the present translation. The sequence and content of them has been preserved; originally they were numbered on a page-by-page basis, but his necessarily abbreviated references have been silently expanded. In a few places, where Wittek's references – or the inferences drawn from them – might be seen to stand in need of updating or modification, this has been supplied editorially in curly brackets.*

* * *

I 'Muhammed II.' (1933)

Born 1430;[1] *1451 sultan; 1453 Conquest of Constantinople; 1456 Campaign against Belgrade. Wars with Venetians, Genoese, Persians; 1478 his suzerainty recognised by the Khan of the Crimean Tatars. Died 3 May 1481.*

Well built; of large rather than middling stature; skilled in martial arts; inspiring more fear than respect; intelligent; generous; stubborn and audacious; only rarely cheerful; a passionate lover of history,

geography and military science; averse to all excesses and diversions and intent only on deeds of glory; but above all obsessed with thoughts of the conquest of Constantinople – thus a Venetian eyewitness[2] characterised the young sultan Mehemmed, the twenty-one-year-old who had succeeded his father Murâd II as ruler of the Ottoman state.

Bitter experience had already rendered the young man both serious and mature. Raised to the throne as a fourteen-year-old youth by his father, who was seeking a peaceful enjoyment of life, he was soon forced by external and inner dangers to give up the throne once again to him. He returned to a governorship in the provinces, which must have seemed to him both an exile and a degradation. In impotent fury against the statesmen of the empire, to whom he attributed the blame for this humiliation, he became a gloomy solitary, willing to tolerate around him only the blind instruments of his will. Here also there was settled in him an inflexible will to expunge his shame through deeds of greatness, which should set the whole world in amazement.

A worthy object of his thirst for action manifested itself clearly enough: the empire of the Rhomaioi still existed, as a small bordering neighbour of which the Ottomans had started out around 1300, and had risen within the space of a century and a half to be a dominating great power in Asia Minor and the Balkans. Declined to the level of a city state, but still radiating the glory of the imperial name and the proudest traditions, lay this empire, protected by the thousand-year old walls of Constantinople, in the heart of the Ottoman lands, right there where the narrow channel of the Bosphorus divided the Ottomans' Anatolian and Rumelian possessions – a dangerous enclave for a state that was still weak as a naval power, all the more so in that the City, with its still keenly-felt aspirations, was both the strongest bulwark against the Ottomans and in the eyes of Christendom both a starting-point and an objective in all their intrigues woven against them.

The necessity for the conquest of Constantinople and the complete destruction of East Rome had already been recognised by Mehmed's great-grandfather Bâyezîd, but the invasion of Tîmûr (1402) had postponed the implementing of the decision for some fifty years. Immediately {after his accession}[3] Mehmed again took up the plan. Students of history stressed into the bargain remembrance of the attempts at the conquest {of Constantinople} undertaken by the caliphs; the traditional seat of imperial power enticed him, as did the universal tendencies of which he embraced through the legends of his

own people and the only recently vanished era of the Mongols.

The young man pursued his goal with calculation, patience and tenacity, arising from a single deeply-rooted resolution of the will. Then, in the third year of his rule, after he had protected himself by treaties with the West and by a short campaign in the East, had cut off Constantinople from any help and support from the north by the construction of a fortress on the Bosphorus, and had created with the help of western technicians an artillery of hitherto unheard of power, he appeared before the City with a gigantic army, its ranks swelled by fanatical volunteers. Despite this apparatus of power the boldness of the undertaking should not be underestimated, since it was not to be foreseen on what scale the West might intervene. What in fact it sent in terms of timely assistance, was exceedingly small, yet it required all of Mehmed's energy, ingenuity, and tenacity to break, in an almost two-month struggle, the heroic resistance of this small but utterly fearless band of defenders. Mehmed, who had brought along a leading Italian humanist in his train,[4] had certainly a heavy heart when, in order to inspire his exhausted troops to a last assault, he gave up the city for general plunder. Thus fell the last remnant of the Roman World-Empire, on 29 May 1453.[5]

To Christendom this conquest appeared as a catastrophe for culture and as a portent of still greater evils to come; in the Islamic world, conversely, it bestowed on the young victor the ennobling name of 'Conqueror'. Mehmed indeed proved the reality of this name subsequently: {by conquests} in the Archipelago, in the Morea, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, and Wallachia; in Asia Minor, where for all the principalities, including the Comnenid 'Empire' of Trebizond, the end was hastened, and in the course of which both in the East, where a threatening Turkoman neighbour was repulsed and the first hostile contacts made with the dominant Syrian-Egyptian power {of the Mamluk sultanate}, and on the northern shores of the Black Sea, where the Genoese colonies surrendered themselves and the khan of the Crimea was obliged to recognise Ottoman suzerainty. He created a fleet, which defied the Venetians: his troops established themselves in southern Italy, while his raiders ravaged the lands across the Isonzo and as far as upper Styria.

In terms of their significance the totality of these conquests cannot be measured with that of Constantinople itself. In it the {Ottoman} empire had achieved its natural capital. Even though the City had been for long in decline, and even, through the horrors of the conquest, had been completely laid waste, its extent, its ruins and its

tradition could only serve to a spirit like Mehmed as an incentive to creative deeds. To rebuild it on a grand scale was his first cultural task, one to which he committed the energy and devotion of a lifetime.[6] To the barrier fortresses on the Bosphorus he added similar ones at the Dardanelles,[7] thus protecting the city from attacks from the sea; its walls were also rebuilt, thereby bestowing on the empire a secure political and cultural heart. With the church of Aya Sofya, Islam obtained a place of worship without equal; furthermore, by the creation of teaching institutions, libraries, convents and hospitals, the city became thereby a centre of Muslim life. Through the organisation of a body of theologians, linked with large-scale endeavours for its propagation, the Sultan secured for the empire the necessary strengths for learning and administration. In order to repopulate the city, he forcibly resettled it with Turks, Christians and Jews – for the most part merchants and artisans.[8] Bazaars and caravanserais appeared for trade. The Patriarchate was renewed and the orthodox Christian population of the empire provided thereby with a unitary organisation.

With these undertakings of creative organisation Mehmed had distanced himself far from the hitherto existing {Islamic}traditions. Full many of his measures offended or infringed long-established rights and also set to one side the restraining prescriptions of religious law. He broke with the patriarchal usages, which had obtained even in the reign of his father. With his advisors, chosen with deep knowledge of human nature principally from the ranks of the renegades, since probably he found among them more understanding and aptitude for his plans – and probably also since they were entirely his own creatures and instruments, devoted to no special interests of their own – he prevailed upon his time by means of hitherto unheard of arbitrary actions. Systematically he had directed the youth of the conquered cities to Islam and to the service of the state, for he was no religious fanatic. Personally he showed much interest in Christian beliefs; he had a catholic form of service explained to him,[9] and noted down orthodox dogma in writing.[10] Also with Jews he had the closest of relations. Publicly he was well-disposed towards a dervish sect whose pantheism relativised the boundaries between religious confessions. When he authorised their destruction at the hands of the {Muslim} clergy, it was clearly done on grounds of *raison d'état*.[11] Many concluded from this that he had risen above religious ties and ruled unprejudiced as a free spirit, embracing everything new and great, which had motivated his era – the Renaissance. At his court

Western painters[12] encountered astronomers from Samarkand.[13] A Greek philosopher in his entourage drew for him a world-map according to Ptolemy, which he also translated.[14] On Mehmed's command, a great Arabic dictionary project was got under way,[15] and for his own use word-lists in Greek and Slavonic were drawn up.[16] He was presented with the history of his people and his deeds written in Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Greek; a humanist had glorified him in a Latin epic;[17] and Westerners began to report in detail on him and his state.[18] For Turkish literature there now began a golden age. Mehmed himself sang in conventional Eastern modes of wine and his beloved in Galata.[19] When the mature man, for whose harem the Greek nobility offered up their daughters, happened to fall a victim to passion, he did not on that score forget his overriding purposes, and it was said that he had stabbed to death a girl of surpassing beauty, towards whom he felt excessive devotion. Such grim behaviour on grounds of *raison d'état* fits in well with his character. Without pity, he had those cut down, where it mattered in order to punish resistance to his will and to protect the common weal. Thus he acted also in conformity to the legal code that he bestowed on his empire, enforcing the killing of his brothers as a duty on each new ruler. And for himself he knew no pity. He took part personally in most of his campaigns, and his restless life quickly consumed itself. Medals and paintings from his last years depict him as worn out and gone to seed. At barely fifty-one years of age, in 1481, he died.

II 'Fath Mubîn: "An Eloquent Conquest"' (1955)

For more than seven weeks, since early April 1453, the Ottoman hosts, under the command of their brilliant young Sultan Mehemmed II, had launched assault upon assault against the ancient walls of Constantine's city, once the capital of a mighty empire but now its last citadel, the campaign, which was to realise a centuries-old dream of the Muslim world, had been long and carefully prepared. No enemy threat retained forces on the frontiers in east and west. Thus, there was time and possibility to muster the entire strength of the state: all the Janissaries (the Sultan's renowned infantry), the proud feudal cavalry of all the provinces, a formidable artillery, a fleet rapidly

multiplied for the occasion – and untold numbers of volunteers, burning with religious zeal and lust for booty, had hastened to join them. The masses assembled round Constantinople in the fanatic resolve to conquer or die can hardly have counted less than 100,000 men, certainly the strongest force that the Ottomans had gathered for a single campaign.

And the defenders: little more than 8,000! A Byzantine army existed no longer for the simple reason that, outside the walls, there was no Byzantine soil (the far-distant Morea, hopelessly divided by internal feuds and itself in deadly peril from the Turks, was of no avail). What forces the doomed Emperor Constantine XI was able to muster had to come from the people of the city, now but a small fraction of the crowds who in times long past had thronged the vast space within the walls. Most of this space was in ruins or under the plough; of inhabitants there were hardly 50,000 left. When, therefore, for the life-and-death struggle of the town every man able to bear arms was conscripted, the very young no less than the very old, nobleman and worker alike, laity as well as priests and monks, all that could be found {34} numbered at best 6,000 men – and how many of these could be called soldiers? They were reinforced by about 2,000 Italian volunteers: the crews of Venetian and other ships that happened to be there at anchor and, above all, a corps of 500 Genoese that the condottiere Giustiniani had hurried to the threatened town of his own accord – these latter almost the only real soldiers on the side of the defence.

What sustained the spirit of the defenders most was the hope of timely rescue by the West. Already the presence of the Italian volunteers was of great com -fort, though it by no means meant that Venice or Genoa had entered the war. (Neighbouring Galata, the Genose town across the Golden horn, remained throughout the siege an anxiously neutral spectator.) But it was known that desperate efforts were being made by the Pope to organize help. Meanwhile, until its arrival, all that mattered was to hold out, trusting in the mighty walls that Antiquity had left as a monument of its still unrivalled craft. Soon these walls were to learn that their day was over. For the Turk had secured an instrument to shatter them – a gun, the like of which the world had never seen; however, only one gun of this kind, and very slow to fire, so that whatever breaches it made were repaired by night, to the fury and dismay of the besiegers. Indefatigable, the young Sultan searched for other stratagems. To thin the lines of the defenders, who with their 8,000 men had to hold the

four miles of the land walls, he ordered the Ottoman fleet to force an entrance into the Golden Horn, so that the defence would have to divert about half its strength to that side; and, seeing his fleet repulsed, he had the ships hauled up to the hills behind Galata and then down into the Golden Horn.

A disheartening sight to the besieged! Nevertheless, so valiantly and so skilfully had they fought throughout these seven weeks that the Ottomans began to despair. Weighty voices were raised, advocating the abandonment of the adventure. News must have reached the Turkish camp {35} that aid from the West was at last on its way. In this hour of decision, conscious that his own fate was at stake, the Sultan ventured all on one last desperate throw. He made it known to his soldiers that if, in the general assault now to be launched, they were to force the walls, the city was theirs for three whole days, for fire and slaughter, rape, plunder and enslavement to their hearts' desire, regardless of person or property, or the sanctity of a place. It was an appeal to the wildest and vilest instincts, the unleashing of that bestial ferocity, which may succeed where disciplined valour fails. And so, on the 29th of May, Constantinople fell. Its last emperor disappeared in the mêlée. If a man dies in the fulfilment of his duty, he must not be pitied but rather envied. All those who in that merciless fight bravely gave their lives for the glory of their faith, Muslim and Christian alike, went – I am sure – straightway to their respective paradise. But, imagining what must have happened during the three days of terror, even at the distance of five hundred years our hearts will stop for a moment in grief over the suffering and destruction that had befallen that once glorious city.

In his *Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks* Sir Edwin Pears gave, just fifty years ago, a full (and still authoritative) account of the event, which I have tried to evoke here in a few words. It remains for us to show these happenings in their right proportion, to understand them as ineluctable, and finally to assess what the possession of the city meant for the conquerors.

The outcry that echoed through Western Christendom at the mournful news was sincere, yet greatly due to an illusion. Constantinople was still imagined as an immense and splendid metropolis – and somehow this illusion lingers on even now. We have seen, however, to what degree the city was ruined and depopulated. Nevertheless, it still sheltered treasures enough, the destruction of which meant a serious loss to mankind. But were they all destroyed?

Well, the {36} Hagia Sophia still stands, and minor sanctuaries too. Even the sumptuous imagery on their walls, though for Muslims an abomination, has survived in undiminished splendour, hidden under harmless whitewash to meet the Holy Law. Nor did the heritage of Greek literature assembled there perish entirely – a century later the imperial ambassador to the Sultan could still buy up and send to Vienna cart-loads of manuscripts. So, through dealers, single objects of art and craft found their way from the looters to the West, where an awakened sensibility drew from them inspiration. Yet, we can be sure, it was sheer desolation that the Sultan beheld, when he finally entered the town – indeed, for that night he had to seek hospitality in Galata, at a Franciscan convent. The city was empty, its surviving inhabitants on the road to the slave-market of Adrianople.

How sad a spectacle, these columns of tired, despondent prisoners – husbands and wives, parents and children, torn from each other, all of them bound for a destination unknown, frightening! But even here we find circumstances that mitigate the cruelty of the scene. It was a Christian country through which the captives were driven. People lived there with all the freedom accorded to non-Muslim subjects, i.e. dhimmis. Sympathy and aid were thus at hand from the very beginning of their journey through the Sultan's realm, almost from the first steps outside the city gates. Search for lost relatives and provision for ransom may have started at once. There must have been many who had friends or relatives among the dhimmis, here and there in the Ottoman provinces. For others the Greek clergy and the monasteries could intervene. Large funds for the redemption of prisoners came from the Serbian king, the Sultan's vassal, and some, too, from the West. Even Mehemmed himself bought from his soldiers or the slave-traders captives in whom he was interested. There are cases known, where, after some time of separation and captivity, entire families were happily reunited in liberty. As for the no doubt considerable number {37} of enslaved Jews, it can be assumed that their numerous co-religionists among the slave-dealers took good care of them. It seems to me quite probable that many of the prisoners, once they had acquired by ransom the status of dhimmi, were able to profit from the facilities granted for the repopulation of the city and returned to their homes, reviving even some of their old sanctuaries. Many years later, the tribunals of the Holy Law found it difficult to explain how, though the city was captured by force, churches and synagogues had been allowed to continue. All this does not alter the fact that Christian Constantinople had been wiped out. The way was clear for the

conquerors to create in its place something entirely new, a city of Islam. Have we then to think that destruction had been intended from the first? As we shall see, most certainly not.

The fact that the Turks had laid claim to Constantinople is easily understood: the city had been the capital of an empire that was now theirs; left as a mighty alien stronghold in the very heart of their realm, just where Ottoman Asia and Europe met at the Bosphorus, it meant far more than a nuisance, a constant danger. And after all, were not the Ottomans essentially ghâzîs, 'champions of the faith'? It was long enough that they had lived as close neighbours of that Kostantiniye, which divine promises had assigned to Islam and which time and again Muslim hosts, sent out by the Caliphs of far-away Damascus and Baghdad, had assailed. How could the Ottoman ghâzîs indefinitely shirk their duty? Astonishingly, it needed serious provocation from the Byzantines to spur them into action. In the first years of his reign Manuel II, Emperor since 1391, had been a trusted general of Sultan Bâyezîd I, serving his overlord with his men and ships in many a campaign – by far the most eminent among the Christian vassals left here and there in the Balkans. All of them must have felt grave concern when in 1393 Bulgaria, having failed to come to terms with the Ottomans, ceased to be. Just in this moment of tension {38} Bâyezîd summoned them to his winter quarters at Seres, but each of them separately and unknown to the others. Great was their surprise when they met. Suspicion awoke among them, grew into frightful conviction that they were caught in a deadly trap. Nothing happened. But they went home with the ominous insight that to be a vassal to a lord so overwhelmingly strong meant no assurance for their future. From that moment on Manuel joined the Sultan no more but turned towards the West – and promptly Bâyezîd, the Conqueror's great-grandfather, laid siege to the city. This first Ottoman siege was rather a blockade, or closing of the frontier, which already at that time ran close to the walls. For seven years Constantinople was cut off from its hinterland, communicating with the outside world only by sea, until in 1402 Tîmûr advanced from the East to shatter at Ankara the Ottoman power. During the twenty years that the Ottomans needed for their recovery, Constantinople breathed more freely. In 1421, on the death of Mehemmed I, Byzantium even had the courage, or rather audacity, to put up a pretender against the new Sultan, Murâd II, a youth of nineteen years. Again provocation, and again a like answer! Having speedily dealt with the pretender, the enraged Murâd, with a formidable army, sat down before Constantinople,

firmly determined to take it. This siege, which started in June 1422, lasted almost eleven weeks and brought the city to dire extremity; but once more unexpected deliverance came. Internal strife compelled Murâd to abandon the enterprise. A sheer miracle – and, indeed, it was believed that the Panhagia, the mother of Christ, in her violet robes had appeared on the ramparts, frightening off the Turks when they were just launching the decisive assault. But from now on Constantinople was withering under the constant threat of the next onslaught, which might come at any moment and mean the end.

In his fear, and fear is the worst adviser, the Emperor (now John VIII) committed himself entirely to the West. Yet the {39} fate of Salonika, taken over by Venice but non the less reduced by Murâd in 1430, should have warned him how impotent the Italian sea powers were to defend such distant outposts. Soon, in 1444, was to follow the lesson of Varna where, with the last Crusader army, perished all hope of rescue by land. And for all this illusory aid a heavy price had to be paid. To complete the Western alliance the Emperor had to submit his Church to the Roman see, whose theology the Greeks had decried for centuries as heresy. What is more, Rome stood for a world held by the Greeks to be hostile, barbarous and profoundly un-Christian. Those robust, ruthless Westerners, who in their various enterprises seemed, laity and clergy alike, exclusively bent on the pursuit of earthly aims, were known to them only too well as cruel, contemptuous masters. Compared with them, the Turks were felt as rather akin and the lesser evil. Rome would fill their Church with the poison of heresy and vice, whereas the Sultan left it to itself. After all, the Early Church too had lived under non-Christian rulers, and to ‘render unto Caesar that which was Caesar’s’ was much easier under a tolerant Muslim sultan than under a deified emperor. The Union with Rome, concluded at Florence in 1438 in defiance of these feelings, was altogether an impossible thing for those Greeks – and they were an overwhelming majority – who were living under the Sultan’s sway. It would have meant their subjection to the influence of the Pope, the Sultan’s foremost political enemy. But even in Constantinople itself the Union met with resistance and was clearly rejected by the population. Its enforcement had time and again to be postponded until December 1452, when the wheels of fate were already in motion. The Ottomans must have regarded the Union as the sharpest possible challenge. However much the Christian clergy under their rule might deny all further connexion with the Patriarch who was now to become an instrument of Rome, Ottoman suspicion of secret treachery would

never be silenced. To deal with the problem, two {40} courses of action were open to the Ottomans: either to make an end of their Christian subjects (but this Draconic way was unthinkable) or to quench the fire on its hearth by taking Constantinople. That for years no action at all was taken was probably due to the fact that the Union failed to come into force. Murâd obviously preferred to bide his time and to see whether the whole matter would not peter out by itself. Prematurely mellowed by age, inclined to peaceful arrangements wherever possible, he had even left the throne to his very young son Mehemmed for almost two years, and returned to it unwillingly only when circumstances compelled him.

All this changed with Murâd's death in 1451. To understand what his successor Mehemmed II was like, we must not turn to Bellini's portrait in the National Gallery, which shows him, in the last year of his life, as a sick and tired man. Let us rather listen how the Italian Langusto, his contemporary, describes him:

> a youth of 26 years (in reality 21 or perhaps even 19 only), of fine complexion, rather tall than of medium stature, of noble bearing in arms, commanding fear rather than reverence, seldom laughing, arduously striving for knowledge, of lordly generosity, stubborn in his purpose, and bold in everything, he aspires to no less fame than that of Alexander the Great. He has read to him by two Italians in his service the histories of Roman and other nations. He speaks Turkish, Greek and Slavonic. Eager for information about the Western world, he possesses a map showing the realms and provinces of Europe. Nothing delights him more than the art of war, and, a cunning explorer of all things, he burns with the desire to rule. No addict to debauchery, sober, vigilant, patient of fatigue, cold and heat, hunger and thirst, he declares that there must be but one empire in the world, one faith, one monarchy – and that to realise this unity there is no place on earth more worthy than Constantinople.

There is no doubt that this second Alexander had set his mind on the conquest of the city from his earliest youth. Had {41} not the strength of his empire immensely increased since his great-grandfather's and father's attempts? Had not its superiority over the West been well established at Salonika and Varna? After those still recent trials of strength Western intervention had become something remote and negligible. Doubtless the Sultan also knew that in Constantinople the Emperor was about to put into effect the Union, with the populace in desperate protest openly voiciong its preference for the Turks. Had Mehemmed wished, he could have proclaimed as his war-aim the liberation of the Greek Church – but, of course, no ghâzî, no Sultan of Islam would have set out with such a battle-cry. The way he forced war upon the Emperor was straight and brutal, without hypocrisy. Nor

was he less ruthless in dealing with the elder statesmen his father had left him as counsellors – advocates of the conciliatory policy that had been followed in the last years of Murâd. In the two years when Mehemmed was for the first time on the throne these same men had exercised power with little regard for him and finally had persuaded his father to oust him and take over again. With this old rancour in his heart, Mehemmed brushed their objections and warnings aside, browbeating them into acquiescence. They stepped forward again at that critical turn of the enterprise, when after seven weeks of vain sacrifices it seemed that the siege was to be abandoned. It was a most critical turning-point in the Sultan's life as well. To accept defeat was to forfeit all authority and to return, humiliated before all his people, under the tutelage of his ministers, now triumphant and more overbearing, more insufferable, perhaps even more dangerous than ever before. There was no choice for him, the city had to be taken at any price – and so he gave it to his soldiers for wanton destruction.

As in the camp of the besiegers, so, too, in the beleaguered city fate was in command. It is difficult to think, thought the sources are silent on this point, that the Emperor, being a Christian ruler, should not have been invited to capitulate – {42} before the siege began and perhaps again before the last assault. For so it is prescribed by the Holy Law of Islam. In any case, if the Emperor had asked for 'aman', i.e. mercy in exchange for submission, it could hardly have been denied. Why did he not ask for it? His heroic decision to fight and to die sprang no doubt from his sense of the holiness of the imperial office, of the duties towards his faith laid upon him, the bearer of the oldest Christian crown. There was, too, his pride in the long and noble line of the Palaeologoi. Furthermore, he who so unreservedly had brought his city into the Western community, should he show himself and his people as cowards void of honour, again the 'treacherous Greek', abandoning that brave Giustiniani who had flown to his aid? Regard for these Italians and their exemplary determination may easily have been a cardinal factor in the struggle of his conflicting thoughts. But was he to decide alone? What about his people? The Union just proclaimed had left them with bitter resentment and sullen despair, an easy prey to fanatic monks who told them that the judgement of God was near. This time there would be no rescue by the Panhagia. And yet a miracle happened. With the appearance of the Turks, under the mortal threat of the gathering storm, this very same people drew togther into one army, all soldiers of Christ. Such was the spirit of mutual love, self-sacrifice, courage, and religious exaltation

that animated the city, that even the thought of surrender never arose.

Lastly, I shall very briefly point out what the conquest meant for the victors. For Mehemmed ('the Conqueror', as he is known in history) it meant forceful assertion as master of his realm. The old aristocracy gradually disappears from the high offices of state, to be replaced by men of slave origin, non-Turkish renegades, blindly obedient instruments of the Sultan's will. The Sultan becomes a ruler of almost divine character – majestic, aloof, unapproachable. Sharply contrasting with the easy, familiar ways in which Mehemmed's pre decessors had ruled, out of conquest autocracy is born, {43} to last for centuries. To the state the conquest brought universal recognition as an empire: throughout the Muslim world the thoughts of the exulting believers turned to those whom, by the victory, Allah had designated as the leaders of Islam, while the Christian West had at last been forced to accept that there existed again an 'Eastern Empire', a great power of its own kind and established in its own right, ruler by the *Imperator Turcarum*. Of still greater importance is the change that the conquest produced in the minds of the Greeks under Ottoman sway. As long as a Basileus of their race and religion existed, they still kept in their hearts the hope that one day he might come out from his citadel to drive the Turks away and to restore the Empire to its former frontiers. Healed of such illusions, the Greeks began to speak of the Sultan as their basileus. On the other hand, their Turkish masters, who dwelt among them as a minority, until then uneasily aware of being in the eyes of their subjects but temporary occupants, now began to feel at home and settled for good.

But the conquest brought to the Ottomans not only gains and successes but also gigantic tasks. The wide field of ruins had to be built up and the empty space be repopulated if Constantinople was to become again a capital. Above all, the city had to be safeguarded against any possible attack. So the shattered walls were repaired at once, and, to exclude the appearance of enemy fleets before them, powerful fortresses were built that closed the Dardanelles. Soon, Mehemmed felt able to move from his first palace in the heart of the town to the new seaglio built on a grandiose scale at the beautiful but exposed point the the Golden Horn, the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora meet – not far from the Hagia Sophia, now transformed into a mosque. Let us recognise that we owe the preservation of this glorious church exclusively to the fact that the Turks possessed all the technical skill and economic resources to defend this age-old building against the ravages of time. For the conquerors, far {44} from being

'barbarian nomads', were in full possession of that superb civilization that had matured in the Islamic world, and now created for itself a new centre. Mehemmed himself founded a new mosque that rivalled the Hagia Sophia in greatness and splendour, and around it a complex of eight colleges, with hospitals and a library – a university that soon attracted the scholars of the entire Muslim world. The rebuilding of the city was a task still unfinished generations after the Conqueror's death. In its accomplishment, the Ottomans developed an architecture of their own, in a truly imperial style, which spread all over the Sultan's realm and even beyond. As the capital grew, there established itself a way of life and behavious and speech that penetrated into the provinces, binding them together in a common civilization.

With this resurrected city, this magnificent Istanbul of the Turks, in our minds, let us turn once more to the fateful event of five hundred years ago and see it as a landmark of history: not so much the end of Eastern Rome (which had died long before) but as the birth of an empire that, for centuries to come, shaped the destinies of much of Asia and Europe.

Notes

a I exclude here Wittek's journalistic writings, in the *Oesterreichischer Rundschau* and elsewhere, from the early 1920s, and his surveys of new publications in Turkish and Ottoman studies, which he published in successive numbers of the *Orientalistische Literatur-Zeitung* in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Many of these writings include much material on Ottoman and Turkish history down to and after the end of the Empire.

b On Babinger and Mehmed II see Colin Heywood, 'Mehmed II and the Historians: the Reception of Babinger's *Mehmed der Eroberer* During Half a Century', *Turcica*, l (2008), 295–344.

c The only work to appear from Wittek's war years in England was his brilliant investigation of a number of published Turkish documents relating to the earliest years of Anglo-Ottoman relations: 'The Turkish Documents in Hakluyt's "Voyages"', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, xix (57), 1941–1942 (appeared 1944), 121–139. His first major post-war work, written when he was again in Brussels, was 'Notes sur la Tughra Ottomane (I and II)', published in *Byzantion*, xviii (1948) and xx (1950).

d Peter Richard Rohden (ed.), *Menschen die Geschichte machten: Viertausend Jahre Weltgeschichte in Zeit- und Lebensbildern*, 2nd edn (Vienna, 1933), I, 557–

561.

e Peter Richard Rohden and Georg Ostrogorsky (eds), *Menschen die Geschichte machten: Viertausend Jahre Weltgeschichte in Zeit- und Lebensbildern* (Vienna, 1931), ii, 177–181. The complex relationship between Wittek and Giese can only be touched on here. *Inter alia* Giese took furious exception to what he termed Wittek's 'intolerable (*unausständige*) review' of his edition of the early Ottoman chronicler 'Âşıkpaşazâde (see *Orientalistische Literatur zeitung*, 1931, cols 698–707; cf. Giese to unknown recipient, autogr. letter, Breslau, 10.8.31, photocopy in the editor's possession), adding that 'his (W's) theory, as set out in the *OLZ*, is in any case laughable, and false from beginning to end'.

f In the first edition (see vol. i, v) Ostrogorsky was listed as editor of the contributions on 'Byzantine, Slavic and Oriental history'. In these years (1928–1933) Ostrogorsky taught as a *Privatdozent* at the University of Breslau (Pol. Wroclaw), where Giese was also a professor; after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany (January 1933) Ostrogorsky moved to Belgrade, which surely explains the cryptic statement *by the publisher* in the second edition (i, vi) that Ostrogorsky had been 'prevented' (*verhindert*) (by the Nazi sympathiser Rohden? – see n. e, above) 'from collaborating on the second edition'. But then why was Giese's article withdrawn and why did Wittek – equally an anti-Nazi, who exactly at this time in 1933 resigned his post with the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul – agree to write for Rohden a new article replacing that of his arch-critic Giese?

g Giese retired from his position at Breslau in 1936, and died in the autumn of 1944. Neither the *Festschrift* for him that was published in Berlin in 1941 as a *Sonderband* to *Die Welt des Islams*, nor the obituary notice by Gotthard Jäschke (*ZDMG*, xcix (1945–1949), 7–10, are helpful in this regard, although the visceral dislike felt by Giese over Wittek's critical handling of his edition of 'Âşıkpaşazâde (Jäschke, 9–10; cf note e, above) must have been at its height at this time and in some obscure way have influenced the situation.

h Wittek visited Vienna (for the last time) in the early 1970s; his collection of offprints was accessioned in 1976 (personal communication from Professor Claudia Römer, 6.10.2009). I am greatly indebted to Professor Römer for her kindness in supplying me with photocopies and .jpeg facsimiles of Wittek's footnoted file copy of 'Muhammed II.', current shelfmark T 4/93 in what is now termed the *Fachbereichsbibliothek Afrikawissenschaften und Orientalistik*. Wittek's own copy of 'Fath Mubîn', which is bound in with his annotated 'Muhammed II.', is sadly devoid of annotation.

1 Sa'deddîn, {*Tâj üt-Tevârîh*, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1279–1280 [1862–1863])}, i, 316: Sat. 7 Rejeb, 833 = Sat. 1.IV.1430. Enverî. {Mükrimin Halil (ed.), Düstûr-nâme-i Enverî (Istanbul, 1928}: Sat. 26 Rejeb 835; Uruj Cambr. 49 16 {see Fr. Babinger (ed.), *Die früh osmanische Jahrbücher des Urudsch* (Hannover, 1925)}: Sat. 27 Rejeb 834 = Wed. (!) 10.IV.1431, at Dimotika; Šükrullâh {ed. Th. Seif, 'Der Abschnitt über die Osmanen in Šükrullah's persischer Universal geschichte', *Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte*, ii (1923–1926), 63–128}, 118 17 : Sa. 27 Rej. 835 = Wed. (!) 30.III.1435 {*sic*: actually = Sa. 26.ii.1435}, at Adrianople.

2 Langusto in the *Chronicle* of Zorzi Dolfin, ed. G. M. Thomas (Munich, 1868), 9

ff.; a useful political map of South-East Europe and western Asia Minor in the year 1451 is in William Miller, '{The last Athenian Historian:} Laonikos Chalkokondyles', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xlii/1 (1922), 36–49, at p. 41. {'Langusto', the 'Venetian eyewitness', appears again in 'Fath Mubîn' (see p. 173 in this volume), quoted from at much greater length). It is doubly unfortunate, as Julian Raby has convincingly demonstrated, that Wittek's 'Langusto', i.e. Jacopo Languschi, a papal secretary, was not the unimpeachable witness that he had always been assumed to be. In fact his account of the sultan, supplied by the Venetian chronicler Zorzi Dolfin, which Wittek makes use of, is, in Raby's words, 'plagiarised and lacks the independent authority of an eye-witness'. It derives most probably from the account of another papal secretary, Nicolò Sagundino, a Greek from Negroponte, who visited Constantinople to report on conditions there after the fall of the City, and whose description of Mehmed II closely parallels that attributed to his papal colleague (see Julian Raby, 'Cyriacus of Ancona and the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, xliii (1980), 242–246).}

3 'Immediately' ('*Erst*') is with hindsight to be extended back to the besieging of Constantinople by Murâd II.; see Joh. Cananos, *De Costantinopoli oppugnata* (1422), Bonn, in I. Bekker (ed.), Georgius Phrantzes. Ioannes Cananus {etc.} (Bonn, 1838)}.

4 E. Jacobs, 'Cyriacus von Ancona und Mehemmed II', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxx (1919/20), 197 ff. {The long-accepted role of Cyriacus of Ancona as tutor/lector of Mehmed II during the siege of Constantinople and after, which generated a vast scholarly literature and provoked a number of unfounded assertions by Emil Jacobs and others concerning Mehmed II as a Renaissance figure, has been convincingly shown by Julian Raby to rest on a misreading in the edited text of Zorzi Dolfin's *Chronicle*; in fact, there is nothing to prove that Cyriac tutored Mehmed II or even that he was in the Ottoman camp in 1452/3: by the time the City fell he was almost certainly dead and buried in Italy. (Raby, 'Cyriacus of Ancona', 244–246).}

5 Detailed account of the taking of Constantinople in G. Schlumberger, *Le Siège, la prise et le sac de Constaninople par les Turcs* (Paris 1914). {See Agostino Pertusi (ed.), *La caduta di Constantinopoli, I: Le testimonianze dei contemporaniei* (Rome, 1976).}

6 Kritobulos II 10. 22. III 11. 12. IV. 9. 10. V 9. 15, 1 {see Charles T. Riggs (tr.), *History of Mehmed the Conqueror* (Princeton, NJ, 1954); Diether Roderich Reinsch (ed.), *Critobuli Imbriotae historia* (Berlin–New York, 1983, *Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae, xxii*); for a German translation by Reinsch see *Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber*, xvii (Graz, etc., 1986)}.

7 Kritobulos IV 14, 15.

8 Phrantzes {(ed. Bekker)}, 308: Serbs, Magyars and Bulgarians settled in the environs of Constantinople. Kritobulos II 22.

9 {Muhlbacher}, *Tractatus de moribus, conditionibus et nequitia Turcorum* (Pavia, 1514), f. 13a. {= Fr. Georgius de Hungarica, OSB ('Georgius Septemcastrensis', the so-called 'Mühlenbacher'). The *Tractatus* was first

published in 1481; there are many subsequent editions (on George of Hungary and his work see J. A. B. Palmer, 'Fr. Georgius de Hungaria, O.P., and the *Tractatus de Moribus Condicion ibus et Nequicia Turcorum', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, xxxiv (1951), 44–68.)}

10 M. Jugie, 'Ecrits apologétiques de Gennade Scholarios à l'adresse des Musulmans', in *Byzantion*, v (1929) 295 ff.

11 Taşköprüzâde, *Vita des Fakhreddîn Adjemî* (Medjdi 582 {?}, Rescher 33 f. {partly illegible; = O. Rescher, *Eš-Šaqâ'iq en-no'mânijje von Taşköprüzâde . . . übersetzt von Oskar Rescher* (Konstantinopel–Galata, 1927); Mecdî, *Hadâ'ik al-Shakâ'ik* (Istanbul, 1269); new edn by A. Subhi Furat (Istanbul, 1985)}.

12 {Joseph von} Karabacek, Abendländische Künstler zu Konstantinopel {im XV. und XVI. ahrhundert}, i {Italienische Künstler am Hofe Muhammeds II.}, (Vienna 1918).

13 Alaeddîn Alî b. Moh. el-Gurdjy (vgl. Taşköprüzade, {tr. Rescher, 102–104: should not be 'el-Gurdjy' but el-Quschdjy}).

14 Krit. V 10.

15 Taşköprüzâde *Vita des Lutfullah et-Toqatî*. Mecdî, {*Hadâ'ik al-Shakâ'ik*}, 299. {Taşköprüzade, tr.} Rescher, 185.

16 {See}, for example, a Persian–Greek–Serbian glossary, MS. Ahlwardt 6849 {= W. Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis der Arabischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, 10 vols (Berlin, 1887–1899; repr. New York, 1980–1981), vi, 197–19–8}.

17 Franciscus Philelphus, *Amyris.* {Wittek appears to be in error here: the author of *Amyris* was not the famous Renaissance humanist Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481; *inter alia* envoy to Murâd II, 1422), but his less than illustrious son, Gian-/Giovanni-Mario (1426–1480). On G-M. Filelfo see Fr. Babinger, 'Mehmed II., der Eroberer, und Italien', *Byzantion*, xxi (1951), 169; Babinger (ed. W. Hickman), *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time* (Princeton, NJ, 1978), 506–507, where Gian-Mario is termed a 'laborious singer of heroic deeds'. There is an authoritative study of Gian-Mario in *Dizionario biografico italiano*, xlviii (1997), 626–631 (by F. Pignatti), and a modern edition of Filelfo's *Amyris* (ed. Aldo Manetti (Bologna, 1978), *Letteratura italiana e comparata, 10*). The question of where and how Wittek was able to make use of *Amyris* may be posed if not answered. The text of the unique manuscript, which is in Geneva, was not widely available until Manetti's edition of 1978. A nineteenth-century edition of sources, including *Amyris*, for the siege of 1453, by Ch. Hopf and Ph. A. Dethier, *Monumenta Hungariae Historica,* vols xxi/1–2; xxii/1–2 (*Amyris* is at xxii/1, 268–495), appears to have been printed but then suppressed and destroyed *circa* 1872 by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (see Manetti, 23; the full story is recounted in Agostino Pertusi, *La caduta di Costantinopoli*, 2. vols (Milan, 1976), i, xlix–l). There is a set of the suppressed volumes in the Széchényi National Library, Budapest, but not in the Austrian National Library in Vienna (nor at the German Archaeological Institute in Istanbul). The mystery remains.}

18 Jacopo de Promontorio de Campis, *Governo et Entrate dell Gran Turco, 1475,* ed. Ikovski in *Izvestija na istoriceskoto družestvo v Sofija,* ix (Sofia 1929) Ist.

Mat., 45–80. {See, still in a less than satisfactory edition, Fr. Babinger (ed.), *Die Aufzeichnungen des Genuesen Iacopo de Promontorio – de Campis über den Osmanenstaat um 1475* (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist.Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Jg. 1956, Heft 8; Munich, 1957).}

19 G. Jacob, Diwan Mehmeds II. {= [Mehmed II], Der Divan Sultan Mehmeds des Zweiten des Eroberers von Konstantinopel. Zum ersten Male nach der Upsalaer Handschrift hrsg. von Georg Jacob (Berlin, 1904)}. The sultan wrote under the pen-name of 'Avnî. Wittek's characterization of his 'conventional Eastern modes' fits well with Babinger's observation (Mehmed the Conqueror, 474) that Mehmed II 'was quite devoid of originality in his choice of images and metaphors, in his ideas and language'. See Fatih'in Siirleri (ed. Kemal Edip Ünsal, Ankara, 1946), and A. Karahan, 'Fatih, Sair Avni', Türk dili ve edbiyat dergisi, vi (1954), 1–38.}

Afterword

It is more than seventy years since Wittek wrote the articles that form the core of this book; more than fifty since his second and last essay on Mehmed II saw the light of day. In that time the study of pre-Ottoman and Ottoman history has been transformed, one is tempted to say, almost beyond recognition. In fact to a considerable extent that is not the case, and the Wittekian legacy still bulks large in many of its aspects. This is particularly the situation in the ongoing discussion on the origins and essential characteristics of the Ottoman state, a discussion which Wittek's all-embracing ghâzî theory did much to launch and which still seems incapable of resolution. Meanwhile, the wider field of historical scholarship has moved on, towards structuralism and post-structuralism; towards modernism and post-modernism, with not so much as a sideways glance at the sequestered – one is tempted to write, privileged – course of Ottoman historical scholarship.

More than twenty years ago, in an article that commanded some attention at the time and was written when positive new possibilities (and not simply the 'end of history') seemed to be opening up in the world, I sketched out a middle road for Ottoman historical scholarship, between what I defined as 'historical myth' and 'mythohistory' – in other words between the 'myth-encrusted carapace' of 'pre-scientific' Ottoman historiography and what I termed the 'new orthodoxies, new mythopoeic constructions', which had arisen, to become in their turn the object of criticism and challenge.[1] Of course, I was thinking here principally of Wittek's ghâzî theory, but also of what I described as 'official myth or "public history"', the elevation of myth to a higher intellectual plane, examples of which have not been lacking in the decades since I wrote these lines.[2]

Despite its relative isolation (better: despite the relative intellectual isolation of many of its practitoners), developments in Ottoman historical scholarship since the late 1980s have conformed to some extent to trends in the wider history-writing world. In an article that was also written at the seminal point in time referred to above, the

Dutch historian F. R. Ankersmit produced a stimulating analysis of the causes underlying what he termed 'the present-day overproduction in our discipline'.[3] As Ankersmit puts it, 'in any imaginable area of historiography, within any speciality, an overwhelming number of books and articles is produced annually, making a comprehensive view of them all impossible'.[4] Perhaps, twenty years ago, when these lines were written, this was still not the case in Ottoman historiography, although it is worth noting that twenty years before that, in an age, still within living scholarly memory, which Ankersmit harks back to as one when scholarly production in his own sub-field was still manageable, it also a time when the appearance of a significant new article on Ottoman history could still take on the character of an 'event'.[5] At the present time, as the regrettable demise of the *Türkologische Anzeiger* and even a cursory reference to the latest quarterly *Index Islamicus* will demonstrate, Ankersmit's words now possess some significance in terms of scholarly overproduction, a problem com -pounded for Ottoman studies in ways not impactable on those in the western mainstream by the sheer Tower-of-Babel polyglottism and unattainable or unreachable library or archive resources required to master most sub-disciplines in the field.

More significant, however, in the present context, is what Ankersmit terms 'the unintended result of this overproduction'. His referent, for purposes of illlustration, is Thomas Hobbes, but what he says applies also *pari passu* to Paul Wittek, in that, to make use of and paraphrase Ankersmit's terms, any discussion of Wittek has tended to take on the nature of a discussion of the *interpretation* of Wittek, rather than of his work *itself*.[6] In other words, it would seem that our attempts to understand, via the sources, the nature of the early Ottoman state, has become hung up on trying to decide (or decode) what Wittek was saying about this phenomenon. Clearly, what Ankersmit terms 'the naïve faith in the [Wittekian] text itself being able to offer a solution to our interpretation problems' becomes just as absurd as 'a signpost attached to a weathervane'.[7]

Wittek's 'ghâzî thesis', however much its author would have wished or believed it to, cannot be allowed to stand alone as the *sole* explicator of Ottoman history. As Ankersmit (again!) has observed, historical interpretations 'first acquire their identity, through the contrast with *other* interpretations'. Crucially, 'they are what they are only on the basis of what they are *not*'.[8]

Wittek himself, in his use of language, was perhaps not behind the leaders. Hayden White, the arch-deconstructor of historical thought in

recent decades, has characterized all historiography as fundamentally ironic, and there is irony aplenty to be found in Wittek's writings:

> All those who in that merciless fight bravely gave their lives for the glory of their faith, Muslim and Christian alike, went – I am sure – straightway to their respective paradise.
>
> ('Fath Mubîn', p. 35)

> As for the no doubt considerable number of enslaved Jews, it can be assumed that their numerous co-religionists among the slave-dealers took good care of them.
>
> (Ibid., pp. 36–37)

> Had Mehemmed wished, he could have proclaimed as his war-aim the liberation of the Greek Church – but, of course, no ghâzî, no Sultan of Islam would have set out with such a battle-cry.
>
> (Ibid., p. 41)

As these few quotations show, Wittek's work represents on occasion a fusion between high scholarship and art. Post-modernism has enabled aestheticism to be extended to cover the entire domain of the representation of reality: language and art are not situated *opposite* reality, but are themselves a pseudo-reality and are therefore situated *within* reality.[9]

Accordingly, it is important to realize, as Ankersmit has pointed out, that the nature of the view of the past presented in a historical work, just as in a work of fiction, is defined . . . by the language used by the historian: in other words, the relation between the historiographical view and the language used by the historian to express it – the author *chooses* the words he uses – 'nowhere intersects the domain of the past', with the result that historiography 'possesses the same opacity and intensional dimension as art'.[10]

This may of course not entirely be the case, and it is not, of course, to argue or assume, as Hayden White and other deconstructionists have done, that historical writing is the *same* as fiction. As Arnaldo Momigliano forcefully pointed out in this context, between the historian and his words, but not between the writer of fiction and his, comes the small matter of evidence: 'what has come to distinguish historical writing from any other type of literature is its being submitted as a whole to the control of evidence', which is not the case with poetry, the epic – or propaganda.[11] We find this clearly in Wittek's work, much of which certainly can be read with as much aesthetic as 'purely' intellectual enjoyment in a story well told, or the

creative recreation of reality. On occasion, as in some of the high-flying pieces of rhetoric in his unfootnoted 'Fath Mubîn', for example, it might be thought that art was going beyond reality. The same might be said in a smaller compass concerning his much shorter 1932 piece on Mehemmed II (see pp. 161–175), which was also published (in a popular multivolume work of collective biography) without the benefit of footnotes. Nonetheless, in Wittek's own file copy of this short essay, preserved – where else but in the library of the Oriental Institute in Vienna – detailed text notes and full references for every statement have been inserted in Wittek's minute hand, proving the point and bearing out Momigliano's dictum even in what appears superficially to be the most extreme of cases.[12]

Which is, perhaps, as far as matters need to be taken. Fully to update the bibliographical apparatus of the works published here with the scholarly output of the past seven decades, and to account for it, would either require another book at least as long as the present one, or would bury Wittek's text under a mountain of scholia and extended glosses, and it has not been attempted. Much could be written, beyond what has been said in the Introduction, on the post-Wittekian spirit of revisionism that has visited the field in recent decades. Here, however, is neither the place nor the occasion to attempt a judgement on whether or not the various attempts to refashion the Wittekian framework for early Ottoman history have met with success. That is for other historians, in other places, to judge. The intention of the present work has not been to attempt to update, but simply to re-present (and represent) Wittek and his work to a later generation than that of those who knew him or were directly influenced by him, and to make it accessible to those who wish to discover more about one of the most remarkable pioneers in the study of the early history of the Ottoman state.

Notes

1 Colin Heywood, 'Between Historical Myth and "Mythohistory": The Limits of Ottoman History', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, xii (1988), 316–319.

2 Cf. the extensive (state-)sponsored literature that appeared in Turkey in and around 1999, the officially-sanctioned date of the seventh-hundredth

anniversary of the 'foundation' of the Ottoman state.

3 F. R. Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', *History and Theory*, xxviii/2 (May, 1989), 137–153.

4 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 137.

5 I remember clearly the intellectual excitement that was generated by the appearance in 1962 (in *Studia Islamica*, 16, 73–94) of Norman Itzkowitz's seminal article, 'Eighteenth-century Ottoman Realities', which at one stroke appeared to liberate us, as students at SOAS, from the aridities of 'Gibb-and-Bowenism' by opening up exciting new possibilities and perspectives in Ottoman history.

6 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 137.

7 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 137.

8 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 142.

9 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 144 (author's italics).

10 Ankersmit, 'Historiography and Post-Modernism', 145 (my italics).

11 Arnaldo Momigliano, 'The Rhetoric of History and the History of Rhetoric: On Hayden White's Tropes', *Comparative Criticism*, iii (1981), 261.

12 No doubt, making due allowance for the sallies of Wittekian irony, the same could be done for his 1955 piece on the Fall of Constantinople. Much to my regret, Wittek's own copy of the booklet containing his essay, also preserved at Vienna, contains no annotations.

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